2019-09-19 18:10:25 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2020-04-23 20:55:52 +08:00
|
|
|
* Copyright 2019-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
|
2019-09-19 18:10:25 +08:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
|
|
|
|
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
|
|
|
|
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
|
|
|
|
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
2019-12-06 01:09:49 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* AES low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for internal
|
|
|
|
* use where we're using them to implement the higher level EVP interface, as is
|
|
|
|
* the case here.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#include "internal/deprecated.h"
|
|
|
|
|
2019-09-19 18:10:25 +08:00
|
|
|
#include "cipher_aes_ocb.h"
|
2020-09-08 10:56:34 +08:00
|
|
|
#include "prov/providercommon.h"
|
2019-10-04 21:25:59 +08:00
|
|
|
#include "prov/providercommonerr.h"
|
2019-12-04 02:41:05 +08:00
|
|
|
#include "prov/ciphercommon_aead.h"
|
2019-10-04 21:20:48 +08:00
|
|
|
#include "prov/implementations.h"
|
2019-09-19 18:10:25 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define AES_OCB_FLAGS AEAD_FLAGS
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define OCB_DEFAULT_TAG_LEN 16
|
|
|
|
#define OCB_DEFAULT_IV_LEN 12
|
|
|
|
#define OCB_MIN_IV_LEN 1
|
|
|
|
#define OCB_MAX_IV_LEN 15
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
PROV_CIPHER_FUNC(int, ocb_cipher, (PROV_AES_OCB_CTX *ctx,
|
|
|
|
const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
|
|
|
|
size_t nextblock));
|
|
|
|
/* forward declarations */
|
2020-06-21 07:19:16 +08:00
|
|
|
static OSSL_FUNC_cipher_encrypt_init_fn aes_ocb_einit;
|
|
|
|
static OSSL_FUNC_cipher_decrypt_init_fn aes_ocb_dinit;
|
|
|
|
static OSSL_FUNC_cipher_update_fn aes_ocb_block_update;
|
|
|
|
static OSSL_FUNC_cipher_final_fn aes_ocb_block_final;
|
|
|
|
static OSSL_FUNC_cipher_cipher_fn aes_ocb_cipher;
|
|
|
|
static OSSL_FUNC_cipher_freectx_fn aes_ocb_freectx;
|
|
|
|
static OSSL_FUNC_cipher_dupctx_fn aes_ocb_dupctx;
|
|
|
|
static OSSL_FUNC_cipher_get_ctx_params_fn aes_ocb_get_ctx_params;
|
|
|
|
static OSSL_FUNC_cipher_set_ctx_params_fn aes_ocb_set_ctx_params;
|
2020-08-05 11:23:32 +08:00
|
|
|
static OSSL_FUNC_cipher_gettable_ctx_params_fn cipher_ocb_gettable_ctx_params;
|
|
|
|
static OSSL_FUNC_cipher_settable_ctx_params_fn cipher_ocb_settable_ctx_params;
|
2019-09-19 18:10:25 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* The following methods could be moved into PROV_AES_OCB_HW if
|
|
|
|
* multiple hardware implementations are ever needed.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static ossl_inline int aes_generic_ocb_setiv(PROV_AES_OCB_CTX *ctx,
|
|
|
|
const unsigned char *iv,
|
|
|
|
size_t ivlen, size_t taglen)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return (CRYPTO_ocb128_setiv(&ctx->ocb, iv, ivlen, taglen) == 1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static ossl_inline int aes_generic_ocb_setaad(PROV_AES_OCB_CTX *ctx,
|
|
|
|
const unsigned char *aad,
|
|
|
|
size_t alen)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return CRYPTO_ocb128_aad(&ctx->ocb, aad, alen) == 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static ossl_inline int aes_generic_ocb_gettag(PROV_AES_OCB_CTX *ctx,
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *tag, size_t tlen)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return CRYPTO_ocb128_tag(&ctx->ocb, tag, tlen) > 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static ossl_inline int aes_generic_ocb_final(PROV_AES_OCB_CTX *ctx)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return (CRYPTO_ocb128_finish(&ctx->ocb, ctx->tag, ctx->taglen) == 0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static ossl_inline void aes_generic_ocb_cleanup(PROV_AES_OCB_CTX *ctx)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_ocb128_cleanup(&ctx->ocb);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static ossl_inline int aes_generic_ocb_cipher(PROV_AES_OCB_CTX *ctx,
|
|
|
|
const unsigned char *in,
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *out, size_t len)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->base.enc) {
|
|
|
|
if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_encrypt(&ctx->ocb, in, out, len))
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_decrypt(&ctx->ocb, in, out, len))
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static ossl_inline int aes_generic_ocb_copy_ctx(PROV_AES_OCB_CTX *dst,
|
|
|
|
PROV_AES_OCB_CTX *src)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2019-11-18 11:13:05 +08:00
