mirror of
https://github.com/openssl/openssl.git
synced 2025-02-17 14:32:04 +08:00
GH601: Various spelling fixes.
Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
This commit is contained in:
parent
2b52de9a37
commit
0d4fb84390
12
CHANGES
12
CHANGES
@ -2750,7 +2750,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
*) New option -sigopt to dgst utility. Update dgst to use
|
||||
EVP_Digest{Sign,Verify}*. These two changes make it possible to use
|
||||
alternative signing paramaters such as X9.31 or PSS in the dgst
|
||||
alternative signing parameters such as X9.31 or PSS in the dgst
|
||||
utility.
|
||||
[Steve Henson]
|
||||
|
||||
@ -3957,7 +3957,7 @@
|
||||
unofficial, and the ID has long expired.
|
||||
[Bodo Moeller]
|
||||
|
||||
*) Fix RSA blinding Heisenbug (problems sometimes occured on
|
||||
*) Fix RSA blinding Heisenbug (problems sometimes occurred on
|
||||
dual-core machines) and other potential thread-safety issues.
|
||||
[Bodo Moeller]
|
||||
|
||||
@ -4972,7 +4972,7 @@
|
||||
unofficial, and the ID has long expired.
|
||||
[Bodo Moeller]
|
||||
|
||||
*) Fix RSA blinding Heisenbug (problems sometimes occured on
|
||||
*) Fix RSA blinding Heisenbug (problems sometimes occurred on
|
||||
dual-core machines) and other potential thread-safety issues.
|
||||
[Bodo Moeller]
|
||||
|
||||
@ -5077,7 +5077,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
*) Added support for proxy certificates according to RFC 3820.
|
||||
Because they may be a security thread to unaware applications,
|
||||
they must be explicitely allowed in run-time. See
|
||||
they must be explicitly allowed in run-time. See
|
||||
docs/HOWTO/proxy_certificates.txt for further information.
|
||||
[Richard Levitte]
|
||||
|
||||
@ -7654,7 +7654,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
|
||||
|
||||
*) Fix ssl/s3_enc.c, ssl/t1_enc.c and ssl/s3_pkt.c so that we don't
|
||||
reveal whether illegal block cipher padding was found or a MAC
|
||||
verification error occured. (Neither SSLerr() codes nor alerts
|
||||
verification error occurred. (Neither SSLerr() codes nor alerts
|
||||
are directly visible to potential attackers, but the information
|
||||
may leak via logfiles.)
|
||||
|
||||
@ -10061,7 +10061,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
|
||||
*) Bugfix: ssl23_get_client_hello did not work properly when called in
|
||||
state SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B, i.e. when the first 7 bytes of
|
||||
a SSLv2-compatible client hello for SSLv3 or TLSv1 could be read,
|
||||
but a retry condition occured while trying to read the rest.
|
||||
but a retry condition occurred while trying to read the rest.
|
||||
[Bodo Moeller]
|
||||
|
||||
*) The PKCS7_ENC_CONTENT_new() function was setting the content type as
|
||||
|
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
||||
@echo off
|
||||
|
||||
rem ========================================================================
|
||||
rem Batch file to assist in setting up the necessary enviroment for
|
||||
rem Batch file to assist in setting up the necessary environment for
|
||||
rem building OpenSSL for NetWare.
|
||||
rem
|
||||
rem usage:
|
||||
@ -84,10 +84,10 @@ echo using GNU GCC Compiler
|
||||
:info
|
||||
echo.
|
||||
|
||||
if "%LIBC_BUILD%" == "Y" echo Enviroment configured for LibC build
|
||||
if "%LIBC_BUILD%" == "Y" echo Environment configured for LibC build
|
||||
if "%LIBC_BUILD%" == "Y" echo use "netware\build.bat netware-libc ..."
|
||||
|
||||
if "%CLIB_BUILD%" == "Y" echo Enviroment configured for CLib build
|
||||
if "%CLIB_BUILD%" == "Y" echo Environment configured for CLib build
|
||||
if "%CLIB_BUILD%" == "Y" echo use "netware\build.bat netware-clib ..."
|
||||
|
||||
goto end
|
||||
|
@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ OPTIONS dgst_options[] = {
|
||||
{"debug", OPT_DEBUG, '-'},
|
||||
{"fips-fingerprint", OPT_FIPS_FINGERPRINT, '-'},
|
||||
{"hmac", OPT_HMAC, 's', "Create hashed MAC with key"},
|
||||
{"mac", OPT_MAC, 's', "Create MAC (not neccessarily HMAC)"},
|
||||
{"mac", OPT_MAC, 's', "Create MAC (not necessarily HMAC)"},
|
||||
{"sigopt", OPT_SIGOPT, 's', "Signature parameter in n:v form"},
|
||||
{"macopt", OPT_MACOPT, 's', "MAC algorithm parameters in n:v form or key"},
|
||||
{"", OPT_DIGEST, '-', "Any supported digest"},
|
||||
|
@ -831,7 +831,7 @@ static STRINT_PAIR chain_flags[] = {
|
||||
{"CA signature", CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE},
|
||||
{"EE key parameters", CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM},
|
||||
{"CA key parameters", CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM},
|
||||
{"Explicity sign with EE key", CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN},
|
||||
{"Explicitly sign with EE key", CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN},
|
||||
{"Issuer Name", CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME},
|
||||
{"Certificate Type", CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE},
|
||||
{NULL}
|
||||
|
@ -767,7 +767,7 @@ _armv4_AES_set_enc2dec_key:
|
||||
ldr $rounds,[r0,#240]
|
||||
mov $i1,r0 @ input
|
||||
add $i2,r0,$rounds,lsl#4
|
||||
mov $key,r1 @ ouput
|
||||
mov $key,r1 @ output
|
||||
add $tbl,r1,$rounds,lsl#4
|
||||
str $rounds,[r1,#240]
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -566,7 +566,7 @@ __set_encrypt_key:
|
||||
NOP
|
||||
|
||||
BNOP RA,5
|
||||
|| MVK -2,RET ; unknown bit lenght
|
||||
|| MVK -2,RET ; unknown bit length
|
||||
|| MVK 0,B0 ; redundant
|
||||
;;====================================================================
|
||||
;;====================================================================
|
||||
|
@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ static size_t i2c_ibuf(const unsigned char *b, size_t blen, int neg,
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* convert content octets into a big endian buffer. Returns the length
|
||||
* of buffer or 0 on error: for malformed INTEGER. If output bufer is
|
||||
* of buffer or 0 on error: for malformed INTEGER. If output buffer is
|
||||
* NULL just return length.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -364,7 +364,7 @@ static int asn1_output_data(BIO *out, BIO *data, ASN1_VALUE *val, int flags,
|
||||
int rv = 1;
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* If data is not deteched or resigning then the output BIO is already
|
||||
* If data is not detached or resigning then the output BIO is already
|
||||
* set up to finalise when it is written through.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (!(flags & SMIME_DETACHED) || (flags & PKCS7_REUSE_DIGEST)) {
|
||||
|
@ -59,7 +59,7 @@
|
||||
#include <openssl/conf.h>
|
||||
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
|
||||
|
||||
/* Multi string module: add table enstries from a given section */
|
||||
/* Multi string module: add table entries from a given section */
|
||||
|
||||
static int do_tcreate(char *value, char *name);
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -984,7 +984,7 @@ static int asn1_find_end(const unsigned char **in, long len, char inf)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* This function collects the asn1 data from a constructred string type into
|
||||
* This function collects the asn1 data from a constructed string type into
|
||||
* a buffer. The values of 'in' and 'len' should refer to the contents of the
|
||||
* constructed type and 'inf' should be set if it is indefinite length.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ int BIO_sock_init(void)
|
||||
memset(&wsa_state, 0, sizeof(wsa_state));
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Not making wsa_state available to the rest of the code is formally
|
||||
* wrong. But the structures we use are [beleived to be] invariable
|
||||
* wrong. But the structures we use are [believed to be] invariable
|
||||
* among Winsock DLLs, while API availability is [expected to be]
|
||||
* probed at run-time with DSO_global_lookup.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ static void dgram_adjust_rcv_timeout(BIO *b)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Adjust socket timeout if next handhake message timer will expire
|
||||
* Adjust socket timeout if next handshake message timer will expire
|
||||
* earlier.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if ((data->socket_timeout.tv_sec == 0
|
||||
|
@ -196,8 +196,8 @@ BIO *BIO_new_fp(FILE *stream, int close_flag)
|
||||
if ((ret = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL)
|
||||
return (NULL);
|
||||
|
||||
BIO_set_flags(ret, BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK); /* redundant, left for
|
||||
* documentation puposes */
|
||||
/* redundant flag, left for documentation purposes */
|
||||
BIO_set_flags(ret, BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK);
|
||||
BIO_set_fp(ret, stream, close_flag);
|
||||
return (ret);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
@ -495,7 +495,7 @@ bn_sqr_words:
|
||||
// scalability. The decision will very likely be reconsidered after the
|
||||
// benchmark program is profiled. I.e. if perfomance gain on Itanium
|
||||
// will appear larger than loss on "wider" IA-64, then the loop should
|
||||
// be explicitely split and the epilogue compressed.
