openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c

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/*
* Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
/*
* RSA low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
* internal use.
*/
#include "internal/deprecated.h"
#include <stdio.h>
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include "crypto/x509.h"
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD2
# include <openssl/md2.h> /* uses MD2_DIGEST_LENGTH */
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD4
# include <openssl/md4.h> /* uses MD4_DIGEST_LENGTH */
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
# include <openssl/md5.h> /* uses MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH */
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MDC2
# include <openssl/mdc2.h> /* uses MDC2_DIGEST_LENGTH */
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RMD160
# include <openssl/ripemd.h> /* uses RIPEMD160_DIGEST_LENGTH */
#endif
#include <openssl/sha.h> /* uses SHA???_DIGEST_LENGTH */
#include "crypto/rsa.h"
#include "rsa_local.h"
/*
* The general purpose ASN1 code is not available inside the FIPS provider.
* To remove the dependency RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 DigestInfo encodings can be
* treated as a special case by pregenerating the required ASN1 encoding.
* This encoding will also be shared by the default provider.
*
* The EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 encoding method includes an ASN.1 value of type
* DigestInfo, where the type DigestInfo has the syntax
*
* DigestInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
* digestAlgorithm DigestAlgorithm,
* digest OCTET STRING
* }
*
* DigestAlgorithm ::= AlgorithmIdentifier {
* {PKCS1-v1-5DigestAlgorithms}
* }
*
* The AlgorithmIdentifier is a sequence containing the digest OID and
* parameters (a value of type NULL).
*
* The ENCODE_DIGESTINFO_SHA() and ENCODE_DIGESTINFO_MD() macros define an
* initialized array containing the DER encoded DigestInfo for the specified
* SHA or MD digest. The content of the OCTET STRING is not included.
* |name| is the digest name.
* |n| is last byte in the encoded OID for the digest.
* |sz| is the digest length in bytes. It must not be greater than 110.
*/
#define ASN1_SEQUENCE 0x30
#define ASN1_OCTET_STRING 0x04
#define ASN1_NULL 0x05
#define ASN1_OID 0x06
/* SHA OIDs are of the form: (2 16 840 1 101 3 4 2 |n|) */
#define ENCODE_DIGESTINFO_SHA(name, n, sz) \
static const unsigned char digestinfo_##name##_der[] = { \
ASN1_SEQUENCE, 0x11 + sz, \
ASN1_SEQUENCE, 0x0d, \
ASN1_OID, 0x09, 2 * 40 + 16, 0x86, 0x48, 1, 101, 3, 4, 2, n, \
ASN1_NULL, 0x00, \
ASN1_OCTET_STRING, sz \
};
/* MD2, MD4 and MD5 OIDs are of the form: (1 2 840 113549 2 |n|) */
#define ENCODE_DIGESTINFO_MD(name, n, sz) \
static const unsigned char digestinfo_##name##_der[] = { \
ASN1_SEQUENCE, 0x10 + sz, \
ASN1_SEQUENCE, 0x0c, \
ASN1_OID, 0x08, 1 * 40 + 2, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 2, n, \
ASN1_NULL, 0x00, \
ASN1_OCTET_STRING, sz \
};
#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD2
ENCODE_DIGESTINFO_MD(md2, 0x02, MD2_DIGEST_LENGTH)
# endif
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD4
ENCODE_DIGESTINFO_MD(md4, 0x03, MD4_DIGEST_LENGTH)
# endif
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
ENCODE_DIGESTINFO_MD(md5, 0x05, MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH)
# endif
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MDC2
/* MDC-2 (2 5 8 3 101) */
static const unsigned char digestinfo_mdc2_der[] = {
ASN1_SEQUENCE, 0x0c + MDC2_DIGEST_LENGTH,
ASN1_SEQUENCE, 0x08,
ASN1_OID, 0x04, 2 * 40 + 5, 8, 3, 101,
ASN1_NULL, 0x00,
ASN1_OCTET_STRING, MDC2_DIGEST_LENGTH
};
# endif
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RMD160
/* RIPEMD160 (1 3 36 3 3 1 2) */
static const unsigned char digestinfo_ripemd160_der[] = {
ASN1_SEQUENCE, 0x0c + RIPEMD160_DIGEST_LENGTH,
ASN1_SEQUENCE, 0x08,
ASN1_OID, 0x04, 1 * 40 + 3, 36, 3, 3, 1, 2,
ASN1_NULL, 0x00,
ASN1_OCTET_STRING, RIPEMD160_DIGEST_LENGTH
};
# endif
#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
/* SHA-1 (1 3 14 3 2 26) */
static const unsigned char digestinfo_sha1_der[] = {
ASN1_SEQUENCE, 0x0d + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
ASN1_SEQUENCE, 0x09,
ASN1_OID, 0x05, 1 * 40 + 3, 14, 3, 2, 26,
ASN1_NULL, 0x00,
ASN1_OCTET_STRING, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
};
ENCODE_DIGESTINFO_SHA(sha256, 0x01, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)
ENCODE_DIGESTINFO_SHA(sha384, 0x02, SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH)
ENCODE_DIGESTINFO_SHA(sha512, 0x03, SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH)
ENCODE_DIGESTINFO_SHA(sha224, 0x04, SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH)
ENCODE_DIGESTINFO_SHA(sha512_224, 0x05, SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH)
ENCODE_DIGESTINFO_SHA(sha512_256, 0x06, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)
ENCODE_DIGESTINFO_SHA(sha3_224, 0x07, SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH)
ENCODE_DIGESTINFO_SHA(sha3_256, 0x08, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)
ENCODE_DIGESTINFO_SHA(sha3_384, 0x09, SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH)
ENCODE_DIGESTINFO_SHA(sha3_512, 0x0a, SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH)
#define MD_CASE(name) \
case NID_##name: \
*len = sizeof(digestinfo_##name##_der); \
return digestinfo_##name##_der;
rsa: add ossl_ prefix to internal rsa_ calls. The functions being: rsa_check_crt_components, rsa_check_key, rsa_check_pminusq_diff, rsa_check_prime_factor, rsa_check_prime_factor_range, rsa_check_private_exponent, rsa_check_public_exponent, rsa_digestinfo_encoding, rsa_fips186_4_gen_prob_primes, rsa_fromdata, rsa_get0_all_params, rsa_get0_libctx, rsa_get0_pss_params_30, rsa_get_lcm, rsa_mgf_nid2name, rsa_mp_coeff_names, rsa_mp_exp_names, rsa_mp_factor_names, rsa_new_with_ctx, rsa_oaeppss_md2nid, rsa_oaeppss_nid2name, rsa_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1_with_libctx, rsa_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2_with_libctx, rsa_padding_add_SSLv23_with_libctx, rsa_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2_TLS, rsa_pkey_method, rsa_pss_params_30_copy, rsa_pss_params_30_fromdata, rsa_pss_params_30_hashalg, rsa_pss_params_30_is_unrestricted, rsa_pss_params_30_maskgenalg, rsa_pss_params_30_maskgenhashalg, rsa_pss_params_30_saltlen, rsa_pss_params_30_set_defaults, rsa_pss_params_30_set_hashalg, rsa_pss_params_30_set_maskgenalg, rsa_pss_params_30_set_maskgenhashalg, rsa_pss_params_30_set_saltlen, rsa_pss_params_30_set_trailerfield, rsa_pss_params_30_todata, rsa_pss_params_30_trailerfield, rsa_pss_pkey_method, rsa_set0_all_params, rsa_sp800_56b_check_keypair, rsa_sp800_56b_check_private, rsa_sp800_56b_check_public, rsa_sp800_56b_derive_params_from_pq, rsa_sp800_56b_generate_key, rsa_sp800_56b_pairwise_test, rsa_sp800_56b_validate_strength, rsa_todata, rsa_validate_pairwise, rsa_validate_private and rsa_validate_public. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13040)
2020-09-30 12:20:14 +08:00
const unsigned char *ossl_rsa_digestinfo_encoding(int md_nid, size_t *len)
{
switch (md_nid) {
#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MDC2
MD_CASE(mdc2)
# endif
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD2
MD_CASE(md2)
# endif
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD4
MD_CASE(md4)
# endif
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
MD_CASE(md5)
# endif
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RMD160
MD_CASE(ripemd160)
# endif
#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
MD_CASE(sha1)
MD_CASE(sha224)
MD_CASE(sha256)
MD_CASE(sha384)
MD_CASE(sha512)
MD_CASE(sha512_224)
MD_CASE(sha512_256)
MD_CASE(sha3_224)
MD_CASE(sha3_256)
MD_CASE(sha3_384)
MD_CASE(sha3_512)
default:
return NULL;
}
}
#define MD_NID_CASE(name, sz) \
case NID_##name: \
return sz;
static int digest_sz_from_nid(int nid)
{
switch (nid) {
#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MDC2
MD_NID_CASE(mdc2, MDC2_DIGEST_LENGTH)
# endif
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD2
MD_NID_CASE(md2, MD2_DIGEST_LENGTH)
# endif
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD4
MD_NID_CASE(md4, MD4_DIGEST_LENGTH)
# endif
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
MD_NID_CASE(md5, MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH)
# endif
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RMD160
MD_NID_CASE(ripemd160, RIPEMD160_DIGEST_LENGTH)
# endif
#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
MD_NID_CASE(sha1, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH)
MD_NID_CASE(sha224, SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH)
MD_NID_CASE(sha256, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)
MD_NID_CASE(sha384, SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH)
MD_NID_CASE(sha512, SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH)
MD_NID_CASE(sha512_224, SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH)
MD_NID_CASE(sha512_256, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)
MD_NID_CASE(sha3_224, SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH)
MD_NID_CASE(sha3_256, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)
MD_NID_CASE(sha3_384, SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH)
MD_NID_CASE(sha3_512, SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH)
default:
return 0;
}
}
/* Size of an SSL signature: MD5+SHA1 */
#define SSL_SIG_LENGTH 36
Implement RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified. RFC 3447, section 8.2.2, steps 3 and 4 states that verifiers must encode the DigestInfo struct and then compare the result against the public key operation result. This implies that one and only one encoding is legal. OpenSSL instead parses with crypto/asn1, then checks that the encoding round-trips, and allows some variations for the parameter. Sufficient laxness in this area can allow signature forgeries, as described in https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/09/26/pkcs1.html Although there aren't known attacks against OpenSSL's current scheme, this change makes OpenSSL implement the algorithm as specified. This avoids the uncertainty and, more importantly, helps grow a healthy ecosystem. Laxness beyond the spec, particularly in implementations which enjoy wide use, risks harm to the ecosystem for all. A signature producer which only tests against OpenSSL may not notice bugs and accidentally become widely deployed. Thus implementations have a responsibility to honor the specification as tightly as is practical. In some cases, the damage is permanent and the spec deviation and security risk becomes a tax all implementors must forever pay, but not here. Both BoringSSL and Go successfully implemented and deployed RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified since their respective beginnings, so this change should be compatible enough to pin down in future OpenSSL releases. See also https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-thomson-postel-was-wrong-00 As a bonus, by not having to deal with sign/verify differences, this version is also somewhat clearer. It also more consistently enforces digest lengths in the verify_recover codepath. The NID_md5_sha1 codepath wasn't quite doing this right. Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> GH: #1474
2016-08-21 01:35:17 +08:00
/*
* Encodes a DigestInfo prefix of hash |type| and digest |m|, as
Implement RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified. RFC 3447, section 8.2.2, steps 3 and 4 states that verifiers must encode the DigestInfo struct and then compare the result against the public key operation result. This implies that one and only one encoding is legal. OpenSSL instead parses with crypto/asn1, then checks that the encoding round-trips, and allows some variations for the parameter. Sufficient laxness in this area can allow signature forgeries, as described in https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/09/26/pkcs1.html Although there aren't known attacks against OpenSSL's current scheme, this change makes OpenSSL implement the algorithm as specified. This avoids the uncertainty and, more importantly, helps grow a healthy ecosystem. Laxness beyond the spec, particularly in implementations which enjoy wide use, risks harm to the ecosystem for all. A signature producer which only tests against OpenSSL may not notice bugs and accidentally become widely deployed. Thus implementations have a responsibility to honor the specification as tightly as is practical. In some cases, the damage is permanent and the spec deviation and security risk becomes a tax all implementors must forever pay, but not here. Both BoringSSL and Go successfully implemented and deployed RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified since their respective beginnings, so this change should be compatible enough to pin down in future OpenSSL releases. See also https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-thomson-postel-was-wrong-00 As a bonus, by not having to deal with sign/verify differences, this version is also somewhat clearer. It also more consistently enforces digest lengths in the verify_recover codepath. The NID_md5_sha1 codepath wasn't quite doing this right. Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> GH: #1474
2016-08-21 01:35:17 +08:00
* described in EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5-ENCODE, RFC 3447 section 9.2 step 2. This
* encodes the DigestInfo (T and tLen) but does not add the padding.
*
* On success, it returns one and sets |*out| to a newly allocated buffer
* containing the result and |*out_len| to its length. The caller must free
* |*out| with OPENSSL_free(). Otherwise, it returns zero.
Implement RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified. RFC 3447, section 8.2.2, steps 3 and 4 states that verifiers must encode the DigestInfo struct and then compare the result against the public key operation result. This implies that one and only one encoding is legal. OpenSSL instead parses with crypto/asn1, then checks that the encoding round-trips, and allows some variations for the parameter. Sufficient laxness in this area can allow signature forgeries, as described in https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/09/26/pkcs1.html Although there aren't known attacks against OpenSSL's current scheme, this change makes OpenSSL implement the algorithm as specified. This avoids the uncertainty and, more importantly, helps grow a healthy ecosystem. Laxness beyond the spec, particularly in implementations which enjoy wide use, risks harm to the ecosystem for all. A signature producer which only tests against OpenSSL may not notice bugs and accidentally become widely deployed. Thus implementations have a responsibility to honor the specification as tightly as is practical. In some cases, the damage is permanent and the spec deviation and security risk becomes a tax all implementors must forever pay, but not here. Both BoringSSL and Go successfully implemented and deployed RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified since their respective beginnings, so this change should be compatible enough to pin down in future OpenSSL releases. See also https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-thomson-postel-was-wrong-00 As a bonus, by not having to deal with sign/verify differences, this version is also somewhat clearer. It also more consistently enforces digest lengths in the verify_recover codepath. The NID_md5_sha1 codepath wasn't quite doing this right. Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> GH: #1474
2016-08-21 01:35:17 +08:00
*/
static int encode_pkcs1(unsigned char **out, size_t *out_len, int type,
const unsigned char *m, size_t m_len)
{
size_t di_prefix_len, dig_info_len;
const unsigned char *di_prefix;
unsigned char *dig_info;
if (type == NID_undef) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE);
Implement RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified. RFC 3447, section 8.2.2, steps 3 and 4 states that verifiers must encode the DigestInfo struct and then compare the result against the public key operation result. This implies that one and only one encoding is legal. OpenSSL instead parses with crypto/asn1, then checks that the encoding round-trips, and allows some variations for the parameter. Sufficient laxness in this area can allow signature forgeries, as described in https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/09/26/pkcs1.html Although there aren't known attacks against OpenSSL's current scheme, this change makes OpenSSL implement the algorithm as specified. This avoids the uncertainty and, more importantly, helps grow a healthy ecosystem. Laxness beyond the spec, particularly in implementations which enjoy wide use, risks harm to the ecosystem for all. A signature producer which only tests against OpenSSL may not notice bugs and accidentally become widely deployed. Thus implementations have a responsibility to honor the specification as tightly as is practical. In some cases, the damage is permanent and the spec deviation and security risk becomes a tax all implementors must forever pay, but not here. Both BoringSSL and Go successfully implemented and deployed RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified since their respective beginnings, so this change should be compatible enough to pin down in future OpenSSL releases. See also https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-thomson-postel-was-wrong-00 As a bonus, by not having to deal with sign/verify differences, this version is also somewhat clearer. It also more consistently enforces digest lengths in the verify_recover codepath. The NID_md5_sha1 codepath wasn't quite doing this right. Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> GH: #1474
2016-08-21 01:35:17 +08:00
return 0;
}
rsa: add ossl_ prefix to internal rsa_ calls. The functions being: rsa_check_crt_components, rsa_check_key, rsa_check_pminusq_diff, rsa_check_prime_factor, rsa_check_prime_factor_range, rsa_check_private_exponent, rsa_check_public_exponent, rsa_digestinfo_encoding, rsa_fips186_4_gen_prob_primes, rsa_fromdata, rsa_get0_all_params, rsa_get0_libctx, rsa_get0_pss_params_30, rsa_get_lcm, rsa_mgf_nid2name, rsa_mp_coeff_names, rsa_mp_exp_names, rsa_mp_factor_names, rsa_new_with_ctx, rsa_oaeppss_md2nid, rsa_oaeppss_nid2name, rsa_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1_with_libctx, rsa_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2_with_libctx, rsa_padding_add_SSLv23_with_libctx, rsa_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2_TLS, rsa_pkey_method, rsa_pss_params_30_copy, rsa_pss_params_30_fromdata, rsa_pss_params_30_hashalg, rsa_pss_params_30_is_unrestricted, rsa_pss_params_30_maskgenalg, rsa_pss_params_30_maskgenhashalg, rsa_pss_params_30_saltlen, rsa_pss_params_30_set_defaults, rsa_pss_params_30_set_hashalg, rsa_pss_params_30_set_maskgenalg, rsa_pss_params_30_set_maskgenhashalg, rsa_pss_params_30_set_saltlen, rsa_pss_params_30_set_trailerfield, rsa_pss_params_30_todata, rsa_pss_params_30_trailerfield, rsa_pss_pkey_method, rsa_set0_all_params, rsa_sp800_56b_check_keypair, rsa_sp800_56b_check_private, rsa_sp800_56b_check_public, rsa_sp800_56b_derive_params_from_pq, rsa_sp800_56b_generate_key, rsa_sp800_56b_pairwise_test, rsa_sp800_56b_validate_strength, rsa_todata, rsa_validate_pairwise, rsa_validate_private and rsa_validate_public. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13040)
2020-09-30 12:20:14 +08:00
di_prefix = ossl_rsa_digestinfo_encoding(type, &di_prefix_len);
if (di_prefix == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA,
RSA_R_THE_ASN1_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER_IS_NOT_KNOWN_FOR_THIS_MD);
Implement RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified. RFC 3447, section 8.2.2, steps 3 and 4 states that verifiers must encode the DigestInfo struct and then compare the result against the public key operation result. This implies that one and only one encoding is legal. OpenSSL instead parses with crypto/asn1, then checks that the encoding round-trips, and allows some variations for the parameter. Sufficient laxness in this area can allow signature forgeries, as described in https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/09/26/pkcs1.html Although there aren't known attacks against OpenSSL's current scheme, this change makes OpenSSL implement the algorithm as specified. This avoids the uncertainty and, more importantly, helps grow a healthy ecosystem. Laxness beyond the spec, particularly in implementations which enjoy wide use, risks harm to the ecosystem for all. A signature producer which only tests against OpenSSL may not notice bugs and accidentally become widely deployed. Thus implementations have a responsibility to honor the specification as tightly as is practical. In some cases, the damage is permanent and the spec deviation and security risk becomes a tax all implementors must forever pay, but not here. Both BoringSSL and Go successfully implemented and deployed RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified since their respective beginnings, so this change should be compatible enough to pin down in future OpenSSL releases. See also https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-thomson-postel-was-wrong-00 As a bonus, by not having to deal with sign/verify differences, this version is also somewhat clearer. It also more consistently enforces digest lengths in the verify_recover codepath. The NID_md5_sha1 codepath wasn't quite doing this right. Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> GH: #1474
2016-08-21 01:35:17 +08:00
return 0;
}
dig_info_len = di_prefix_len + m_len;
dig_info = OPENSSL_malloc(dig_info_len);
if (dig_info == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
Implement RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified. RFC 3447, section 8.2.2, steps 3 and 4 states that verifiers must encode the DigestInfo struct and then compare the result against the public key operation result. This implies that one and only one encoding is legal. OpenSSL instead parses with crypto/asn1, then checks that the encoding round-trips, and allows some variations for the parameter. Sufficient laxness in this area can allow signature forgeries, as described in https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/09/26/pkcs1.html Although there aren't known attacks against OpenSSL's current scheme, this change makes OpenSSL implement the algorithm as specified. This avoids the uncertainty and, more importantly, helps grow a healthy ecosystem. Laxness beyond the spec, particularly in implementations which enjoy wide use, risks harm to the ecosystem for all. A signature producer which only tests against OpenSSL may not notice bugs and accidentally become widely deployed. Thus implementations have a responsibility to honor the specification as tightly as is practical. In some cases, the damage is permanent and the spec deviation and security risk becomes a tax all implementors must forever pay, but not here. Both BoringSSL and Go successfully implemented and deployed RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified since their respective beginnings, so this change should be compatible enough to pin down in future OpenSSL releases. See also https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-thomson-postel-was-wrong-00 As a bonus, by not having to deal with sign/verify differences, this version is also somewhat clearer. It also more consistently enforces digest lengths in the verify_recover codepath. The NID_md5_sha1 codepath wasn't quite doing this right. Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> GH: #1474
2016-08-21 01:35:17 +08:00
return 0;
}
memcpy(dig_info, di_prefix, di_prefix_len);
memcpy(dig_info + di_prefix_len, m, m_len);
