2016-05-18 02:52:22 +08:00
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/*
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2020-04-23 20:55:52 +08:00
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* Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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1998-12-21 19:00:56 +08:00
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*
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2018-12-06 20:52:15 +08:00
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* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
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2016-05-18 02:52:22 +08:00
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* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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1998-12-21 19:00:56 +08:00
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*/
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <time.h>
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2015-05-14 22:56:48 +08:00
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#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
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2016-01-05 12:00:33 +08:00
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#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
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2019-09-28 06:45:33 +08:00
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#include "crypto/rand.h"
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2016-03-19 02:30:20 +08:00
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#include <openssl/engine.h>
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2017-04-06 17:30:03 +08:00
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#include "internal/thread_once.h"
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2019-09-28 06:45:40 +08:00
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#include "rand_local.h"
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2017-11-17 22:00:35 +08:00
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#include "e_os.h"
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1998-12-21 19:00:56 +08:00
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2020-04-14 04:34:56 +08:00
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#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
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2019-05-24 23:36:44 +08:00
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# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
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2001-09-26 04:23:40 +08:00
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/* non-NULL if default_RAND_meth is ENGINE-provided */
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2017-06-22 21:21:43 +08:00
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static ENGINE *funct_ref;
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static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_engine_lock;
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2019-05-24 23:36:44 +08:00
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# endif
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2017-06-22 21:21:43 +08:00
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static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_meth_lock;
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static const RAND_METHOD *default_RAND_meth;
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static CRYPTO_ONCE rand_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
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2017-09-01 05:16:22 +08:00
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2018-11-08 04:53:30 +08:00
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static int rand_inited = 0;
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2020-04-14 04:34:56 +08:00
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#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
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2019-05-24 23:36:44 +08:00
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2017-07-18 21:39:21 +08:00
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#ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDTSC
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/*
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* IMPORTANT NOTE: It is not currently possible to use this code
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2017-08-08 07:21:36 +08:00
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* because we are not sure about the amount of randomness it provides.
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* Some SP900 tests have been run, but there is internal skepticism.
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2017-07-18 21:39:21 +08:00
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* So for now this code is not used.
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*/
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# error "RDTSC enabled? Should not be possible!"
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/*
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2017-09-01 05:16:22 +08:00
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* Acquire entropy from high-speed clock
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*
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2017-07-18 21:39:21 +08:00
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* Since we get some randomness from the low-order bits of the
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2017-09-01 05:16:22 +08:00
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* high-speed clock, it can help.
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*
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* Returns the total entropy count, if it exceeds the requested
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* entropy count. Otherwise, returns an entropy count of 0.
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2017-07-18 21:39:21 +08:00
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*/
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2017-09-01 05:16:22 +08:00
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size_t rand_acquire_entropy_from_tsc(RAND_POOL *pool)
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2017-07-18 21:39:21 +08:00
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{
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unsigned char c;
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int i;
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2017-08-08 07:21:36 +08:00
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if ((OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[0] & (1 << 4)) != 0) {
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for (i = 0; i < TSC_READ_COUNT; i++) {
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c = (unsigned char)(OPENSSL_rdtsc() & 0xFF);
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2018-03-06 06:45:44 +08:00
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rand_pool_add(pool, &c, 1, 4);
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2017-08-08 07:21:36 +08:00
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}
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2017-07-18 21:39:21 +08:00
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}
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2018-03-06 06:45:44 +08:00
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return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
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2017-07-18 21:39:21 +08:00
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}
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#endif
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#ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDCPU
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2017-09-01 05:16:22 +08:00
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size_t OPENSSL_ia32_rdseed_bytes(unsigned char *buf, size_t len);
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size_t OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, size_t len);
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2017-07-18 21:39:21 +08:00
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2017-09-01 05:16:22 +08:00
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/*
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* Acquire entropy using Intel-specific cpu instructions
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*
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* Uses the RDSEED instruction if available, otherwise uses
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* RDRAND if available.
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*
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* For the differences between RDSEED and RDRAND, and why RDSEED
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* is the preferred choice, see https://goo.gl/oK3KcN
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*
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* Returns the total entropy count, if it exceeds the requested
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* entropy count. Otherwise, returns an entropy count of 0.