|
||||
// be explicitly split and the epilogue compressed.
|
||||
.L_bn_sqr_words_ctop:
|
||||
{ .mfi; (p16) ldf8 f32=[r33],8
|
||||
(p25) xmpy.lu f42=f41,f41
|
||||
|
@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ $fp="%r3";
|
||||
$hi1="%r2";
|
||||
$hi0="%r1";
|
||||
|
||||
$xfer=$n0; # accomodates [-16..15] offset in fld[dw]s
|
||||
$xfer=$n0; # accommodates [-16..15] offset in fld[dw]s
|
||||
|
||||
$fm0="%fr4"; $fti=$fm0;
|
||||
$fbi="%fr5L";
|
||||
|
@ -1671,7 +1671,7 @@ ___
|
||||
{ # __rsaz_512_mul
|
||||
#
|
||||
# input: %rsi - ap, %rbp - bp
|
||||
# ouput:
|
||||
# output:
|
||||
# clobbers: everything
|
||||
my ($ap,$bp) = ("%rsi","%rbp");
|
||||
$code.=<<___;
|
||||
@ -1823,7 +1823,7 @@ if ($addx) {
|
||||
# __rsaz_512_mulx
|
||||
#
|
||||
# input: %rsi - ap, %rbp - bp
|
||||
# ouput:
|
||||
# output:
|
||||
# clobbers: everything
|
||||
my ($ap,$bp,$zero) = ("%rsi","%rbp","%rdi");
|
||||
$code.=<<___;
|
||||
|
@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ BIGNUM *int_bn_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *in,
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Binary inversion algorithm; requires odd modulus. This is faster
|
||||
* than the general algorithm if the modulus is sufficiently small
|
||||
* (about 400 .. 500 bits on 32-bit sytems, but much more on 64-bit
|
||||
* (about 400 .. 500 bits on 32-bit systems, but much more on 64-bit
|
||||
* systems)
|
||||
*/
|
||||
int shift;
|
||||
|
@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ int BN_kronecker(const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
|
||||
goto end;
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Kronecker symbol, imlemented according to Henri Cohen,
|
||||
* Kronecker symbol, implemented according to Henri Cohen,
|
||||
* "A Course in Computational Algebraic Number Theory"
|
||||
* (algorithm 1.4.10).
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
@ -330,7 +330,7 @@ static BN_ULONG *bn_expand_internal(const BIGNUM *b, int words)
|
||||
* The fact that the loop is unrolled
|
||||
* 4-wise is a tribute to Intel. It's
|
||||
* the one that doesn't have enough
|
||||
* registers to accomodate more data.
|
||||
* registers to accommodate more data.
|
||||
* I'd unroll it 8-wise otherwise:-)
|
||||
*
|
||||
* <appro@fy.chalmers.se>
|
||||
|
@ -69,7 +69,7 @@
|
||||
* Here follows specialised variants of bn_add_words() and bn_sub_words().
|
||||
* They have the property performing operations on arrays of different sizes.
|
||||
* The sizes of those arrays is expressed through cl, which is the common
|
||||
* length ( basicall, min(len(a),len(b)) ), and dl, which is the delta
|
||||
* length ( basically, min(len(a),len(b)) ), and dl, which is the delta
|
||||
* between the two lengths, calculated as len(a)-len(b). All lengths are the
|
||||
* number of BN_ULONGs... For the operations that require a result array as
|
||||
* parameter, it must have the length cl+abs(dl). These functions should
|
||||
|
@ -644,7 +644,7 @@ int BN_nist_mod_224(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *field,
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
} else if (carry < 0) {
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* it's a bit more comlicated logic in this case. if bn_add_words
|
||||
* it's a bit more complicated logic in this case. if bn_add_words
|
||||
* yields no carry, then result has to be adjusted by unconditionally
|
||||
* *adding* the modulus. but if it does, then result has to be
|
||||
* compared to the modulus and conditionally adjusted by
|
||||
|
@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ static int bn_x931_derive_pi(BIGNUM *pi, const BIGNUM *Xpi, BN_CTX *ctx,
|
||||
for (;;) {
|
||||
i++;
|
||||
BN_GENCB_call(cb, 0, i);
|
||||
/* NB 27 MR is specificed in X9.31 */
|
||||
/* NB 27 MR is specified in X9.31 */
|
||||
if (BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(pi, 27, ctx, 1, cb))
|
||||
break;
|
||||
if (!BN_add_word(pi, 2))
|
||||
|
@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ int CMAC_Init(CMAC_CTX *ctx, const void *key, size_t keylen,
|
||||
ctx->nlast_block = 0;
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* Initialiase context */
|
||||
/* Initialise context */
|
||||
if (cipher && !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx->cctx, cipher, impl, NULL, NULL))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
/* Non-NULL key means initialisation complete */
|
||||
@ -257,9 +257,9 @@ int CMAC_resume(CMAC_CTX *ctx)
|
||||
if (ctx->nlast_block == -1)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* The buffer "tbl" containes the last fully encrypted block which is the
|
||||
* The buffer "tbl" contains the last fully encrypted block which is the
|
||||
* last IV (or all zeroes if no last encrypted block). The last block has
|
||||
* not been modified since CMAC_final(). So reinitliasing using the last
|
||||
* not been modified since CMAC_final(). So reinitialising using the last
|
||||
* decrypted block will allow CMAC to continue after calling
|
||||
* CMAC_Final().
