PR: 1835

Submitted by: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Approved by: steve@openssl.org

Fix various typos.

MacOS/GetHTTPS.src/ErrorHandling.hpp

@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ OSErr AppendErrorMessageToHandle(Handle inoutHandle);
 
 
 
-//	A bunch of evil macros that would be uneccessary if I were always using C++ !
+//	A bunch of evil macros that would be unnecessary if I were always using C++ !
 
 #define SetErrorMessageAndBailIfNil(theArg,theMessage)								\
 {																					\

crypto/asn1/a_bytes.c

@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ ASN1_STRING *d2i_ASN1_type_bytes(ASN1_STRING **a, const unsigned char **pp,
 
 	if (tag >= 32)
 		{
-		i=ASN1_R_TAG_VALUE_TOO_HIGH;;
+		i=ASN1_R_TAG_VALUE_TOO_HIGH;
 		goto err;
 		}
 	if (!(ASN1_tag2bit(tag) & type))

crypto/bn/bntest.c

@@ -928,7 +928,7 @@ int test_mod_exp(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
 		BN_bntest_rand(b,2+i,0,0); /**/
 
 		if (!BN_mod_exp(d,a,b,c,ctx))
-			return(00);
+			return(0);
 
 		if (bp != NULL)
 			{
@@ -1030,7 +1030,7 @@ int test_exp(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
 		BN_bntest_rand(b,2+i,0,0); /**/
 
 		if (!BN_exp(d,a,b,ctx))
-			return(00);
+			return(0);
 
 		if (bp != NULL)
 			{

crypto/des/times/usparc.cc

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ solaris 2.5.1 usparc 167mhz?? - SC4.0 cc -fast -Xa -xO5
 
 For the ultra sparc, SunC 4.0 cc -fast -Xa -xO5, running 'des_opts'
 gives a speed of 475,000 des/s while 'speed' gives 417,000 des/s.
-I belive the difference is tied up in optimisation that the compiler
+I believe the difference is tied up in optimisation that the compiler
 is able to perform when the code is 'inlined'.  For 'speed', the DES
 routines are being linked from a library.  I'll record the higher
 speed since if performance is everything, you can always inline

crypto/ripemd/README

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ http://www.esat.kuleuven.ac.be/~bosselae/ripemd160.html
 This is my implementation of RIPEMD-160.  The pentium assember is a little
 off the pace since I only get 1050 cycles, while the best is 1013.
 I have a few ideas for how to get another 20 or so cycles, but at
-this point I will not bother right now.  I belive the trick will be
+this point I will not bother right now.  I believe the trick will be
 to remove my 'copy X array onto stack' until inside the RIP1() finctions the
 first time round.  To do this I need another register and will only have one
 temporary one.  A bit tricky....  I can also cleanup the saving of the 5 words

crypto/x509v3/v3_utl.c

@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ int X509V3_add_value(const char *name, const char *value,
 	CONF_VALUE *vtmp = NULL;
 	char *tname = NULL, *tvalue = NULL;
 	if(name && !(tname = BUF_strdup(name))) goto err;
-	if(value && !(tvalue = BUF_strdup(value))) goto err;;
+	if(value && !(tvalue = BUF_strdup(value))) goto err;
 	if(!(vtmp = (CONF_VALUE *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CONF_VALUE)))) goto err;
 	if(!*extlist && !(*extlist = sk_CONF_VALUE_new_null())) goto err;
 	vtmp->section = NULL;

doc/ssl/SSL_CIPHER_get_name.pod

@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ SSL_CIPHER_get_version() returns the protocol version for B<cipher>, currently
 
 SSL_CIPHER_description() returns a textual description of the cipher used
 into the buffer B<buf> of length B<len> provided. B<len> must be at least
-128 bytes, otherwise a pointer to the the string "Buffer too small" is
+128 bytes, otherwise a pointer to the string "Buffer too small" is
 returned. If B<buf> is NULL, a buffer of 128 bytes is allocated using
 OPENSSL_malloc(). If the allocation fails, a pointer to the string
 "OPENSSL_malloc Error" is returned.

doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_verify.pod

@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ specifies the B<verify_callback> function to be used. If no callback function
 shall be specified, the NULL pointer can be used for B<verify_callback>. In
 this case last B<verify_callback> set specifically for this B<ssl> remains. If
 no special B<callback> was set before, the default callback for the underlying
-B<ctx> is used, that was valid at the the time B<ssl> was created with
+B<ctx> is used, that was valid at the time B<ssl> was created with
 L<SSL_new(3)|SSL_new(3)>.
 
 SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth() sets the maximum B<depth> for the certificate chain

doc/ssl/SSL_SESSION_free.pod

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ SSL_SESSION_free - free an allocated SSL_SESSION structure
 
 SSL_SESSION_free() decrements the reference count of B<session> and removes
 the B<SSL_SESSION> structure pointed to by B<session> and frees up the allocated
-memory, if the the reference count has reached 0.
+memory, if the reference count has reached 0.
 
 =head1 NOTES
 

doc/ssl/SSL_free.pod

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ SSL_free - free an allocated SSL structure
 
 SSL_free() decrements the reference count of B<ssl>, and removes the SSL
 structure pointed to by B<ssl> and frees up the allocated memory if the
-the reference count has reached 0.
+reference count has reached 0.
 
 =head1 NOTES
 

doc/ssleay.txt

@@ -3800,9 +3800,9 @@ made public on sci.crypt in Sep 1994 (RC4) and Feb 1996 (RC2).  I have
 copies of the origional postings if people are interested.  RSA I believe 
 claim that they were 'trade-secrets' and that some-one broke an NDA in 
 revealing them.  Other claim they reverse engineered the algorithms from 
-compiled binaries.  If the algorithms were reverse engineered, I belive 
+compiled binaries.  If the algorithms were reverse engineered, I believe 
 RSA had no legal leg to stand on.  If an NDA was broken, I don't know.
-Regardless, RSA, I belive, is willing to go to court over the issue so 
+Regardless, RSA, I believe, is willing to go to court over the issue so 
 licencing is probably the best idea, or at least talk to them.
 If there are people who actually know more about this, pease let me know, I 
 don't want to vilify or spread miss-information if I can help it.

ssl/kssl.c

@@ -946,7 +946,7 @@ kssl_err_set(KSSL_ERR *kssl_err, int reason, char *text)
 	if (kssl_err == NULL)  return;
 
 	kssl_err->reason = reason;
-	BIO_snprintf(kssl_err->text, KSSL_ERR_MAX, text);
+	BIO_snprintf(kssl_err->text, KSSL_ERR_MAX, "%s", text);
 	return;
         }
 

ssl/s3_clnt.c

@@ -190,7 +190,7 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
 	long num1;
 	void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
 	int ret= -1;
-	int new_state,state,skip=0;;
+	int new_state,state,skip=0;
 
 	RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
 	ERR_clear_error();

test/times

@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ eric (adding numbers to speculation)
 --- Appendix ---
 - The time measured is user time but these number a very rough.
 - Remember this is the cost of both client and server sides of the protocol.
-- The TCP/kernal overhead of connection establishment is normally the
+- The TCP/kernel overhead of connection establishment is normally the
   killer in SSL.  Often delays in the TCP protocol will make session-id
   reuse look slower that new sessions, but this would not be the case on
   a loaded server.