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ocsp_vfy.c: Clean up code w.r.t. coding guidelines and reduce redundancies

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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12669)
This commit is contained in:
Dr. David von Oheimb 2020-08-18 14:44:33 +02:00
parent b5f82567af
commit 4a71bee6cf
2 changed files with 111 additions and 142 deletions
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2
crypto/ocsp/ocsp_local.h
View File

@ -234,5 +234,5 @@ struct ocsp_service_locator_st {
&(a)->optionalSignature->signatureAlgorithm,\
(a)->optionalSignature->signature,&(a)->tbsRequest,r)
# define OCSP_BASICRESP_verify(a,r,d) ASN1_item_verify(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(OCSP_RESPDATA),\
# define OCSP_BASICRESP_verify(a,r) ASN1_item_verify(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(OCSP_RESPDATA),\
&(a)->signatureAlgorithm,(a)->signature,&(a)->tbsResponseData,r)

251
crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c
View File

@ -25,79 +25,102 @@ static int ocsp_req_find_signer(X509 **psigner, OCSP_REQUEST *req,
const X509_NAME *nm, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
unsigned long flags);
/* Verify a basic response message */
/* Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure, or -1 on fatal error */
static int ocsp_verify_signer(X509 *signer, X509_STORE *st, unsigned long flags,
STACK_OF(X509) *untrusted, STACK_OF(X509) **chain)
{
X509_STORE_CTX *ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vp;
int ret = -1;
if (ctx == NULL) {
OCSPerr(0, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto end;
}
if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, st, signer, untrusted)) {
OCSPerr(0, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
goto end;
}
if ((flags & OCSP_PARTIAL_CHAIN) != 0
&& (vp = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(ctx)) != NULL)
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(vp, X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN);
X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(ctx, X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER);
X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(ctx, X509_TRUST_OCSP_REQUEST);
/* TODO: why is X509_TRUST_OCSP_REQUEST set? Seems to get ignored. */
ret = X509_verify_cert(ctx);
if (ret <= 0) {
ret = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
OCSPerr(0, OCSP_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_ERROR);
ERR_add_error_data(2, "Verify error:",
X509_verify_cert_error_string(ret));
goto end;
}
if (chain != NULL)
*chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(ctx);
end:
X509_STORE_CTX_free(ctx);
return ret;
}
static int ocsp_verify(OCSP_REQUEST *req, OCSP_BASICRESP *bs,
X509 *signer, unsigned long flags)
{
EVP_PKEY *skey;
int ret = 1;
if ((flags & OCSP_NOSIGS) == 0) {
if ((skey = X509_get0_pubkey(signer)) == NULL) {
OCSPerr(0, OCSP_R_NO_SIGNER_KEY);
return -1;
}
if (req != NULL)
ret = OCSP_REQUEST_verify(req, skey);
else
ret = OCSP_BASICRESP_verify(bs, skey);
if (ret <= 0)
OCSPerr(0, OCSP_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE);
}
return ret;
}
/* Verify a basic response message */
int OCSP_basic_verify(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
X509_STORE *st, unsigned long flags)
{
X509 *signer, *x;
STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL;
STACK_OF(X509) *untrusted = NULL;
X509_STORE_CTX *ctx = NULL;
X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vp;
int i, ret = ocsp_find_signer(&signer, bs, certs, flags);
int ret = ocsp_find_signer(&signer, bs, certs, flags);
if (!ret) {
if (ret == 0) {
OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY,
OCSP_R_SIGNER_CERTIFICATE_NOT_FOUND);
goto end;
}
ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) {
OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto f_err;
}
if ((ret == 2) && (flags & OCSP_TRUSTOTHER))
if ((ret == 2) && (flags & OCSP_TRUSTOTHER) != 0)
flags |= OCSP_NOVERIFY;
if (!(flags & OCSP_NOSIGS)) {
EVP_PKEY *skey;
skey = X509_get0_pubkey(signer);
if (skey == NULL) {
OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, OCSP_R_NO_SIGNER_KEY);
goto err;
}
ret = OCSP_BASICRESP_verify(bs, skey, 0);
if (ret <= 0) {
OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, OCSP_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE);
goto end;
}
}
if (!(flags & OCSP_NOVERIFY)) {
int init_res;
if (flags & OCSP_NOCHAIN) {
if ((ret = ocsp_verify(NULL, bs, signer, flags)) <= 0)
goto end;
if ((flags & OCSP_NOVERIFY) == 0) {
ret = -1;
if ((flags & OCSP_NOCHAIN) != 0) {
untrusted = NULL;