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*/
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size_t rand_acquire_entropy_from_cpu(RAND_POOL *pool)
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2017-07-18 21:39:21 +08:00
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{
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2017-09-01 05:16:22 +08:00
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size_t bytes_needed;
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unsigned char *buffer;
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2018-05-02 12:24:20 +08:00
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bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/);
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2017-09-01 05:16:22 +08:00
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if (bytes_needed > 0) {
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2018-03-06 06:45:44 +08:00
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buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
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2017-09-01 05:16:22 +08:00
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if (buffer != NULL) {
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2018-04-05 00:31:50 +08:00
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/* Whichever comes first, use RDSEED, RDRAND or nothing */
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2017-09-01 05:16:22 +08:00
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if ((OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[2] & (1 << 18)) != 0) {
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if (OPENSSL_ia32_rdseed_bytes(buffer, bytes_needed)
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2018-04-05 00:31:50 +08:00
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== bytes_needed) {
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rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes_needed, 8 * bytes_needed);
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}
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} else if ((OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1 << (62 - 32))) != 0) {
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2017-09-01 05:16:22 +08:00
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if (OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand_bytes(buffer, bytes_needed)
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2018-04-05 00:31:50 +08:00
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== bytes_needed) {
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rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes_needed, 8 * bytes_needed);
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}
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} else {
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rand_pool_add_end(pool, 0, 0);
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2017-09-01 05:16:22 +08:00
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}
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2017-08-08 07:21:36 +08:00
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}
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2017-07-18 21:39:21 +08:00
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}
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2018-03-06 06:45:44 +08:00
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return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
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2017-07-18 21:39:21 +08:00
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}
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#endif
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2017-06-22 21:21:43 +08:00
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2020-05-08 08:25:03 +08:00
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#if 0
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2017-08-03 21:23:28 +08:00
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/*
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2017-09-01 05:16:22 +08:00
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* Implements the get_entropy() callback (see RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks())
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*
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* If the DRBG has a parent, then the required amount of entropy input
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* is fetched using the parent's RAND_DRBG_generate().
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2017-08-03 21:23:28 +08:00
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*
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2017-09-01 05:16:22 +08:00
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* Otherwise, the entropy is polled from the system entropy sources
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2018-03-06 06:45:44 +08:00
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* using rand_pool_acquire_entropy().
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2017-09-01 05:16:22 +08:00
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*
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* If a random pool has been added to the DRBG using RAND_add(), then
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* its entropy will be used up first.
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2017-08-03 21:23:28 +08:00
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*/
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2017-09-01 05:16:22 +08:00
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size_t rand_drbg_get_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
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2018-02-19 02:26:55 +08:00
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unsigned char **pout,
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int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len,
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int prediction_resistance)
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2017-08-03 21:23:28 +08:00
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{
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2017-09-01 05:16:22 +08:00
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size_t ret = 0;
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size_t entropy_available = 0;
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2018-03-04 20:23:05 +08:00
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RAND_POOL *pool;
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2019-03-22 08:49:57 +08:00
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if (drbg->parent != NULL && drbg->strength > drbg->parent->strength) {
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2018-03-04 20:23:05 +08:00
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/*
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* We currently don't support the algorithm from NIST SP 800-90C
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* 10.1.2 to use a weaker DRBG as source
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*/
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RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GET_ENTROPY, RAND_R_PARENT_STRENGTH_TOO_WEAK);
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return 0;
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}
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2017-08-03 21:23:28 +08:00
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2018-11-06 06:13:11 +08:00
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if (drbg->seed_pool != NULL) {
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pool = drbg->seed_pool;
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2018-10-10 07:53:29 +08:00
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pool->entropy_requested = entropy;
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} else {
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2019-07-20 17:22:46 +08:00
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pool = rand_pool_new(entropy, drbg->secure, min_len, max_len);
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2018-10-23 22:30:20 +08:00
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if (pool == NULL)
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return 0;
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2017-08-03 21:23:28 +08:00
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}
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2019-03-22 08:49:57 +08:00
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if (drbg->parent != NULL) {
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2018-05-02 12:24:20 +08:00
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size_t bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/);
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2018-03-06 06:45:44 +08:00
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unsigned char *buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
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2017-08-23 06:24:23 +08:00
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2017-09-01 05:16:22 +08:00
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if (buffer != NULL) {
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size_t bytes = 0;
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2017-08-03 21:23:28 +08:00
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2017-10-12 01:25:26 +08:00
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/*
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2019-05-31 00:37:29 +08:00
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* Get random data from parent. Include our address as additional input,
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* in order to provide some additional distinction between different
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* DRBG child instances.
