mirror of
https://github.com/openssl/openssl.git
synced 2025-02-17 14:32:04 +08:00
Update man3/verify documentation, error text
Move the x509_V_ERR_xxx definitions from openssl-verify to X509_STORE_CTX_get_error.pod. Add some missing ones. Consistently start with a lowercase letter, unless it's an acronym. Fix some markup mistakes in X509_verify_cert. Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10132)
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21d08b9ee9
@ -111,9 +111,9 @@ const char *X509_verify_cert_error_string(long n)
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case X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY:
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return "no explicit policy";
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case X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE:
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return "Different CRL scope";
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return "different CRL scope";
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case X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION_FEATURE:
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return "Unsupported extension feature";
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return "unsupported extension feature";
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case X509_V_ERR_UNNESTED_RESOURCE:
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return "RFC 3779 resource not subset of parent's resources";
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case X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION:
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@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ const char *X509_verify_cert_error_string(long n)
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case X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR:
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return "CRL path validation error";
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case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LOOP:
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return "Path Loop";
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return "path loop";
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case X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION:
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return "Suite B: certificate version invalid";
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case X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_ALGORITHM:
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@ -147,13 +147,13 @@ const char *X509_verify_cert_error_string(long n)
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case X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_CANNOT_SIGN_P_384_WITH_P_256:
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return "Suite B: cannot sign P-384 with P-256";
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case X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH:
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return "Hostname mismatch";
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return "hostname mismatch";
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case X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH:
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return "Email address mismatch";
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return "email address mismatch";
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case X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH:
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return "IP address mismatch";
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case X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH:
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return "No matching DANE TLSA records";
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return "no matching DANE TLSA records";
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case X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL:
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return "EE certificate key too weak";
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case X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL:
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@ -161,9 +161,9 @@ const char *X509_verify_cert_error_string(long n)
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case X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK:
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return "CA signature digest algorithm too weak";
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case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL:
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return "Invalid certificate verification context";
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return "invalid certificate verification context";
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case X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP:
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return "Issuer certificate lookup error";
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return "issuer certificate lookup error";
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case X509_V_ERR_NO_VALID_SCTS:
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return "Certificate Transparency required, but no valid SCTs found";
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case X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION:
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@ -175,10 +175,9 @@ const char *X509_verify_cert_error_string(long n)
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case X509_V_ERR_OCSP_CERT_UNKNOWN:
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return "OCSP unknown cert";
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case X509_V_ERR_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH:
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return "Subject signature algorithm and issuer public key algorithm mismatch";
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return "subject signature algorithm and issuer public key algorithm mismatch";
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case X509_V_ERR_NO_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY:
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return "Issuer certificate doesn't have a public key";
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return "issuer certificate doesn't have a public key";
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default:
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/* Printing an error number into a static buffer is not thread-safe */
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return "unknown certificate verification error";
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@ -39,34 +39,6 @@ B<openssl> B<cms>
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[B<-text>]
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[B<-noout>]
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[B<-print>]
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[B<-attime> I<timestamp>]
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[B<-check_ss_sig>]
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[B<-crl_check>]
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[B<-crl_check_all>]
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[B<-explicit_policy>]
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[B<-extended_crl>]
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[B<-ignore_critical>]
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[B<-inhibit_any>]
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[B<-inhibit_map>]
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[B<-no_check_time>]
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[B<-partial_chain>]
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[B<-policy> I<arg>]
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[B<-policy_check>]
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[B<-policy_print>]
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[B<-purpose> I<purpose>]
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[B<-suiteB_128>]
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[B<-suiteB_128_only>]
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[B<-suiteB_192>]
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[B<-trusted_first>]
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[B<-no_alt_chains>]
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[B<-use_deltas>]
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[B<-auth_level> I<num>]
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[B<-verify_depth> I<num>]
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[B<-verify_email> I<email>]
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[B<-verify_hostname> I<hostname>]
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[B<-verify_ip> I<ip>]
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[B<-verify_name> I<name>]
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[B<-x509_strict>]
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[B<-md> I<digest>]
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[B<-I<cipher>>]
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[B<-nointern>]
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@ -78,7 +50,6 @@ B<openssl> B<cms>
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[B<-crlfeol>]
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[B<-asciicrlf>]
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[B<-nodetach>]
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[B<-certfile> I<file>]
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[B<-certsout> I<file>]
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[B<-signer> I<file>]
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[B<-recip> I<file>]
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@ -97,6 +68,7 @@ B<openssl> B<cms>
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[B<-to> I<addr>]
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[B<-from> I<addr>]
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[B<-subject> I<subj>]
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{- $OpenSSL::safe::opt_v_synopsis -}
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{- $OpenSSL::safe::opt_trust_synopsis -}
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{- $OpenSSL::safe::opt_r_synopsis -}
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[I<cert.pem> ...]
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@ -462,16 +434,9 @@ portion of a message so they may be included manually. If signing
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then many S/MIME mail clients check the signers certificate's email
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address matches that specified in the From: address.
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=item B<-attime>, B<-check_ss_sig>, B<-crl_check>, B<-crl_check_all>,
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B<-explicit_policy>, B<-extended_crl>, B<-ignore_critical>, B<-inhibit_any>,
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B<-inhibit_map>, B<-no_alt_chains>, B<-no_check_time>, B<-partial_chain>, B<-policy>,
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B<-policy_check>, B<-policy_print>, B<-purpose>, B<-suiteB_128>,
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B<-suiteB_128_only>, B<-suiteB_192>, B<-trusted_first>, B<-use_deltas>,
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B<-auth_level>, B<-verify_depth>, B<-verify_email>, B<-verify_hostname>,
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B<-verify_ip>, B<-verify_name>, B<-x509_strict>
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{- $OpenSSL::safe::opt_v_item -}
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Set various certificate chain validation options. See the
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L<openssl-verify(1)> manual page for details.
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Any verification errors cause the command to exit.
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{- $OpenSSL::safe::opt_trust_item -}
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@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ B<openssl> B<dgst>|I<digest>
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[B<-hmac> I<key>]
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[B<-fips-fingerprint>]
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[B<-engine> I<id>]
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[B<-engine_impl> I<id>]
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{- $OpenSSL::safe::opt_engine_synopsis -}
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{- $OpenSSL::safe::opt_r_synopsis -}
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[I<file> ...]
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@ -170,17 +171,17 @@ option.
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Compute HMAC using a specific key for certain OpenSSL-FIPS operations.
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=item B<-engine_impl>
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When used with the B<-engine> option, it specifies to also use
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engine I<id> for digest operations.
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{- $OpenSSL::safe::opt_r_item -}
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{- $OpenSSL::safe::opt_engine_item -}
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The engine is not used for digests unless the B<-engine_impl> option is
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used or it is configured to do so, see L<config(5)/Engine Configuration Module>.
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=item B<-engine_impl>
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When used with the B<-engine> option, it specifies to also use
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engine I<id> for digest operations.
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=item I<file> ...
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File or files to digest. If no files are specified then standard input is
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@ -31,34 +31,6 @@ B<openssl> B<ocsp>
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[B<-multi> I<process-count>]
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[B<-header>]
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[B<-path>]
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[B<-attime> I<timestamp>]
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[B<-check_ss_sig>]
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[B<-crl_check>]
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[B<-crl_check_all>]
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[B<-explicit_policy>]
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[B<-extended_crl>]
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[B<-ignore_critical>]
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[B<-inhibit_any>]
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[B<-inhibit_map>]
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[B<-no_check_time>]
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[B<-partial_chain>]
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[B<-policy> I<arg>]
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[B<-policy_check>]
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[B<-policy_print>]
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[B<-purpose> I<purpose>]
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[B<-suiteB_128>]
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[B<-suiteB_128_only>]
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[B<-suiteB_192>]
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[B<-trusted_first>]
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[B<-no_alt_chains>]
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[B<-use_deltas>]
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[B<-auth_level> I<num>]
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[B<-verify_depth> I<num>]
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[B<-verify_email> I<email>]
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[B<-verify_hostname> I<hostname>]
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[B<-verify_ip> I<ip>]
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[B<-verify_name> I<name>]
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[B<-x509_strict>]
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[B<-VAfile> I<file>]
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[B<-validity_period> I<n>]
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[B<-status_age> I<n>]
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@ -88,6 +60,7 @@ B<openssl> B<ocsp>
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[B<-rcid> I<digest>]
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[B<-I<digest>>]
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{- $OpenSSL::safe::opt_trust_synopsis -}
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{- $OpenSSL::safe::opt_v_synopsis -}
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=for openssl ifdef multi
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@ -206,17 +179,6 @@ each child is willing to wait for the client's OCSP response.
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This option is available on POSIX systems (that support the fork() and other
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required unix system-calls).
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=item B<-attime>, B<-check_ss_sig>, B<-crl_check>, B<-crl_check_all>,
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B<-explicit_policy>, B<-extended_crl>, B<-ignore_critical>, B<-inhibit_any>,
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B<-inhibit_map>, B<-no_alt_chains>, B<-no_check_time>, B<-partial_chain>, B<-policy>,
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B<-policy_check>, B<-policy_print>, B<-purpose>, B<-suiteB_128>,
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B<-suiteB_128_only>, B<-suiteB_192>, B<-trusted_first>, B<-use_deltas>,
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B<-auth_level>, B<-verify_depth>, B<-verify_email>, B<-verify_hostname>,
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B<-verify_ip>, B<-verify_name>, B<-x509_strict>
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Set different certificate verification options.