|
|
|
return CRYPTO_ocb128_copy_ctx(&dst->ocb, &src->ocb,
|
|
|
|
&dst->ksenc.ks, &dst->ksdec.ks);
|
2019-09-19 18:10:25 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*-
|
|
|
|
* Provider dispatch functions
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int aes_ocb_init(void *vctx, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
|
|
|
|
const unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen, int enc)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2020-09-08 10:56:34 +08:00
|
|
|
PROV_AES_OCB_CTX *ctx = (PROV_AES_OCB_CTX *)vctx;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ctx->aad_buf_len = 0;
|
|
|
|
ctx->data_buf_len = 0;
|
|
|
|
ctx->base.enc = enc;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (iv != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
if (ivlen != ctx->base.ivlen) {
|
|
|
|
/* IV len must be 1 to 15 */
|
|
|
|
if (ivlen < OCB_MIN_IV_LEN || ivlen > OCB_MAX_IV_LEN) {
|
|
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_IV_LENGTH);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ctx->base.ivlen = ivlen;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!cipher_generic_initiv(&ctx->base, iv, ivlen))
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
ctx->iv_state = IV_STATE_BUFFERED;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (key != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
if (keylen != ctx->base.keylen) {
|
|
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ctx->base.hw->init(&ctx->base, key, keylen);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
2019-09-19 18:10:25 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int aes_ocb_einit(void *vctx, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
|
|
|
|
const unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return aes_ocb_init(vctx, key, keylen, iv, ivlen, 1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int aes_ocb_dinit(void *vctx, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
|
|
|
|
const unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return aes_ocb_init(vctx, key, keylen, iv, ivlen, 0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Because of the way OCB works, both the AAD and data are buffered in the
|
|
|
|
* same way. Only the last block can be a partial block.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int aes_ocb_block_update_internal(PROV_AES_OCB_CTX *ctx,
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *buf, size_t *bufsz,
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *out, size_t *outl,
|
|
|
|
size_t outsize, const unsigned char *in,
|
|
|
|
size_t inl, OSSL_ocb_cipher_fn ciph)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2020-02-16 21:44:06 +08:00
|
|
|
size_t nextblocks;
|
2019-09-19 18:10:25 +08:00
|
|
|
size_t outlint = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2020-04-27 06:21:06 +08:00
|
|
|
if (*bufsz != 0)
|
2020-02-16 21:44:06 +08:00
|
|
|
nextblocks = fillblock(buf, bufsz, AES_BLOCK_SIZE, &in, &inl);
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
nextblocks = inl & ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE-1);
|
|
|
|
|
2019-09-19 18:10:25 +08:00
|
|
|
if (*bufsz == AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
|
|
|
|
if (outsize < AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
|
|
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!ciph(ctx, buf, out, AES_BLOCK_SIZE)) {
|
|
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_CIPHER_OPERATION_FAILED);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*bufsz = 0;
|
|
|
|
outlint = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
|
|
|
|
out += AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (nextblocks > 0) {
|
|
|
|
outlint += nextblocks;
|
|
|
|
if (outsize < outlint) {
|
|
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!ciph(ctx, in, out, nextblocks)) {
|
|
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_CIPHER_OPERATION_FAILED);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
in += nextblocks;
|
|
|
|
inl -= nextblocks;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2020-02-16 21:44:06 +08:00
|
|
|
if (inl != 0 && !trailingdata(buf, bufsz, AES_BLOCK_SIZE, &in, &inl)) {
|
2019-09-19 18:10:25 +08:00
|
|
|
/* PROVerr already called */
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*outl = outlint;
|
|
|
|
return inl == 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* A wrapper function that has the same signature as cipher */
|
|
|
|
static int cipher_updateaad(PROV_AES_OCB_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *in,
