Add an HMAC implementation that is TLS aware

The TLS HMAC implementation should take care to calculate the MAC in
constant time in the case of MAC-Then-Encrypt where we have a variable
amount of padding.

Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12732)
This commit is contained in:
Matt Caswell 2020-07-30 12:02:06 +01:00
parent b48ca22a56
commit 3fddbb264e
7 changed files with 146 additions and 22 deletions

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@ -14,7 +14,9 @@ IF[{- !$disabled{asm} -}]
ENDIF
ENDIF
SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=md5_dgst.c md5_one.c md5_sha1.c $MD5ASM
$COMMON=md5_dgst.c md5_one.c md5_sha1.c $MD5ASM
SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=$COMMON
SOURCE[../../providers/libimplementations.a]=$COMMON
# Implementations are now spread across several libraries, so the defines
# need to be applied to all affected libraries and modules.

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@ -153,10 +153,11 @@ extern "C" {
* If "engine" or "properties" are specified, they should always be paired
* with "cipher" or "digest".
*/
#define OSSL_MAC_PARAM_CIPHER OSSL_ALG_PARAM_CIPHER /* utf8 string */
#define OSSL_MAC_PARAM_DIGEST OSSL_ALG_PARAM_DIGEST /* utf8 string */
#define OSSL_MAC_PARAM_PROPERTIES OSSL_ALG_PARAM_PROPERTIES /* utf8 string */
#define OSSL_MAC_PARAM_SIZE "size" /* size_t */
#define OSSL_MAC_PARAM_CIPHER OSSL_ALG_PARAM_CIPHER /* utf8 string */
#define OSSL_MAC_PARAM_DIGEST OSSL_ALG_PARAM_DIGEST /* utf8 string */
#define OSSL_MAC_PARAM_PROPERTIES OSSL_ALG_PARAM_PROPERTIES /* utf8 string */
#define OSSL_MAC_PARAM_SIZE "size" /* size_t */
#define OSSL_MAC_PARAM_TLS_DATA_SIZE "tls-data-size" /* size_t */
/* Known MAC names */
#define OSSL_MAC_NAME_BLAKE2BMAC "BLAKE2BMAC"