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See L<openssl-verify(1)> manual page for details.
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=item B<-verify_other> I<file>
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File containing additional certificates to search when attempting to locate
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@ -307,6 +269,8 @@ digest used by subsequent certificate identifiers.
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{- $OpenSSL::safe::opt_trust_item -}
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{- $OpenSSL::safe::opt_v_item -}
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=back
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=head2 OCSP Server Options
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@ -36,35 +36,7 @@ B<openssl> B<s_client>
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[B<-dane_tlsa_domain> I<domain>]
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[B<-dane_tlsa_rrdata> I<rrdata>]
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[B<-dane_ee_no_namechecks>]
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[B<-attime> I<timestamp>]
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[B<-check_ss_sig>]
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[B<-crl_check>]
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[B<-crl_check_all>]
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[B<-explicit_policy>]
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[B<-extended_crl>]
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[B<-ignore_critical>]
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[B<-inhibit_any>]
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[B<-inhibit_map>]
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[B<-no_check_time>]
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[B<-partial_chain>]
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[B<-policy> I<arg>]
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[B<-policy_check>]
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[B<-policy_print>]
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[B<-purpose> I<purpose>]
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[B<-suiteB_128>]
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[B<-suiteB_128_only>]
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[B<-suiteB_192>]
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[B<-trusted_first>]
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[B<-no_alt_chains>]
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[B<-use_deltas>]
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[B<-auth_level> I<num>]
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[B<-verify_depth> I<num>]
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[B<-verify_email> I<email>]
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[B<-verify_hostname> I<hostname>]
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[B<-verify_ip> I<ip>]
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[B<-verify_name> I<name>]
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[B<-build_chain>]
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[B<-x509_strict>]
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[B<-reconnect>]
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[B<-showcerts>]
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[B<-debug>]
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@ -119,6 +91,7 @@ B<openssl> B<s_client>
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{- $OpenSSL::safe::opt_trust_synopsis -}
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{- $OpenSSL::safe::opt_r_synopsis -}
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{- $OpenSSL::safe::opt_engine_synopsis -}
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{- $OpenSSL::safe::opt_v_synopsis -}
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[I<host>:I<port>]
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=for openssl ifdef engine ssl_client_engine ct noct ctlogfile
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@ -347,17 +320,6 @@ records already make it possible for a remote domain to redirect client
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connections to any server of its choice, and in any case SMTP and XMPP clients
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do not execute scripts downloaded from remote servers.
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=item B<-attime>, B<-check_ss_sig>, B<-crl_check>, B<-crl_check_all>,
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B<-explicit_policy>, B<-extended_crl>, B<-ignore_critical>, B<-inhibit_any>,
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B<-inhibit_map>, B<-no_alt_chains>, B<-no_check_time>, B<-partial_chain>, B<-policy>,
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B<-policy_check>, B<-policy_print>, B<-purpose>, B<-suiteB_128>,
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B<-suiteB_128_only>, B<-suiteB_192>, B<-trusted_first>, B<-use_deltas>,
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B<-auth_level>, B<-verify_depth>, B<-verify_email>, B<-verify_hostname>,
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B<-verify_ip>, B<-verify_name>, B<-x509_strict>
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Set various certificate chain validation options. See the
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L<openssl-verify(1)> manual page for details.
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=item B<-reconnect>
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Reconnects to the same server 5 times using the same session ID, this can
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@ -668,6 +630,11 @@ happen whether or not a certificate has been provided via B<-cert>.
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{- $OpenSSL::safe::opt_engine_item -}
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{- $OpenSSL::safe::opt_v_item -}
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Verification errors are displayed, for debugging, but the command will
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proceed unless the B<-verify_return_error> option is used.
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=item I<host>:I<port>
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Rather than providing B<-connect>, the target hostname and optional port may
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@ -107,36 +107,6 @@ B<openssl> B<s_server>
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[B<-dhparam> I<infile>]
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[B<-record_padding> I<val>]
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[B<-debug_broken_protocol>]
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[B<-policy> I<val>]
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[B<-purpose> I<val>]
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[B<-verify_name> I<val>]
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[B<-verify_depth> I<int>]
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[B<-auth_level> I<int>]
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[B<-attime> I<intmax>]
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[B<-verify_hostname> I<val>]
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[B<-verify_email> I<val>]
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[B<-verify_ip>]
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[B<-ignore_critical>]
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[B<-issuer_checks>]
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[B<-crl_check>]
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[B<-crl_check_all>]
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[B<-policy_check>]
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[B<-explicit_policy>]
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[B<-inhibit_any>]
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[B<-inhibit_map>]
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[B<-x509_strict>]
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[B<-extended_crl>]
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[B<-use_deltas>]
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[B<-policy_print>]
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[B<-check_ss_sig>]
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[B<-trusted_first>]
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[B<-suiteB_128_only>]
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[B<-suiteB_128>]
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[B<-suiteB_192>]
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[B<-partial_chain>]
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[B<-no_alt_chains>]
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[B<-no_check_time>]
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[B<-allow_proxy_certs>]
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[B<-nbio>]
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[B<-psk_identity> I<val>]
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[B<-psk_hint> I<val>]
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@ -161,6 +131,7 @@ B<openssl> B<s_server>
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[B<-http_server_binmode>]
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{- $OpenSSL::safe::opt_name_synopsis -}
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{- $OpenSSL::safe::opt_version_synopsis -}
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{- $OpenSSL::safe::opt_v_synopsis -}
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{- $OpenSSL::safe::opt_x_synopsis -}
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{- $OpenSSL::safe::opt_trust_synopsis -}
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{- $OpenSSL::safe::opt_r_synopsis -}
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@ -565,23 +536,6 @@ load the parameters from the server certificate file.
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If this fails then a static set of parameters hard coded into this command
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will be used.
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=item B<-attime>, B<-check_ss_sig>, B<-crl_check>, B<-crl_check_all>,
|
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B<-explicit_policy>, B<-extended_crl>, B<-ignore_critical>, B<-inhibit_any>,
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B<-inhibit_map>, B<-no_alt_chains>, B<-no_check_time>, B<-partial_chain>, B<-policy>,
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B<-policy_check>, B<-policy_print>, B<-purpose>, B<-suiteB_128>,
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B<-suiteB_128_only>, B<-suiteB_192>, B<-trusted_first>, B<-use_deltas>,
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B<-auth_level>, B<-verify_depth>, B<-verify_email>, B<-verify_hostname>,
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B<-verify_ip>, B<-verify_name>, B<-x509_strict>
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Set different peer certificate verification options.
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See the L<openssl-verify(1)> manual page for details.
|
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=item B<-crl_check>, B<-crl_check_all>
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Check the peer certificate has not been revoked by its CA.
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The CRL(s) are appended to the certificate file. With the B<-crl_check_all>
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option all CRLs of all CAs in the chain are checked.
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=item B<-nbio>
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Turns on non blocking I/O.
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@ -692,6 +646,12 @@ by the client in binary mode.
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{- $OpenSSL::safe::opt_engine_item -}
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{- $OpenSSL::safe::opt_v_item -}
|
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If the server requests a client certificate, then
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verification errors are displayed, for debugging, but the command will
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proceed unless the B<-verify_return_error> option is used.
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=back
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=head1 CONNECTED COMMANDS
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|
@ -72,12 +72,6 @@ Currently the verify operation continues after errors so all the problems
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with a certificate chain can be seen. As a side effect the connection
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will never fail due to a server certificate verify failure.
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=item B<-CApath> I<directory>
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The directory to use for server certificate verification. This directory
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must be in "hash format", see L<openssl-verify(1)> for more information.
|
||||
These are also used when building the client certificate chain.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-new>
|
||||
|
||||
Performs the timing test using a new session ID for each connection.
|
||||
|
@ -19,33 +19,6 @@ B<openssl> B<smime>
|
||||
[B<-crlfeol>]
|
||||
[B<-I<cipher>>]
|
||||
[B<-in> I<file>]
|
||||
[B<-attime> I<timestamp>]
|
||||
[B<-check_ss_sig>]
|
||||
[B<-crl_check>]
|
||||
[B<-crl_check_all>]
|
||||
[B<-explicit_policy>]
|
||||
[B<-extended_crl>]
|
||||
[B<-ignore_critical>]
|
||||
[B<-inhibit_any>]
|
||||
[B<-inhibit_map>]
|
||||
[B<-partial_chain>]
|
||||
[B<-policy> I<arg>]
|
||||
[B<-policy_check>]
|
||||
[B<-policy_print>]
|
||||
[B<-purpose> I<purpose>]
|
||||
[B<-suiteB_128>]
|
||||
[B<-suiteB_128_only>]
|
||||
[B<-suiteB_192>]
|
||||
[B<-trusted_first>]
|
||||
[B<-no_alt_chains>]
|
||||
[B<-use_deltas>]
|
||||
[B<-auth_level> I<num>]
|
||||
[B<-verify_depth> I<num>]
|
||||
[B<-verify_email> I<email>]
|
||||
[B<-verify_hostname> I<hostname>]
|
||||
[B<-verify_ip> I<ip>]
|
||||
[B<-verify_name> I<name>]
|
||||
[B<-x509_strict>]
|
||||
[B<-certfile> I<file>]
|
||||
[B<-signer> I<file>]
|
||||
[B<-recip> I< file>]
|
||||
@ -66,6 +39,7 @@ B<openssl> B<smime>
|
||||
[B<-md> I<digest>]
|
||||
{- $OpenSSL::safe::opt_trust_synopsis -}
|
||||
{- $OpenSSL::safe::opt_r_synopsis -}
|
||||
{- $OpenSSL::safe::opt_v_synopsis -}
|
||||
I<cert.pem> ...