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *out, size_t len)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return aes_generic_ocb_setaad(ctx, in, len);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int update_iv(PROV_AES_OCB_CTX *ctx)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->iv_state == IV_STATE_FINISHED
|
|
|
|
|| ctx->iv_state == IV_STATE_UNINITIALISED)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->iv_state == IV_STATE_BUFFERED) {
|
|
|
|
if (!aes_generic_ocb_setiv(ctx, ctx->base.iv, ctx->base.ivlen,
|
|
|
|
ctx->taglen))
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
ctx->iv_state = IV_STATE_COPIED;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int aes_ocb_block_update(void *vctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outl,
|
|
|
|
size_t outsize, const unsigned char *in,
|
|
|
|
size_t inl)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
PROV_AES_OCB_CTX *ctx = (PROV_AES_OCB_CTX *)vctx;
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *buf;
|
|
|
|
size_t *buflen;
|
|
|
|
OSSL_ocb_cipher_fn fn;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!ctx->key_set || !update_iv(ctx))
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2019-11-28 00:06:34 +08:00
|
|
|
if (inl == 0) {
|
|
|
|
*outl = 0;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2019-09-19 18:10:25 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Are we dealing with AAD or normal data here? */
|
|
|
|
if (out == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
buf = ctx->aad_buf;
|
|
|
|
buflen = &ctx->aad_buf_len;
|
|
|
|
fn = cipher_updateaad;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
buf = ctx->data_buf;
|
|
|
|
buflen = &ctx->data_buf_len;
|
|
|
|
fn = aes_generic_ocb_cipher;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return aes_ocb_block_update_internal(ctx, buf, buflen, out, outl, outsize,
|
|
|
|
in, inl, fn);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int aes_ocb_block_final(void *vctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outl,
|
|
|
|
size_t outsize)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
PROV_AES_OCB_CTX *ctx = (PROV_AES_OCB_CTX *)vctx;
|
|
|
|
|
2020-09-08 10:56:34 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2019-09-19 18:10:25 +08:00
|
|
|
/* If no block_update has run then the iv still needs to be set */
|
|
|
|
if (!ctx->key_set || !update_iv(ctx))
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Empty the buffer of any partial block that we might have been provided,
|
|
|
|
* both for data and AAD
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
*outl = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->data_buf_len > 0) {
|
|
|
|
if (!aes_generic_ocb_cipher(ctx, ctx->data_buf, out, ctx->data_buf_len))
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
*outl = ctx->data_buf_len;
|
|
|
|
ctx->data_buf_len = 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->aad_buf_len > 0) {
|
|
|
|
if (!aes_generic_ocb_setaad(ctx, ctx->aad_buf, ctx->aad_buf_len))
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
ctx->aad_buf_len = 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->base.enc) {
|
|
|
|
/* If encrypting then just get the tag */
|
|
|
|
if (!aes_generic_ocb_gettag(ctx, ctx->tag, ctx->taglen))
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
/* If decrypting then verify */
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->taglen == 0)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
if (!aes_generic_ocb_final(ctx))
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Don't reuse the IV */
|
|
|
|
ctx->iv_state = IV_STATE_FINISHED;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void *aes_ocb_newctx(void *provctx, size_t kbits, size_t blkbits,
|
|
|
|
size_t ivbits, unsigned int mode, uint64_t flags)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2020-09-08 10:56:34 +08:00
|
|
|
PROV_AES_OCB_CTX *ctx;
|
2019-09-19 18:10:25 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2020-09-08 10:56:34 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx));
|
2019-09-19 18:10:25 +08:00
|
|
|
if (ctx != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
cipher_generic_initkey(ctx, kbits, blkbits, ivbits, mode, flags,
|
|
|
|
PROV_CIPHER_HW_aes_ocb(kbits), NULL);
|
|
|
|
ctx->taglen = OCB_DEFAULT_TAG_LEN;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ctx;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void aes_ocb_freectx(void *vctx)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
PROV_AES_OCB_CTX *ctx = (PROV_AES_OCB_CTX *)vctx;
|
|
|
|
|
2019-10-03 07:29:51 +08:00
|
|
|