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2017-10-12 01:25:26 +08:00
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* Our lock is already held, but we need to lock our parent before
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2018-02-08 23:40:32 +08:00
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* generating bits from it. (Note: taking the lock will be a no-op
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* if locking if drbg->parent->lock == NULL.)
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2017-10-12 01:25:26 +08:00
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*/
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2018-02-15 17:29:56 +08:00
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rand_drbg_lock(drbg->parent);
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2017-09-01 05:16:22 +08:00
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if (RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg->parent,
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buffer, bytes_needed,
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2018-02-19 03:55:28 +08:00
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prediction_resistance,
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2019-05-31 00:37:29 +08:00
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(unsigned char *)&drbg, sizeof(drbg)) != 0)
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2017-09-01 05:16:22 +08:00
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bytes = bytes_needed;
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2018-10-14 18:35:19 +08:00
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drbg->reseed_next_counter
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= tsan_load(&drbg->parent->reseed_prop_counter);
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2018-02-15 17:29:56 +08:00
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rand_drbg_unlock(drbg->parent);
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2017-08-03 21:23:28 +08:00
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2018-04-05 00:31:50 +08:00
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rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
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entropy_available = rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
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2017-09-01 05:16:22 +08:00
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}
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2017-08-27 23:46:33 +08:00
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2017-09-01 05:16:22 +08:00
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} else {
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/* Get entropy by polling system entropy sources. */
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2018-03-06 06:45:44 +08:00
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entropy_available = rand_pool_acquire_entropy(pool);
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2017-08-03 21:23:28 +08:00
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}
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2017-09-01 05:16:22 +08:00
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if (entropy_available > 0) {
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2018-03-06 06:45:44 +08:00
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ret = rand_pool_length(pool);
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*pout = rand_pool_detach(pool);
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2017-08-26 05:26:53 +08:00
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}
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2017-09-01 05:16:22 +08:00
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2018-11-06 06:13:11 +08:00
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if (drbg->seed_pool == NULL)
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2018-10-27 03:06:14 +08:00
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rand_pool_free(pool);
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2017-09-01 05:16:22 +08:00
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return ret;
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2017-08-03 21:23:28 +08:00
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}
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2018-02-06 05:17:31 +08:00
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/*
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2018-04-10 16:22:52 +08:00
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* Implements the cleanup_entropy() callback (see RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks())
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2018-02-19 01:39:19 +08:00
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*
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2018-02-06 05:17:31 +08:00
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*/
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2018-04-10 16:22:52 +08:00
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void rand_drbg_cleanup_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
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unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
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2018-02-06 05:17:31 +08:00
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{
|
2019-07-20 17:22:46 +08:00
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if (drbg->seed_pool == NULL) {
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if (drbg->secure)
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OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(out, outlen);
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else
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OPENSSL_clear_free(out, outlen);
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}
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2018-04-10 16:22:52 +08:00
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}
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2017-11-17 22:00:35 +08:00
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/*
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* Generate additional data that can be used for the drbg. The data does
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* not need to contain entropy, but it's useful if it contains at least
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* some bits that are unpredictable.
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*
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* Returns 0 on failure.
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*
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* On success it allocates a buffer at |*pout| and returns the length of
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* the data. The buffer should get freed using OPENSSL_secure_clear_free().