|
||||
|
||||
=for openssl ifdef engine
|
||||
@ -283,16 +257,9 @@ portion of a message so they may be included manually. If signing
|
||||
then many S/MIME mail clients check the signers certificate's email
|
||||
address matches that specified in the From: address.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-attime>, B<-check_ss_sig>, B<-crl_check>, B<-crl_check_all>,
|
||||
B<-explicit_policy>, B<-extended_crl>, B<-ignore_critical>, B<-inhibit_any>,
|
||||
B<-inhibit_map>, B<-no_alt_chains>, B<-partial_chain>, B<-policy>,
|
||||
B<-policy_check>, B<-policy_print>, B<-purpose>, B<-suiteB_128>,
|
||||
B<-suiteB_128_only>, B<-suiteB_192>, B<-trusted_first>, B<-use_deltas>,
|
||||
B<-auth_level>, B<-verify_depth>, B<-verify_email>, B<-verify_hostname>,
|
||||
B<-verify_ip>, B<-verify_name>, B<-x509_strict>
|
||||
{- $OpenSSL::safe::opt_v_item -}
|
||||
|
||||
Set various options of certificate chain verification. See
|
||||
L<openssl-verify(1)> manual page for details.
|
||||
Any verification errors cause the command to exit.
|
||||
|
||||
{- $OpenSSL::safe::opt_trust_item -}
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ B<-reply>
|
||||
[B<-chain> I<certs_file.pem>]
|
||||
[B<-tspolicy> I<object_id>]
|
||||
[B<-in> I<response.tsr>]
|
||||
[B<-untrusted> I<file>]
|
||||
[B<-token_in>]
|
||||
[B<-out> I<response.tsr>]
|
||||
[B<-token_out>]
|
||||
@ -46,42 +47,8 @@ B<-verify>
|
||||
[B<-queryfile> I<request.tsq>]
|
||||
[B<-in> I<response.tsr>]
|
||||
[B<-token_in>]
|
||||
[B<-CApath> I<trusted_cert_path>]
|
||||
[B<-CAfile> I<trusted_certs.pem>]
|
||||
[B<-CAstore> I<trusted_certs_uri>]
|
||||
[B<-untrusted> I<cert_file.pem>]
|
||||
[I<verify options>]
|
||||
|
||||
I<verify options:>
|
||||
[B<-attime> I<timestamp>]
|
||||
[B<-check_ss_sig>]
|
||||
[B<-crl_check>]
|
||||
[B<-crl_check_all>]
|
||||
[B<-explicit_policy>]
|
||||
[B<-extended_crl>]
|
||||
[B<-ignore_critical>]
|
||||
[B<-inhibit_any>]
|
||||
[B<-inhibit_map>]
|
||||
[B<-issuer_checks>]
|
||||
[B<-no_alt_chains>]
|
||||
[B<-no_check_time>]
|
||||
[B<-partial_chain>]
|
||||
[B<-policy> I<arg>]
|
||||
[B<-policy_check>]
|
||||
[B<-policy_print>]
|
||||
[B<-purpose> I<purpose>]
|
||||
[B<-suiteB_128>]
|
||||
[B<-suiteB_128_only>]
|
||||
[B<-suiteB_192>]
|
||||
[B<-trusted_first>]
|
||||
[B<-use_deltas>]
|
||||
[B<-auth_level> I<num>]
|
||||
[B<-verify_depth> I<num>]
|
||||
[B<-verify_email> I<email>]
|
||||
[B<-verify_hostname> I<hostname>]
|
||||
[B<-verify_ip> I<ip>]
|
||||
[B<-verify_name> I<name>]
|
||||
[B<-x509_strict>]
|
||||
{- $OpenSSL::safe::opt_trust_synopsis -}
|
||||
{- $OpenSSL::safe::opt_v_synopsis -}
|
||||
|
||||
=for openssl ifdef engine
|
||||
|
||||
@ -344,12 +311,6 @@ This flag can be used together with the B<-in> option and indicates
|
||||
that the input is a DER encoded timestamp token (ContentInfo) instead
|
||||
of a timestamp response (TimeStampResp). (Optional)
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-CAfile> I<file>, B<-CApath> I<dir>, B<-CAstore> I<uri>
|
||||
|
||||
See L<openssl(1)/Trusted Certificate Options> for more information.
|
||||
|
||||
At least one of B<-CApath>, B<-CAfile> or B<-CAstore> must be specified.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-untrusted> I<cert_file.pem>
|
||||
|
||||
Set of additional untrusted certificates in PEM format which may be
|
||||
@ -358,17 +319,13 @@ certificate. This file must contain the TSA signing certificate and
|
||||
all intermediate CA certificates unless the response includes them.
|
||||
(Optional)
|
||||
|
||||
=item I<verify options>
|
||||
{- $OpenSSL::safe::opt_trust_item -}
|
||||
|
||||
The options B<-attime>, B<-check_ss_sig>, B<-crl_check>,
|
||||
B<-crl_check_all>, B<-explicit_policy>, B<-extended_crl>, B<-ignore_critical>,
|
||||
B<-inhibit_any>, B<-inhibit_map>, B<-issuer_checks>, B<-no_alt_chains>,
|
||||
B<-no_check_time>, B<-partial_chain>, B<-policy>, B<-policy_check>,
|
||||
B<-policy_print>, B<-purpose>, B<-suiteB_128>, B<-suiteB_128_only>,
|
||||
B<-suiteB_192>, B<-trusted_first>, B<-use_deltas>, B<-auth_level>,
|
||||
B<-verify_depth>, B<-verify_email>, B<-verify_hostname>, B<-verify_ip>,
|
||||
B<-verify_name>, and B<-x509_strict> can be used to control timestamp
|
||||
verification. See L<openssl-verify(1)>.
|
||||
At least one of B<-CApath>, B<-CAfile> or B<-CAstore> must be specified.
|
||||
|
||||
{- $OpenSSL::safe::opt_v_item -}
|
||||
|
||||
Any verification errors cause the command to exit.
|
||||
|
||||
=back
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -9,46 +9,18 @@ openssl-verify - Utility to verify certificates
|
||||
|
||||
B<openssl> B<verify>
|
||||
[B<-help>]
|
||||
[B<-allow_proxy_certs>]
|
||||
[B<-attime> I<timestamp>]
|
||||
[B<-check_ss_sig>]
|
||||
[B<-CRLfile> I<file>]
|
||||
[B<-crl_download>]
|
||||
[B<-crl_check>]
|
||||
[B<-crl_check_all>]
|
||||
[B<-explicit_policy>]
|
||||
[B<-extended_crl>]
|
||||
[B<-ignore_critical>]
|
||||
[B<-inhibit_any>]
|
||||
[B<-inhibit_map>]
|
||||
[B<-no_check_time>]
|
||||
[B<-partial_chain>]
|
||||
[B<-policy> I<arg>]
|
||||
[B<-policy_check>]
|
||||
[B<-policy_print>]
|
||||
[B<-purpose> I<purpose>]
|
||||
[B<-suiteB_128>]
|
||||
[B<-suiteB_128_only>]
|
||||
[B<-suiteB_192>]
|
||||
[B<-trusted_first>]
|
||||
[B<-no_alt_chains>]
|
||||
[B<-untrusted> I<file>]
|
||||
[B<-trusted> I<file>]
|
||||
[B<-use_deltas>]
|
||||
[B<-verbose>]
|
||||
[B<-auth_level> I<level>]
|
||||
[B<-verify_depth> I<num>]
|
||||
[B<-verify_email> I<email>]
|
||||
[B<-verify_hostname> I<hostname>]
|
||||
[B<-verify_ip> I<ip>]
|
||||
[B<-verify_name> I<name>]
|
||||
[B<-x509_strict>]
|
||||
[B<-show_chain>]
|
||||
[B<-sm2-id> I<string>]
|
||||
[B<-sm2-hex-id> I<hex-string>]
|
||||
[B<-sm2-id> I<hexstring>]
|
||||
[B<-sm2-hex-id> I<hexstring>]
|
||||
[B<-verbose>]
|
||||
[B<-trusted> I<file>]
|
||||
[B<-untrusted> I<file>]
|
||||
{- $OpenSSL::safe::opt_name_synopsis -}
|
||||
{- $OpenSSL::safe::opt_trust_synopsis -}
|
||||
{- $OpenSSL::safe::opt_engine_synopsis -}
|
||||
{- $OpenSSL::safe::opt_v_synopsis -}
|
||||
[B<-->]
|
||||
[I<certificate> ...]
|
||||
|
||||
@ -66,20 +38,9 @@ This command verifies certificate chains.
|
||||
|
||||
Print out a usage message.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-allow_proxy_certs>
|
||||
=item B<-CAfile> I<file>, B<-no-CAfile>, B<-CApath> I<dir>, B<-no-CApath>
|
||||
|
||||
Allow the verification of proxy certificates.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-attime> I<timestamp>
|
||||
|
||||
Perform validation checks using time specified by I<timestamp> and not
|
||||
current system time. I<timestamp> is the number of seconds since
|
||||
01.01.1970 (UNIX time).