if (ctx != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
aes_generic_ocb_cleanup(ctx);
|
2020-06-23 23:47:31 +08:00
|
|
|
cipher_generic_reset_ctx((PROV_CIPHER_CTX *)vctx);
|
2019-10-03 07:29:51 +08:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx, sizeof(*ctx));
|
|
|
|
}
|
2019-09-19 18:10:25 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void *aes_ocb_dupctx(void *vctx)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
PROV_AES_OCB_CTX *in = (PROV_AES_OCB_CTX *)vctx;
|
2020-09-08 10:56:34 +08:00
|
|
|
PROV_AES_OCB_CTX *ret;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
2019-09-19 18:10:25 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2020-09-08 10:56:34 +08:00
|
|
|
ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ret));
|
2019-09-19 18:10:25 +08:00
|
|
|
if (ret == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*ret = *in;
|
2019-10-03 07:29:51 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!aes_generic_ocb_copy_ctx(ret, in)) {
|
2019-09-19 18:10:25 +08:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(ret);
|
2019-10-03 07:29:51 +08:00
|
|
|
ret = NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2019-09-19 18:10:25 +08:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int aes_ocb_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
PROV_AES_OCB_CTX *ctx = (PROV_AES_OCB_CTX *)vctx;
|
|
|
|
const OSSL_PARAM *p;
|
|
|
|
size_t sz;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_AEAD_TAG);
|
|
|
|
if (p != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
if (p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_OCTET_STRING) {
|
|
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_FAILED_TO_GET_PARAMETER);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (p->data == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
/* Tag len must be 0 to 16 */
|
|
|
|
if (p->data_size > OCB_MAX_TAG_LEN)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
ctx->taglen = p->data_size;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
if (p->data_size != ctx->taglen || ctx->base.enc)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(ctx->tag, p->data, p->data_size);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_AEAD_IVLEN);
|
|
|
|
if (p != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_size_t(p, &sz)) {
|
|
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_FAILED_TO_GET_PARAMETER);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* IV len must be 1 to 15 */
|
|
|
|
if (sz < OCB_MIN_IV_LEN || sz > OCB_MAX_IV_LEN)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
ctx->base.ivlen = sz;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_KEYLEN);
|
|
|
|
if (p != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
size_t keylen;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_size_t(p, &keylen)) {
|
|
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_FAILED_TO_GET_PARAMETER);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->base.keylen != keylen) {
|
|
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int aes_ocb_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
PROV_AES_OCB_CTX *ctx = (PROV_AES_OCB_CTX *)vctx;
|
|
|
|
OSSL_PARAM *p;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_IVLEN);
|
|
|
|
if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, ctx->base.ivlen)) {
|
|
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_FAILED_TO_SET_PARAMETER);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_KEYLEN);
|
|
|
|
if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, ctx->base.keylen)) {
|
|
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_FAILED_TO_SET_PARAMETER);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_AEAD_TAGLEN);
|
|
|
|
if (p != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, ctx->taglen)) {
|
|
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_FAILED_TO_SET_PARAMETER);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_IV);
|
|
|
|
if (p != NULL) {
|
2020-06-02 03:31:55 +08:00
|
|
|
if (ctx->base.ivlen > p->data_size) {
|
2019-09-19 18:10:25 +08:00
|
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_IV_LENGTH);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2020-06-02 05:33:54 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_octet_string(p, ctx->base.oiv, ctx->base.ivlen)
|
|
|
|
&& !OSSL_PARAM_set_octet_ptr(p, &ctx->base.oiv, ctx->base.ivlen)) {
|
2019-09-19 18:10:25 +08:00
|
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_FAILED_TO_SET_PARAMETER);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
Support cipher provider "iv state"
Some modes (e.g., CBC and OFB) update the effective IV with each