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*/
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2018-10-27 17:31:21 +08:00
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size_t rand_drbg_get_additional_data(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned char **pout)
|
2017-11-17 22:00:35 +08:00
|
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{
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2018-04-10 16:22:52 +08:00
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size_t ret = 0;
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2017-11-17 22:00:35 +08:00
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2018-04-10 16:22:52 +08:00
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if (rand_pool_add_additional_data(pool) == 0)
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goto err;
|
2017-11-17 22:00:35 +08:00
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|
2018-04-10 16:22:52 +08:00
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ret = rand_pool_length(pool);
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*pout = rand_pool_detach(pool);
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2017-11-17 22:00:35 +08:00
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2018-04-10 16:22:52 +08:00
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err:
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return ret;
|
2017-11-17 22:00:35 +08:00
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}
|
2017-09-01 05:16:22 +08:00
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2018-10-27 17:31:21 +08:00
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void rand_drbg_cleanup_additional_data(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned char *out)
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2017-08-03 21:23:28 +08:00
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{
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2018-10-27 17:31:21 +08:00
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rand_pool_reattach(pool, out);
|
2017-08-03 02:00:52 +08:00
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}
|
2020-05-08 08:25:03 +08:00
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#endif
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2017-08-03 02:00:52 +08:00
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2020-04-14 04:34:56 +08:00
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#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
|
2017-06-22 21:21:43 +08:00
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DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_rand_init)
|
2017-04-06 17:30:03 +08:00
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{
|
2019-05-24 23:36:44 +08:00
|
|
|
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
|
Revert the crypto "global lock" implementation
Conceptually, this is a squashed version of:
Revert "Address feedback"
This reverts commit 75551e07bd2339dfea06ef1d31d69929e13a4495.
and
Revert "Add CRYPTO_thread_glock_new"
This reverts commit ed6b2c7938ec6f07b15745d4183afc276e74c6dd.
But there were some intervening commits that made neither revert apply
cleanly, so instead do it all as one shot.
The crypto global locks were an attempt to cope with the awkward
POSIX semantics for pthread_atfork(); its documentation (the "RATIONALE"
section) indicates that the expected usage is to have the prefork handler
lock all "global" locks, and the parent and child handlers release those
locks, to ensure that forking happens with a consistent (lock) state.
However, the set of functions available in the child process is limited
to async-signal-safe functions, and pthread_mutex_unlock() is not on
the list of async-signal-safe functions! The only synchronization
primitives that are async-signal-safe are the semaphore primitives,
which are not really appropriate for general-purpose usage.
However, the state consistency problem that the global locks were
attempting to solve is not actually a serious problem, particularly for
OpenSSL. That is, we can consider four cases of forking application
that might use OpenSSL:
(1) Single-threaded, does not call into OpenSSL in the child (e.g.,
the child calls exec() immediately)
For this class of process, no locking is needed at all, since there is
only ever a single thread of execution and the only reentrancy is due to
signal handlers (which are themselves limited to async-signal-safe
operation and should not be doing much work at all).
(2) Single-threaded, calls into OpenSSL after fork()
The application must ensure that it does not fork() with an unexpected
lock held (that is, one that would get unlocked in the parent but
accidentally remain locked in the child and cause deadlock). Since
OpenSSL does not expose any of its internal locks to the application
and the application is single-threaded, the OpenSSL internal locks
will be unlocked for the fork(), and the state will be consistent.
(OpenSSL will need to reseed its PRNG in the child, but that is
an orthogonal issue.) If the application makes use of locks from
libcrypto, proper handling for those locks is the responsibility of
the application, as for any other locking primitive that is available
for application programming.
(3) Multi-threaded, does not call into OpenSSL after fork()
As for (1), the OpenSSL state is only relevant in the parent, so
no particular fork()-related handling is needed. The internal locks
are relevant, but there is no interaction with the child to consider.
(4) Multi-threaded, calls into OpenSSL after fork()
This is the case where the pthread_atfork() hooks to ensure that all
global locks are in a known state across fork() would come into play,
per the above discussion. However, these "calls into OpenSSL after
fork()" are still subject to the restriction to async-signal-safe
functions. Since OpenSSL uses all sorts of locking and libc functions
that are not on the list of safe functions (e.g., malloc()), this
case is not currently usable and is unlikely to ever be usable,
independently of the locking situation. So, there is no need to
go through contortions to attempt to support this case in the one small
area of locking interaction with fork().
In light of the above analysis (thanks @davidben and @achernya), go
back to the simpler implementation that does not need to distinguish
"library-global" locks or to have complicated atfork handling for locks.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5089)
2018-01-16 23:49:54 +08:00
|
|
|
rand_engine_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
|
2018-04-29 02:35:54 +08:00
|
|
|
if (rand_engine_lock == NULL)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2019-05-24 23:36:44 +08:00
|
|
|
# endif
|
2018-04-29 02:35:54 +08:00
|
|
|
|
Revert the crypto "global lock" implementation
Conceptually, this is a squashed version of:
Revert "Address feedback"
This reverts commit 75551e07bd2339dfea06ef1d31d69929e13a4495.
and
Revert "Add CRYPTO_thread_glock_new"
This reverts commit ed6b2c7938ec6f07b15745d4183afc276e74c6dd.