} else if (bs->certs && certs) {
} else if (bs->certs != NULL && certs != NULL) {
untrusted = sk_X509_dup(bs->certs);
if (!X509_add_certs(untrusted, certs, X509_ADD_FLAG_DEFAULT))
goto f_err;
goto end;
} else if (certs != NULL) {
untrusted = certs;
} else {
untrusted = bs->certs;
}
init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, st, signer, untrusted);
if (!init_res) {
OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
goto f_err;
}
if ((flags & OCSP_PARTIAL_CHAIN) != 0
&& (vp = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(ctx)) != NULL)
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(vp, X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN);
X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(ctx, X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER);
ret = X509_verify_cert(ctx);
chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(ctx);
if (ret <= 0) {
i = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY,
OCSP_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_ERROR);
ERR_add_error_data(2, "Verify error:",
X509_verify_cert_error_string(i));
ret = ocsp_verify_signer(signer, st, flags, untrusted, &chain);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
}
if (flags & OCSP_NOCHECKS) {
if ((flags & OCSP_NOCHECKS) != 0) {
ret = 1;
goto end;
}
@ -115,38 +138,29 @@ int OCSP_basic_verify(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
* Easy case: explicitly trusted. Get root CA and check for explicit
* trust
*/
if (flags & OCSP_NOEXPLICIT)
if ((flags & OCSP_NOEXPLICIT) != 0)
goto end;
x = sk_X509_value(chain, sk_X509_num(chain) - 1);
if (X509_check_trust(x, NID_OCSP_sign, 0) != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED) {
OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, OCSP_R_ROOT_CA_NOT_TRUSTED);
goto err;
ret = 0;
goto end;
}
ret = 1;
}
end:
X509_STORE_CTX_free(ctx);
sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free);
if (bs->certs && certs)
sk_X509_free(untrusted);
return ret;
err:
ret = 0;
goto end;
f_err:
ret = -1;
goto end;
}
int OCSP_resp_get0_signer(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, X509 **signer,
STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs)
{
int ret;
ret = ocsp_find_signer(signer, bs, extra_certs, 0);
return (ret > 0) ? 1 : 0;
return ocsp_find_signer(signer, bs, extra_certs, 0) > 0;
}
static int ocsp_find_signer(X509 **psigner, OCSP_BASICRESP *bs,
@ -155,11 +169,11 @@ static int ocsp_find_signer(X509 **psigner, OCSP_BASICRESP *bs,
X509 *signer;
OCSP_RESPID *rid = &bs->tbsResponseData.responderId;
if ((signer = ocsp_find_signer_sk(certs, rid))) {
if ((signer = ocsp_find_signer_sk(certs, rid)) != NULL) {
*psigner = signer;
return 2;
}
if (!(flags & OCSP_NOINTERN) &&
if ((flags & OCSP_NOINTERN) == 0 &&
(signer = ocsp_find_signer_sk(bs->certs, rid))) {
*psigner = signer;
return 1;
@ -199,32 +213,31 @@ static X509 *ocsp_find_signer_sk(STACK_OF(X509) *certs, OCSP_RESPID *id)
static int ocsp_check_issuer(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
{
STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp;
STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp = bs->tbsResponseData.responses;
X509 *signer, *sca;
OCSP_CERTID *caid = NULL;
int i;
int ret;
sresp = bs->tbsResponseData.responses;
if (sk_X509_num(chain) <= 0) {
OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_ISSUER, OCSP_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_IN_CHAIN);
return -1;
}
/* See if the issuer IDs match. */
i = ocsp_check_ids(sresp, &caid);
ret = ocsp_check_ids(sresp, &caid);
/* If ID mismatch or other error then return */
if (i <= 0)
return i;
if (ret <= 0)
return ret;
signer = sk_X509_value(chain, 0);
/* Check to see if OCSP responder CA matches request CA */
if (sk_X509_num(chain) > 1) {
sca = sk_X509_value(chain, 1);
i = ocsp_match_issuerid(sca, caid, sresp);
if (i < 0)
return i;
if (i) {
ret = ocsp_match_issuerid(sca, caid, sresp);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
if (ret != 0) {
/* We have a match, if extensions OK then success */
if (ocsp_check_delegated(signer))
return 1;
@ -258,7 +271,6 @@ static int ocsp_check_ids(STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp, OCSP_CERTID **ret)
cid = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_value(sresp, 0)->certId;
*ret = NULL;
for (i = 1; i < idcount; i++) {
tmpid = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_value(sresp, i)->certId;
/* Check to see if IDs match */
@ -279,19 +291,18 @@ static int ocsp_check_ids(STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp, OCSP_CERTID **ret)
/*
* Match the certificate issuer ID.