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
@ -422,7 +422,7 @@ int cms_RecipientInfo_kari_encrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
|
||||
if (!cms_wrap_init(kari, ec->cipher))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* If no orignator key set up initialise for ephemeral key the public key
|
||||
* If no originator key set up initialise for ephemeral key the public key
|
||||
* ASN1 structure will set the actual public key value.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (kari->originator->type == -1) {
|
||||
|
@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ int CMS_dataFinal(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, BIO *cmsbio)
|
||||
ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pos = CMS_get0_content(cms);
|
||||
if (!pos)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
/* If ebmedded content find memory BIO and set content */
|
||||
/* If embedded content find memory BIO and set content */
|
||||
if (*pos && ((*pos)->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_CONT)) {
|
||||
BIO *mbio;
|
||||
unsigned char *cont;
|
||||
|
@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ static CMS_SignedData *cms_signed_data_init(CMS_ContentInfo *cms)
|
||||
return cms_get0_signed(cms);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Just initialize SignedData e.g. for certs only structure */
|
||||
/* Just initialise SignedData e.g. for certs only structure */
|
||||
|
||||
int CMS_SignedData_init(CMS_ContentInfo *cms)
|
||||
{
|
||||
@ -351,7 +351,7 @@ CMS_SignerInfo *CMS_add1_signer(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
if (!(flags & CMS_NOATTR)) {
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Initialialize signed attributes strutucture so other attributes
|
||||
* Initialize signed attributes structure so other attributes
|
||||
* such as signing time etc are added later even if we add none here.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (!si->signedAttrs) {
|
||||
@ -593,7 +593,7 @@ static int cms_SignerInfo_content_sign(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
|
||||
|
||||
if (!cms_DigestAlgorithm_find_ctx(mctx, chain, si->digestAlgorithm))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
/* Set SignerInfo algortihm details if we used custom parametsr */
|
||||
/* Set SignerInfo algorithm details if we used custom parameter */
|
||||
if (si->pctx && !cms_sd_asn1_ctrl(si, 0))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ static int zlib_stateful_expand_block(COMP_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
|
||||
unsigned int olen, unsigned char *in,
|
||||
unsigned int ilen);
|
||||
|
||||
/* memory allocations functions for zlib intialization */
|
||||
/* memory allocations functions for zlib initialisation */
|
||||
static void *zlib_zalloc(void *opaque, unsigned int no, unsigned int size)
|
||||
{
|
||||
void *p;
|
||||
|
@ -59,7 +59,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* The input and output are loaded in multiples of 8 bits. What this means is
|
||||
* that if you hame numbits=12 and length=2 the first 12 bits will be
|
||||
* that if you have numbits=12 and length=2 the first 12 bits will be
|
||||
* retrieved from the first byte and half the second. The second 12 bits
|
||||
* will come from the 3rd and half the 4th byte.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ static int dh_pub_encode(X509_PUBKEY *pk, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* PKCS#8 DH is defined in PKCS#11 of all places. It is similar to DH in that
|
||||
* the AlgorithmIdentifier contains the parameters, the private key is
|
||||
* explcitly included and the pubkey must be recalculated.
|
||||
* explicitly included and the pubkey must be recalculated.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
static int dh_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8)
|
||||
@ -861,7 +861,7 @@ static int dh_cms_encrypt(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
|
||||
V_ASN1_UNDEF, NULL);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* See if custom paraneters set */
|
||||
/* See if custom parameters set */
|
||||
kdf_type = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_dh_kdf_type(pctx);
|
||||
if (kdf_type <= 0)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
|
@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ int i2d_int_dhx(const int_dhx942_dh *a, unsigned char **pp);
|
||||
|
||||
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const_fname(int_dhx942_dh, DHxparams, int_dhx)
|
||||
|
||||
/* Application leve function: read in X9.42 DH parameters into DH structure */
|
||||
/* Application public function: read in X9.42 DH parameters into DH structure */
|
||||
|
||||
DH *d2i_DHxparams(DH **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length)
|
||||
{
|
||||
|
@ -257,7 +257,7 @@ static int dh_bn_mod_exp(const DH *dh, BIGNUM *r,
|
||||
{
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* If a is only one word long and constant time is false, use the faster
|
||||
* exponenentiation function.
|
||||
* exponentiation function.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (bn_get_top(a) == 1 && ((dh->flags & DH_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME) != 0)) {
|
||||
BN_ULONG A = bn_get_words(a)[0];
|
||||
|
@ -375,7 +375,7 @@ int dsa_builtin_paramgen2(DSA *ret, size_t L, size_t N,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
mdsize = EVP_MD_size(evpmd);
|
||||
/* If unverificable g generation only don't need seed */
|
||||
/* If unverifiable g generation only don't need seed */
|
||||
if (!ret->p || !ret->q || idx >= 0) {
|
||||
if (seed_len == 0)
|
||||
seed_len = mdsize;
|
||||
|
@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ const unsigned char os_toebcdic[256] = {
|
||||
* systems. It is a modified version of the BS2000 table.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Bijective EBCDIC (character set IBM-1047) to US-ASCII table: This table is
|
||||
* bijective - there are no ambigous or duplicate characters.
|
||||
* bijective - there are no ambiguous or duplicate characters.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
const unsigned char os_toascii[256] = {
|
||||
0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x85, 0x09, 0x86, 0x7f, /* 00-0f: */
|
||||
|
@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
|
||||
___
|
||||
|
||||
{
|
||||
# This function recieves a pointer to an array of four affine points
|
||||
# This function receives a pointer to an array of four affine points
|
||||
# (X, Y, <1>) and rearanges the data for AVX2 execution, while
|
||||
# converting it to 2^29 radix redundant form
|
||||
|
||||
@ -301,7 +301,7 @@ ___
|
||||
}
|
||||
{
|
||||
################################################################################
|
||||
# This function recieves a pointer to an array of four AVX2 formatted points
|
||||
# This function receives a pointer to an array of four AVX2 formatted points
|
||||
# (X, Y, Z) convert the data to normal representation, and rearanges the data
|
||||
|
||||
my ($D0,$D1,$D2,$D3, $D4,$D5,$D6,$D7, $D8)=map("%ymm$_",(0..8));
|
||||
|
@ -819,7 +819,7 @@ static int ecdh_cms_encrypt(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
|
||||
V_ASN1_UNDEF, NULL);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* See if custom paraneters set */
|
||||
/* See if custom parameters set */
|
||||
kdf_type = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_ecdh_kdf_type(pctx);
|
||||
if (kdf_type <= 0)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
@ -838,7 +838,7 @@ static int ecdh_cms_encrypt(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
|
||||
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ecdh_kdf_type(pctx, kdf_type) <= 0)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
} else
|
||||
/* Uknown KDF */
|
||||
/* Unknown KDF */
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
if (kdf_md == NULL) {
|
||||
/* Fixme later for better MD */
|
||||
|
@ -645,7 +645,7 @@ ECPKPARAMETERS *ec_asn1_group2pkparameters(const EC_GROUP *group,
|
||||
if ((ret->value.named_curve = OBJ_nid2obj(tmp)) == NULL)
|
||||
ok = 0;
|
||||
} else
|
||||
/* we don't kmow the nid => ERROR */
|
||||
/* we don't know the nid => ERROR */
|
||||
ok = 0;
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
/* use the ECPARAMETERS structure */
|
||||
@ -1189,7 +1189,7 @@ EC_KEY *o2i_ECPublicKey(EC_KEY **a, const unsigned char **in, long len)
|
||||
|
||||
if (a == NULL || (*a) == NULL || (*a)->group == NULL) {
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* sorry, but a EC_GROUP-structur is necessary to set the public key
|
||||
* sorry, but a EC_GROUP-structure is necessary to set the public key
|
||||
*/
|
||||
ECerr(EC_F_O2I_ECPUBLICKEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
@ -2981,7 +2981,7 @@ static const ec_list_element curve_list[] = {
|
||||
"NIST/SECG/WTLS curve over a 233 bit binary field"},
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
{NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls12, &_EC_WTLS_12.h, 0,
|
||||
"WTLS curvs over a 224 bit prime field"},
|
||||
"WTLS curve over a 224 bit prime field"},
|
||||
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
|
||||
/* IPSec curves */
|
||||
{NID_ipsec3, &_EC_IPSEC_155_ID3.h, 0,
|
||||
|
@ -67,7 +67,7 @@
|
||||
#include "ec_lcl.h"
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* This file implements the wNAF-based interleaving multi-exponentation method
|
||||
* This file implements the wNAF-based interleaving multi-exponentiation method
|
||||
* (<URL:http://www.informatik.tu-darmstadt.de/TI/Mitarbeiter/moeller.html#multiexp>);
|
||||
* for multiplication with precomputation, we use wNAF splitting
|
||||
* (<URL:http://www.informatik.tu-darmstadt.de/TI/Mitarbeiter/moeller.html#fastexp>).