Implement RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified. RFC 3447, section 8.2.2, steps 3 and 4 states that verifiers must encode the DigestInfo struct and then compare the result against the public key operation result. This implies that one and only one encoding is legal. OpenSSL instead parses with crypto/asn1, then checks that the encoding round-trips, and allows some variations for the parameter. Sufficient laxness in this area can allow signature forgeries, as described in https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/09/26/pkcs1.html Although there aren't known attacks against OpenSSL's current scheme, this change makes OpenSSL implement the algorithm as specified. This avoids the uncertainty and, more importantly, helps grow a healthy ecosystem. Laxness beyond the spec, particularly in implementations which enjoy wide use, risks harm to the ecosystem for all. A signature producer which only tests against OpenSSL may not notice bugs and accidentally become widely deployed. Thus implementations have a responsibility to honor the specification as tightly as is practical. In some cases, the damage is permanent and the spec deviation and security risk becomes a tax all implementors must forever pay, but not here. Both BoringSSL and Go successfully implemented and deployed RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified since their respective beginnings, so this change should be compatible enough to pin down in future OpenSSL releases. See also https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-thomson-postel-was-wrong-00 As a bonus, by not having to deal with sign/verify differences, this version is also somewhat clearer. It also more consistently enforces digest lengths in the verify_recover codepath. The NID_md5_sha1 codepath wasn't quite doing this right. Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> GH: #1474
2016-08-21 01:35:17 +08:00
*out = dig_info;
*out_len = dig_info_len;
Implement RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified. RFC 3447, section 8.2.2, steps 3 and 4 states that verifiers must encode the DigestInfo struct and then compare the result against the public key operation result. This implies that one and only one encoding is legal. OpenSSL instead parses with crypto/asn1, then checks that the encoding round-trips, and allows some variations for the parameter. Sufficient laxness in this area can allow signature forgeries, as described in https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/09/26/pkcs1.html Although there aren't known attacks against OpenSSL's current scheme, this change makes OpenSSL implement the algorithm as specified. This avoids the uncertainty and, more importantly, helps grow a healthy ecosystem. Laxness beyond the spec, particularly in implementations which enjoy wide use, risks harm to the ecosystem for all. A signature producer which only tests against OpenSSL may not notice bugs and accidentally become widely deployed. Thus implementations have a responsibility to honor the specification as tightly as is practical. In some cases, the damage is permanent and the spec deviation and security risk becomes a tax all implementors must forever pay, but not here. Both BoringSSL and Go successfully implemented and deployed RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified since their respective beginnings, so this change should be compatible enough to pin down in future OpenSSL releases. See also https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-thomson-postel-was-wrong-00 As a bonus, by not having to deal with sign/verify differences, this version is also somewhat clearer. It also more consistently enforces digest lengths in the verify_recover codepath. The NID_md5_sha1 codepath wasn't quite doing this right. Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> GH: #1474
2016-08-21 01:35:17 +08:00
return 1;
}
int RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, RSA *rsa)
{
int encrypt_len, ret = 0;
size_t encoded_len = 0;
Implement RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified. RFC 3447, section 8.2.2, steps 3 and 4 states that verifiers must encode the DigestInfo struct and then compare the result against the public key operation result. This implies that one and only one encoding is legal. OpenSSL instead parses with crypto/asn1, then checks that the encoding round-trips, and allows some variations for the parameter. Sufficient laxness in this area can allow signature forgeries, as described in https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/09/26/pkcs1.html Although there aren't known attacks against OpenSSL's current scheme, this change makes OpenSSL implement the algorithm as specified. This avoids the uncertainty and, more importantly, helps grow a healthy ecosystem. Laxness beyond the spec, particularly in implementations which enjoy wide use, risks harm to the ecosystem for all. A signature producer which only tests against OpenSSL may not notice bugs and accidentally become widely deployed. Thus implementations have a responsibility to honor the specification as tightly as is practical. In some cases, the damage is permanent and the spec deviation and security risk becomes a tax all implementors must forever pay, but not here. Both BoringSSL and Go successfully implemented and deployed RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified since their respective beginnings, so this change should be compatible enough to pin down in future OpenSSL releases. See also https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-thomson-postel-was-wrong-00 As a bonus, by not having to deal with sign/verify differences, this version is also somewhat clearer. It also more consistently enforces digest lengths in the verify_recover codepath. The NID_md5_sha1 codepath wasn't quite doing this right. Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> GH: #1474
2016-08-21 01:35:17 +08:00
unsigned char *tmps = NULL;
const unsigned char *encoded = NULL;
#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
if (rsa->meth->rsa_sign != NULL)
return rsa->meth->rsa_sign(type, m, m_len, sigret, siglen, rsa);
#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
Implement RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified. RFC 3447, section 8.2.2, steps 3 and 4 states that verifiers must encode the DigestInfo struct and then compare the result against the public key operation result. This implies that one and only one encoding is legal. OpenSSL instead parses with crypto/asn1, then checks that the encoding round-trips, and allows some variations for the parameter. Sufficient laxness in this area can allow signature forgeries, as described in https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/09/26/pkcs1.html Although there aren't known attacks against OpenSSL's current scheme, this change makes OpenSSL implement the algorithm as specified. This avoids the uncertainty and, more importantly, helps grow a healthy ecosystem. Laxness beyond the spec, particularly in implementations which enjoy wide use, risks harm to the ecosystem for all. A signature producer which only tests against OpenSSL may not notice bugs and accidentally become widely deployed. Thus implementations have a responsibility to honor the specification as tightly as is practical. In some cases, the damage is permanent and the spec deviation and security risk becomes a tax all implementors must forever pay, but not here. Both BoringSSL and Go successfully implemented and deployed RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified since their respective beginnings, so this change should be compatible enough to pin down in future OpenSSL releases. See also https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-thomson-postel-was-wrong-00 As a bonus, by not having to deal with sign/verify differences, this version is also somewhat clearer. It also more consistently enforces digest lengths in the verify_recover codepath. The NID_md5_sha1 codepath wasn't quite doing this right. Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> GH: #1474
2016-08-21 01:35:17 +08:00
/* Compute the encoded digest. */
if (type == NID_md5_sha1) {
Implement RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified. RFC 3447, section 8.2.2, steps 3 and 4 states that verifiers must encode the DigestInfo struct and then compare the result against the public key operation result. This implies that one and only one encoding is legal. OpenSSL instead parses with crypto/asn1, then checks that the encoding round-trips, and allows some variations for the parameter. Sufficient laxness in this area can allow signature forgeries, as described in https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/09/26/pkcs1.html Although there aren't known attacks against OpenSSL's current scheme, this change makes OpenSSL implement the algorithm as specified. This avoids the uncertainty and, more importantly, helps grow a healthy ecosystem. Laxness beyond the spec, particularly in implementations which enjoy wide use, risks harm to the ecosystem for all. A signature producer which only tests against OpenSSL may not notice bugs and accidentally become widely deployed. Thus implementations have a responsibility to honor the specification as tightly as is practical. In some cases, the damage is permanent and the spec deviation and security risk becomes a tax all implementors must forever pay, but not here. Both BoringSSL and Go successfully implemented and deployed RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified since their respective beginnings, so this change should be compatible enough to pin down in future OpenSSL releases. See also https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-thomson-postel-was-wrong-00 As a bonus, by not having to deal with sign/verify differences, this version is also somewhat clearer. It also more consistently enforces digest lengths in the verify_recover codepath. The NID_md5_sha1 codepath wasn't quite doing this right. Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> GH: #1474
2016-08-21 01:35:17 +08:00
/*
* NID_md5_sha1 corresponds to the MD5/SHA1 combination in TLS 1.1 and
* earlier. It has no DigestInfo wrapper but otherwise is
* RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5.
