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Restore historical SSL_get_servername() behavior
Commit 1c4aa31d79
modified the state machine
to clean up stale ext.hostname values from SSL objects in the case when
SNI was not negotiated for the current handshake. This is natural from
the TLS perspective, since this information is an extension that the client
offered but we ignored, and since we ignored it we do not need to keep it
around for anything else.
However, as documented in https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/7014 ,
there appear to be some deployed code that relies on retrieving such an
ignored SNI value from the client, after the handshake has completed.
Because the 1.1.1 release is on a stable branch and should preserve the
published ABI, restore the historical behavior by retaining the ext.hostname
value sent by the client, in the SSL structure, for subsequent retrieval.
[extended tests]
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7115)
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parent
cd3b53b8f8
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@ -938,11 +938,8 @@ static int final_server_name(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent)
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* was successful.
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*/
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if (s->server) {
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if (!sent) {
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/* Nothing from the client this handshake; cleanup stale value */
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OPENSSL_free(s->ext.hostname);
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s->ext.hostname = NULL;
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} else if (ret == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK && (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s))) {
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/* TODO(OpenSSL1.2) revisit !sent case */
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if (sent && ret == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK && (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s))) {
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/* Only store the hostname in the session if we accepted it. */
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OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.hostname);
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s->session->ext.hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(s->ext.hostname);
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