But there were some intervening commits that made neither revert apply
cleanly, so instead do it all as one shot.
The crypto global locks were an attempt to cope with the awkward
POSIX semantics for pthread_atfork(); its documentation (the "RATIONALE"
section) indicates that the expected usage is to have the prefork handler
lock all "global" locks, and the parent and child handlers release those
locks, to ensure that forking happens with a consistent (lock) state.
However, the set of functions available in the child process is limited
to async-signal-safe functions, and pthread_mutex_unlock() is not on
the list of async-signal-safe functions! The only synchronization
primitives that are async-signal-safe are the semaphore primitives,
which are not really appropriate for general-purpose usage.
However, the state consistency problem that the global locks were
attempting to solve is not actually a serious problem, particularly for
OpenSSL. That is, we can consider four cases of forking application
that might use OpenSSL:
(1) Single-threaded, does not call into OpenSSL in the child (e.g.,
the child calls exec() immediately)
For this class of process, no locking is needed at all, since there is
only ever a single thread of execution and the only reentrancy is due to
signal handlers (which are themselves limited to async-signal-safe
operation and should not be doing much work at all).
(2) Single-threaded, calls into OpenSSL after fork()
The application must ensure that it does not fork() with an unexpected
lock held (that is, one that would get unlocked in the parent but
accidentally remain locked in the child and cause deadlock). Since
OpenSSL does not expose any of its internal locks to the application
and the application is single-threaded, the OpenSSL internal locks
will be unlocked for the fork(), and the state will be consistent.
(OpenSSL will need to reseed its PRNG in the child, but that is
an orthogonal issue.) If the application makes use of locks from
libcrypto, proper handling for those locks is the responsibility of
the application, as for any other locking primitive that is available
for application programming.
(3) Multi-threaded, does not call into OpenSSL after fork()
As for (1), the OpenSSL state is only relevant in the parent, so
no particular fork()-related handling is needed. The internal locks
are relevant, but there is no interaction with the child to consider.
(4) Multi-threaded, calls into OpenSSL after fork()
This is the case where the pthread_atfork() hooks to ensure that all
global locks are in a known state across fork() would come into play,
per the above discussion. However, these "calls into OpenSSL after
fork()" are still subject to the restriction to async-signal-safe
functions. Since OpenSSL uses all sorts of locking and libc functions
that are not on the list of safe functions (e.g., malloc()), this
case is not currently usable and is unlikely to ever be usable,
independently of the locking situation. So, there is no need to
go through contortions to attempt to support this case in the one small
area of locking interaction with fork().
In light of the above analysis (thanks @davidben and @achernya), go
back to the simpler implementation that does not need to distinguish
"library-global" locks or to have complicated atfork handling for locks.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5089)
2018-01-16 23:49:54 +08:00
|
|
|
rand_meth_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
|
2018-04-29 02:35:54 +08:00
|
|
|
if (rand_meth_lock == NULL)
|
2019-05-24 23:36:44 +08:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
2018-04-10 16:22:52 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2018-11-08 04:53:30 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!rand_pool_init())
|
2019-05-24 23:36:44 +08:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
2018-06-07 07:31:44 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2018-11-08 04:53:30 +08:00
|
|
|
rand_inited = 1;
|
2018-04-29 02:35:54 +08:00
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
|
2019-05-24 23:36:44 +08:00
|
|
|
err:
|
2018-04-29 02:35:54 +08:00
|
|
|
CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_meth_lock);
|
|
|
|
rand_meth_lock = NULL;
|
2019-05-24 23:36:44 +08:00
|
|
|
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
|
2018-04-29 02:35:54 +08:00
|
|
|
CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_engine_lock);
|
|
|
|
rand_engine_lock = NULL;
|
2019-05-24 23:36:44 +08:00
|
|
|
# endif
|
2018-04-29 02:35:54 +08:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2017-04-06 17:30:03 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
1998-12-21 19:00:56 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2017-06-22 21:21:43 +08:00