|
||||
|
@ -1226,7 +1226,7 @@ static void copy_small_conditional(felem out, const smallfelem in, limb mask)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*-
|
||||
* point_add calcuates (x1, y1, z1) + (x2, y2, z2)
|
||||
* point_add calculates (x1, y1, z1) + (x2, y2, z2)
|
||||
*
|
||||
* The method is taken from:
|
||||
* http://hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-shortw-jacobian-3.html#addition-add-2007-bl,
|
||||
|
@ -1032,7 +1032,7 @@ static void felem_contract(felem out, const felem in)
|
||||
* coordinates */
|
||||
|
||||
/*-
|
||||
* point_double calcuates 2*(x_in, y_in, z_in)
|
||||
* point_double calculates 2*(x_in, y_in, z_in)
|
||||
*
|
||||
* The method is taken from:
|
||||
* http://hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-shortw-jacobian-3.html#doubling-dbl-2001-b
|
||||
@ -1148,7 +1148,7 @@ static void copy_conditional(felem out, const felem in, limb mask)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*-
|
||||
* point_add calcuates (x1, y1, z1) + (x2, y2, z2)
|
||||
* point_add calculates (x1, y1, z1) + (x2, y2, z2)
|
||||
*
|
||||
* The method is taken from
|
||||
* http://hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-shortw-jacobian-3.html#addition-add-2007-bl,
|
||||
|
@ -364,12 +364,12 @@ static int get_cryptodev_digests(const int **cnids)
|
||||
* Find the useable ciphers|digests from dev/crypto - this is the first
|
||||
* thing called by the engine init crud which determines what it
|
||||
* can use for ciphers from this engine. We want to return
|
||||
* only what we can do, anythine else is handled by software.
|
||||
* only what we can do, anything else is handled by software.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* If we can't initialize the device to do anything useful for
|
||||
* any reason, we want to return a NULL array, and 0 length,
|
||||
* which forces everything to be done is software. By putting
|
||||
* the initalization of the device in here, we ensure we can
|
||||
* the initialization of the device in here, we ensure we can
|
||||
* use this engine as the default, and if for whatever reason
|
||||
* /dev/crypto won't do what we want it will just be done in
|
||||
* software
|
||||
@ -400,7 +400,7 @@ static int cryptodev_usable_digests(const int **nids)
|
||||
* suck moose gonads - would be nice to be able to decide something
|
||||
* as reasonable default without having hackery that's card dependent.
|
||||
* of course, the default should probably be just do everything,
|
||||
* with perhaps a sysctl to turn algoritms off (or have them off
|
||||
* with perhaps a sysctl to turn algorithms off (or have them off
|
||||
* by default) on cards that generally suck like the hifn.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
*nids = NULL;
|
||||
@ -447,7 +447,7 @@ cryptodev_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
|
||||
|
||||
if (ioctl(state->d_fd, CIOCCRYPT, &cryp) == -1) {
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* XXX need better errror handling this can fail for a number of
|
||||
* XXX need better error handling this can fail for a number of
|
||||
* different reasons.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
return (0);
|
||||
@ -503,7 +503,7 @@ cryptodev_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* free anything we allocated earlier when initting a
|
||||
* free anything we allocated earlier when initing a
|
||||
* session, and close the session.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
static int cryptodev_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
|
||||
@ -516,7 +516,7 @@ static int cryptodev_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
|
||||
return (0);
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* XXX if this ioctl fails, someting's wrong. the invoker may have called
|
||||
* XXX if this ioctl fails, something's wrong. the invoker may have called
|
||||
* us with a bogus ctx, or we could have a device that for whatever
|
||||
* reason just doesn't want to play ball - it's not clear what's right
|
||||
* here - should this be an error? should it just increase a counter,
|
||||
|
@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ static int int_ctrl_helper(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p,
|
||||
return e->cmd_defns[idx].cmd_num;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* For the rest of the commands, the 'long' argument must specify a valie
|
||||
* For the rest of the commands, the 'long' argument must specify a valid
|
||||
* command number - so we need to conduct a search.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if ((e->cmd_defns == NULL) || ((idx = int_ctrl_cmd_by_num(e->cmd_defns,
|
||||
|
@ -316,7 +316,7 @@ void ENGINE_load_dynamic(void)
|
||||
static int dynamic_init(ENGINE *e)
|
||||
{
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* We always return failure - the "dyanamic" engine itself can't be used
|
||||
* We always return failure - the "dynamic" engine itself can't be used
|
||||
* for anything.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ ENGINE *ENGINE_get_next(ENGINE *e)
|
||||
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
|
||||
ret = e->next;
|
||||
if (ret) {
|
||||
/* Return a valid structural refernce to the next ENGINE */
|
||||
/* Return a valid structural reference to the next ENGINE */
|
||||
ret->struct_ref++;
|
||||
engine_ref_debug(ret, 0, 1);
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -353,7 +353,7 @@ ENGINE *ENGINE_by_id(const char *id)
|
||||
if (iterator != NULL)
|
||||
return iterator;
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Prevent infinite recusrion if we're looking for the dynamic engine.
|
||||
* Prevent infinite recursion if we're looking for the dynamic engine.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (strcmp(id, "dynamic")) {
|
||||
# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
|
||||
|
@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ int engine_table_register(ENGINE_TABLE **table, ENGINE_CLEANUP_CB *cleanup,
|
||||
fnd->funct = NULL;
|
||||
(void)lh_ENGINE_PILE_insert(&(*table)->piles, fnd);
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* A registration shouldn't add duplciate entries */
|
||||
/* A registration shouldn't add duplicate entries */
|
||||
(void)sk_ENGINE_delete_ptr(fnd->sk, e);
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* if 'setdefault', this ENGINE goes to the head of the list
|
||||
|
@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ int EVP_DigestInit_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *type, ENGINE *impl)
|
||||
* Whether it's nice or not, "Inits" can be used on "Final"'d contexts so
|
||||
* this context may already have an ENGINE! Try to avoid releasing the
|
||||
* previous handle, re-querying for an ENGINE, and having a
|
||||
* reinitialisation, when it may all be unecessary.
|
||||
* reinitialisation, when it may all be unnecessary.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (ctx->engine && ctx->digest && (!type ||
|
||||
(type
|
||||
|
@ -605,7 +605,7 @@ void aes_t4_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
|
||||
* non-key-length specific routines would require conditional branches
|
||||
* either in inner loops or on subroutines' entries. Former is hardly
|
||||
* acceptable, while latter means code size increase to size occupied
|
||||
* by multiple key-length specfic subroutines, so why fight?
|
||||
* by multiple key-length specific subroutines, so why fight?
|
||||
*/
|
||||
void aes128_t4_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
|
||||
size_t len, const AES_KEY *key,
|
||||
|
@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ int EVP_CipherInit_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
|
||||
* Whether it's nice or not, "Inits" can be used on "Final"'d contexts so
|
||||
* this context may already have an ENGINE! Try to avoid releasing the
|
||||
* previous handle, re-querying for an ENGINE, and having a
|
||||
* reinitialisation, when it may all be unecessary.
|
||||
* reinitialisation, when it may all be unnecessary.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (ctx->engine && ctx->cipher
|
||||
&& (!cipher || (cipher && (cipher->nid == ctx->cipher->nid))))
|
||||
@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ int EVP_CipherInit_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* One positive side-effect of US's export control history,
|
||||
* is that we should at least be able to avoid using US
|
||||
* mispellings of "initialisation"?
|
||||
* misspellings of "initialisation"?