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-check_ss_sig>
|
||||
|
||||
Verify the signature on the self-signed root CA. This is disabled by default
|
||||
because it doesn't add any security.
|
||||
See L<openssl(1)/Trusted Certificate Options> for more information.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-CRLfile> I<file>
|
||||
|
||||
@ -91,285 +52,61 @@ I<file>s.
|
||||
|
||||
Attempt to download CRL information for this certificate.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-crl_check>
|
||||
|
||||
Checks end entity certificate validity by attempting to look up a valid CRL.
|
||||
If a valid CRL cannot be found an error occurs.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-crl_check_all>
|
||||
|
||||
Checks the validity of B<all> certificates in the chain by attempting
|
||||
to look up valid CRLs.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-explicit_policy>
|
||||
|
||||
Set policy variable require-explicit-policy (see RFC5280).
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-extended_crl>
|
||||
|
||||
Enable extended CRL features such as indirect CRLs and alternate CRL
|
||||
signing keys.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-ignore_critical>
|
||||
|
||||
Normally if an unhandled critical extension is present which is not
|
||||
supported by OpenSSL the certificate is rejected (as required by RFC5280).
|
||||
If this option is set critical extensions are ignored.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-inhibit_any>
|
||||
|
||||
Set policy variable inhibit-any-policy (see RFC5280).
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-inhibit_map>
|
||||
|
||||
Set policy variable inhibit-policy-mapping (see RFC5280).
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-no_check_time>
|
||||
|
||||
This option suppresses checking the validity period of certificates and CRLs
|
||||
against the current time. If option B<-attime> is used to specify
|
||||
a verification time, the check is not suppressed.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-partial_chain>
|
||||
|
||||
Allow verification to succeed even if a I<complete> chain cannot be built to a
|
||||
self-signed trust-anchor, provided it is possible to construct a chain to a
|
||||
trusted certificate that might not be self-signed.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-policy> I<arg>
|
||||
|
||||
Enable policy processing and add I<arg> to the user-initial-policy-set (see
|
||||
RFC5280). The policy I<arg> can be an object name an OID in numeric form.
|
||||
This argument can appear more than once.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-policy_check>
|
||||
|
||||
Enables certificate policy processing.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-policy_print>
|
||||
|
||||
Print out diagnostics related to policy processing.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-purpose> I<purpose>
|
||||
|
||||
The intended use for the certificate. If this option is not specified,
|
||||
this command will not consider certificate purpose during chain
|
||||
verification.
|
||||
Currently accepted uses are B<sslclient>, B<sslserver>, B<nssslserver>,
|
||||
B<smimesign>, B<smimeencrypt>. See the L</VERIFY OPERATION> section for more
|
||||
information.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-suiteB_128_only>, B<-suiteB_128>, B<-suiteB_192>
|
||||
|
||||
Enable the Suite B mode operation at 128 bit Level of Security, 128 bit or
|
||||
192 bit, or only 192 bit Level of Security respectively.
|
||||
See RFC6460 for details. In particular the supported signature algorithms are
|
||||
reduced to support only ECDSA and SHA256 or SHA384 and only the elliptic curves
|
||||
P-256 and P-384.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-trusted_first>
|
||||
|
||||
When constructing the certificate chain, use the trusted certificates specified
|
||||
via B<-CAfile>, B<-CApath>, B<-CAstore> or B<-trusted> before any certificates
|
||||
specified via B<-untrusted>.
|
||||
This can be useful in environments with Bridge or Cross-Certified CAs.
|
||||
As of OpenSSL 1.1.0 this option is on by default and cannot be disabled.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-no_alt_chains>
|
||||
|
||||
By default, unless B<-trusted_first> is specified, when building a certificate
|
||||
chain, if the first certificate chain found is not trusted, then OpenSSL will
|
||||
attempt to replace untrusted issuer certificates with certificates from the
|
||||
trust store to see if an alternative chain can be found that is trusted.
|
||||
As of OpenSSL 1.1.0, with B<-trusted_first> always on, this option has no
|
||||
effect.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-untrusted> I<file>
|
||||
|
||||
A I<file> of additional untrusted certificates (intermediate issuer CAs) used
|
||||
to construct a certificate chain from the subject certificate to a trust-anchor.
|
||||
The I<file> should contain one or more certificates in PEM format.
|
||||
This option can be specified more than once to include untrusted certificates
|
||||
from multiple I<file>s.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-trusted> I<file>
|
||||
|
||||
A I<file> of trusted certificates, which must be self-signed, unless the
|
||||
B<-partial_chain> option is specified.
|
||||
The I<file> contains one or more certificates in PEM format.
|
||||
With this option, no additional (e.g., default) certificate lists are
|
||||
consulted.
|
||||
That is, the only trust-anchors are those listed in I<file>.
|
||||
This option can be specified more than once to include trusted certificates
|
||||
from multiple I<file>s.
|
||||
This option implies the B<-no-CAfile>, B<-no-CApath> and B<-no-CAstore> options.
|
||||
This option cannot be used in combination with any of the B<-CAfile>,
|
||||
B<-CApath> or B<-CAstore> options.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-use_deltas>
|
||||
|
||||
Enable support for delta CRLs.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-verbose>
|
||||
|
||||
Print extra information about the operations being performed.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-auth_level> I<level>
|
||||
|
||||
Set the certificate chain authentication security level to I<level>.
|
||||
The authentication security level determines the acceptable signature and
|
||||
public key strength when verifying certificate chains.
|
||||
For a certificate chain to validate, the public keys of all the certificates
|
||||
must meet the specified security I<level>.
|
||||
The signature algorithm security level is enforced for all the certificates in
|
||||
the chain except for the chain's I<trust anchor>, which is either directly
|
||||
trusted or validated by means other than its signature.
|
||||
See L<SSL_CTX_set_security_level(3)> for the definitions of the available
|
||||
levels.
|
||||
The default security level is -1, or "not set".
|
||||
At security level 0 or lower all algorithms are acceptable.
|
||||
Security level 1 requires at least 80-bit-equivalent security and is broadly
|
||||
interoperable, though it will, for example, reject MD5 signatures or RSA keys
|
||||
shorter than 1024 bits.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-verify_depth> I<num>
|
||||
|
||||
Limit the certificate chain to I<num> intermediate CA certificates.
|
||||
A maximal depth chain can have up to I<num>+2 certificates, since neither the
|
||||
end-entity certificate nor the trust-anchor certificate count against the
|
||||
B<-verify_depth> limit.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-verify_email> I<email>
|
||||
|
||||
Verify if I<email> matches the email address in Subject Alternative Name or
|
||||
the email in the subject Distinguished Name.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-verify_hostname> I<hostname>
|
||||
|
||||
Verify if I<hostname> matches DNS name in Subject Alternative Name or
|
||||
Common Name in the subject certificate.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-verify_ip> I<ip>
|
||||
|
||||
Verify if I<ip> matches the IP address in Subject Alternative Name of
|
||||
the subject certificate.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-verify_name> I<name>
|
||||
|
||||
Use default verification policies like trust model and required certificate
|
||||
policies identified by I<name>.
|
||||
The trust model determines which auxiliary trust or reject OIDs are applicable
|
||||
to verifying the given certificate chain.
|
||||
See the B<-addtrust> and B<-addreject> options for L<openssl-x509(1)>.
|
||||
Supported policy names include: B<default>, B<pkcs7>, B<smime_sign>,
|
||||
B<ssl_client>, B<ssl_server>.
|
||||
These mimics the combinations of purpose and trust settings used in SSL, CMS
|
||||
and S/MIME.
|
||||
As of OpenSSL 1.1.0, the trust model is inferred from the purpose when not
|
||||
specified, so the B<-verify_name> options are functionally equivalent to the
|
||||
corresponding B<-purpose> settings.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-x509_strict>
|
||||
|
||||
For strict X.509 compliance, disable non-compliant workarounds for broken
|
||||
certificates.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-show_chain>
|
||||
|
||||
Display information about the certificate chain that has been built (if
|
||||
successful). Certificates in the chain that came from the untrusted list will be
|
||||
flagged as "untrusted".
