Move session version consistency check

Make sure the session version consistency check is inside
ssl_get_prev_session(). Also fixes a bug where an inconsistent version can
cause a seg fault in TLSv1.3.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2259)
This commit is contained in:
Matt Caswell 2017-01-19 10:46:53 +00:00
parent b3ad72ce1d
commit 128ae27692
2 changed files with 8 additions and 27 deletions

View File

@ -556,6 +556,10 @@ int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
/* Now ret is non-NULL and we own one of its reference counts. */
/* Check TLS version consistency */
if (ret->ssl_version != s->version)
goto err;
if (ret->sid_ctx_length != s->sid_ctx_length
|| memcmp(ret->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, ret->sid_ctx_length)) {
/*
@ -606,23 +610,6 @@ int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
goto err;
}
/*
* TODO(TLS1.3): This is temporary, because TLSv1.3 resumption is completely
* different. For now though we're still using the old resumption logic, so
* to avoid test failures we need this. Remove this code!
*
* Check TLS version consistency. We can't resume <=TLSv1.2 session if we
* have negotiated TLSv1.3, and vice versa.
*/
if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)
&& ((ret->ssl_version <= TLS1_2_VERSION
&& s->version >=TLS1_3_VERSION)
|| (ret->ssl_version >= TLS1_3_VERSION
&& s->version <= TLS1_2_VERSION))) {
/* Continue but do not resume */
goto err;
}
/* Check extended master secret extension consistency */
if (ret->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS) {
/* If old session includes extms, but new does not: abort handshake */
@ -651,6 +638,9 @@ int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
err:
if (ret != NULL) {
SSL_SESSION_free(ret);
/* In TLSv1.3 we already set s->session, so better NULL it out */
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
s->session = NULL;
if (!try_session_cache) {
/*

View File

@ -1476,16 +1476,7 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
goto err;
} else {
i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, &clienthello);
/*
* Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
* version.
* RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
* with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
* the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
* In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
* will abort the handshake with an error.
*/
if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) {
if (i == 1) {
/* previous session */
s->hit = 1;
} else if (i == -1) {