|
|
|
void rand_cleanup_int(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
const RAND_METHOD *meth = default_RAND_meth;
|
|
|
|
|
2018-11-08 04:53:30 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!rand_inited)
|
|
|
|
return;
|
2018-08-22 04:51:28 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2017-06-22 21:21:43 +08:00
|
|
|
if (meth != NULL && meth->cleanup != NULL)
|
|
|
|
meth->cleanup();
|
|
|
|
RAND_set_rand_method(NULL);
|
2018-08-22 04:51:28 +08:00
|
|
|
rand_pool_cleanup();
|
2019-05-24 23:36:44 +08:00
|
|
|
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
|
2017-06-22 21:21:43 +08:00
|
|
|
CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_engine_lock);
|
2018-04-29 02:35:54 +08:00
|
|
|
rand_engine_lock = NULL;
|
2019-05-24 23:36:44 +08:00
|
|
|
# endif
|
2017-06-22 21:21:43 +08:00
|
|
|
CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_meth_lock);
|
2018-04-29 02:35:54 +08:00
|
|
|
rand_meth_lock = NULL;
|
2018-11-08 04:53:30 +08:00
|
|
|
rand_inited = 0;
|
2017-08-03 21:23:28 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2019-05-24 23:36:44 +08:00
|
|
|
/* TODO(3.0): Do we need to handle this somehow in the FIPS module? */
|
2018-06-07 07:31:44 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2019-07-02 16:04:04 +08:00
|
|
|
* RAND_close_seed_files() ensures that any seed file descriptors are
|
2018-06-07 07:31:44 +08:00
|
|
|
* closed after use.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
void RAND_keep_random_devices_open(int keep)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2018-11-08 05:22:01 +08:00
|
|
|
if (RUN_ONCE(&rand_init, do_rand_init))
|
|
|
|
rand_pool_keep_random_devices_open(keep);
|
2018-06-07 07:31:44 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-03 21:23:28 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2017-09-01 05:16:22 +08:00
|
|
|
* RAND_poll() reseeds the default RNG using random input
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* The random input is obtained from polling various entropy
|
|
|
|
* sources which depend on the operating system and are
|
|
|
|
* configurable via the --with-rand-seed configure option.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int RAND_poll(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
|
|
|
|
|
2019-12-12 05:41:00 +08:00
|
|
|
if (meth == NULL)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2017-09-01 05:16:22 +08:00
|
|
|
if (meth == RAND_OpenSSL()) {
|
2017-11-24 21:59:58 +08:00
|
|
|
/* fill random pool and seed the master DRBG */
|
|
|
|
RAND_DRBG *drbg = RAND_DRBG_get0_master();
|
2017-09-01 05:16:22 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (drbg == NULL)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2020-05-08 08:25:03 +08:00
|
|
|
#if 0
|
2017-09-01 05:16:22 +08:00
|
|
|
ret = rand_drbg_restart(drbg, NULL, 0, 0);
|
2020-05-08 08:25:03 +08:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2017-09-01 05:16:22 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
2019-05-24 23:36:44 +08:00
|
|
|
RAND_POOL *pool = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
2017-09-01 05:16:22 +08:00
|
|
|
/* fill random pool and seed the current legacy RNG */
|
2019-07-20 17:22:46 +08:00
|
|
|
pool = rand_pool_new(RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH, 1,
|
2019-03-22 08:49:57 +08:00
|
|
|
(RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH + 7) / 8,
|
2018-10-10 07:53:29 +08:00
|
|
|
RAND_POOL_MAX_LENGTH);
|
2017-09-01 05:16:22 +08:00
|
|
|
if (pool == NULL)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2020-05-08 08:25:03 +08:00
|
|
|
#if 0
|
2018-03-06 06:45:44 +08:00
|
|
|
if (rand_pool_acquire_entropy(pool) == 0)
|
2017-09-01 05:16:22 +08:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
2020-05-08 08:25:03 +08:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2017-09-01 05:16:22 +08:00
|
|
|
if (meth->add == NULL
|
2018-03-06 06:45:44 +08:00
|
|
|
|| meth->add(rand_pool_buffer(pool),
|
|
|
|
rand_pool_length(pool),
|
|
|
|
(rand_pool_entropy(pool) / 8.0)) == 0)
|
2017-09-01 05:16:22 +08:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ret = 1;
|
2019-05-24 23:36:44 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
|
|
rand_pool_free(pool);
|
2017-09-01 05:16:22 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2001-09-26 04:23:40 +08:00
|
|
|
int RAND_set_rand_method(const RAND_METHOD *meth)
|
2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2017-06-22 21:21:43 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_init, do_rand_init))
|
2017-04-06 17:30:03 +08:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_meth_lock);
|
2019-05-24 23:36:44 +08:00
