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Start using the provider side TLS HMAC implementation

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This commit just moves the TLS1 and above implementation to use the TLS
HMAC implementation in the providers.

Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12732)
This commit is contained in:
Matt Caswell 2020-07-30 13:16:39 +01:00
parent 3fddbb264e
commit 2e2084dac3
2 changed files with 22 additions and 28 deletions
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8
providers/implementations/macs/hmac_prov.c
View File

@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ struct hmac_data_st {
PROV_DIGEST digest;
unsigned char *key;
size_t keylen;
/* Length of TLS data including the MAC but excluding padding */
/* Length of full TLS record including the MAC and any padding */
size_t tls_data_size;
unsigned char tls_header[13];
int tls_header_set;
@ -166,8 +166,8 @@ static int hmac_update(void *vmacctx, const unsigned char *data,
macctx->tls_header_set = 1;
return 1;
}
/* datalen is macctx->tls_data_size plus the padding length */
if (datalen < macctx->tls_data_size)
/* macctx->tls_data_size is datalen plus the padding length */
if (macctx->tls_data_size < datalen)
return 0;
return ssl3_cbc_digest_record(ossl_prov_digest_md(&macctx->digest),
@ -175,8 +175,8 @@ static int hmac_update(void *vmacctx, const unsigned char *data,
&macctx->tls_mac_out_size,
macctx->tls_header,
data,
macctx->tls_data_size,
datalen,
macctx->tls_data_size,
macctx->key,
macctx->keylen,
0);

42
ssl/record/ssl3_record.c
View File

@ -1465,31 +1465,25 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int sending)
header[12] = (unsigned char)(rec->length & 0xff);
if (!sending && !SSL_READ_ETM(ssl) &&
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(mac_ctx)) {
/*
* This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any
* timing-side channel information about how many blocks of data we
* are hashing because that gives an attacker a timing-oracle.
*/
/* Final param == not SSLv3 */
if (ssl3_cbc_digest_record(EVP_MD_CTX_md(mac_ctx),
md, &md_size,
header, rec->input,
rec->length + md_size, rec->orig_len,
ssl->s3.read_mac_secret,
ssl->s3.read_mac_secret_size, 0) <= 0) {
EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(mac_ctx)) {
OSSL_PARAM tls_hmac_params[2], *p = tls_hmac_params;
*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_TLS_DATA_SIZE,
&rec->orig_len);
*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(EVP_MD_CTX_pkey_ctx(mac_ctx),
tls_hmac_params))
return 0;
}
} else {
/* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, header, sizeof(header)) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, rec->input, rec->length) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx, md, &md_size) <= 0) {
EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac);
return 0;
}
}
/* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, header, sizeof(header)) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, rec->input, rec->length) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx, md, &md_size) <= 0) {
EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac);
return 0;
}
EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac);