openssl/crypto/asn1/a_object.c

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/*
* Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include "crypto/ctype.h"
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
#include <openssl/asn1.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include "crypto/asn1.h"
#include "asn1_local.h"
int i2d_ASN1_OBJECT(const ASN1_OBJECT *a, unsigned char **pp)
{
unsigned char *p, *allocated = NULL;
int objsize;
if ((a == NULL) || (a->data == NULL))
return 0;
objsize = ASN1_object_size(0, a->length, V_ASN1_OBJECT);
if (pp == NULL || objsize == -1)
return objsize;
if (*pp == NULL) {
if ((p = allocated = OPENSSL_malloc(objsize)) == NULL)
return 0;
} else {
p = *pp;
}
ASN1_put_object(&p, 0, a->length, V_ASN1_OBJECT, V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL);
memcpy(p, a->data, a->length);
/*
* If a new buffer was allocated, just return it back.
* If not, return the incremented buffer pointer.
*/
*pp = allocated != NULL ? allocated : p + a->length;
return objsize;
}
int a2d_ASN1_OBJECT(unsigned char *out, int olen, const char *buf, int num)
{
int i, first, len = 0, c, use_bn;
char ftmp[24], *tmp = ftmp;
int tmpsize = sizeof(ftmp);
const char *p;
unsigned long l;
BIGNUM *bl = NULL;
if (num == 0)
return 0;
else if (num == -1)
num = strlen(buf);
p = buf;
c = *(p++);
num--;
if ((c >= '0') && (c <= '2')) {
first = c - '0';
} else {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_ASN1, ASN1_R_FIRST_NUM_TOO_LARGE);
goto err;
}
if (num <= 0) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_ASN1, ASN1_R_MISSING_SECOND_NUMBER);
goto err;
}
c = *(p++);
num--;
for (;;) {
if (num <= 0)
break;
if ((c != '.') && (c != ' ')) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_ASN1, ASN1_R_INVALID_SEPARATOR);
goto err;
}
l = 0;
use_bn = 0;
for (;;) {
if (num <= 0)
break;
num--;
c = *(p++);
if ((c == ' ') || (c == '.'))
break;
if (!ossl_isdigit(c)) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_ASN1, ASN1_R_INVALID_DIGIT);
goto err;
}
if (!use_bn && l >= ((ULONG_MAX - 80) / 10L)) {
use_bn = 1;
if (bl == NULL)
bl = BN_new();
if (bl == NULL || !BN_set_word(bl, l))
goto err;
}
if (use_bn) {
if (!BN_mul_word(bl, 10L)
|| !BN_add_word(bl, c - '0'))
goto err;
} else
l = l * 10L + (long)(c - '0');
}
if (len == 0) {
if ((first < 2) && (l >= 40)) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_ASN1, ASN1_R_SECOND_NUMBER_TOO_LARGE);
goto err;
}
if (use_bn) {
if (!BN_add_word(bl, first * 40))
goto err;
} else
l += (long)first *40;
}
i = 0;
if (use_bn) {
int blsize;
blsize = BN_num_bits(bl);
blsize = (blsize + 6) / 7;
if (blsize > tmpsize) {
if (tmp != ftmp)
OPENSSL_free(tmp);
tmpsize = blsize + 32;
tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(tmpsize);
if (tmp == NULL)
goto err;
}
while (blsize--) {
BN_ULONG t = BN_div_word(bl, 0x80L);
if (t == (BN_ULONG)-1)
goto err;
tmp[i++] = (unsigned char)t;
}
} else {
for (;;) {
tmp[i++] = (unsigned char)l & 0x7f;
l >>= 7L;
if (l == 0L)
break;
}
}
if (out != NULL) {
if (len + i > olen) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_ASN1, ASN1_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
goto err;
}
while (--i > 0)
out[len++] = tmp[i] | 0x80;
out[len++] = tmp[0];
} else
len += i;
}
if (tmp != ftmp)
OPENSSL_free(tmp);
BN_free(bl);
return len;
err:
if (tmp != ftmp)
OPENSSL_free(tmp);
BN_free(bl);
return 0;
}
int i2t_ASN1_OBJECT(char *buf, int buf_len, const ASN1_OBJECT *a)
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{
return OBJ_obj2txt(buf, buf_len, a, 0);
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}
int i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(BIO *bp, const ASN1_OBJECT *a)
{
char buf[80], *p = buf;
int i;
if ((a == NULL) || (a->data == NULL))
return BIO_write(bp, "NULL", 4);
i = i2t_ASN1_OBJECT(buf, sizeof(buf), a);
if (i > (int)(sizeof(buf) - 1)) {
if (i > INT_MAX - 1) { /* catch an integer overflow */
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_ASN1, ASN1_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
return -1;
}
if ((p = OPENSSL_malloc(i + 1)) == NULL)
return -1;
i2t_ASN1_OBJECT(p, i + 1, a);
}
if (i <= 0) {
i = BIO_write(bp, "<INVALID>", 9);
i += BIO_dump(bp, (const char *)a->data, a->length);
return i;
}
BIO_write(bp, p, i);
if (p != buf)
OPENSSL_free(p);
return i;
}
ASN1_OBJECT *d2i_ASN1_OBJECT(ASN1_OBJECT **a, const unsigned char **pp,
long length)
{