|
|
|
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
|
2016-02-26 01:09:06 +08:00
|
|
|
ENGINE_finish(funct_ref);
|
|
|
|
funct_ref = NULL;
|
2019-05-24 23:36:44 +08:00
|
|
|
# endif
|
2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
|
|
|
default_RAND_meth = meth;
|
2017-04-06 17:30:03 +08:00
|
|
|
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_meth_lock);
|
2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2020-05-08 08:25:03 +08:00
|
|
|
#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
|
1998-12-21 19:00:56 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2001-04-18 12:18:16 +08:00
|
|
|
const RAND_METHOD *RAND_get_rand_method(void)
|
2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2020-04-14 04:34:56 +08:00
|
|
|
#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
|
2019-05-24 23:36:44 +08:00
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
#else
|
2017-04-06 17:30:03 +08:00
|
|
|
const RAND_METHOD *tmp_meth = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
2017-06-22 21:21:43 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_init, do_rand_init))
|
2017-04-06 17:30:03 +08:00
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_meth_lock);
|
2017-06-22 21:21:43 +08:00
|
|
|
if (default_RAND_meth == NULL) {
|
2019-05-24 23:36:44 +08:00
|
|
|
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
|
2017-06-22 21:21:43 +08:00
|
|
|
ENGINE *e;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* If we have an engine that can do RAND, use it. */
|
|
|
|
if ((e = ENGINE_get_default_RAND()) != NULL
|
|
|
|
&& (tmp_meth = ENGINE_get_RAND(e)) != NULL) {
|
2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
|
|
|
funct_ref = e;
|
2017-06-22 21:21:43 +08:00
|
|
|
default_RAND_meth = tmp_meth;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
ENGINE_finish(e);
|
2017-08-03 21:23:28 +08:00
|
|
|
default_RAND_meth = &rand_meth;
|
2017-06-22 21:21:43 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2019-05-24 23:36:44 +08:00
|
|
|
# else
|
2017-08-03 21:23:28 +08:00
|
|
|
default_RAND_meth = &rand_meth;
|
2019-05-24 23:36:44 +08:00
|
|
|
# endif
|
2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2017-04-06 17:30:03 +08:00
|
|
|
tmp_meth = default_RAND_meth;
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_meth_lock);
|
|
|
|
return tmp_meth;
|
2019-05-24 23:36:44 +08:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2001-09-26 04:23:40 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2020-04-14 04:34:56 +08:00
|
|
|
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE) && !defined(FIPS_MODULE)
|
2001-09-26 04:23:40 +08:00
|
|
|
int RAND_set_rand_engine(ENGINE *engine)
|
2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
const RAND_METHOD *tmp_meth = NULL;
|
2017-04-06 17:30:03 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2017-06-22 21:21:43 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_init, do_rand_init))
|
2017-04-06 17:30:03 +08:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2017-06-22 21:21:43 +08:00
|
|
|
if (engine != NULL) {
|
2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!ENGINE_init(engine))
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
tmp_meth = ENGINE_get_RAND(engine);
|
2016-02-26 01:09:06 +08:00
|
|
|
if (tmp_meth == NULL) {
|
2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
|
|
|
ENGINE_finish(engine);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-04-06 17:30:03 +08:00
|
|
|
CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_engine_lock);
|
2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
|
|
|
/* This function releases any prior ENGINE so call it first */
|
|
|
|
RAND_set_rand_method(tmp_meth);
|
|
|
|
funct_ref = engine;
|
2017-04-06 17:30:03 +08:00
|
|
|
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_engine_lock);
|
2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2003-01-31 01:39:26 +08:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
1998-12-21 19:00:56 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2008-11-12 11:58:08 +08:00
|
|
|
void RAND_seed(const void *buf, int num)
|
2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
|
2017-06-22 21:21:43 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2019-12-12 05:41:00 +08:00
|
|
|
if (meth != NULL && meth->seed != NULL)
|
2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
|
|
|
meth->seed(buf, num);
|
|
|
|
}
|
1998-12-21 19:00:56 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2017-06-22 21:21:43 +08:00
|
|
|
void RAND_add(const void *buf, int num, double randomness)
|
2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
|
2017-06-22 21:21:43 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2019-12-12 05:41:00 +08:00