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-sm2-id>
|
||||
=item B<-sm2-id> I<hexstring>
|
||||
|
||||
Specify the ID string to use when verifying an SM2 certificate. The ID string is
|
||||
required by the SM2 signature algorithm for signing and verification.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-sm2-hex-id>
|
||||
=item B<-sm2-hex-id> I<hexstring>
|
||||
|
||||
Specify a binary ID string to use when signing or verifying using an SM2
|
||||
certificate. The argument for this option is string of hexadecimal digits.
|
||||
|
||||
{- $OpenSSL::safe::opt_name_item -}
|
||||
=item B<-verbose>
|
||||
|
||||
{- $OpenSSL::safe::opt_trust_item -}
|
||||
Print extra information about the operations being performed.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-trusted> I<file>
|
||||
|
||||
A file of trusted certificates.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-untrusted> I<file>
|
||||
|
||||
A file of untrusted certificates.
|
||||
|
||||
{- $OpenSSL::safe::opt_name_item -}
|
||||
|
||||
{- $OpenSSL::safe::opt_engine_item -}
|
||||
To load certificates or CRLs that require engine support, specify the
|
||||
B<-engine> option before any of the
|
||||
B<-trusted>, B<-untrusted> or B<-CRLfile> options.
|
||||
|
||||
{- $OpenSSL::safe::opt_trust_item -}
|
||||
|
||||
{- $OpenSSL::safe::opt_v_item -}
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-->
|
||||
|
||||
Indicates the last option. All arguments following this are assumed to be
|
||||
certificate files. This is useful if the first certificate filename begins
|
||||
with a B<-->.
|
||||
with a B<->.
|
||||
|
||||
=item I<certificate> ...
|
||||
|
||||
One or more certificates to verify. If no certificates are given,
|
||||
this command will attempt to read a certificate from standard input.
|
||||
Certificates must be in PEM format.
|
||||
If a certificate chain has multiple problems, this program tries to
|
||||
display all of them.
|
||||
|
||||
=back
|
||||
|
||||
=head1 VERIFY OPERATION
|
||||
|
||||
This command uses the same functions as the internal SSL
|
||||
and S/MIME verification, therefore this description applies to these verify
|
||||
operations too.
|
||||
|
||||
There is one crucial difference between the verify operations performed
|
||||
by this command: wherever possible an attempt is made to
|
||||
continue after an error whereas normally the verify operation would halt on
|
||||
the first error. This allows all the problems with a certificate chain to be
|
||||
determined.
|
||||
|
||||
The verify operation consists of a number of separate steps.
|
||||
|
||||
Firstly a certificate chain is built up starting from the supplied certificate
|
||||
and ending in the root CA.
|
||||
It is an error if the whole chain cannot be built up.
|
||||
The chain is built up by looking up the issuers certificate of the current
|
||||
certificate.
|
||||
If a certificate is found which is its own issuer it is assumed to be the root
|
||||
CA.
|
||||
|
||||
The process of 'looking up the issuers certificate' itself involves a number of
|
||||
steps.
|
||||
After all certificates whose subject name matches the issuer name of the current
|
||||
certificate are subject to further tests.
|
||||
The relevant authority key identifier components of the current certificate (if
|
||||
present) must match the subject key identifier (if present) and issuer and
|
||||
serial number of the candidate issuer, in addition the keyUsage extension of
|
||||
the candidate issuer (if present) must permit certificate signing.
|
||||
|
||||
The lookup first looks in the list of untrusted certificates and if no match
|
||||
is found the remaining lookups are from the trusted certificates. The root CA
|
||||
is always looked up in the trusted certificate list: if the certificate to
|
||||
verify is a root certificate then an exact match must be found in the trusted
|
||||
list.
|
||||
|
||||
The second operation is to check every untrusted certificate's extensions for
|
||||
consistency with the supplied purpose. If the B<-purpose> option is not included
|
||||
then no checks are done. The supplied or "leaf" certificate must have extensions
|
||||
compatible with the supplied purpose and all other certificates must also be
|
||||
valid CA certificates. The precise extensions required are described in more
|
||||
detail in L<openssl-x509(1)/CERTIFICATE EXTENSIONS>.
|
||||
|
||||
The third operation is to check the trust settings on the root CA. The root CA
|
||||
should be trusted for the supplied purpose.
|
||||
For compatibility with previous versions of OpenSSL, a certificate with no
|
||||
trust settings is considered to be valid for all purposes.
|
||||
|
||||
The final operation is to check the validity of the certificate chain. The
|
||||
validity period is checked against the current system time and the notBefore
|
||||
and notAfter dates in the certificate. The certificate signatures are also
|
||||
checked at this point.
|
||||
|
||||
If all operations complete successfully then certificate is considered valid. If
|
||||
any operation fails then the certificate is not valid.
|
||||
|
||||
=head1 DIAGNOSTICS
|
||||
|
||||
When a verify operation fails the output messages can be somewhat cryptic. The
|
||||
@ -385,344 +122,12 @@ problem was detected starting with zero for the certificate being verified itsel
|
||||
then 1 for the CA that signed the certificate and so on. Finally a text version
|
||||
of the error number is presented.
|
||||
|
||||
A partial list of the error codes and messages is shown below, this also
|
||||
includes the name of the error code as defined in the header file
|
||||
A list of the error codes and messages can be found in
|
||||
L<X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(3)>; the full list is defined in the header file
|
||||
F<< <openssl/x509_vfy.h> >>.
|
||||
Some of the error codes are defined but never returned: these are described
|
||||
as "unused".
|
||||
|
||||
=over 4
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_OK>
|
||||
|
||||
The operation was successful.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED>
|
||||
|
||||
Unspecified error; should not happen.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT>
|
||||
|
||||
The issuer certificate of a looked up certificate could not be found. This
|
||||
normally means the list of trusted certificates is not complete.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL>
|
||||
|
||||
The CRL of a certificate could not be found.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE>
|
||||
|
||||
The certificate signature could not be decrypted. This means that the
|
||||
actual signature value could not be determined rather than it not matching
|
||||
the expected value, this is only meaningful for RSA keys.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE>
|
||||
|
||||
The CRL signature could not be decrypted: this means that the actual
|
||||
signature value could not be determined rather than it not matching the
|
||||
expected value. Unused.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY>
|
||||
|
||||
The public key in the certificate SubjectPublicKeyInfo could not be read.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE>
|
||||
|
||||
The signature of the certificate is invalid.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE>
|
||||
|
||||
The signature of the certificate is invalid.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID>
|
||||
|
||||
The certificate is not yet valid: the notBefore date is after the
|
||||
current time.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED>
|
||||
|
||||
The certificate has expired: that is the notAfter date is before the
|
||||
current time.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID>
|
||||
|
||||
The CRL is not yet valid.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED>
|
||||
|
||||
The CRL has expired.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD>
|
||||
|
||||
The certificate notBefore field contains an invalid time.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD>
|
||||
|
||||
The certificate notAfter field contains an invalid time.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD>
|
||||
|
||||
The CRL lastUpdate field contains an invalid time.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD>
|
||||
|
||||
The CRL nextUpdate field contains an invalid time.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM>
|
||||
|
||||
An error occurred trying to allocate memory. This should never happen.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT>
|
||||
|
||||
The passed certificate is self-signed and the same certificate cannot
|
||||
be found in the list of trusted certificates.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN>
|
||||
|
||||
The certificate chain could be built up using the untrusted certificates
|
||||
but the root could not be found locally.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY>
|
||||
|
||||
The issuer certificate could not be found: this occurs if the issuer
|
||||
certificate of an untrusted certificate cannot be found.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE>
|
||||
|
||||
No signatures could be verified because the chain contains only one
|
||||
certificate and it is not self signed.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG>
|
||||
|
||||
The certificate chain length is greater than the supplied maximum
|
||||
depth. Unused.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED>
|
||||
|
||||
The certificate has been revoked.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA>
|
||||
|
||||
A CA certificate is invalid. Either it is not a CA or its extensions
|
||||
are not consistent with the supplied purpose.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED>
|
||||
|
||||
The basicConstraints pathlength parameter has been exceeded.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE>
|
||||
|
||||
The supplied certificate cannot be used for the specified purpose.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED>
|
||||
|
||||
The root CA is not marked as trusted for the specified purpose.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED>
|
||||
|
||||
The root CA is marked to reject the specified purpose.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH>
|
||||
|
||||
Not used as of OpenSSL 1.1.0 as a result of the deprecation of the
|
||||
B<-issuer_checks> option.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_AKID_SKID_MISMATCH>
|
||||
|
||||
Not used as of OpenSSL 1.1.0 as a result of the deprecation of the
|
||||
B<-issuer_checks> option.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH>
|
||||
|
||||
Not used as of OpenSSL 1.1.0 as a result of the deprecation of the
|
||||
B<-issuer_checks> option.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CERTSIGN>
|
||||
|
||||
Not used as of OpenSSL 1.1.0 as a result of the deprecation of the
|
||||
B<-issuer_checks> option.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER>
|
||||
|
||||
Unable to get CRL issuer certificate.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION>
|
||||
|
||||
Unhandled critical extension.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN>
|
||||
|
||||
Key usage does not include CRL signing.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION>
|
||||
|
||||
Unhandled critical CRL extension.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA>
|
||||
|
||||
Invalid non-CA certificate has CA markings.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED>
|
||||
|
||||
Proxy path length constraint exceeded.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_INVALID>
|
||||
|
||||
Proxy certificate subject is invalid. It MUST be the same as the issuer
|
||||
with a single CN component added.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE>
|
||||
|
||||
Key usage does not include digital signature.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED>
|
||||
|
||||
Proxy certificates not allowed, please use B<-allow_proxy_certs>.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION>
|
||||
|
||||
Invalid or inconsistent certificate extension.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION>
|
||||
|
||||
Invalid or inconsistent certificate policy extension.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY>
|
||||
|
||||
No explicit policy.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE>
|
||||
|
||||
Different CRL scope.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION_FEATURE>
|
||||
|
||||
Unsupported extension feature.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNNESTED_RESOURCE>
|
||||
|
||||
RFC 3779 resource not subset of parent's resources.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION>
|
||||
|
||||
Permitted subtree violation.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_EXCLUDED_VIOLATION>
|
||||
|
||||
Excluded subtree violation.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_SUBTREE_MINMAX>
|
||||
|
||||
Name constraints minimum and maximum not supported.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION>
|
||||
|
||||
Application verification failure. Unused.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CONSTRAINT_TYPE>
|
||||
|
||||
Unsupported name constraint type.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CONSTRAINT_SYNTAX>
|
||||
|
||||
Unsupported or invalid name constraint syntax.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX>
|
||||
|
||||
Unsupported or invalid name syntax.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR>
|
||||
|
||||
CRL path validation error.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_PATH_LOOP>
|
||||
|
||||
Path loop.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION>
|
||||
|
||||
Suite B: certificate version invalid.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_ALGORITHM>
|
||||
|
||||
Suite B: invalid public key algorithm.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_CURVE>
|
||||
|
||||
Suite B: invalid ECC curve.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM>
|
||||
|
||||
Suite B: invalid signature algorithm.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED>
|
||||
|
||||
Suite B: curve not allowed for this LOS.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_CANNOT_SIGN_P_384_WITH_P_256>
|
||||
|
||||
Suite B: cannot sign P-384 with P-256.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH>
|
||||
|
||||
Hostname mismatch.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH>
|
||||
|
||||
Email address mismatch.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH>
|
||||
|
||||
IP address mismatch.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH>
|
||||
|
||||
DANE TLSA authentication is enabled, but no TLSA records matched the
|
||||
certificate chain.
|
||||
This error is only possible in L<openssl-s_client(1)>.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL>
|
||||
|
||||
EE certificate key too weak.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL>
|
||||
|
||||
CA certificate key too weak.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK>
|
||||
|
||||
CA signature digest algorithm too weak.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL>
|
||||
|
||||
nvalid certificate verification context.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP>
|
||||
|
||||
Issuer certificate lookup error.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_NO_VALID_SCTS>
|
||||
|
||||
Certificate Transparency required, but no valid SCTs found.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION>
|
||||
|
||||
Proxy subject name violation.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_OCSP_VERIFY_NEEDED>
|
||||
|
||||
Returned by the verify callback to indicate an OCSP verification is needed.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_OCSP_VERIFY_FAILED>
|
||||
|
||||
Returned by the verify callback to indicate OCSP verification failed.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_OCSP_CERT_UNKNOWN>
|
||||
|
||||
Returned by the verify callback to indicate that the certificate is not recognized
|
||||
by the OCSP responder.
|
||||
|
||||
=back
|
||||
This command ignores many errors, in order to allow all the problems with a
|
||||
certificate chain to be determined.
|
||||
|
||||
=head1 BUGS
|
||||
|
||||
@ -751,9 +156,6 @@ L<ossl_store-file(7)>
|
||||
|
||||
The B<-show_chain> option was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
|
||||
|
||||
The B<-issuer_checks> option is deprecated as of OpenSSL 1.1.0 and
|
||||
is silently ignored.
|
||||
|
||||
The B<-sm2-id> and B<-sm2-hex-id> options were added in OpenSSL 3.0.
|
||||
|
||||
=head1 COPYRIGHT
|
||||
|
@ -781,6 +781,258 @@ client.
|
||||
The input format for the extra certificate and key, respectively.
|
||||
See L<openssl(1)/Format Options> for details.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-xchain_build>
|
||||
|
||||
Specify whether the application should build the certificate chain to be
|
||||
provided to the server for the extra certificates via the B<-xkey>,
|
||||
B<-xcert>, and B<-xchain> options.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-xcertform> B<DER>|B<PEM>, B<-xkeyform> B<DER>|B<PEM>
|
||||
|
||||
The input format for the extra certifcate and key, respectively.
|
||||
See L<openssl(1)/Format Options> for details.
|
||||
|
||||
=back
|
||||
|
||||
=head2 Verification Options
|
||||
|
||||
Many OpenSSL commands verify certificates. The details of how each
|
||||
command handles errors are documented on the specific command page.
|
||||
|
||||
Verification is a complicated process, consisting of a number of separate
|
||||
steps that are detailed in the following paragraphs.
|
||||
|
||||
First, a certificate chain is built up starting from the supplied certificate
|
||||
and ending in a root CA. It is an error if the whole chain cannot be
|
||||
built up. The chain is built up by looking up the certificate that
|
||||
signed (or issued) the certificate. It then repeats the process, until
|
||||
it gets to a certificate that is self-issued.
|
||||
|
||||
The process of looking up the issuer's certificate itself involves a number
|
||||
of steps. After all certificates whose subject name matches the issuer
|
||||
name of the current certificate are subject to further tests. The relevant
|
||||
authority key identifier components of the current certificate (if present)
|
||||
must match the subject key identifier (if present) and issuer and serial
|
||||
number of the candidate issuer, in addition the keyUsage extension of the
|
||||
candidate issuer (if present) must permit certificate signing.
|
||||
|
||||
The lookup first looks in the list of untrusted certificates and if no match
|
||||
is found the remaining lookups are from the trusted certificates. The root CA
|
||||
is always looked up in the trusted certificate list: if the certificate to
|
||||
verify is a root certificate then an exact match must be found in the trusted
|
||||
list.
|
||||
|
||||
The second step is to check every untrusted certificate's extensions
|
||||
for consistency with the supplied purpose. If the B<-purpose> option is
|
||||
not included then no checks are done. The supplied or "leaf" certificate
|
||||
must have extensions compatible with the supplied purpose and all other
|
||||
certificates must also be valid CA certificates. The precise extensions
|
||||
required are described in more detail in
|
||||
L<openssl-x509(1)/CERTIFICATE EXTENSIONS>.
|
||||
|
||||
The third step is to check the trust settings on the root CA. The root
|
||||
CA should be trusted for the supplied purpose. For compatibility with
|
||||
previous versions of OpenSSL, a certificate with no trust settings is
|
||||
considered to be valid for all purposes.
|
||||
|
||||
The fourth, and final, step is to check the validity of the certificate
|
||||
chain. The validity period is checked against the system time
|
||||
and the C<notBefore> and C<notAfter> dates in the certificate. The certificate
|
||||
signatures are also checked at this point. The B<-attime> flag may be
|
||||
used to specify a time other than "now."
|
||||
|
||||
If all operations complete successfully then certificate is considered
|
||||
valid. If any operation fails then the certificate is not valid.
|
||||
|
||||
The details of the processing steps can be fine-tuned with the
|
||||
following flags.
|
||||
|
||||
=over 4
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-verbose>
|
||||
|
||||
Print extra information about the operations being performed.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-attime> I<timestamp>
|
||||
|
||||
Perform validation checks using time specified by I<timestamp> and not
|
||||
current system time. I<timestamp> is the number of seconds since
|
||||
January 1, 1970 (i.e., the Unix Epoch).
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-no_check_time>
|
||||
|
||||
This option suppresses checking the validity period of certificates and CRLs
|
||||
against the current time. If option B<-attime> is used to specify
|
||||
a verification time, the check is not suppressed.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-x509_strict>
|
||||
|
||||
This disables non-compliant workarounds for broken certificates.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-ignore_critical>
|
||||
|
||||
Normally if an unhandled critical extension is present which is not
|
||||
supported by OpenSSL the certificate is rejected (as required by RFC5280).
|
||||
If this option is set critical extensions are ignored.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-issuer_checks>
|
||||
|
||||
Ignored.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-crl_check>
|
||||
|
||||
Checks end entity certificate validity by attempting to look up a valid CRL.
|
||||
If a valid CRL cannot be found an error occurs.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-crl_check_all>
|
||||
|
||||
Checks the validity of B<all> certificates in the chain by attempting
|
||||
to look up valid CRLs.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-use_deltas>
|
||||
|
||||
Enable support for delta CRLs.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-extended_crl>
|
||||
|
||||
Enable extended CRL features such as indirect CRLs and alternate CRL
|
||||
signing keys.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-suiteB_128_only>, B<-suiteB_128>, B<-suiteB_192>
|
||||
|
||||
Enable the Suite B mode operation at 128 bit Level of Security, 128 bit or
|
||||
192 bit, or only 192 bit Level of Security respectively.
|
||||
See RFC6460 for details. In particular the supported signature algorithms are
|
||||
reduced to support only ECDSA and SHA256 or SHA384 and only the elliptic curves
|
||||
P-256 and P-384.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-auth_level> I<level>
|
||||
|
||||
Set the certificate chain authentication security level to I<level>.
|
||||
The authentication security level determines the acceptable signature and
|
||||
public key strength when verifying certificate chains. For a certificate
|
||||
chain to validate, the public keys of all the certificates must meet the
|
||||
specified security I<level>. The signature algorithm security level is
|
||||
enforced for all the certificates in the chain except for the chain's
|
||||
I<trust anchor>, which is either directly trusted or validated by means
|
||||
other than its signature. See L<SSL_CTX_set_security_level(3)> for the
|
||||
definitions of the available levels. The default security level is -1,
|
||||
or "not set". At security level 0 or lower all algorithms are acceptable.
|
||||
Security level 1 requires at least 80-bit-equivalent security and is broadly
|
||||
interoperable, though it will, for example, reject MD5 signatures or RSA
|
||||
keys shorter than 1024 bits.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-partial_chain>
|
||||
|
||||
Allow verification to succeed even if a I<complete> chain cannot be built to a
|
||||
self-signed trust-anchor, provided it is possible to construct a chain to a
|
||||
trusted certificate that might not be self-signed.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-check_ss_sig>
|
||||
|
||||
Verify the signature on the self-signed root CA. This is disabled by default
|
||||
because it doesn't add any security.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-allow_proxy_certs>
|
||||
|
||||
Allow the verification of proxy certificates.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-trusted_first>
|
||||
|
||||
As of OpenSSL 1.1.0 this option is on by default and cannot be disabled.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-no_alt_chains>
|
||||
|
||||
As of OpenSSL 1.1.0, since B<-trusted_first> always on, this option has no
|
||||
effect.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-trusted> I<file>
|
||||
|
||||
Parse I<file> as a set of one or more certificates in PEM format.
|
||||
All certificates must be self-signed, unless the
|
||||
B<-partial_chain> option is specified.
|
||||
This option implies the B<-no-CAfile> and B<-no-CApath> options and it
|
||||
cannot be used with either the B<-CAfile> or B<-CApath> options, so
|
||||
only certificates in the file are trust anchors.
|
||||
This option may be used multiple times.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-untrusted> I<file>
|
||||
|
||||
Parse I<file> as a set of one or more certificates in PEM format.
|
||||
All certificates are untrusted certificates that may be used to
|
||||
construct a certificate chain from the subject certificate to a trust anchor.
|
||||
This option may be used multiple times.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-policy> I<arg>
|
||||
|
||||
Enable policy processing and add I<arg> to the user-initial-policy-set (see
|
||||
RFC5280). The policy I<arg> can be an object name an OID in numeric form.
|
||||
This argument can appear more than once.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-explicit_policy>
|
||||
|
||||
Set policy variable require-explicit-policy (see RFC5280).
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-policy_check>
|
||||
|
||||
Enables certificate policy processing.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-policy_print>
|
||||
|
||||
Print out diagnostics related to policy processing.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-inhibit_any>
|
||||
|
||||
Set policy variable inhibit-any-policy (see RFC5280).
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-inhibit_map>
|
||||
|
||||
Set policy variable inhibit-policy-mapping (see RFC5280).
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-purpose> I<purpose>
|
||||
|
||||
The intended use for the certificate. If this option is not specified, this
|
||||
command will not consider certificate purpose during chain verification.
|
||||
Currently accepted uses are B<sslclient>, B<sslserver>, B<nssslserver>,
|
||||
B<smimesign>, B<smimeencrypt>.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-verify_depth> I<num>
|
||||
|
||||
Limit the certificate chain to I<num> intermediate CA certificates.
|
||||
A maximal depth chain can have up to I<num>+2 certificates, since neither the
|
||||
end-entity certificate nor the trust-anchor certificate count against the
|
||||
B<-verify_depth> limit.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-verify_email> I<email>
|
||||
|
||||
Verify if I<email> matches the email address in Subject Alternative Name or
|
||||
the email in the subject Distinguished Name.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-verify_hostname> I<hostname>
|
||||
|
||||
Verify if I<hostname> matches DNS name in Subject Alternative Name or
|
||||
Common Name in the subject certificate.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-verify_ip> I<ip>
|
||||
|
||||
Verify if I<ip> matches the IP address in Subject Alternative Name of
|
||||
the subject certificate.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<-verify_name> I<name>
|
||||
|
||||
Use default verification policies like trust model and required certificate
|
||||
policies identified by I<name>.
|
||||
The trust model determines which auxiliary trust or reject OIDs are applicable
|
||||
to verifying the given certificate chain.
|
||||
See the B<-addtrust> and B<-addreject> options for L<openssl-x509(1)>.
|
||||
Supported policy names include: B<default>, B<pkcs7>, B<smime_sign>,
|
||||
B<ssl_client>, B<ssl_server>.
|
||||
These mimics the combinations of purpose and trust settings used in SSL, CMS
|
||||
and S/MIME.
|
||||
As of OpenSSL 1.1.0, the trust model is inferred from the purpose when not
|
||||
specified, so the B<-verify_name> options are functionally equivalent to the
|
||||
corresponding B<-purpose> settings.
|
||||
|
||||
=back
|
||||
|
||||
=head2 Name Format Options
|
||||
@ -1122,6 +1374,9 @@ The B<list> -I<XXX>B<-algorithms> options were added in OpenSSL 1.0.0;
|
||||
For notes on the availability of other commands, see their individual
|
||||
manual pages.
|
||||
|
||||
The B<-issuer_checks> option is deprecated as of OpenSSL 1.1.0 and
|
||||
is silently ignored.
|
||||
|
||||
=head1 COPYRIGHT
|
||||
|
||||
Copyright 2000-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
|
||||
|
@ -97,160 +97,163 @@ error codes are defined but currently never returned: these are described as
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_OK: ok>
|
||||
|
||||
the operation was successful.
|
||||
The operation was successful.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED: unspecified certificate verification error>
|
||||
|
||||
Unspecified error; should not happen.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT: unable to get issuer certificate>
|
||||
|
||||
the issuer certificate of a locally looked up certificate could not be found.
|
||||
The issuer certificate of a locally looked up certificate could not be found.
|
||||
This normally means the list of trusted certificates is not complete.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL: unable to get certificate CRL>
|
||||
|
||||
the CRL of a certificate could not be found.
|
||||
The CRL of a certificate could not be found.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE: unable to decrypt certificate's signature>
|
||||
|
||||
the certificate signature could not be decrypted. This means that the actual
|
||||
The certificate signature could not be decrypted. This means that the actual
|
||||
signature value could not be determined rather than it not matching the
|
||||
expected value, this is only meaningful for RSA keys.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE: unable to decrypt CRL's signature>
|
||||
|
||||
the CRL signature could not be decrypted: this means that the actual signature
|
||||
The CRL signature could not be decrypted: this means that the actual signature
|
||||
value could not be determined rather than it not matching the expected value.
|
||||
Unused.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY: unable to decode issuer public key>
|
||||
|
||||
the public key in the certificate SubjectPublicKeyInfo could not be read.
|
||||
The public key in the certificate C<SubjectPublicKeyInfo> field could
|
||||
not be read.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: certificate signature failure>
|
||||
|
||||
the signature of the certificate is invalid.
|
||||
The signature of the certificate is invalid.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: CRL signature failure>
|
||||
|
||||
the signature of the certificate is invalid.
|
||||
The signature of the certificate is invalid.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID: certificate is not yet valid>
|
||||
|
||||
the certificate is not yet valid: the notBefore date is after the current time.
|
||||
The certificate is not yet valid: the C<notBefore> date is after the
|
||||
current time.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED: certificate has expired>
|
||||
|
||||
the certificate has expired: that is the notAfter date is before the current time.
|
||||
The certificate has expired: that is the C<notAfter> date is before the
|
||||
current time.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID: CRL is not yet valid>
|
||||
|
||||
the CRL is not yet valid.
|
||||
The CRL is not yet valid.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED: CRL has expired>
|
||||
|
||||
the CRL has expired.
|
||||
The CRL has expired.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD: format error in certificate's notBefore field>
|
||||
|
||||
the certificate notBefore field contains an invalid time.
|
||||
The certificate B<notBefore> field contains an invalid time.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD: format error in certificate's notAfter field>
|
||||
|
||||
the certificate notAfter field contains an invalid time.
|
||||
The certificate B<notAfter> field contains an invalid time.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD: format error in CRL's lastUpdate field>
|
||||
|
||||
the CRL lastUpdate field contains an invalid time.
|
||||
The CRL B<lastUpdate> field contains an invalid time.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD: format error in CRL's nextUpdate field>
|
||||
|
||||
the CRL nextUpdate field contains an invalid time.
|
||||
The CRL B<nextUpdate> field contains an invalid time.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM: out of memory>
|
||||
|
||||
an error occurred trying to allocate memory. This should never happen.
|
||||
An error occurred trying to allocate memory.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT: self signed certificate>
|
||||
|
||||
the passed certificate is self signed and the same certificate cannot be found
|
||||
The passed certificate is self-signed and the same certificate cannot be found
|
||||
in the list of trusted certificates.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN: self signed certificate in certificate chain>
|
||||
|
||||
the certificate chain could be built up using the untrusted certificates but
|
||||
The certificate chain could be built up using the untrusted certificates but
|
||||
the root could not be found locally.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY: unable to get local issuer certificate>
|
||||
|
||||
the issuer certificate could not be found: this occurs if the issuer certificate
|
||||
The issuer certificate could not be found: this occurs if the issuer certificate
|
||||
of an untrusted certificate cannot be found.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE: unable to verify the first certificate>
|
||||
|
||||
no signatures could be verified because the chain contains only one certificate
|
||||
No signatures could be verified because the chain contains only one certificate
|
||||
and it is not self signed.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG: certificate chain too long>
|
||||
|
||||
the certificate chain length is greater than the supplied maximum depth. Unused.
|
||||
The certificate chain length is greater than the supplied maximum depth. Unused.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED: certificate revoked>
|
||||
|
||||
the certificate has been revoked.
|
||||
The certificate has been revoked.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA: invalid CA certificate>
|
||||
|
||||
a CA certificate is invalid. Either it is not a CA or its extensions are not
|
||||
A CA certificate is invalid. Either it is not a CA or its extensions are not
|
||||
consistent with the supplied purpose.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED: path length constraint exceeded>
|
||||
|
||||
the basicConstraints path-length parameter has been exceeded.
|
||||
The basicConstraints path-length parameter has been exceeded.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE: unsupported certificate purpose>
|
||||
|
||||
the supplied certificate cannot be used for the specified purpose.
|
||||
The supplied certificate cannot be used for the specified purpose.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED: certificate not trusted>
|
||||
|
||||
the root CA is not marked as trusted for the specified purpose.
|
||||
The root CA is not marked as trusted for the specified purpose.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED: certificate rejected>
|
||||
|
||||
the root CA is marked to reject the specified purpose.
