Allow ignoring unknown sigalgs and groups in the configuration

Related to #20789

Signature algorithms and groups in the configuration that are
preceded with ? character and are unknown to libssl are just ignored.
The handling for them is similar to handling of ciphers.
I.e., there should be a failure only in case the configuration produces
no valid sigalgs or groups.

Also ignore duplicate sigalgs and groups as such confiuration errors
should not be fatal.

Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23050)
This commit is contained in:
Tomas Mraz 2023-12-14 17:08:56 +01:00 committed by Dmitry Belyavskiy
parent d6d9277b2e
commit 10f65f7282

View File

@ -1044,9 +1044,15 @@ static int gid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
size_t i;
uint16_t gid = 0;
char etmp[GROUP_NAME_BUFFER_LENGTH];
int ignore_unknown = 0;
if (elem == NULL)
return 0;
if (elem[0] == '?') {
ignore_unknown = 1;
++elem;
--len;
}
if (garg->gidcnt == garg->gidmax) {
uint16_t *tmp =
OPENSSL_realloc(garg->gid_arr,
@ -1063,13 +1069,14 @@ static int gid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
gid = tls1_group_name2id(garg->ctx, etmp);
if (gid == 0) {
ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT,
"group '%s' cannot be set", etmp);
return 0;
/* Unknown group - ignore, if ignore_unknown */
return ignore_unknown;
}
for (i = 0; i < garg->gidcnt; i++)
if (garg->gid_arr[i] == gid)
return 0;
if (garg->gid_arr[i] == gid) {
/* Duplicate group - ignore */
return 1;
}
garg->gid_arr[garg->gidcnt++] = gid;
return 1;
}
@ -1090,6 +1097,11 @@ int tls1_set_groups_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen,
gcb.ctx = ctx;
if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, gid_cb, &gcb))
goto end;
if (gcb.gidcnt == 0) {
ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT,
"No valid groups in '%s'", str);
goto end;
}
if (pext == NULL) {
ret = 1;
goto end;
@ -2870,8 +2882,15 @@ static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
char etmp[TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN], *p;
int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
int ignore_unknown = 0;
if (elem == NULL)
return 0;
if (elem[0] == '?') {
ignore_unknown = 1;
++elem;
--len;
}
if (sarg->sigalgcnt == TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT)
return 0;
if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
@ -2896,8 +2915,10 @@ static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
break;
}
}
if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
return 0;
if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl)) {
/* Ignore unknown algorithms if ignore_unknown */
return ignore_unknown;
}
} else {
*p = 0;
p++;
@ -2905,8 +2926,10 @@ static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
return 0;
get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
return 0;
if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef) {
/* Ignore unknown algorithms if ignore_unknown */
return ignore_unknown;
}
for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
i++, s++) {
if (s->hash == hash_alg && s->sig == sig_alg) {
@ -2914,15 +2937,17 @@ static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
break;
}
}
if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
return 0;
if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl)) {
/* Ignore unknown algorithms if ignore_unknown */
return ignore_unknown;
}
}
/* Reject duplicates */
/* Ignore duplicates */
for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt - 1; i++) {
if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt - 1]) {
sarg->sigalgcnt--;
return 0;
return 1;
}
}
return 1;
@ -2938,6 +2963,11 @@ int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
sig.sigalgcnt = 0;
if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
return 0;
if (sig.sigalgcnt == 0) {
ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT,
"No valid signature algorithms in '%s'", str);
return 0;
}
if (c == NULL)
return 1;
return tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);