*/
if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
Implement RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified. RFC 3447, section 8.2.2, steps 3 and 4 states that verifiers must encode the DigestInfo struct and then compare the result against the public key operation result. This implies that one and only one encoding is legal. OpenSSL instead parses with crypto/asn1, then checks that the encoding round-trips, and allows some variations for the parameter. Sufficient laxness in this area can allow signature forgeries, as described in https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/09/26/pkcs1.html Although there aren't known attacks against OpenSSL's current scheme, this change makes OpenSSL implement the algorithm as specified. This avoids the uncertainty and, more importantly, helps grow a healthy ecosystem. Laxness beyond the spec, particularly in implementations which enjoy wide use, risks harm to the ecosystem for all. A signature producer which only tests against OpenSSL may not notice bugs and accidentally become widely deployed. Thus implementations have a responsibility to honor the specification as tightly as is practical. In some cases, the damage is permanent and the spec deviation and security risk becomes a tax all implementors must forever pay, but not here. Both BoringSSL and Go successfully implemented and deployed RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified since their respective beginnings, so this change should be compatible enough to pin down in future OpenSSL releases. See also https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-thomson-postel-was-wrong-00 As a bonus, by not having to deal with sign/verify differences, this version is also somewhat clearer. It also more consistently enforces digest lengths in the verify_recover codepath. The NID_md5_sha1 codepath wasn't quite doing this right. Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> GH: #1474
2016-08-21 01:35:17 +08:00
return 0;
}
Implement RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified. RFC 3447, section 8.2.2, steps 3 and 4 states that verifiers must encode the DigestInfo struct and then compare the result against the public key operation result. This implies that one and only one encoding is legal. OpenSSL instead parses with crypto/asn1, then checks that the encoding round-trips, and allows some variations for the parameter. Sufficient laxness in this area can allow signature forgeries, as described in https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/09/26/pkcs1.html Although there aren't known attacks against OpenSSL's current scheme, this change makes OpenSSL implement the algorithm as specified. This avoids the uncertainty and, more importantly, helps grow a healthy ecosystem. Laxness beyond the spec, particularly in implementations which enjoy wide use, risks harm to the ecosystem for all. A signature producer which only tests against OpenSSL may not notice bugs and accidentally become widely deployed. Thus implementations have a responsibility to honor the specification as tightly as is practical. In some cases, the damage is permanent and the spec deviation and security risk becomes a tax all implementors must forever pay, but not here. Both BoringSSL and Go successfully implemented and deployed RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified since their respective beginnings, so this change should be compatible enough to pin down in future OpenSSL releases. See also https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-thomson-postel-was-wrong-00 As a bonus, by not having to deal with sign/verify differences, this version is also somewhat clearer. It also more consistently enforces digest lengths in the verify_recover codepath. The NID_md5_sha1 codepath wasn't quite doing this right. Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> GH: #1474
2016-08-21 01:35:17 +08:00
encoded_len = SSL_SIG_LENGTH;
encoded = m;
} else {
Implement RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified. RFC 3447, section 8.2.2, steps 3 and 4 states that verifiers must encode the DigestInfo struct and then compare the result against the public key operation result. This implies that one and only one encoding is legal. OpenSSL instead parses with crypto/asn1, then checks that the encoding round-trips, and allows some variations for the parameter. Sufficient laxness in this area can allow signature forgeries, as described in https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/09/26/pkcs1.html Although there aren't known attacks against OpenSSL's current scheme, this change makes OpenSSL implement the algorithm as specified. This avoids the uncertainty and, more importantly, helps grow a healthy ecosystem. Laxness beyond the spec, particularly in implementations which enjoy wide use, risks harm to the ecosystem for all. A signature producer which only tests against OpenSSL may not notice bugs and accidentally become widely deployed. Thus implementations have a responsibility to honor the specification as tightly as is practical. In some cases, the damage is permanent and the spec deviation and security risk becomes a tax all implementors must forever pay, but not here. Both BoringSSL and Go successfully implemented and deployed RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified since their respective beginnings, so this change should be compatible enough to pin down in future OpenSSL releases. See also https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-thomson-postel-was-wrong-00 As a bonus, by not having to deal with sign/verify differences, this version is also somewhat clearer. It also more consistently enforces digest lengths in the verify_recover codepath. The NID_md5_sha1 codepath wasn't quite doing this right. Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> GH: #1474
2016-08-21 01:35:17 +08:00
if (!encode_pkcs1(&tmps, &encoded_len, type, m, m_len))
goto err;
encoded = tmps;
}
Implement RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified. RFC 3447, section 8.2.2, steps 3 and 4 states that verifiers must encode the DigestInfo struct and then compare the result against the public key operation result. This implies that one and only one encoding is legal. OpenSSL instead parses with crypto/asn1, then checks that the encoding round-trips, and allows some variations for the parameter. Sufficient laxness in this area can allow signature forgeries, as described in https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/09/26/pkcs1.html Although there aren't known attacks against OpenSSL's current scheme, this change makes OpenSSL implement the algorithm as specified. This avoids the uncertainty and, more importantly, helps grow a healthy ecosystem. Laxness beyond the spec, particularly in implementations which enjoy wide use, risks harm to the ecosystem for all. A signature producer which only tests against OpenSSL may not notice bugs and accidentally become widely deployed. Thus implementations have a responsibility to honor the specification as tightly as is practical. In some cases, the damage is permanent and the spec deviation and security risk becomes a tax all implementors must forever pay, but not here. Both BoringSSL and Go successfully implemented and deployed RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified since their respective beginnings, so this change should be compatible enough to pin down in future OpenSSL releases. See also https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-thomson-postel-was-wrong-00 As a bonus, by not having to deal with sign/verify differences, this version is also somewhat clearer. It also more consistently enforces digest lengths in the verify_recover codepath. The NID_md5_sha1 codepath wasn't quite doing this right. Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> GH: #1474
2016-08-21 01:35:17 +08:00
if (encoded_len + RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE > (size_t)RSA_size(rsa)) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG_FOR_RSA_KEY);
Implement RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified. RFC 3447, section 8.2.2, steps 3 and 4 states that verifiers must encode the DigestInfo struct and then compare the result against the public key operation result. This implies that one and only one encoding is legal. OpenSSL instead parses with crypto/asn1, then checks that the encoding round-trips, and allows some variations for the parameter. Sufficient laxness in this area can allow signature forgeries, as described in https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/09/26/pkcs1.html Although there aren't known attacks against OpenSSL's current scheme, this change makes OpenSSL implement the algorithm as specified. This avoids the uncertainty and, more importantly, helps grow a healthy ecosystem. Laxness beyond the spec, particularly in implementations which enjoy wide use, risks harm to the ecosystem for all. A signature producer which only tests against OpenSSL may not notice bugs and accidentally become widely deployed. Thus implementations have a responsibility to honor the specification as tightly as is practical. In some cases, the damage is permanent and the spec deviation and security risk becomes a tax all implementors must forever pay, but not here. Both BoringSSL and Go successfully implemented and deployed RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified since their respective beginnings, so this change should be compatible enough to pin down in future OpenSSL releases. See also https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-thomson-postel-was-wrong-00 As a bonus, by not having to deal with sign/verify differences, this version is also somewhat clearer. It also more consistently enforces digest lengths in the verify_recover codepath. The NID_md5_sha1 codepath wasn't quite doing this right. Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> GH: #1474
2016-08-21 01:35:17 +08:00
goto err;
}
encrypt_len = RSA_private_encrypt((int)encoded_len, encoded, sigret, rsa,
Implement RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified. RFC 3447, section 8.2.2, steps 3 and 4 states that verifiers must encode the DigestInfo struct and then compare the result against the public key operation result. This implies that one and only one encoding is legal. OpenSSL instead parses with crypto/asn1, then checks that the encoding round-trips, and allows some variations for the parameter. Sufficient laxness in this area can allow signature forgeries, as described in https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/09/26/pkcs1.html Although there aren't known attacks against OpenSSL's current scheme, this change makes OpenSSL implement the algorithm as specified. This avoids the uncertainty and, more importantly, helps grow a healthy ecosystem. Laxness beyond the spec, particularly in implementations which enjoy wide use, risks harm to the ecosystem for all. A signature producer which only tests against OpenSSL may not notice bugs and accidentally become widely deployed. Thus implementations have a responsibility to honor the specification as tightly as is practical. In some cases, the damage is permanent and the spec deviation and security risk becomes a tax all implementors must forever pay, but not here. Both BoringSSL and Go successfully implemented and deployed RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified since their respective beginnings, so this change should be compatible enough to pin down in future OpenSSL releases. See also https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-thomson-postel-was-wrong-00 As a bonus, by not having to deal with sign/verify differences, this version is also somewhat clearer. It also more consistently enforces digest lengths in the verify_recover codepath. The NID_md5_sha1 codepath wasn't quite doing this right. Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> GH: #1474
2016-08-21 01:35:17 +08:00
RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
if (encrypt_len <= 0)
goto err;
Implement RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified. RFC 3447, section 8.2.2, steps 3 and 4 states that verifiers must encode the DigestInfo struct and then compare the result against the public key operation result. This implies that one and only one encoding is legal. OpenSSL instead parses with crypto/asn1, then checks that the encoding round-trips, and allows some variations for the parameter. Sufficient laxness in this area can allow signature forgeries, as described in https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/09/26/pkcs1.html Although there aren't known attacks against OpenSSL's current scheme, this change makes OpenSSL implement the algorithm as specified. This avoids the uncertainty and, more importantly, helps grow a healthy ecosystem. Laxness beyond the spec, particularly in implementations which enjoy wide use, risks harm to the ecosystem for all. A signature producer which only tests against OpenSSL may not notice bugs and accidentally become widely deployed. Thus implementations have a responsibility to honor the specification as tightly as is practical. In some cases, the damage is permanent and the spec deviation and security risk becomes a tax all implementors must forever pay, but not here. Both BoringSSL and Go successfully implemented and deployed RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified since their respective beginnings, so this change should be compatible enough to pin down in future OpenSSL releases. See also https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-thomson-postel-was-wrong-00 As a bonus, by not having to deal with sign/verify differences, this version is also somewhat clearer. It also more consistently enforces digest lengths in the verify_recover codepath. The NID_md5_sha1 codepath wasn't quite doing this right. Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> GH: #1474
2016-08-21 01:35:17 +08:00
*siglen = encrypt_len;
ret = 1;
err:
OPENSSL_clear_free(tmps, encoded_len);
return ret;
}
Implement RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified. RFC 3447, section 8.2.2, steps 3 and 4 states that verifiers must encode the DigestInfo struct and then compare the result against the public key operation result. This implies that one and only one encoding is legal. OpenSSL instead parses with crypto/asn1, then checks that the encoding round-trips, and allows some variations for the parameter. Sufficient laxness in this area can allow signature forgeries, as described in https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/09/26/pkcs1.html Although there aren't known attacks against OpenSSL's current scheme, this change makes OpenSSL implement the algorithm as specified. This avoids the uncertainty and, more importantly, helps grow a healthy ecosystem. Laxness beyond the spec, particularly in implementations which enjoy wide use, risks harm to the ecosystem for all. A signature producer which only tests against OpenSSL may not notice bugs and accidentally become widely deployed. Thus implementations have a responsibility to honor the specification as tightly as is practical. In some cases, the damage is permanent and the spec deviation and security risk becomes a tax all implementors must forever pay, but not here. Both BoringSSL and Go successfully implemented and deployed RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified since their respective beginnings, so this change should be compatible enough to pin down in future OpenSSL releases. See also https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-thomson-postel-was-wrong-00 As a bonus, by not having to deal with sign/verify differences, this version is also somewhat clearer. It also more consistently enforces digest lengths in the verify_recover codepath. The NID_md5_sha1 codepath wasn't quite doing this right. Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> GH: #1474
2016-08-21 01:35:17 +08:00
/*
* Verify an RSA signature in |sigbuf| using |rsa|.
* |type| is the NID of the digest algorithm to use.
* If |rm| is NULL, it verifies the signature for digest |m|, otherwise
* it recovers the digest from the signature, writing the digest to |rm| and
* the length to |*prm_len|.
*
* It returns one on successful verification or zero otherwise.