|
||||
The root CA is marked to reject the specified purpose.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH: subject issuer mismatch>
|
||||
|
||||
the current candidate issuer certificate was rejected because its subject name
|
||||
did not match the issuer name of the current certificate. This is only set
|
||||
if issuer check debugging is enabled it is used for status notification and
|
||||
is B<not> in itself an error.
|
||||
The current candidate issuer certificate was rejected because its subject name
|
||||
did not match the issuer name of the current certificate.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_AKID_SKID_MISMATCH: authority and subject key identifier mismatch>
|
||||
|
||||
the current candidate issuer certificate was rejected because its subject key
|
||||
The current candidate issuer certificate was rejected because its subject key
|
||||
identifier was present and did not match the authority key identifier current
|
||||
certificate. This is only set if issuer check debugging is enabled it is used
|
||||
for status notification and is B<not> in itself an error.
|
||||
certificate.
|
||||
Not used as of OpenSSL 1.1.0.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH: authority and issuer serial number mismatch>
|
||||
|
||||
the current candidate issuer certificate was rejected because its issuer name
|
||||
The current candidate issuer certificate was rejected because its issuer name
|
||||
and serial number was present and did not match the authority key identifier of
|
||||
the current certificate. This is only set if issuer check debugging is enabled
|
||||
it is used for status notification and is B<not> in itself an error.
|
||||
the current certificate.
|
||||
Not used as of OpenSSL 1.1.0.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CERTSIGN:key usage does not include certificate signing>
|
||||
|
||||
the current candidate issuer certificate was rejected because its keyUsage
|
||||
extension does not permit certificate signing. This is only set if issuer check
|
||||
debugging is enabled it is used for status notification and is B<not> in itself
|
||||
an error.
|
||||
The current candidate issuer certificate was rejected because its B<keyUsage>
|
||||
extension does not permit certificate signing.
|
||||
Not used as of OpenSSL 1.1.0.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION: invalid or inconsistent certificate extension>
|
||||
|
||||
A certificate extension had an invalid value (for example an incorrect
|
||||
encoding) or some value inconsistent with other extensions.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION: invalid or inconsistent certificate policy extension>
|
||||
|
||||
A certificate policies extension had an invalid value (for example an incorrect
|
||||
@ -301,8 +304,121 @@ happen if extended CRL checking is enabled.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION: application verification failure>
|
||||
|
||||
an application specific error. This will never be returned unless explicitly
|
||||
set by an application.
|
||||
An application specific error. This will never be returned unless explicitly
|
||||
set by an application callback.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER: unable to get CRL issuer certificate>
|
||||
|
||||
Unable to get CRL issuer certificate.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION: unhandled critical extension>
|
||||
|
||||
Unhandled critical extension.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN: key usage does not include CRL signing>
|
||||
|
||||
Key usage does not include CRL signing.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION: unhandled critical CRL extension>
|
||||
|
||||
Unhandled critical CRL extension.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA: invalid non-CA certificate (has CA markings)>
|
||||
|
||||
Invalid non-CA certificate has CA markings.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED: proxy path length contraint exceeded>
|
||||
|
||||
Proxy path length constraint exceeded.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE: key usage does not include digital signature>
|
||||
|
||||
Key usage does not include digital signature, and therefore cannot sign
|
||||
certificates.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED: proxy certificates not allowed, please set the appropriate flag>
|
||||
|
||||
Proxy certificates not allowed unless the B<-allow_proxy_certs> option is used.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNNESTED_RESOURCE: RFC 3779 resource not subset of parent's resrouces>
|
||||
|
||||
See RFC 3779 for details.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX: unsupported or invalid name syntax>
|
||||
|
||||
Unsupported or invalid name syntax.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_PATH_LOOP: path loop>
|
||||
|
||||
Path loop.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH: hostname mismatch>
|
||||
|
||||
Hostname mismatch.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH: email address mismatch>
|
||||
|
||||
Email address mismatch.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH: IP address mismatch>
|
||||
|
||||
IP address mismatch.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH: no matching DANE TLSA records>
|
||||
|
||||
DANE TLSA authentication is enabled, but no TLSA records matched the
|
||||
certificate chain.
|
||||
This error is only possible in L<openssl-s_client(1)>.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL: EE certificate key too weak>
|
||||
|
||||
EE certificate key too weak.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL: CA certificate key too weak>
|
||||
|
||||
CA certificate key too weak.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK: CA signature digest algorithm too weak>
|
||||
|
||||
CA signature digest algorithm too weak.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL: invalid certificate verification context>
|
||||
|
||||
invalid certificate verification context.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP: issuer certificate lookup error>
|
||||
|
||||
Issuer certificate lookup error.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_NO_VALID_SCTS: certificate transparency required, but no valid SCTs found>
|
||||
|
||||
Certificate Transparency required, but no valid SCTs found.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION: proxy subject name violation>
|
||||
|
||||
Proxy subject name violation.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_OCSP_VERIFY_NEEDED: OCSP verification needed>
|
||||
|
||||
Returned by the verify callback to indicate an OCSP verification is needed.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_OCSP_VERIFY_FAILED: OCSP verification failed>
|
||||
|
||||
Returned by the verify callback to indicate OCSP verification failed.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_OCSP_CERT_UNKNOWN: OCSP unknown cert>
|
||||
|
||||
Returned by the verify callback to indicate that the certificate is not
|
||||
recognized by the OCSP responder.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<509_V_ERROR_NO_ISSUER_PUBLI_KEY, issuer certificate doesn't have a public key>
|
||||
|
||||
The issuer certificate does not have a public key.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<X509_V_ERROR_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH, Subject signature algorithm and issuer public key algoritm mismatch>
|
||||
|
||||
The issuer's public key is not of the type required by the signature in
|
||||
the subject's certificate.
|
||||
|
||||
=back
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -16,17 +16,6 @@ The X509_verify_cert() function attempts to discover and validate a
|
||||
certificate chain based on parameters in B<ctx>. A complete description of
|
||||
the process is contained in the L<openssl-verify(1)> manual page.
|
||||
|
||||
=head1 RETURN VALUES
|
||||
|
||||
If a complete chain can be built and validated this function returns 1,
|
||||
otherwise it return zero, in exceptional circumstances it can also
|
||||
return a negative code.
|
||||
|
||||
If the function fails additional error information can be obtained by
|
||||
examining B<ctx> using, for example X509_STORE_CTX_get_error().
|
||||
|
||||
=head1 NOTES
|
||||
|
||||
Applications rarely call this function directly but it is used by
|
||||
OpenSSL internally for certificate validation, in both the S/MIME and
|
||||
SSL/TLS code.
|
||||
@ -39,10 +28,20 @@ a retry operation is requested during internal lookups (which never happens
|
||||
with standard lookup methods).
|
||||
Applications must check for <= 0 return value on error.
|
||||
|
||||
=head1 RETURN VALUES
|
||||
|
||||
If a complete chain can be built and validated this function returns 1,
|
||||
otherwise it return zero, in exceptional circumstances it can also
|
||||
return a negative code.
|
||||
|
||||
If the function fails additional error information can be obtained by
|
||||
examining B<ctx> using, for example X509_STORE_CTX_get_error().
|
||||
|
||||
=head1 BUGS
|
||||
|
||||
This function uses the header B<x509.h> as opposed to most chain verification
|
||||
functions which use B<x509_vfy.h>.
|
||||
This function uses the header F<< <x509.h> >>
|
||||
as opposed to most chain verification
|
||||
functions which use F<< <x509_vfy.h> >>.
|
||||
|
||||
=head1 SEE ALSO
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -10,7 +10,9 @@
|
||||
|
||||
# Verify options
|
||||
$OpenSSL::safe::opt_v_synopsis = ""
|
||||
. "[B<-allow_proxy_certs>]\n"
|
||||
. "[B<-attime> I<timestamp>]\n"
|
||||
. "[B<-no_check_time>]\n"
|
||||
. "[B<-check_ss_sig>]\n"
|
||||
. "[B<-crl_check>]\n"
|
||||
. "[B<-crl_check_all>]\n"
|
||||
@ -36,10 +38,10 @@ $OpenSSL::safe::opt_v_synopsis = ""
|
||||
. "[B<-verify_hostname> I<hostname>]\n"
|
||||
. "[B<-verify_ip> I<ip>]\n"
|
||||
. "[B<-verify_name> I<name>]\n"
|
||||
. "[B<-x509_strict>]\n"
|
||||
. "[B<-certfile> I<file>]";
|
||||
. "[B<-x509_strict>]\n";
|
||||
$OpenSSL::safe::opt_v_item = ""
|
||||
. "=item B<-attime>, B<-check_ss_sig>, B<-crl_check>, B<-crl_check_all>,\n"
|
||||
. "=item B<-allow_proxy_certs>, B<-attime>, B<-no_check_time>,\n"
|
||||
. "B<-check_ss_sig>, B<-crl_check>, B<-crl_check_all>,\n"
|
||||
. "B<-explicit_policy>, B<-extended_crl>, B<-ignore_critical>, B<-inhibit_any>,\n"
|
||||
. "B<-inhibit_map>, B<-no_alt_chains>, B<-partial_chain>, B<-policy>,\n"
|
||||
. "B<-policy_check>, B<-policy_print>, B<-purpose>, B<-suiteB_128>,\n"
|
||||
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user