block-cipher invocation, making the "IV" stored in the (historically)
EVP_CIPHER_CTX or (current) PROV_CIPHER_CTX distinct from the initial
IV passed in at cipher initialization time. The latter is stored in
the "oiv" (original IV) field, and has historically been accessible
via the EVP_CIPHER_CTX_original_iv() API. The "effective IV" has
also historically been accessible, via both EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv()
and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(), the latter of which allows for
*write* access to the internal cipher state. This is particularly
problematic given that provider-internal cipher state need not, in
general, even be accessible from the same address space as libcrypto,
so these APIs are not sustainable in the long term. However, it still
remains necessary to provide access to the contents of the "IV state"
(e.g., when serializing cipher state for in-kernel TLS); a subsequent
reinitialization of a cipher context using the "IV state" as the
input IV will be able to resume processing of data in a compatible
manner.
This problem was introduced in commit
089cb623be76b88a1eea6fcd135101037661bbc3, which effectively caused
all IV queries to return the "original IV", removing access to the
current IV state of the cipher.
These functions for accessing the (even the "original") IV had remained
undocumented for quite some time, presumably due to unease about
exposing the internals of the cipher state in such a manner.
Note that this also as a side effect "fixes" some "bugs" where things
had been referring to the 'iv' field that should have been using the
'oiv' field. It also fixes the EVP_CTRL_GET_IV cipher control,
which was clearly intended to expose the non-original IV, for
use exporting the cipher state into the kernel for kTLS.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12233)
2020-06-20 04:50:22 +08:00
|
|
|
p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_IV_STATE);
|
|
|
|
if (p != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->base.ivlen > p->data_size) {
|
|
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_IV_LENGTH);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_octet_string(p, ctx->base.iv, ctx->base.ivlen)
|
|
|
|
&& !OSSL_PARAM_set_octet_ptr(p, &ctx->base.iv, ctx->base.ivlen)) {
|
|
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_FAILED_TO_SET_PARAMETER);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2019-09-19 18:10:25 +08:00
|
|
|
p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_AEAD_TAG);
|
|
|
|
if (p != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
if (p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_OCTET_STRING) {
|
|
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_FAILED_TO_GET_PARAMETER);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!ctx->base.enc || p->data_size != ctx->taglen) {
|
|
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_TAGLEN);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memcpy(p->data, ctx->tag, ctx->taglen);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static const OSSL_PARAM cipher_ocb_known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
|
|
|
|
OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_KEYLEN, NULL),
|
|
|
|
OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_IVLEN, NULL),
|
|
|
|
OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_AEAD_TAGLEN, NULL),
|
|
|
|
OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_IV, NULL, 0),
|
Support cipher provider "iv state"
Some modes (e.g., CBC and OFB) update the effective IV with each
block-cipher invocation, making the "IV" stored in the (historically)
EVP_CIPHER_CTX or (current) PROV_CIPHER_CTX distinct from the initial
IV passed in at cipher initialization time. The latter is stored in
the "oiv" (original IV) field, and has historically been accessible
via the EVP_CIPHER_CTX_original_iv() API. The "effective IV" has
also historically been accessible, via both EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv()
and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(), the latter of which allows for
*write* access to the internal cipher state. This is particularly
problematic given that provider-internal cipher state need not, in
general, even be accessible from the same address space as libcrypto,
so these APIs are not sustainable in the long term. However, it still
remains necessary to provide access to the contents of the "IV state"
(e.g., when serializing cipher state for in-kernel TLS); a subsequent
reinitialization of a cipher context using the "IV state" as the
input IV will be able to resume processing of data in a compatible
manner.