|
||||
*/
|
||||
EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_CIPHERINIT_EX, EVP_R_INITIALIZATION_ERROR);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ static EVP_PKEY_CTX *int_ctx_new(EVP_PKEY *pkey, ENGINE *e, int id)
|
||||
e = ENGINE_get_pkey_meth_engine(id);
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* If an ENGINE handled this method look it up. Othewise use internal
|
||||
* If an ENGINE handled this method look it up. Otherwise use internal
|
||||
* tables.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -116,8 +116,8 @@
|
||||
* exdata has a stack of callbacks for each instance.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
struct ex_callback_st {
|
||||
long argl; /* Arbitary long */
|
||||
void *argp; /* Arbitary void * */
|
||||
long argl; /* Arbitrary long */
|
||||
void *argp; /* Arbitrary void * */
|
||||
CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func;
|
||||
CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func;
|
||||
CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func;
|
||||
|
@ -190,7 +190,7 @@ static void cfbr_encrypt_block(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
|
||||
block128_f block)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int n, rem, num;
|
||||
unsigned char ovec[16 * 2 + 1]; /* +1 because we dererefence (but don't
|
||||
unsigned char ovec[16 * 2 + 1]; /* +1 because we dereference (but don't
|
||||
* use) one byte off the end */
|
||||
|
||||
if (nbits <= 0 || nbits > 128)
|
||||
|
@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ static void ctr128_inc_aligned(unsigned char *counter)
|
||||
* before the first call to CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt(). This algorithm assumes
|
||||
* that the counter is in the x lower bits of the IV (ivec), and that the
|
||||
* application has full control over overflow and the rest of the IV. This
|
||||
* implementation takes NO responsability for checking that the counter
|
||||
* implementation takes NO responsibility for checking that the counter
|
||||
* doesn't overflow into the rest of the IV when incremented.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
void CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
|
||||
@ -245,7 +245,7 @@ void CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt_ctr32(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
|
||||
(*func) (in, out, blocks, key, ivec);
|
||||
/* (*ctr) does not update ivec, caller does: */
|
||||
PUTU32(ivec + 12, ctr32);
|
||||
/* ... overflow was detected, propogate carry. */
|
||||
/* ... overflow was detected, propagate carry. */
|
||||
if (ctr32 == 0)
|
||||
ctr96_inc(ivec);
|
||||
blocks *= 16;
|
||||
|
@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ struct tm *OPENSSL_gmtime(const time_t *timer, struct tm *result)
|
||||
/*-
|
||||
* The VMS epoch is the astronomical Smithsonian date,
|
||||
if I remember correctly, which is November 17, 1858.
|
||||
Furthermore, time is measure in thenths of microseconds
|
||||
Furthermore, time is measure in tenths of microseconds
|
||||
and stored in quadwords (64 bit integers). unix_epoch
|
||||
below is January 1st 1970 expressed as a VMS time. The
|
||||
following code was used to get this number:
|
||||
@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ int OPENSSL_gmtime_adj(struct tm *tm, int off_day, long offset_sec)
|
||||
int time_sec, time_year, time_month, time_day;
|
||||
long time_jd;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Convert time and offset into julian day and seconds */
|
||||
/* Convert time and offset into Julian day and seconds */
|
||||
if (!julian_adj(tm, off_day, offset_sec, &time_jd, &time_sec))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
|
||||
#include "obj_lcl.h"
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Later versions of DEC C has started to add lnkage information to certain
|
||||
* Later versions of DEC C has started to add linkage information to certain
|
||||
* functions, which makes it tricky to use them as values to regular function
|
||||
* pointers. One way is to define a macro that takes care of casting them
|
||||
* correctly.
|
||||
|
@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* History: This file was transfered to Richard Levitte from CertCo by Kathy
|
||||
* History: This file was transferred to Richard Levitte from CertCo by Kathy
|
||||
* Weinhold in mid-spring 2000 to be included in OpenSSL or released as a
|
||||
* patch kit.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ int OCSP_request_add1_cert(OCSP_REQUEST *req, X509 *cert)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Sign an OCSP request set the requestorName to the subjec name of an
|
||||
* Sign an OCSP request set the requestorName to the subject name of an
|
||||
* optional signers certificate and include one or more optional certificates
|
||||
* in the request. Behaves like PKCS7_sign().
|
||||
*/
|
||||
@ -222,7 +222,7 @@ ASN1_OCTET_STRING *OCSP_resp_get0_signature(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Return number of OCSP_SINGLERESP reponses present in a basic response.
|
||||
* Return number of OCSP_SINGLERESP responses present in a basic response.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
int OCSP_resp_count(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs)
|
||||
|
@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* History: This file was transfered to Richard Levitte from CertCo by Kathy
|
||||
* History: This file was transferred to Richard Levitte from CertCo by Kathy
|
||||
* Weinhold in mid-spring 2000 to be included in OpenSSL or released as a
|
||||
* patch kit.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ int OCSP_SINGLERESP_add_ext(OCSP_SINGLERESP *x, X509_EXTENSION *ex, int loc)
|
||||
/* Nonce handling functions */
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Add a nonce to an extension stack. A nonce can be specificed or if NULL a
|
||||
* Add a nonce to an extension stack. A nonce can be specified or if NULL a
|
||||
* random nonce will be generated. Note: OpenSSL 0.9.7d and later create an
|
||||
* OCTET STRING containing the nonce, previous versions used the raw nonce.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* History: This file was transfered to Richard Levitte from CertCo by Kathy
|
||||
* History: This file was transferred to Richard Levitte from CertCo by Kathy
|
||||
* Weinhold in mid-spring 2000 to be included in OpenSSL or released as a
|
||||
* patch kit.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* History: This file was transfered to Richard Levitte from CertCo by Kathy
|
||||
* History: This file was transferred to Richard Levitte from CertCo by Kathy
|
||||
* Weinhold in mid-spring 2000 to be included in OpenSSL or released as a
|
||||
* patch kit.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* History: This file was originally part of ocsp.c and was transfered to
|
||||
* History: This file was originally part of ocsp.c and was transferred to
|
||||
* Richard Levitte from CertCo by Kathy Weinhold in mid-spring 2000 to be
|
||||
* included in OpenSSL or released as a patch kit.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
@ -288,7 +288,7 @@ static int ocsp_check_ids(STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp, OCSP_CERTID **ret)
|
||||
tmpid = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_value(sresp, i)->certId;
|
||||
/* Check to see if IDs match */
|
||||
if (OCSP_id_issuer_cmp(cid, tmpid)) {
|
||||
/* If algoritm mismatch let caller deal with it */
|
||||
/* If algorithm mismatch let caller deal with it */
|
||||
if (OBJ_cmp(tmpid->hashAlgorithm.algorithm,
|
||||
cid->hashAlgorithm.algorithm))
|
||||
return 2;
|
||||
|
@ -302,7 +302,7 @@ my %globals;
|
||||
}
|
||||
{ package register; # pick up registers, which start with %.
|
||||
sub re {
|
||||
my $class = shift; # muliple instances...
|
||||
my $class = shift; # multiple instances...
|
||||
my $self = {};
|
||||
local *line = shift;
|
||||
undef $ret;
|
||||
@ -950,7 +950,7 @@ close STDOUT;
|
||||
# (#) Nth argument, volatile
|
||||
#
|
||||
# In Unix terms top of stack is argument transfer area for arguments
|
||||
# which could not be accomodated in registers. Or in other words 7th
|
||||
# which could not be accommodated in registers. Or in other words 7th
|
||||
# [integer] argument resides at 8(%rsp) upon function entry point.
|
||||
# 128 bytes above %rsp constitute a "red zone" which is not touched
|
||||
# by signal handlers and can be used as temporal storage without
|
||||
|
@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ static int parse_bag(PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, const char *pass, int passlen,
|
||||
* Parse and decrypt a PKCS#12 structure returning user key, user cert and
|
||||
* other (CA) certs. Note either ca should be NULL, *ca should be NULL, or it
|
||||
* should point to a valid STACK structure. pkey and cert can be passed
|
||||
* unitialised.