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@ -13,6 +13,8 @@
*/
#include "internal/deprecated.h"
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/core_dispatch.h>
#include <openssl/core_names.h>
#include <openssl/params.h>
@ -47,8 +49,27 @@ struct hmac_data_st {
void *provctx;
HMAC_CTX *ctx; /* HMAC context */
PROV_DIGEST digest;
unsigned char *key;
size_t keylen;
/* Length of TLS data including the MAC but excluding padding */
size_t tls_data_size;
unsigned char tls_header[13];
int tls_header_set;
unsigned char tls_mac_out[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
size_t tls_mac_out_size;
};
/* Defined in ssl/s3_cbc.c */
int ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD *md,
unsigned char *md_out,
size_t *md_out_size,
const unsigned char header[13],
const unsigned char *data,
size_t data_plus_mac_size,
size_t data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size,
const unsigned char *mac_secret,
size_t mac_secret_length, char is_sslv3);
static size_t hmac_size(void *vmacctx);
static void *hmac_new(void *provctx)
@ -73,6 +94,7 @@ static void hmac_free(void *vmacctx)
if (macctx != NULL) {
HMAC_CTX_free(macctx->ctx);
ossl_prov_digest_reset(&macctx->digest);
OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(macctx->key, macctx->keylen);
OPENSSL_free(macctx);
}
}
@ -81,15 +103,30 @@ static void *hmac_dup(void *vsrc)
{
struct hmac_data_st *src = vsrc;
struct hmac_data_st *dst = hmac_new(src->provctx);
HMAC_CTX *ctx;
if (dst == NULL)
return NULL;
ctx = dst->ctx;
*dst = *src;
dst->ctx = ctx;
dst->key = NULL;
if (!HMAC_CTX_copy(dst->ctx, src->ctx)
|| !ossl_prov_digest_copy(&dst->digest, &src->digest)) {
hmac_free(dst);
return NULL;
}
if (src->key != NULL) {
/* There is no "secure" OPENSSL_memdup */
dst->key = OPENSSL_secure_malloc(src->keylen);
if (dst->key == NULL) {
hmac_free(dst);
return 0;
}
memcpy(dst->key, src->key, src->keylen);
}
return dst;
}
@ -107,10 +144,10 @@ static int hmac_init(void *vmacctx)
int rv = 1;
/* HMAC_Init_ex doesn't tolerate all zero params, so we must be careful */
if (digest != NULL)
if (macctx->tls_data_size == 0 && digest != NULL)
rv = HMAC_Init_ex(macctx->ctx, NULL, 0, digest,
ossl_prov_digest_engine(&macctx->digest));
ossl_prov_digest_reset(&macctx->digest);
return rv;
}
@ -119,6 +156,32 @@ static int hmac_update(void *vmacctx, const unsigned char *data,
{
struct hmac_data_st *macctx = vmacctx;
if (macctx->tls_data_size > 0) {
/* We're doing a TLS HMAC */
if (!macctx->tls_header_set) {
/* We expect the first update call to contain the TLS header */
if (datalen != sizeof(macctx->tls_header))
return 0;
memcpy(macctx->tls_header, data, datalen);
macctx->tls_header_set = 1;
return 1;
}
/* datalen is macctx->tls_data_size plus the padding length */
if (datalen < macctx->tls_data_size)
return 0;
return ssl3_cbc_digest_record(ossl_prov_digest_md(&macctx->digest),
macctx->tls_mac_out,
&macctx->tls_mac_out_size,
macctx->tls_header,
data,
macctx->tls_data_size,
datalen,
macctx->key,
macctx->keylen,
0);
}
return HMAC_Update(macctx->ctx, data, datalen);
}
@ -128,6 +191,14 @@ static int hmac_final(void *vmacctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outl,
unsigned int hlen;
struct hmac_data_st *macctx = vmacctx;
if (macctx->tls_data_size > 0) {
if (macctx->tls_mac_out_size == 0)
return 0;
if (outl != NULL)
*outl = macctx->tls_mac_out_size;
memcpy(out, macctx->tls_mac_out, macctx->tls_mac_out_size);
return 1;
}
if (!HMAC_Final(macctx->ctx, out, &hlen))
return 0;
*outl = hlen;
@ -158,6 +229,7 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = {
OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0),
OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_KEY, NULL, 0),
OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_FLAGS, NULL),
OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_TLS_DATA_SIZE, NULL),
OSSL_PARAM_END
};
static const OSSL_PARAM *hmac_settable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *provctx)
@ -190,12 +262,25 @@ static int hmac_set_ctx_params(void *vmacctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
if (p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_OCTET_STRING)
return 0;
if (macctx->keylen > 0)
OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(macctx->key, macctx->keylen);
/* Keep a copy of the key if we need it for TLS HMAC */
macctx->key = OPENSSL_secure_malloc(p->data_size);
if (macctx->key == NULL)
return 0;
memcpy(macctx->key, p->data, p->data_size);
macctx->keylen = p->data_size;
if (!HMAC_Init_ex(macctx->ctx, p->data, p->data_size,
ossl_prov_digest_md(&macctx->digest),
NULL /* ENGINE */))
return 0;
ossl_prov_digest_reset(&macctx->digest);
}
if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params,
OSSL_MAC_PARAM_TLS_DATA_SIZE)) != NULL) {
if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_size_t(p, &macctx->tls_data_size))
return 0;
}
return 1;
}

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@ -37,3 +37,4 @@ SOURCE[../libssl]=\
DEFINE[../libssl]=$AESDEF
SOURCE[../providers/libcommon.a]=record/tls_pad.c
SOURCE[../providers/libimplementations.a]=s3_cbc.c