Implement RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified. RFC 3447, section 8.2.2, steps 3 and 4 states that verifiers must encode the DigestInfo struct and then compare the result against the public key operation result. This implies that one and only one encoding is legal. OpenSSL instead parses with crypto/asn1, then checks that the encoding round-trips, and allows some variations for the parameter. Sufficient laxness in this area can allow signature forgeries, as described in https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/09/26/pkcs1.html Although there aren't known attacks against OpenSSL's current scheme, this change makes OpenSSL implement the algorithm as specified. This avoids the uncertainty and, more importantly, helps grow a healthy ecosystem. Laxness beyond the spec, particularly in implementations which enjoy wide use, risks harm to the ecosystem for all. A signature producer which only tests against OpenSSL may not notice bugs and accidentally become widely deployed. Thus implementations have a responsibility to honor the specification as tightly as is practical. In some cases, the damage is permanent and the spec deviation and security risk becomes a tax all implementors must forever pay, but not here. Both BoringSSL and Go successfully implemented and deployed RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified since their respective beginnings, so this change should be compatible enough to pin down in future OpenSSL releases. See also https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-thomson-postel-was-wrong-00 As a bonus, by not having to deal with sign/verify differences, this version is also somewhat clearer. It also more consistently enforces digest lengths in the verify_recover codepath. The NID_md5_sha1 codepath wasn't quite doing this right. Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> GH: #1474
2016-08-21 01:35:17 +08:00
*/
int int_rsa_verify(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
unsigned char *rm, size_t *prm_len,
const unsigned char *sigbuf, size_t siglen, RSA *rsa)
{
int len, ret = 0;
size_t decrypt_len, encoded_len = 0;
Implement RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified. RFC 3447, section 8.2.2, steps 3 and 4 states that verifiers must encode the DigestInfo struct and then compare the result against the public key operation result. This implies that one and only one encoding is legal. OpenSSL instead parses with crypto/asn1, then checks that the encoding round-trips, and allows some variations for the parameter. Sufficient laxness in this area can allow signature forgeries, as described in https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/09/26/pkcs1.html Although there aren't known attacks against OpenSSL's current scheme, this change makes OpenSSL implement the algorithm as specified. This avoids the uncertainty and, more importantly, helps grow a healthy ecosystem. Laxness beyond the spec, particularly in implementations which enjoy wide use, risks harm to the ecosystem for all. A signature producer which only tests against OpenSSL may not notice bugs and accidentally become widely deployed. Thus implementations have a responsibility to honor the specification as tightly as is practical. In some cases, the damage is permanent and the spec deviation and security risk becomes a tax all implementors must forever pay, but not here. Both BoringSSL and Go successfully implemented and deployed RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified since their respective beginnings, so this change should be compatible enough to pin down in future OpenSSL releases. See also https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-thomson-postel-was-wrong-00 As a bonus, by not having to deal with sign/verify differences, this version is also somewhat clearer. It also more consistently enforces digest lengths in the verify_recover codepath. The NID_md5_sha1 codepath wasn't quite doing this right. Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> GH: #1474
2016-08-21 01:35:17 +08:00
unsigned char *decrypt_buf = NULL, *encoded = NULL;
Implement RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified. RFC 3447, section 8.2.2, steps 3 and 4 states that verifiers must encode the DigestInfo struct and then compare the result against the public key operation result. This implies that one and only one encoding is legal. OpenSSL instead parses with crypto/asn1, then checks that the encoding round-trips, and allows some variations for the parameter. Sufficient laxness in this area can allow signature forgeries, as described in https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/09/26/pkcs1.html Although there aren't known attacks against OpenSSL's current scheme, this change makes OpenSSL implement the algorithm as specified. This avoids the uncertainty and, more importantly, helps grow a healthy ecosystem. Laxness beyond the spec, particularly in implementations which enjoy wide use, risks harm to the ecosystem for all. A signature producer which only tests against OpenSSL may not notice bugs and accidentally become widely deployed. Thus implementations have a responsibility to honor the specification as tightly as is practical. In some cases, the damage is permanent and the spec deviation and security risk becomes a tax all implementors must forever pay, but not here. Both BoringSSL and Go successfully implemented and deployed RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified since their respective beginnings, so this change should be compatible enough to pin down in future OpenSSL releases. See also https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-thomson-postel-was-wrong-00 As a bonus, by not having to deal with sign/verify differences, this version is also somewhat clearer. It also more consistently enforces digest lengths in the verify_recover codepath. The NID_md5_sha1 codepath wasn't quite doing this right. Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> GH: #1474
2016-08-21 01:35:17 +08:00
if (siglen != (size_t)RSA_size(rsa)) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
Implement RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified. RFC 3447, section 8.2.2, steps 3 and 4 states that verifiers must encode the DigestInfo struct and then compare the result against the public key operation result. This implies that one and only one encoding is legal. OpenSSL instead parses with crypto/asn1, then checks that the encoding round-trips, and allows some variations for the parameter. Sufficient laxness in this area can allow signature forgeries, as described in https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/09/26/pkcs1.html Although there aren't known attacks against OpenSSL's current scheme, this change makes OpenSSL implement the algorithm as specified. This avoids the uncertainty and, more importantly, helps grow a healthy ecosystem. Laxness beyond the spec, particularly in implementations which enjoy wide use, risks harm to the ecosystem for all. A signature producer which only tests against OpenSSL may not notice bugs and accidentally become widely deployed. Thus implementations have a responsibility to honor the specification as tightly as is practical. In some cases, the damage is permanent and the spec deviation and security risk becomes a tax all implementors must forever pay, but not here. Both BoringSSL and Go successfully implemented and deployed RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified since their respective beginnings, so this change should be compatible enough to pin down in future OpenSSL releases. See also https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-thomson-postel-was-wrong-00 As a bonus, by not having to deal with sign/verify differences, this version is also somewhat clearer. It also more consistently enforces digest lengths in the verify_recover codepath. The NID_md5_sha1 codepath wasn't quite doing this right. Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> GH: #1474
2016-08-21 01:35:17 +08:00
return 0;
}
Implement RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified. RFC 3447, section 8.2.2, steps 3 and 4 states that verifiers must encode the DigestInfo struct and then compare the result against the public key operation result. This implies that one and only one encoding is legal. OpenSSL instead parses with crypto/asn1, then checks that the encoding round-trips, and allows some variations for the parameter. Sufficient laxness in this area can allow signature forgeries, as described in https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/09/26/pkcs1.html Although there aren't known attacks against OpenSSL's current scheme, this change makes OpenSSL implement the algorithm as specified. This avoids the uncertainty and, more importantly, helps grow a healthy ecosystem. Laxness beyond the spec, particularly in implementations which enjoy wide use, risks harm to the ecosystem for all. A signature producer which only tests against OpenSSL may not notice bugs and accidentally become widely deployed. Thus implementations have a responsibility to honor the specification as tightly as is practical. In some cases, the damage is permanent and the spec deviation and security risk becomes a tax all implementors must forever pay, but not here. Both BoringSSL and Go successfully implemented and deployed RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified since their respective beginnings, so this change should be compatible enough to pin down in future OpenSSL releases. See also https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-thomson-postel-was-wrong-00 As a bonus, by not having to deal with sign/verify differences, this version is also somewhat clearer. It also more consistently enforces digest lengths in the verify_recover codepath. The NID_md5_sha1 codepath wasn't quite doing this right. Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> GH: #1474
2016-08-21 01:35:17 +08:00
/* Recover the encoded digest. */
decrypt_buf = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen);
if (decrypt_buf == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
len = RSA_public_decrypt((int)siglen, sigbuf, decrypt_buf, rsa,
RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
if (len <= 0)
goto err;
decrypt_len = len;
Implement RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified. RFC 3447, section 8.2.2, steps 3 and 4 states that verifiers must encode the DigestInfo struct and then compare the result against the public key operation result. This implies that one and only one encoding is legal. OpenSSL instead parses with crypto/asn1, then checks that the encoding round-trips, and allows some variations for the parameter. Sufficient laxness in this area can allow signature forgeries, as described in https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/09/26/pkcs1.html Although there aren't known attacks against OpenSSL's current scheme, this change makes OpenSSL implement the algorithm as specified. This avoids the uncertainty and, more importantly, helps grow a healthy ecosystem. Laxness beyond the spec, particularly in implementations which enjoy wide use, risks harm to the ecosystem for all. A signature producer which only tests against OpenSSL may not notice bugs and accidentally become widely deployed. Thus implementations have a responsibility to honor the specification as tightly as is practical. In some cases, the damage is permanent and the spec deviation and security risk becomes a tax all implementors must forever pay, but not here. Both BoringSSL and Go successfully implemented and deployed RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified since their respective beginnings, so this change should be compatible enough to pin down in future OpenSSL releases. See also https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-thomson-postel-was-wrong-00 As a bonus, by not having to deal with sign/verify differences, this version is also somewhat clearer. It also more consistently enforces digest lengths in the verify_recover codepath. The NID_md5_sha1 codepath wasn't quite doing this right. Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> GH: #1474
2016-08-21 01:35:17 +08:00
#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
Implement RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified. RFC 3447, section 8.2.2, steps 3 and 4 states that verifiers must encode the DigestInfo struct and then compare the result against the public key operation result. This implies that one and only one encoding is legal. OpenSSL instead parses with crypto/asn1, then checks that the encoding round-trips, and allows some variations for the parameter. Sufficient laxness in this area can allow signature forgeries, as described in https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/09/26/pkcs1.html Although there aren't known attacks against OpenSSL's current scheme, this change makes OpenSSL implement the algorithm as specified. This avoids the uncertainty and, more importantly, helps grow a healthy ecosystem. Laxness beyond the spec, particularly in implementations which enjoy wide use, risks harm to the ecosystem for all. A signature producer which only tests against OpenSSL may not notice bugs and accidentally become widely deployed. Thus implementations have a responsibility to honor the specification as tightly as is practical. In some cases, the damage is permanent and the spec deviation and security risk becomes a tax all implementors must forever pay, but not here. Both BoringSSL and Go successfully implemented and deployed RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified since their respective beginnings, so this change should be compatible enough to pin down in future OpenSSL releases. See also https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-thomson-postel-was-wrong-00 As a bonus, by not having to deal with sign/verify differences, this version is also somewhat clearer. It also more consistently enforces digest lengths in the verify_recover codepath. The NID_md5_sha1 codepath wasn't quite doing this right. Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> GH: #1474
2016-08-21 01:35:17 +08:00
if (type == NID_md5_sha1) {
/*
* NID_md5_sha1 corresponds to the MD5/SHA1 combination in TLS 1.1 and
* earlier. It has no DigestInfo wrapper but otherwise is
* RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5.