|
||||
* uninitialised.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
int PKCS12_parse(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert,
|
||||
|
@ -323,7 +323,7 @@ static int rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add)
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Parallel threads may interfere with this, but always each byte
|
||||
* of the new state is the XOR of some previous value of its and
|
||||
* local_md (itermediate values may be lost). Alway using locking
|
||||
* local_md (intermediate values may be lost). Alway using locking
|
||||
* could hurt performance more than necessary given that
|
||||
* conflicts occur only when the total seeding is longer than the
|
||||
* random state.
|
||||
|
@ -122,7 +122,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Limit the time spent walking through the heap, processes, threads and
|
||||
* modules to a maximum of 1000 miliseconds each, unless CryptoGenRandom
|
||||
* modules to a maximum of 1000 milliseconds each, unless CryptoGenRandom
|
||||
* failed
|
||||
*/
|
||||
# define MAXDELAY 1000
|
||||
|
@ -569,7 +569,7 @@ static ASN1_STRING *rsa_ctx_to_pss(EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx)
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* From PSS AlgorithmIdentifier set public key parameters. If pkey isn't NULL
|
||||
* then the EVP_MD_CTX is setup and initalised. If it is NULL parameters are
|
||||
* then the EVP_MD_CTX is setup and initialised. If it is NULL parameters are
|
||||
* passed to pkctx instead.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -729,7 +729,7 @@ static int rsa_ossl_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
|
||||
BIGNUM *p = NULL, *q = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Make sure BN_mod_inverse in Montgomery intialization uses the
|
||||
* Make sure BN_mod_inverse in Montgomery initialization uses the
|
||||
* BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag (unless RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME is set)
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
|
||||
|
@ -479,7 +479,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
|
||||
jnz .Loop_grande
|
||||
|
||||
.Ldone:
|
||||
mov `$REG_SZ*17`(%rsp),%rax # orignal %rsp
|
||||
mov `$REG_SZ*17`(%rsp),%rax # original %rsp
|
||||
___
|
||||
$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
|
||||
movaps -0xb8(%rax),%xmm6
|
||||
@ -539,7 +539,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
|
||||
movdqa K_XX_XX+0x80(%rip),$BSWAP # byte-n-word swap
|
||||
|
||||
.Loop_grande_shaext:
|
||||
mov $num,`$REG_SZ*17+8`(%rsp) # orignal $num
|
||||
mov $num,`$REG_SZ*17+8`(%rsp) # original $num
|
||||
xor $num,$num
|
||||
___
|
||||
for($i=0;$i<2;$i++) {
|
||||
@ -1117,7 +1117,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
|
||||
jnz .Loop_grande_avx
|
||||
|
||||
.Ldone_avx:
|
||||
mov `$REG_SZ*17`(%rsp),%rax # orignal %rsp
|
||||
mov `$REG_SZ*17`(%rsp),%rax # original %rsp
|
||||
vzeroupper
|
||||
___
|
||||
$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
|
||||
@ -1272,7 +1272,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
|
||||
#jnz .Loop_grande_avx2
|
||||
|
||||
.Ldone_avx2:
|
||||
mov `$REG_SZ*17`(%rsp),%rax # orignal %rsp
|
||||
mov `$REG_SZ*17`(%rsp),%rax # original %rsp
|
||||
vzeroupper
|
||||
___
|
||||
$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
|
||||
|
@ -325,7 +325,7 @@ $code.=<<___ if ($i<79);
|
||||
___
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
$FRAMESIZE=16; # large enough to accomodate NUBI saved registers
|
||||
$FRAMESIZE=16; # large enough to accommodate NUBI saved registers
|
||||
$SAVED_REGS_MASK = ($flavour =~ /nubi/i) ? 0xc0fff008 : 0xc0ff0000;
|
||||
|
||||
$code=<<___;
|
||||
|
@ -383,7 +383,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
|
||||
jnz .Loop_grande
|
||||
|
||||
.Ldone:
|
||||
mov `$REG_SZ*17`(%rsp),%rax # orignal %rsp
|
||||
mov `$REG_SZ*17`(%rsp),%rax # original %rsp
|
||||
___
|
||||
$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
|
||||
movaps -0xb8(%rax),%xmm6
|
||||
@ -443,7 +443,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
|
||||
lea K256_shaext+0x80(%rip),$Tbl
|
||||
|
||||
.Loop_grande_shaext:
|
||||
mov $num,`$REG_SZ*17+8`(%rsp) # orignal $num
|
||||
mov $num,`$REG_SZ*17+8`(%rsp) # original $num
|
||||
xor $num,$num
|
||||
___
|
||||
for($i=0;$i<2;$i++) {
|
||||
@ -1062,7 +1062,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
|
||||
jnz .Loop_grande_avx
|
||||
|
||||
.Ldone_avx:
|
||||
mov `$REG_SZ*17`(%rsp),%rax # orignal %rsp
|
||||
mov `$REG_SZ*17`(%rsp),%rax # original %rsp
|
||||
vzeroupper
|
||||
___
|
||||
$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
|
||||
@ -1238,7 +1238,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
|
||||
#jnz .Loop_grande_avx2
|
||||
|
||||
.Ldone_avx2:
|
||||
mov `$REG_SZ*17`(%rsp),%rax # orignal %rsp
|
||||
mov `$REG_SZ*17`(%rsp),%rax # original %rsp
|
||||
vzeroupper
|
||||
___
|
||||
$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
|
||||
|
@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ int SHA224_Final(unsigned char *md, SHA256_CTX *c)
|
||||
* default: case below covers for it. It's not clear however if it's
|
||||
* permitted to truncate to amount of bytes not divisible by 4. I bet not,
|
||||
* but if it is, then default: case shall be extended. For reference.
|
||||
* Idea behind separate cases for pre-defined lenghts is to let the
|
||||
* Idea behind separate cases for pre-defined lengths is to let the
|
||||
* compiler decide if it's appropriate to unroll small loops.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
#define HASH_MAKE_STRING(c,s) do { \
|
||||
|
@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ int HASH_INIT(SHA_CTX *c)
|
||||
# ifndef MD32_XARRAY
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Originally X was an array. As it's automatic it's natural
|
||||
* to expect RISC compiler to accomodate at least part of it in
|
||||
* to expect RISC compiler to accommodate at least part of it in
|
||||
* the register bank, isn't it? Unfortunately not all compilers
|
||||
* "find" this expectation reasonable:-( On order to make such
|
||||
* compilers generate better code I replace X[] with a bunch of
|
||||
|
@ -333,7 +333,7 @@ static SRP_gN knowngN[] = {
|
||||
# define KNOWN_GN_NUMBER sizeof(knowngN) / sizeof(SRP_gN)
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Check if G and N are kwown parameters. The values have been generated
|
||||
* Check if G and N are known parameters. The values have been generated
|
||||
* from the ietf-tls-srp draft version 8
|
||||
*/
|
||||
char *SRP_check_known_gN_param(BIGNUM *g, BIGNUM *N)
|
||||
|
@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ static int general_allocate_string(UI *ui, const char *prompt,
|
||||
s->_.string_data.result_maxsize = maxsize;
|
||||
s->_.string_data.test_buf = test_buf;
|
||||
ret = sk_UI_STRING_push(ui->strings, s);
|
||||
/* sk_push() returns 0 on error. Let's addapt that */
|
||||
/* sk_push() returns 0 on error. Let's adapt that */
|
||||
if (ret <= 0)
|
||||
ret--;
|
||||
} else
|
||||
@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ static int general_allocate_boolean(UI *ui,
|
||||
s->_.boolean_data.cancel_chars = cancel_chars;
|
||||
ret = sk_UI_STRING_push(ui->strings, s);
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* sk_push() returns 0 on error. Let's addapt that
|
||||
* sk_push() returns 0 on error. Let's adapt that
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (ret <= 0)
|
||||
ret--;
|
||||
|
@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ typedef unsigned long long u64;
|
||||
* one quadword load. One can argue that that many single-byte loads
|
||||
* is too excessive, as one could load a quadword and "milk" it for
|
||||
* eight 8-bit values instead. Well, yes, but in order to do so *and*
|
||||
* avoid excessive loads you have to accomodate a handful of 64-bit
|
||||
* avoid excessive loads you have to accommodate a handful of 64-bit
|
||||
* values in the register bank and issue a bunch of shifts and mask.