* Returns -1 on error, 0 if there is no match and 1 if there is a match.
* Returns -1 on fatal error, 0 if there is no match and 1 if there is a match.
*/
static int ocsp_match_issuerid(X509 *cert, OCSP_CERTID *cid,
STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp)
{
/* If only one ID to match then do it */
if (cid != NULL) {
const EVP_MD *dgst;
const EVP_MD *dgst = EVP_get_digestbyobj(cid->hashAlgorithm.algorithm);
const X509_NAME *iname;
int mdlen;
unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
dgst = EVP_get_digestbyobj(cid->hashAlgorithm.algorithm);
if (dgst == NULL) {
OCSPerr(0, OCSP_R_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
return -1;
@ -343,87 +354,46 @@ static int ocsp_check_delegated(X509 *x)
}
/*
* Verify an OCSP request. This is fortunately much easier than OCSP response
* verify. Just find the signers certificate and verify it against a given
* trust value.
* Verify an OCSP request. This is much easier than OCSP response verify.
* Just find the signer's certificate and verify it against a given trust value.
* Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure and on fatal error.
*/
int OCSP_request_verify(OCSP_REQUEST *req, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
X509_STORE *store, unsigned long flags)
{
X509 *signer;
const X509_NAME *nm;
GENERAL_NAME *gen;
int ret = 0;
X509_STORE_CTX *ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) {
OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
int ret;
if (!req->optionalSignature) {
OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, OCSP_R_REQUEST_NOT_SIGNED);
goto err;
return 0;
}
gen = req->tbsRequest.requestorName;
if (!gen || gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME) {
OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY,
OCSP_R_UNSUPPORTED_REQUESTORNAME_TYPE);
goto err;
return 0; /* not returning -1 here for backward compatibility*/
}
nm = gen->d.directoryName;
ret = ocsp_req_find_signer(&signer, req, nm, certs, flags);
if (ret <= 0) {
OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY,
OCSP_R_SIGNER_CERTIFICATE_NOT_FOUND);
goto err;
return 0; /* not returning -1 here for backward compatibility*/
}
if ((ret == 2) && (flags & OCSP_TRUSTOTHER))
if ((ret == 2) && (flags & OCSP_TRUSTOTHER) != 0)
flags |= OCSP_NOVERIFY;
if (!(flags & OCSP_NOSIGS)) {
EVP_PKEY *skey;
skey = X509_get0_pubkey(signer);
ret = OCSP_REQUEST_verify(req, skey);
if (ret <= 0) {
OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, OCSP_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
}
if (!(flags & OCSP_NOVERIFY)) {
int init_res;
if (flags & OCSP_NOCHAIN)
init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, store, signer, NULL);
else
init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, store, signer,
req->optionalSignature->certs);
if (!init_res) {
OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
goto err;
}
X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(ctx, X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER);
X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(ctx, X509_TRUST_OCSP_REQUEST);
ret = X509_verify_cert(ctx);
if (ret <= 0) {
ret = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY,
OCSP_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_ERROR);
ERR_add_error_data(2, "Verify error:",
X509_verify_cert_error_string(ret));
goto err;
}
}
ret = 1;
goto end;
err:
ret = 0;
end:
X509_STORE_CTX_free(ctx);
return ret;
if ((ret = ocsp_verify(req, NULL, signer, flags)) <= 0)
return 0; /* not returning 'ret' here for backward compatibility*/
if ((flags & OCSP_NOVERIFY) != 0)
return 1;
return ocsp_verify_signer(signer, store, flags,
(flags & OCSP_NOCHAIN) != 0 ?
NULL : req->optionalSignature->certs, NULL) > 0;
/* using '> 0' here to avoid breaking backward compatibility returning -1 */
}
static int ocsp_req_find_signer(X509 **psigner, OCSP_REQUEST *req,
@ -432,16 +402,15 @@ static int ocsp_req_find_signer(X509 **psigner, OCSP_REQUEST *req,
{
X509 *signer;
if (!(flags & OCSP_NOINTERN)) {
if ((flags & OCSP_NOINTERN) == 0) {
signer = X509_find_by_subject(req->optionalSignature->certs, nm);
if (signer) {
if (signer != NULL) {
*psigner = signer;
return 1;
}
}
signer = X509_find_by_subject(certs, nm);
if (signer) {
if ((signer = X509_find_by_subject(certs, nm)) != NULL) {
*psigner = signer;
return 2;
}