*/
if (decrypt_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
Implement RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified. RFC 3447, section 8.2.2, steps 3 and 4 states that verifiers must encode the DigestInfo struct and then compare the result against the public key operation result. This implies that one and only one encoding is legal. OpenSSL instead parses with crypto/asn1, then checks that the encoding round-trips, and allows some variations for the parameter. Sufficient laxness in this area can allow signature forgeries, as described in https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/09/26/pkcs1.html Although there aren't known attacks against OpenSSL's current scheme, this change makes OpenSSL implement the algorithm as specified. This avoids the uncertainty and, more importantly, helps grow a healthy ecosystem. Laxness beyond the spec, particularly in implementations which enjoy wide use, risks harm to the ecosystem for all. A signature producer which only tests against OpenSSL may not notice bugs and accidentally become widely deployed. Thus implementations have a responsibility to honor the specification as tightly as is practical. In some cases, the damage is permanent and the spec deviation and security risk becomes a tax all implementors must forever pay, but not here. Both BoringSSL and Go successfully implemented and deployed RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified since their respective beginnings, so this change should be compatible enough to pin down in future OpenSSL releases. See also https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-thomson-postel-was-wrong-00 As a bonus, by not having to deal with sign/verify differences, this version is also somewhat clearer. It also more consistently enforces digest lengths in the verify_recover codepath. The NID_md5_sha1 codepath wasn't quite doing this right. Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> GH: #1474
2016-08-21 01:35:17 +08:00
goto err;
}
Implement RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified. RFC 3447, section 8.2.2, steps 3 and 4 states that verifiers must encode the DigestInfo struct and then compare the result against the public key operation result. This implies that one and only one encoding is legal. OpenSSL instead parses with crypto/asn1, then checks that the encoding round-trips, and allows some variations for the parameter. Sufficient laxness in this area can allow signature forgeries, as described in https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/09/26/pkcs1.html Although there aren't known attacks against OpenSSL's current scheme, this change makes OpenSSL implement the algorithm as specified. This avoids the uncertainty and, more importantly, helps grow a healthy ecosystem. Laxness beyond the spec, particularly in implementations which enjoy wide use, risks harm to the ecosystem for all. A signature producer which only tests against OpenSSL may not notice bugs and accidentally become widely deployed. Thus implementations have a responsibility to honor the specification as tightly as is practical. In some cases, the damage is permanent and the spec deviation and security risk becomes a tax all implementors must forever pay, but not here. Both BoringSSL and Go successfully implemented and deployed RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified since their respective beginnings, so this change should be compatible enough to pin down in future OpenSSL releases. See also https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-thomson-postel-was-wrong-00 As a bonus, by not having to deal with sign/verify differences, this version is also somewhat clearer. It also more consistently enforces digest lengths in the verify_recover codepath. The NID_md5_sha1 codepath wasn't quite doing this right. Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> GH: #1474
2016-08-21 01:35:17 +08:00
if (rm != NULL) {
memcpy(rm, decrypt_buf, SSL_SIG_LENGTH);
*prm_len = SSL_SIG_LENGTH;
} else {
if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
Implement RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified. RFC 3447, section 8.2.2, steps 3 and 4 states that verifiers must encode the DigestInfo struct and then compare the result against the public key operation result. This implies that one and only one encoding is legal. OpenSSL instead parses with crypto/asn1, then checks that the encoding round-trips, and allows some variations for the parameter. Sufficient laxness in this area can allow signature forgeries, as described in https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/09/26/pkcs1.html Although there aren't known attacks against OpenSSL's current scheme, this change makes OpenSSL implement the algorithm as specified. This avoids the uncertainty and, more importantly, helps grow a healthy ecosystem. Laxness beyond the spec, particularly in implementations which enjoy wide use, risks harm to the ecosystem for all. A signature producer which only tests against OpenSSL may not notice bugs and accidentally become widely deployed. Thus implementations have a responsibility to honor the specification as tightly as is practical. In some cases, the damage is permanent and the spec deviation and security risk becomes a tax all implementors must forever pay, but not here. Both BoringSSL and Go successfully implemented and deployed RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified since their respective beginnings, so this change should be compatible enough to pin down in future OpenSSL releases. See also https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-thomson-postel-was-wrong-00 As a bonus, by not having to deal with sign/verify differences, this version is also somewhat clearer. It also more consistently enforces digest lengths in the verify_recover codepath. The NID_md5_sha1 codepath wasn't quite doing this right. Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> GH: #1474
2016-08-21 01:35:17 +08:00
goto err;
}
Implement RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified. RFC 3447, section 8.2.2, steps 3 and 4 states that verifiers must encode the DigestInfo struct and then compare the result against the public key operation result. This implies that one and only one encoding is legal. OpenSSL instead parses with crypto/asn1, then checks that the encoding round-trips, and allows some variations for the parameter. Sufficient laxness in this area can allow signature forgeries, as described in https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/09/26/pkcs1.html Although there aren't known attacks against OpenSSL's current scheme, this change makes OpenSSL implement the algorithm as specified. This avoids the uncertainty and, more importantly, helps grow a healthy ecosystem. Laxness beyond the spec, particularly in implementations which enjoy wide use, risks harm to the ecosystem for all. A signature producer which only tests against OpenSSL may not notice bugs and accidentally become widely deployed. Thus implementations have a responsibility to honor the specification as tightly as is practical. In some cases, the damage is permanent and the spec deviation and security risk becomes a tax all implementors must forever pay, but not here. Both BoringSSL and Go successfully implemented and deployed RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified since their respective beginnings, so this change should be compatible enough to pin down in future OpenSSL releases. See also https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-thomson-postel-was-wrong-00 As a bonus, by not having to deal with sign/verify differences, this version is also somewhat clearer. It also more consistently enforces digest lengths in the verify_recover codepath. The NID_md5_sha1 codepath wasn't quite doing this right. Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> GH: #1474
2016-08-21 01:35:17 +08:00
if (memcmp(decrypt_buf, m, SSL_SIG_LENGTH) != 0) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
Implement RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified. RFC 3447, section 8.2.2, steps 3 and 4 states that verifiers must encode the DigestInfo struct and then compare the result against the public key operation result. This implies that one and only one encoding is legal. OpenSSL instead parses with crypto/asn1, then checks that the encoding round-trips, and allows some variations for the parameter. Sufficient laxness in this area can allow signature forgeries, as described in https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/09/26/pkcs1.html Although there aren't known attacks against OpenSSL's current scheme, this change makes OpenSSL implement the algorithm as specified. This avoids the uncertainty and, more importantly, helps grow a healthy ecosystem. Laxness beyond the spec, particularly in implementations which enjoy wide use, risks harm to the ecosystem for all. A signature producer which only tests against OpenSSL may not notice bugs and accidentally become widely deployed. Thus implementations have a responsibility to honor the specification as tightly as is practical. In some cases, the damage is permanent and the spec deviation and security risk becomes a tax all implementors must forever pay, but not here. Both BoringSSL and Go successfully implemented and deployed RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified since their respective beginnings, so this change should be compatible enough to pin down in future OpenSSL releases. See also https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-thomson-postel-was-wrong-00 As a bonus, by not having to deal with sign/verify differences, this version is also somewhat clearer. It also more consistently enforces digest lengths in the verify_recover codepath. The NID_md5_sha1 codepath wasn't quite doing this right. Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> GH: #1474
2016-08-21 01:35:17 +08:00
goto err;
}
}
Implement RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified. RFC 3447, section 8.2.2, steps 3 and 4 states that verifiers must encode the DigestInfo struct and then compare the result against the public key operation result. This implies that one and only one encoding is legal. OpenSSL instead parses with crypto/asn1, then checks that the encoding round-trips, and allows some variations for the parameter. Sufficient laxness in this area can allow signature forgeries, as described in https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/09/26/pkcs1.html Although there aren't known attacks against OpenSSL's current scheme, this change makes OpenSSL implement the algorithm as specified. This avoids the uncertainty and, more importantly, helps grow a healthy ecosystem. Laxness beyond the spec, particularly in implementations which enjoy wide use, risks harm to the ecosystem for all. A signature producer which only tests against OpenSSL may not notice bugs and accidentally become widely deployed. Thus implementations have a responsibility to honor the specification as tightly as is practical. In some cases, the damage is permanent and the spec deviation and security risk becomes a tax all implementors must forever pay, but not here. Both BoringSSL and Go successfully implemented and deployed RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified since their respective beginnings, so this change should be compatible enough to pin down in future OpenSSL releases. See also https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-thomson-postel-was-wrong-00 As a bonus, by not having to deal with sign/verify differences, this version is also somewhat clearer. It also more consistently enforces digest lengths in the verify_recover codepath. The NID_md5_sha1 codepath wasn't quite doing this right. Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> GH: #1474
2016-08-21 01:35:17 +08:00
} else if (type == NID_mdc2 && decrypt_len == 2 + 16
&& decrypt_buf[0] == 0x04 && decrypt_buf[1] == 0x10) {
/*
* Oddball MDC2 case: signature can be OCTET STRING. check for correct
* tag and length octets.