|
||||
* It's a tradeoff: loads vs. shift and mask in big register bank[!].
|
||||
* On most CPUs eight single-byte loads are faster and I let other
|
||||
|
@ -48,7 +48,7 @@
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Unlike authors' reference implementation, block processing
|
||||
* routine whirlpool_block is designed to operate on multi-block
|
||||
* input. This is done for perfomance.
|
||||
* input. This is done for performance.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
#include "wp_locl.h"
|
||||
|
@ -458,7 +458,7 @@ int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
|
||||
i--;
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* If we have LOS error and flags changed then we are signing P-384
|
||||
* with P-256. Use more meaninggul error.
|
||||
* with P-256. Use more meaningful error.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED && flags != tflags)
|
||||
rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_CANNOT_SIGN_P_384_WITH_P_256;
|
||||
|
@ -2474,7 +2474,7 @@ static int dane_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert, int depth)
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* If we've previously matched a PKIX-?? record, no need to test any
|
||||
* furher PKIX-?? records, it remains to just build the PKIX chain.
|
||||
* further PKIX-?? records, it remains to just build the PKIX chain.
|
||||
* Had the match been a DANE-?? record, we'd be done already.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (dane->mdpth >= 0)
|
||||
@ -2505,7 +2505,7 @@ static int dane_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert, int depth)
|
||||
*
|
||||
* As soon as we find a match at any given depth, we stop, because either
|
||||
* we've matched a DANE-?? record and the peer is authenticated, or, after
|
||||
* exhausing all DANE-?? records, we've matched a PKIX-?? record, which is
|
||||
* exhausting all DANE-?? records, we've matched a PKIX-?? record, which is
|
||||
* sufficient for DANE, and what remains to do is ordinary PKIX validation.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
recnum = (dane->umask & mask) ? sk_danetls_record_num(dane->trecs) : 0;
|
||||
|
@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ int X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(X509_NAME *name, int nid, int lastpos)
|
||||
return (X509_NAME_get_index_by_OBJ(name, obj, lastpos));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* NOTE: you should be passsing -1, not 0 as lastpos */
|
||||
/* NOTE: you should be passing -1, not 0 as lastpos */
|
||||
int X509_NAME_get_index_by_OBJ(X509_NAME *name, ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int lastpos)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int n;
|
||||
|
@ -324,7 +324,7 @@ static int x509_name_ex_print(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE **pval,
|
||||
* it all strings are converted to UTF8, leading, trailing and multiple
|
||||
* spaces collapsed, converted to lower case and the leading SEQUENCE header
|
||||
* removed. In future we could also normalize the UTF8 too. By doing this
|
||||
* comparison of Name structures can be rapidly perfomed by just using
|
||||
* comparison of Name structures can be rapidly performed by just using
|
||||
* memcmp() of the canonical encoding. By omitting the leading SEQUENCE name
|
||||
* constraints of type dirName can also be checked with a simple memcmp().
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
@ -360,7 +360,7 @@ static int IPAddressOrRange_cmp(const IPAddressOrRange *a,
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* IPv4-specific closure over IPAddressOrRange_cmp, since sk_sort()
|
||||
* comparision routines are only allowed two arguments.
|
||||
* comparison routines are only allowed two arguments.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
static int v4IPAddressOrRange_cmp(const IPAddressOrRange *const *a,
|
||||
const IPAddressOrRange *const *b)
|
||||
@ -370,7 +370,7 @@ static int v4IPAddressOrRange_cmp(const IPAddressOrRange *const *a,
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* IPv6-specific closure over IPAddressOrRange_cmp, since sk_sort()
|
||||
* comparision routines are only allowed two arguments.
|
||||
* comparison routines are only allowed two arguments.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
static int v6IPAddressOrRange_cmp(const IPAddressOrRange *const *a,
|
||||
const IPAddressOrRange *const *b)
|
||||
@ -704,7 +704,7 @@ int v3_addr_get_range(IPAddressOrRange *aor,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Sort comparision function for a sequence of IPAddressFamily.
|
||||
* Sort comparison function for a sequence of IPAddressFamily.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* The last paragraph of RFC 3779 2.2.3.3 is slightly ambiguous about
|
||||
* the ordering: I can read it as meaning that IPv6 without a SAFI
|
||||
|
@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ static int i2r_ASIdentifiers(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Sort comparision function for a sequence of ASIdOrRange elements.
|
||||
* Sort comparison function for a sequence of ASIdOrRange elements.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
static int ASIdOrRange_cmp(const ASIdOrRange *const *a_,
|
||||
const ASIdOrRange *const *b_)
|
||||
@ -720,7 +720,7 @@ static int asid_contains(ASIdOrRanges *parent, ASIdOrRanges *child)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Test whether a is a subet of b.
|
||||
* Test whether a is a subset of b.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
int v3_asid_subset(ASIdentifiers *a, ASIdentifiers *b)
|
||||
{
|
||||
|
@ -405,7 +405,7 @@ static int nc_email(ASN1_IA5STRING *eml, ASN1_IA5STRING *base)
|
||||
const char *emlat = strchr(emlptr, '@');
|
||||
if (!emlat)
|
||||
return X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX;
|
||||
/* Special case: inital '.' is RHS match */
|
||||
/* Special case: initial '.' is RHS match */
|
||||
if (!baseat && (*baseptr == '.')) {
|
||||
if (eml->length > base->length) {
|
||||
emlptr += eml->length - base->length;
|
||||
@ -465,7 +465,7 @@ static int nc_uri(ASN1_IA5STRING *uri, ASN1_IA5STRING *base)
|
||||
if (hostlen == 0)
|
||||
return X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Special case: inital '.' is RHS match */
|
||||
/* Special case: initial '.' is RHS match */
|
||||
if (*baseptr == '.') {
|
||||
if (hostlen > base->length) {
|
||||
p = hostptr + hostlen - base->length;
|
||||
|
@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
|
||||
This directory contains examples of how to contruct
|
||||
This directory contains examples of how to construct
|
||||
various X509 structures. Certificates, certificate requests
|
||||
and CRLs.
|
||||
|
@ -467,7 +467,7 @@ B<sep_comma_plus>, B<dn_rev> and B<sname>.
|
||||
a oneline format which is more readable than RFC2253. It is equivalent to
|
||||
specifying the B<esc_2253>, B<esc_ctrl>, B<esc_msb>, B<utf8>, B<dump_nostr>,
|
||||
B<dump_der>, B<use_quote>, B<sep_comma_plus_space>, B<space_eq> and B<sname>
|
||||
options. This is the I<default> of no name options are given explicitely.
|
||||
options. This is the I<default> of no name options are given explicitly.
|
||||
|
||||
=item B<multiline>
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -85,9 +85,9 @@ an appropriate C integer type.
|
||||
|
||||
=head1 BUGS
|
||||
|
||||
The ambigious return values of ASN1_INTEGER_get() and ASN1_ENUMERATED_get()
|
||||
The ambiguous return values of ASN1_INTEGER_get() and ASN1_ENUMERATED_get()
|
||||
mean these functions should be avoided if possible. They are retained for
|
||||
compatibility. Normally the ambigious return values are not legitimate
|
||||
compatibility. Normally the ambiguous return values are not legitimate
|
||||
values for the fields they represent.