|
|
|
if (meth != NULL && meth->add != NULL)
|
2017-06-22 21:21:43 +08:00
|
|
|
meth->add(buf, num, randomness);
|
2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2000-01-14 04:59:17 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2017-08-03 02:00:52 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* This function is not part of RAND_METHOD, so if we're not using
|
|
|
|
* the default method, then just call RAND_bytes(). Otherwise make
|
|
|
|
* sure we're instantiated and use the private DRBG.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2020-01-16 00:34:55 +08:00
|
|
|
int RAND_priv_bytes_ex(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *buf, int num)
|
2017-08-03 02:00:52 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2017-08-27 23:46:33 +08:00
|
|
|
RAND_DRBG *drbg;
|
2019-05-24 23:36:44 +08:00
|
|
|
const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
|
2017-08-03 02:00:52 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2019-12-12 05:41:00 +08:00
|
|
|
if (meth != NULL && meth != RAND_OpenSSL()) {
|
|
|
|
if (meth->bytes != NULL)
|
|
|
|
return meth->bytes(buf, num);
|
|
|
|
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_PRIV_BYTES_EX, RAND_R_FUNC_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-08-03 02:00:52 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2019-06-28 18:23:46 +08:00
|
|
|
drbg = OPENSSL_CTX_get0_private_drbg(ctx);
|
2019-12-12 05:41:00 +08:00
|
|
|
if (drbg != NULL)
|
|
|
|
return RAND_DRBG_bytes(drbg, buf, num);
|
2017-08-03 02:00:52 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2019-12-12 05:41:00 +08:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2017-08-03 02:00:52 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2019-06-28 18:23:46 +08:00
|
|
|
int RAND_priv_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
|
2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2020-01-16 00:34:55 +08:00
|
|
|
return RAND_priv_bytes_ex(NULL, buf, num);
|
2019-06-28 18:23:46 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-01-16 00:34:55 +08:00
|
|
|
int RAND_bytes_ex(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *buf, int num)
|
2019-06-28 18:23:46 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
RAND_DRBG *drbg;
|
2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
|
|
|
const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
|
2017-06-22 21:21:43 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2019-12-12 05:41:00 +08:00
|
|
|
if (meth != NULL && meth != RAND_OpenSSL()) {
|
2019-06-28 18:23:46 +08:00
|
|
|
if (meth->bytes != NULL)
|
|
|
|
return meth->bytes(buf, num);
|
|
|
|
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_BYTES_EX, RAND_R_FUNC_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
drbg = OPENSSL_CTX_get0_public_drbg(ctx);
|
2019-12-12 05:41:00 +08:00
|
|
|
if (drbg != NULL)
|
|
|
|
return RAND_DRBG_bytes(drbg, buf, num);
|
2019-06-28 18:23:46 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2019-12-12 05:41:00 +08:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2019-06-28 18:23:46 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int RAND_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2020-01-16 00:34:55 +08:00
|
|
|
return RAND_bytes_ex(NULL, buf, num);
|
2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
1998-12-21 19:00:56 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2020-04-14 04:34:56 +08:00
|
|
|
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_1_1_0) && !defined(FIPS_MODULE)
|
2008-11-12 11:58:08 +08:00
|
|
|
int RAND_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
|
2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
|
2017-06-22 21:21:43 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2019-12-12 05:41:00 +08:00
|
|
|
if (meth != NULL && meth->pseudorand != NULL)
|
2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
|
|
|
return meth->pseudorand(buf, num);
|
2019-12-12 05:41:00 +08:00
|
|
|
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_PSEUDO_BYTES, RAND_R_FUNC_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
|
2017-06-22 21:21:43 +08:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2015-02-26 21:52:30 +08:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2000-03-02 22:34:58 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int RAND_status(void)
|
2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
|
2017-06-22 21:21:43 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2019-12-12 05:41:00 +08:00
|
|
|
if (meth != NULL && meth->status != NULL)
|
2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
|
|
|
return meth->status();
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|