*/
if (rm != NULL) {
memcpy(rm, decrypt_buf + 2, 16);
*prm_len = 16;
} else {
if (m_len != 16) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
Implement RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified. RFC 3447, section 8.2.2, steps 3 and 4 states that verifiers must encode the DigestInfo struct and then compare the result against the public key operation result. This implies that one and only one encoding is legal. OpenSSL instead parses with crypto/asn1, then checks that the encoding round-trips, and allows some variations for the parameter. Sufficient laxness in this area can allow signature forgeries, as described in https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/09/26/pkcs1.html Although there aren't known attacks against OpenSSL's current scheme, this change makes OpenSSL implement the algorithm as specified. This avoids the uncertainty and, more importantly, helps grow a healthy ecosystem. Laxness beyond the spec, particularly in implementations which enjoy wide use, risks harm to the ecosystem for all. A signature producer which only tests against OpenSSL may not notice bugs and accidentally become widely deployed. Thus implementations have a responsibility to honor the specification as tightly as is practical. In some cases, the damage is permanent and the spec deviation and security risk becomes a tax all implementors must forever pay, but not here. Both BoringSSL and Go successfully implemented and deployed RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified since their respective beginnings, so this change should be compatible enough to pin down in future OpenSSL releases. See also https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-thomson-postel-was-wrong-00 As a bonus, by not having to deal with sign/verify differences, this version is also somewhat clearer. It also more consistently enforces digest lengths in the verify_recover codepath. The NID_md5_sha1 codepath wasn't quite doing this right. Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> GH: #1474
2016-08-21 01:35:17 +08:00
goto err;
}
Implement RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified. RFC 3447, section 8.2.2, steps 3 and 4 states that verifiers must encode the DigestInfo struct and then compare the result against the public key operation result. This implies that one and only one encoding is legal. OpenSSL instead parses with crypto/asn1, then checks that the encoding round-trips, and allows some variations for the parameter. Sufficient laxness in this area can allow signature forgeries, as described in https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/09/26/pkcs1.html Although there aren't known attacks against OpenSSL's current scheme, this change makes OpenSSL implement the algorithm as specified. This avoids the uncertainty and, more importantly, helps grow a healthy ecosystem. Laxness beyond the spec, particularly in implementations which enjoy wide use, risks harm to the ecosystem for all. A signature producer which only tests against OpenSSL may not notice bugs and accidentally become widely deployed. Thus implementations have a responsibility to honor the specification as tightly as is practical. In some cases, the damage is permanent and the spec deviation and security risk becomes a tax all implementors must forever pay, but not here. Both BoringSSL and Go successfully implemented and deployed RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified since their respective beginnings, so this change should be compatible enough to pin down in future OpenSSL releases. See also https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-thomson-postel-was-wrong-00 As a bonus, by not having to deal with sign/verify differences, this version is also somewhat clearer. It also more consistently enforces digest lengths in the verify_recover codepath. The NID_md5_sha1 codepath wasn't quite doing this right. Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> GH: #1474
2016-08-21 01:35:17 +08:00
if (memcmp(m, decrypt_buf + 2, 16) != 0) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
Implement RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified. RFC 3447, section 8.2.2, steps 3 and 4 states that verifiers must encode the DigestInfo struct and then compare the result against the public key operation result. This implies that one and only one encoding is legal. OpenSSL instead parses with crypto/asn1, then checks that the encoding round-trips, and allows some variations for the parameter. Sufficient laxness in this area can allow signature forgeries, as described in https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/09/26/pkcs1.html Although there aren't known attacks against OpenSSL's current scheme, this change makes OpenSSL implement the algorithm as specified. This avoids the uncertainty and, more importantly, helps grow a healthy ecosystem. Laxness beyond the spec, particularly in implementations which enjoy wide use, risks harm to the ecosystem for all. A signature producer which only tests against OpenSSL may not notice bugs and accidentally become widely deployed. Thus implementations have a responsibility to honor the specification as tightly as is practical. In some cases, the damage is permanent and the spec deviation and security risk becomes a tax all implementors must forever pay, but not here. Both BoringSSL and Go successfully implemented and deployed RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified since their respective beginnings, so this change should be compatible enough to pin down in future OpenSSL releases. See also https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-thomson-postel-was-wrong-00 As a bonus, by not having to deal with sign/verify differences, this version is also somewhat clearer. It also more consistently enforces digest lengths in the verify_recover codepath. The NID_md5_sha1 codepath wasn't quite doing this right. Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> GH: #1474
2016-08-21 01:35:17 +08:00
goto err;
}
}
} else
#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
{
/*
Implement RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified. RFC 3447, section 8.2.2, steps 3 and 4 states that verifiers must encode the DigestInfo struct and then compare the result against the public key operation result. This implies that one and only one encoding is legal. OpenSSL instead parses with crypto/asn1, then checks that the encoding round-trips, and allows some variations for the parameter. Sufficient laxness in this area can allow signature forgeries, as described in https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/09/26/pkcs1.html Although there aren't known attacks against OpenSSL's current scheme, this change makes OpenSSL implement the algorithm as specified. This avoids the uncertainty and, more importantly, helps grow a healthy ecosystem. Laxness beyond the spec, particularly in implementations which enjoy wide use, risks harm to the ecosystem for all. A signature producer which only tests against OpenSSL may not notice bugs and accidentally become widely deployed. Thus implementations have a responsibility to honor the specification as tightly as is practical. In some cases, the damage is permanent and the spec deviation and security risk becomes a tax all implementors must forever pay, but not here. Both BoringSSL and Go successfully implemented and deployed RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified since their respective beginnings, so this change should be compatible enough to pin down in future OpenSSL releases. See also https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-thomson-postel-was-wrong-00 As a bonus, by not having to deal with sign/verify differences, this version is also somewhat clearer. It also more consistently enforces digest lengths in the verify_recover codepath. The NID_md5_sha1 codepath wasn't quite doing this right. Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> GH: #1474
2016-08-21 01:35:17 +08:00
* If recovering the digest, extract a digest-sized output from the end
* of |decrypt_buf| for |encode_pkcs1|, then compare the decryption
* output as in a standard verification.
*/
Implement RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified. RFC 3447, section 8.2.2, steps 3 and 4 states that verifiers must encode the DigestInfo struct and then compare the result against the public key operation result. This implies that one and only one encoding is legal. OpenSSL instead parses with crypto/asn1, then checks that the encoding round-trips, and allows some variations for the parameter. Sufficient laxness in this area can allow signature forgeries, as described in https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/09/26/pkcs1.html Although there aren't known attacks against OpenSSL's current scheme, this change makes OpenSSL implement the algorithm as specified. This avoids the uncertainty and, more importantly, helps grow a healthy ecosystem. Laxness beyond the spec, particularly in implementations which enjoy wide use, risks harm to the ecosystem for all. A signature producer which only tests against OpenSSL may not notice bugs and accidentally become widely deployed. Thus implementations have a responsibility to honor the specification as tightly as is practical. In some cases, the damage is permanent and the spec deviation and security risk becomes a tax all implementors must forever pay, but not here. Both BoringSSL and Go successfully implemented and deployed RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified since their respective beginnings, so this change should be compatible enough to pin down in future OpenSSL releases. See also https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-thomson-postel-was-wrong-00 As a bonus, by not having to deal with sign/verify differences, this version is also somewhat clearer. It also more consistently enforces digest lengths in the verify_recover codepath. The NID_md5_sha1 codepath wasn't quite doing this right. Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> GH: #1474
2016-08-21 01:35:17 +08:00
if (rm != NULL) {
len = digest_sz_from_nid(type);
Implement RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified. RFC 3447, section 8.2.2, steps 3 and 4 states that verifiers must encode the DigestInfo struct and then compare the result against the public key operation result. This implies that one and only one encoding is legal. OpenSSL instead parses with crypto/asn1, then checks that the encoding round-trips, and allows some variations for the parameter. Sufficient laxness in this area can allow signature forgeries, as described in https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/09/26/pkcs1.html Although there aren't known attacks against OpenSSL's current scheme, this change makes OpenSSL implement the algorithm as specified. This avoids the uncertainty and, more importantly, helps grow a healthy ecosystem. Laxness beyond the spec, particularly in implementations which enjoy wide use, risks harm to the ecosystem for all. A signature producer which only tests against OpenSSL may not notice bugs and accidentally become widely deployed. Thus implementations have a responsibility to honor the specification as tightly as is practical. In some cases, the damage is permanent and the spec deviation and security risk becomes a tax all implementors must forever pay, but not here. Both BoringSSL and Go successfully implemented and deployed RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified since their respective beginnings, so this change should be compatible enough to pin down in future OpenSSL releases. See also https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-thomson-postel-was-wrong-00 As a bonus, by not having to deal with sign/verify differences, this version is also somewhat clearer. It also more consistently enforces digest lengths in the verify_recover codepath. The NID_md5_sha1 codepath wasn't quite doing this right. Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> GH: #1474
2016-08-21 01:35:17 +08:00
if (len <= 0)
goto err;
m_len = (unsigned int)len;
if (m_len > decrypt_len) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH);
Implement RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified. RFC 3447, section 8.2.2, steps 3 and 4 states that verifiers must encode the DigestInfo struct and then compare the result against the public key operation result. This implies that one and only one encoding is legal. OpenSSL instead parses with crypto/asn1, then checks that the encoding round-trips, and allows some variations for the parameter. Sufficient laxness in this area can allow signature forgeries, as described in https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/09/26/pkcs1.html Although there aren't known attacks against OpenSSL's current scheme, this change makes OpenSSL implement the algorithm as specified. This avoids the uncertainty and, more importantly, helps grow a healthy ecosystem. Laxness beyond the spec, particularly in implementations which enjoy wide use, risks harm to the ecosystem for all. A signature producer which only tests against OpenSSL may not notice bugs and accidentally become widely deployed. Thus implementations have a responsibility to honor the specification as tightly as is practical. In some cases, the damage is permanent and the spec deviation and security risk becomes a tax all implementors must forever pay, but not here. Both BoringSSL and Go successfully implemented and deployed RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified since their respective beginnings, so this change should be compatible enough to pin down in future OpenSSL releases. See also https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-thomson-postel-was-wrong-00 As a bonus, by not having to deal with sign/verify differences, this version is also somewhat clearer. It also more consistently enforces digest lengths in the verify_recover codepath. The NID_md5_sha1 codepath wasn't quite doing this right. Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> GH: #1474
2016-08-21 01:35:17 +08:00
goto err;
}
m = decrypt_buf + decrypt_len - m_len;
}
Implement RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified. RFC 3447, section 8.2.2, steps 3 and 4 states that verifiers must encode the DigestInfo struct and then compare the result against the public key operation result. This implies that one and only one encoding is legal. OpenSSL instead parses with crypto/asn1, then checks that the encoding round-trips, and allows some variations for the parameter. Sufficient laxness in this area can allow signature forgeries, as described in https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/09/26/pkcs1.html Although there aren't known attacks against OpenSSL's current scheme, this change makes OpenSSL implement the algorithm as specified. This avoids the uncertainty and, more importantly, helps grow a healthy ecosystem. Laxness beyond the spec, particularly in implementations which enjoy wide use, risks harm to the ecosystem for all. A signature producer which only tests against OpenSSL may not notice bugs and accidentally become widely deployed. Thus implementations have a responsibility to honor the specification as tightly as is practical. In some cases, the damage is permanent and the spec deviation and security risk becomes a tax all implementors must forever pay, but not here. Both BoringSSL and Go successfully implemented and deployed RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified since their respective beginnings, so this change should be compatible enough to pin down in future OpenSSL releases. See also https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-thomson-postel-was-wrong-00 As a bonus, by not having to deal with sign/verify differences, this version is also somewhat clearer. It also more consistently enforces digest lengths in the verify_recover codepath. The NID_md5_sha1 codepath wasn't quite doing this right. Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> GH: #1474