const unsigned char *p;
long len;
int tag, xclass;
int inf, i;
ASN1_OBJECT *ret = NULL;
p = *pp;
inf = ASN1_get_object(&p, &len, &tag, &xclass, length);
if (inf & 0x80) {
i = ASN1_R_BAD_OBJECT_HEADER;
goto err;
}
if (tag != V_ASN1_OBJECT) {
i = ASN1_R_EXPECTING_AN_OBJECT;
goto err;
}
ret = ossl_c2i_ASN1_OBJECT(a, &p, len);
if (ret)
*pp = p;
return ret;
err:
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_ASN1, i);
return NULL;
}
ASN1_OBJECT *ossl_c2i_ASN1_OBJECT(ASN1_OBJECT **a, const unsigned char **pp,
long len)
{
ASN1_OBJECT *ret = NULL, tobj;
const unsigned char *p;
unsigned char *data;
int i, length;
/*
* Sanity check OID encoding. Need at least one content octet. MSB must
* be clear in the last octet. can't have leading 0x80 in subidentifiers,
* see: X.690 8.19.2
*/
if (len <= 0 || len > INT_MAX || pp == NULL || (p = *pp) == NULL ||
p[len - 1] & 0x80) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_ASN1, ASN1_R_INVALID_OBJECT_ENCODING);
return NULL;
}
/* Now 0 < len <= INT_MAX, so the cast is safe. */
length = (int)len;
/*
* Try to lookup OID in table: these are all valid encodings so if we get
* a match we know the OID is valid.
*/
tobj.nid = NID_undef;
tobj.data = p;
tobj.length = length;
tobj.flags = 0;
i = OBJ_obj2nid(&tobj);
if (i != NID_undef) {
/*
* Return shared registered OID object: this improves efficiency
* because we don't have to return a dynamically allocated OID
* and NID lookups can use the cached value.
*/
ret = OBJ_nid2obj(i);
if (a) {
ASN1_OBJECT_free(*a);
*a = ret;
}
*pp += len;
return ret;
}
for (i = 0; i < length; i++, p++) {
if (*p == 0x80 && (!i || !(p[-1] & 0x80))) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_ASN1, ASN1_R_INVALID_OBJECT_ENCODING);
return NULL;
}
}
if ((a == NULL) || ((*a) == NULL) ||
!((*a)->flags & ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC)) {
if ((ret = ASN1_OBJECT_new()) == NULL)
return NULL;
} else {
ret = (*a);
}
p = *pp;
/* detach data from object */
data = (unsigned char *)ret->data;
ret->data = NULL;
/* once detached we can change it */
if ((data == NULL) || (ret->length < length)) {
ret->length = 0;
OPENSSL_free(data);
data = OPENSSL_malloc(length);
if (data == NULL)
goto err;
ret->flags |= ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_DATA;
}
memcpy(data, p, length);
/* If there are dynamic strings, free them here, and clear the flag */
if ((ret->flags & ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_STRINGS) != 0) {
OPENSSL_free((char *)ret->sn);
OPENSSL_free((char *)ret->ln);
ret->flags &= ~ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_STRINGS;
}
/* reattach data to object, after which it remains const */
ret->data = data;
ret->length = length;
ret->sn = NULL;
ret->ln = NULL;
/* ret->flags=ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC; we know it is dynamic */
p += length;
if (a != NULL)
(*a) = ret;
*pp = p;
return ret;
err:
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_ASN1, i);
if ((a == NULL) || (*a != ret))
ASN1_OBJECT_free(ret);
return NULL;
}
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ASN1_OBJECT *ASN1_OBJECT_new(void)
{
ASN1_OBJECT *ret;
ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
if (ret == NULL)
return NULL;
ret->flags = ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC;
return ret;
}
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void ASN1_OBJECT_free(ASN1_OBJECT *a)
{
if (a == NULL)
return;
if (a->flags & ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_STRINGS) {
#ifndef CONST_STRICT
/*
* Disable purely for compile-time strict const checking. Doing this
* on a "real" compile will cause memory leaks
*/
OPENSSL_free((void*)a->sn);
OPENSSL_free((void*)a->ln);
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#endif
a->sn = a->ln = NULL;
}
if (a->flags & ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_DATA) {
OPENSSL_free((void*)a->data);
a->data = NULL;
a->length = 0;
}
if (a->flags & ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC)
OPENSSL_free(a);
}
ASN1_OBJECT *ASN1_OBJECT_create(int nid, unsigned char *data, int len,
const char *sn, const char *ln)
{
ASN1_OBJECT o;
o.sn = sn;
o.ln = ln;
o.data = data;
o.nid = nid;
o.length = len;
o.flags = ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC | ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_STRINGS |
ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_DATA;
return OBJ_dup(&o);
}