|
||||
|
||||
=head1 RETURN VALUES
|
||||
|
@ -139,9 +139,9 @@ ASYNC_block_pause() twice then you must call ASYNC_unblock_pause() twice in
|
||||
order to reenable pausing. If these functions are called while there is no
|
||||
currently active job then they have no effect. This functionality can be useful
|
||||
to avoid deadlock scenarios. For example during the execution of an ASYNC_JOB an
|
||||
application aquires a lock. It then calls some cryptographic function which
|
||||
application acquires a lock. It then calls some cryptographic function which
|
||||
invokes ASYNC_pause_job(). This returns control back to the code that created
|
||||
the ASYNC_JOB. If that code then attempts to aquire the same lock before
|
||||
the ASYNC_JOB. If that code then attempts to acquire the same lock before
|
||||
resuming the original job then a deadlock can occur. By calling
|
||||
ASYNC_block_pause() immediately after aquiring the lock and
|
||||
ASYNC_unblock_pause() immediately before releasing it then this situation cannot
|
||||
@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ ASYNC_init and ASYNC_init_thread return 1 on success or 0 otherwise.
|
||||
ASYNC_start_job returns one of ASYNC_ERR, ASYNC_NO_JOBS, ASYNC_PAUSE or
|
||||
ASYNC_FINISH as described above.
|
||||
|
||||
ASYNC_pause_job returns 0 if an error occured or 1 on success. If called when
|
||||
ASYNC_pause_job returns 0 if an error occurred or 1 on success. If called when
|
||||
not within the context of an ASYNC_JOB then this is counted as success so 1 is
|
||||
returned.
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -58,8 +58,8 @@ EC_GROUP object.
|
||||
|
||||
EC_GROUP_method_of obtains the EC_METHOD of B<group>.
|
||||
|
||||
EC_GROUP_set_generator sets curve paramaters that must be agreed by all participants using the curve. These
|
||||
paramaters include the B<generator>, the B<order> and the B<cofactor>. The B<generator> is a well defined point on the
|
||||
EC_GROUP_set_generator sets curve parameters that must be agreed by all participants using the curve. These
|
||||
parameters include the B<generator>, the B<order> and the B<cofactor>. The B<generator> is a well defined point on the
|
||||
curve chosen for cryptographic operations. Integers used for point multiplications will be between 0 and
|
||||
n-1 where n is the B<order>. The B<order> multiplied by the B<cofactor> gives the number of points on the curve.
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ otherwise.
|
||||
|
||||
OCSP_CERTID_free() does not return a value.
|
||||
|
||||
OCSP_id_get0_info() returns 1 for sucess and 0 for failure.
|
||||
OCSP_id_get0_info() returns 1 for success and 0 for failure.
|
||||
|
||||
=head1 NOTES
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ of a certificate a CRL or a CRL entry respectively.
|
||||
=head1 NOTES
|
||||
|
||||
In almost all cases an extension can occur at most once and multiple
|
||||
occurences is an error. Therefore the B<idx> parameter is usually B<NULL>.
|
||||
occurrences is an error. Therefore the B<idx> parameter is usually B<NULL>.
|
||||
|
||||
The B<flags> parameter may be one of the following values.
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -28,7 +28,7 @@
|
||||
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
|
||||
;; Note, it could be easy to inherit from the "gnu" style... however,
|
||||
;; one never knows if that style will change somewhere in the future,
|
||||
;; so I've chosen to copy the "gnu" style values explicitely instead
|
||||
;; so I've chosen to copy the "gnu" style values explicitly instead
|
||||
;; and mark them with a comment. // RLevitte 2015-08-31
|
||||
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -80,14 +80,14 @@ The use of MD5 as a digest is strongly discouraged due to security weaknesses.
|
||||
|
||||
=head1 EXAMPLES
|
||||
|
||||
Set supported signature algoritms to SHA256 with ECDSA and SHA256 with RSA
|
||||
Set supported signature algorithms to SHA256 with ECDSA and SHA256 with RSA
|
||||
using an array:
|
||||
|
||||
const int slist[] = {NID_sha256, EVP_PKEY_EC, NID_sha256, EVP_PKEY_RSA};
|
||||
|
||||
SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs(ctx, slist, 4);
|
||||
|
||||
Set supported signature algoritms to SHA256 with ECDSA and SHA256 with RSA
|
||||
Set supported signature algorithms to SHA256 with ECDSA and SHA256 with RSA
|
||||
using a string:
|
||||
|
||||
SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs_list(ctx, "ECDSA+SHA256:RSA+SHA256");
|
||||
|
@ -338,7 +338,7 @@ DSO_METHOD *DSO_METHOD_vms(void);
|
||||
* 'addr' into 'sz' large caller-provided 'path' and returns the number of
|
||||
* characters [including trailing zero] written to it. If 'sz' is 0 or
|
||||
* negative, 'path' is ignored and required amount of charachers [including
|
||||
* trailing zero] to accomodate pathname is returned. If 'addr' is NULL, then
|
||||
* trailing zero] to accommodate pathname is returned. If 'addr' is NULL, then
|
||||
* pathname of cryptolib itself is returned. Negative or zero return value
|
||||
* denotes error.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
@ -206,8 +206,8 @@ extern "C" {
|
||||
/*-
|
||||
* Definitions of OPENSSL_GLOBAL and OPENSSL_EXTERN, to define and declare
|
||||
* certain global symbols that, with some compilers under VMS, have to be
|
||||
* defined and declared explicitely with globaldef and globalref.
|
||||
* Definitions of OPENSSL_EXPORT and OPENSSL_EXTERN, to define and declare
|
||||
* defined and declared explicitly with globaldef and globalref.
|
||||
* Definitions of OPENSSL_EXPORT and OPENSSL_IMPORT, to define and declare
|
||||
* DLL exports and imports for compilers under Win32. These are a little
|
||||
* more complicated to use. Basically, for any library that exports some
|
||||
* global variables, the following code must be present in the header file
|
||||
|
@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* History: This file was transfered to Richard Levitte from CertCo by Kathy
|
||||
* History: This file was transferred to Richard Levitte from CertCo by Kathy
|
||||
* Weinhold in mid-spring 2000 to be included in OpenSSL or released as a
|
||||
* patch kit.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ void UI_free(UI *ui);
|
||||
added, so the result is *not* a string.
|
||||
|
||||
On success, the all return an index of the added information. That index
|
||||
is usefull when retrieving results with UI_get0_result(). */
|
||||
is useful when retrieving results with UI_get0_result(). */
|
||||
int UI_add_input_string(UI *ui, const char *prompt, int flags,
|
||||
char *result_buf, int minsize, int maxsize);
|
||||
int UI_dup_input_string(UI *ui, const char *prompt, int flags,
|
||||
|
@ -511,7 +511,7 @@ static void init_read_state_machine(SSL *s)
|
||||
* READ_STATE_POST_PROCESS is an optional step that may occur if some post
|
||||
* processing activity performed on the message may block.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Any of the above states could result in an NBIO event occuring in which case
|
||||
* Any of the above states could result in an NBIO event occurring in which case
|
||||
* control returns to the calling application. When this function is recalled we
|
||||
* will resume in the same state where we left off.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
@ -702,7 +702,7 @@ static void init_write_state_machine(SSL *s)
|
||||
* WRITE_STATE_TRANSITION transitions the state of the handshake state machine
|
||||
|
||||
* WRITE_STATE_PRE_WORK performs any work necessary to prepare the later
|
||||
* sending of the message. This could result in an NBIO event occuring in
|
||||
* sending of the message. This could result in an NBIO event occurring in
|
||||
* which case control returns to the calling application. When this function
|
||||
* is recalled we will resume in the same state where we left off.
|
||||
*
|
||||
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user