2016-08-21 01:35:17 +08:00
/* Construct the encoded digest and ensure it matches. */
if (!encode_pkcs1(&encoded, &encoded_len, type, m, m_len))
goto err;
Implement RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified. RFC 3447, section 8.2.2, steps 3 and 4 states that verifiers must encode the DigestInfo struct and then compare the result against the public key operation result. This implies that one and only one encoding is legal. OpenSSL instead parses with crypto/asn1, then checks that the encoding round-trips, and allows some variations for the parameter. Sufficient laxness in this area can allow signature forgeries, as described in https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/09/26/pkcs1.html Although there aren't known attacks against OpenSSL's current scheme, this change makes OpenSSL implement the algorithm as specified. This avoids the uncertainty and, more importantly, helps grow a healthy ecosystem. Laxness beyond the spec, particularly in implementations which enjoy wide use, risks harm to the ecosystem for all. A signature producer which only tests against OpenSSL may not notice bugs and accidentally become widely deployed. Thus implementations have a responsibility to honor the specification as tightly as is practical. In some cases, the damage is permanent and the spec deviation and security risk becomes a tax all implementors must forever pay, but not here. Both BoringSSL and Go successfully implemented and deployed RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified since their respective beginnings, so this change should be compatible enough to pin down in future OpenSSL releases. See also https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-thomson-postel-was-wrong-00 As a bonus, by not having to deal with sign/verify differences, this version is also somewhat clearer. It also more consistently enforces digest lengths in the verify_recover codepath. The NID_md5_sha1 codepath wasn't quite doing this right. Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> GH: #1474
2016-08-21 01:35:17 +08:00
if (encoded_len != decrypt_len
|| memcmp(encoded, decrypt_buf, encoded_len) != 0) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
goto err;
}
Implement RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified. RFC 3447, section 8.2.2, steps 3 and 4 states that verifiers must encode the DigestInfo struct and then compare the result against the public key operation result. This implies that one and only one encoding is legal. OpenSSL instead parses with crypto/asn1, then checks that the encoding round-trips, and allows some variations for the parameter. Sufficient laxness in this area can allow signature forgeries, as described in https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/09/26/pkcs1.html Although there aren't known attacks against OpenSSL's current scheme, this change makes OpenSSL implement the algorithm as specified. This avoids the uncertainty and, more importantly, helps grow a healthy ecosystem. Laxness beyond the spec, particularly in implementations which enjoy wide use, risks harm to the ecosystem for all. A signature producer which only tests against OpenSSL may not notice bugs and accidentally become widely deployed. Thus implementations have a responsibility to honor the specification as tightly as is practical. In some cases, the damage is permanent and the spec deviation and security risk becomes a tax all implementors must forever pay, but not here. Both BoringSSL and Go successfully implemented and deployed RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified since their respective beginnings, so this change should be compatible enough to pin down in future OpenSSL releases. See also https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-thomson-postel-was-wrong-00 As a bonus, by not having to deal with sign/verify differences, this version is also somewhat clearer. It also more consistently enforces digest lengths in the verify_recover codepath. The NID_md5_sha1 codepath wasn't quite doing this right. Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> GH: #1474
2016-08-21 01:35:17 +08:00
/* Output the recovered digest. */
if (rm != NULL) {
memcpy(rm, m, m_len);
*prm_len = m_len;
}
}
Implement RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified. RFC 3447, section 8.2.2, steps 3 and 4 states that verifiers must encode the DigestInfo struct and then compare the result against the public key operation result. This implies that one and only one encoding is legal. OpenSSL instead parses with crypto/asn1, then checks that the encoding round-trips, and allows some variations for the parameter. Sufficient laxness in this area can allow signature forgeries, as described in https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/09/26/pkcs1.html Although there aren't known attacks against OpenSSL's current scheme, this change makes OpenSSL implement the algorithm as specified. This avoids the uncertainty and, more importantly, helps grow a healthy ecosystem. Laxness beyond the spec, particularly in implementations which enjoy wide use, risks harm to the ecosystem for all. A signature producer which only tests against OpenSSL may not notice bugs and accidentally become widely deployed. Thus implementations have a responsibility to honor the specification as tightly as is practical. In some cases, the damage is permanent and the spec deviation and security risk becomes a tax all implementors must forever pay, but not here. Both BoringSSL and Go successfully implemented and deployed RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified since their respective beginnings, so this change should be compatible enough to pin down in future OpenSSL releases. See also https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-thomson-postel-was-wrong-00 As a bonus, by not having to deal with sign/verify differences, this version is also somewhat clearer. It also more consistently enforces digest lengths in the verify_recover codepath. The NID_md5_sha1 codepath wasn't quite doing this right. Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> GH: #1474
2016-08-21 01:35:17 +08:00
ret = 1;
err:
OPENSSL_clear_free(encoded, encoded_len);
Implement RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified. RFC 3447, section 8.2.2, steps 3 and 4 states that verifiers must encode the DigestInfo struct and then compare the result against the public key operation result. This implies that one and only one encoding is legal. OpenSSL instead parses with crypto/asn1, then checks that the encoding round-trips, and allows some variations for the parameter. Sufficient laxness in this area can allow signature forgeries, as described in https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/09/26/pkcs1.html Although there aren't known attacks against OpenSSL's current scheme, this change makes OpenSSL implement the algorithm as specified. This avoids the uncertainty and, more importantly, helps grow a healthy ecosystem. Laxness beyond the spec, particularly in implementations which enjoy wide use, risks harm to the ecosystem for all. A signature producer which only tests against OpenSSL may not notice bugs and accidentally become widely deployed. Thus implementations have a responsibility to honor the specification as tightly as is practical. In some cases, the damage is permanent and the spec deviation and security risk becomes a tax all implementors must forever pay, but not here. Both BoringSSL and Go successfully implemented and deployed RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified since their respective beginnings, so this change should be compatible enough to pin down in future OpenSSL releases. See also https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-thomson-postel-was-wrong-00 As a bonus, by not having to deal with sign/verify differences, this version is also somewhat clearer. It also more consistently enforces digest lengths in the verify_recover codepath. The NID_md5_sha1 codepath wasn't quite doing this right. Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> GH: #1474
2016-08-21 01:35:17 +08:00
OPENSSL_clear_free(decrypt_buf, siglen);
return ret;
}
Implement RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified. RFC 3447, section 8.2.2, steps 3 and 4 states that verifiers must encode the DigestInfo struct and then compare the result against the public key operation result. This implies that one and only one encoding is legal. OpenSSL instead parses with crypto/asn1, then checks that the encoding round-trips, and allows some variations for the parameter. Sufficient laxness in this area can allow signature forgeries, as described in https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/09/26/pkcs1.html Although there aren't known attacks against OpenSSL's current scheme, this change makes OpenSSL implement the algorithm as specified. This avoids the uncertainty and, more importantly, helps grow a healthy ecosystem. Laxness beyond the spec, particularly in implementations which enjoy wide use, risks harm to the ecosystem for all. A signature producer which only tests against OpenSSL may not notice bugs and accidentally become widely deployed. Thus implementations have a responsibility to honor the specification as tightly as is practical. In some cases, the damage is permanent and the spec deviation and security risk becomes a tax all implementors must forever pay, but not here. Both BoringSSL and Go successfully implemented and deployed RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified since their respective beginnings, so this change should be compatible enough to pin down in future OpenSSL releases. See also https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-thomson-postel-was-wrong-00 As a bonus, by not having to deal with sign/verify differences, this version is also somewhat clearer. It also more consistently enforces digest lengths in the verify_recover codepath. The NID_md5_sha1 codepath wasn't quite doing this right. Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> GH: #1474
2016-08-21 01:35:17 +08:00
int RSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
const unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, RSA *rsa)
{
if (rsa->meth->rsa_verify != NULL)
Implement RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified. RFC 3447, section 8.2.2, steps 3 and 4 states that verifiers must encode the DigestInfo struct and then compare the result against the public key operation result. This implies that one and only one encoding is legal. OpenSSL instead parses with crypto/asn1, then checks that the encoding round-trips, and allows some variations for the parameter. Sufficient laxness in this area can allow signature forgeries, as described in https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/09/26/pkcs1.html Although there aren't known attacks against OpenSSL's current scheme, this change makes OpenSSL implement the algorithm as specified. This avoids the uncertainty and, more importantly, helps grow a healthy ecosystem. Laxness beyond the spec, particularly in implementations which enjoy wide use, risks harm to the ecosystem for all. A signature producer which only tests against OpenSSL may not notice bugs and accidentally become widely deployed. Thus implementations have a responsibility to honor the specification as tightly as is practical. In some cases, the damage is permanent and the spec deviation and security risk becomes a tax all implementors must forever pay, but not here. Both BoringSSL and Go successfully implemented and deployed RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified since their respective beginnings, so this change should be compatible enough to pin down in future OpenSSL releases. See also https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-thomson-postel-was-wrong-00 As a bonus, by not having to deal with sign/verify differences, this version is also somewhat clearer. It also more consistently enforces digest lengths in the verify_recover codepath. The NID_md5_sha1 codepath wasn't quite doing this right. Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> GH: #1474
2016-08-21 01:35:17 +08:00
return rsa->meth->rsa_verify(type, m, m_len, sigbuf, siglen, rsa);
Implement RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified. RFC 3447, section 8.2.2, steps 3 and 4 states that verifiers must encode the DigestInfo struct and then compare the result against the public key operation result. This implies that one and only one encoding is legal. OpenSSL instead parses with crypto/asn1, then checks that the encoding round-trips, and allows some variations for the parameter. Sufficient laxness in this area can allow signature forgeries, as described in https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/09/26/pkcs1.html Although there aren't known attacks against OpenSSL's current scheme, this change makes OpenSSL implement the algorithm as specified. This avoids the uncertainty and, more importantly, helps grow a healthy ecosystem. Laxness beyond the spec, particularly in implementations which enjoy wide use, risks harm to the ecosystem for all. A signature producer which only tests against OpenSSL may not notice bugs and accidentally become widely deployed. Thus implementations have a responsibility to honor the specification as tightly as is practical. In some cases, the damage is permanent and the spec deviation and security risk becomes a tax all implementors must forever pay, but not here. Both BoringSSL and Go successfully implemented and deployed RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified since their respective beginnings, so this change should be compatible enough to pin down in future OpenSSL releases. See also https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-thomson-postel-was-wrong-00 As a bonus, by not having to deal with sign/verify differences, this version is also somewhat clearer. It also more consistently enforces digest lengths in the verify_recover codepath. The NID_md5_sha1 codepath wasn't quite doing this right. Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> GH: #1474
2016-08-21 01:35:17 +08:00
return int_rsa_verify(type, m, m_len, NULL, NULL, sigbuf, siglen, rsa);
}