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@ -1362,7 +1362,7 @@ int n_ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int sending)
header[j++] = (unsigned char)(rec->length & 0xff);
/* Final param == is SSLv3 */
if (ssl3_cbc_digest_record(ssl, hash,
if (ssl3_cbc_digest_record(EVP_MD_CTX_md(hash),
md, &md_size,
header, rec->input,
rec->length + md_size, rec->orig_len,
@ -1473,7 +1473,7 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int sending)
* are hashing because that gives an attacker a timing-oracle.
*/
/* Final param == not SSLv3 */
if (ssl3_cbc_digest_record(ssl, mac_ctx,
if (ssl3_cbc_digest_record(EVP_MD_CTX_md(mac_ctx),
md, &md_size,
header, rec->input,
rec->length + md_size, rec->orig_len,

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@ -7,6 +7,16 @@
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
/*
* This file has no dependencies on the rest of libssl because it is shared
* with the providers. It contains functions for low level MAC calculations.
* Responsibility for this lies with the HMAC implementation in the
* providers. However there are legacy code paths in libssl which also need to
* do this. In time those legacy code paths can be removed and this file can be
* moved out of libssl.
*/
/*
* MD5 and SHA-1 low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
* internal use.
@ -14,12 +24,44 @@
#include "internal/deprecated.h"
#include "internal/constant_time.h"
#include "ssl_local.h"
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/md5.h>
#include <openssl/sha.h>
char ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
int ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD *md,
unsigned char *md_out,
size_t *md_out_size,
const unsigned char header[13],
const unsigned char *data,
size_t data_plus_mac_size,
size_t data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size,
const unsigned char *mac_secret,
size_t mac_secret_length, char is_sslv3);
# define l2n(l,c) (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24)&0xff), \
*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff), \
*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \
*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff))
# define l2n6(l,c) (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>40)&0xff), \
*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>32)&0xff), \
*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24)&0xff), \
*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff), \
*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \
*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff))
# define l2n8(l,c) (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>56)&0xff), \
*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>48)&0xff), \
*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>40)&0xff), \
*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>32)&0xff), \
*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24)&0xff), \
*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff), \
*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \
*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff))
/*
* MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES is the maximum number of bytes in the hash's
* length field. (SHA-384/512 have 128-bit length.)
@ -131,8 +173,7 @@ char ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
* padding too. )
* Returns 1 on success or 0 on error
*/
int ssl3_cbc_digest_record(SSL *s,
const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
int ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD *md,
unsigned char *md_out,
size_t *md_out_size,
const unsigned char header[13],
@ -168,7 +209,6 @@ int ssl3_cbc_digest_record(SSL *s,
size_t md_length_size = 8;
char length_is_big_endian = 1;
int ret = 0;
const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
/*
* This is a, hopefully redundant, check that allows us to forget about
@ -177,7 +217,7 @@ int ssl3_cbc_digest_record(SSL *s,
if (!ossl_assert(data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size < 1024 * 1024))
return 0;
switch (EVP_MD_CTX_type(ctx)) {
switch (EVP_MD_type(md)) {
case NID_md5:
if (MD5_Init((MD5_CTX *)md_state.c) <= 0)
return 0;
@ -463,10 +503,7 @@ int ssl3_cbc_digest_record(SSL *s,
md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
if (md_ctx == NULL)
goto err;
md = ssl_evp_md_fetch(s->ctx->libctx, EVP_MD_type(EVP_MD_CTX_md(ctx)),
s->ctx->propq);
if (md == NULL)
goto err;
if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL /* engine */ ) <= 0)
goto err;
if (is_sslv3) {
@ -494,6 +531,5 @@ int ssl3_cbc_digest_record(SSL *s,
ret = 1;
err:
EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
ssl_evp_md_free(md);
return ret;
}

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@ -2761,8 +2761,7 @@ int ktls_configure_crypto(const SSL *s, const EVP_CIPHER *c, EVP_CIPHER_CTX *dd,
/* s3_cbc.c */
__owur char ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
__owur int ssl3_cbc_digest_record(SSL *s,
const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
__owur int ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD *md,
unsigned char *md_out,
size_t *md_out_size,
const unsigned char header[13],