This problem was introduced in commit
089cb623be76b88a1eea6fcd135101037661bbc3, which effectively caused
all IV queries to return the "original IV", removing access to the
current IV state of the cipher.
These functions for accessing the (even the "original") IV had remained
undocumented for quite some time, presumably due to unease about
exposing the internals of the cipher state in such a manner.
Note that this also as a side effect "fixes" some "bugs" where things
had been referring to the 'iv' field that should have been using the
'oiv' field. It also fixes the EVP_CTRL_GET_IV cipher control,
which was clearly intended to expose the non-original IV, for
use exporting the cipher state into the kernel for kTLS.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12233)
2020-06-20 04:50:22 +08:00
|
|
|
OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_IV_STATE, NULL, 0),
|
2019-09-19 18:10:25 +08:00
|
|
|
OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_AEAD_TAG, NULL, 0),
|
|
|
|
OSSL_PARAM_END
|
|
|
|
};
|
2020-08-07 11:20:18 +08:00
|
|
|
static const OSSL_PARAM *cipher_ocb_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *p_ctx)
|
2019-09-19 18:10:25 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return cipher_ocb_known_gettable_ctx_params;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static const OSSL_PARAM cipher_ocb_known_settable_ctx_params[] = {
|
|
|
|
OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_KEYLEN, NULL),
|
|
|
|
OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_AEAD_IVLEN, NULL),
|
|
|
|
OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_AEAD_TAG, NULL, 0),
|
|
|
|
OSSL_PARAM_END
|
|
|
|
};
|
2020-08-07 11:20:18 +08:00
|
|
|
static const OSSL_PARAM *cipher_ocb_settable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *p_ctx)
|
2019-09-19 18:10:25 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return cipher_ocb_known_settable_ctx_params;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int aes_ocb_cipher(void *vctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outl,
|
|
|
|
size_t outsize, const unsigned char *in, size_t inl)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
PROV_AES_OCB_CTX *ctx = (PROV_AES_OCB_CTX *)vctx;
|
|
|
|
|
2020-09-08 10:56:34 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2019-09-19 18:10:25 +08:00
|
|
|
if (outsize < inl) {
|
|
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!aes_generic_ocb_cipher(ctx, in, out, inl)) {
|
|
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_CIPHER_OPERATION_FAILED);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*outl = inl;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define IMPLEMENT_cipher(mode, UCMODE, flags, kbits, blkbits, ivbits) \
|
2020-06-21 07:19:16 +08:00
|
|
|
static OSSL_FUNC_cipher_get_params_fn aes_##kbits##_##mode##_get_params; \
|
2019-09-19 18:10:25 +08:00
|
|
|
static int aes_##kbits##_##mode##_get_params(OSSL_PARAM params[]) \
|
|
|
|
{ \
|
|
|
|
return cipher_generic_get_params(params, EVP_CIPH_##UCMODE##_MODE, \
|
|
|
|
flags, kbits, blkbits, ivbits); \
|
|
|
|
} \
|
2020-06-21 07:19:16 +08:00
|
|
|
static OSSL_FUNC_cipher_newctx_fn aes_##kbits##_##mode##_newctx; \
|
2019-09-19 18:10:25 +08:00
|
|
|
static void *aes_##kbits##_##mode##_newctx(void *provctx) \
|
|
|
|
{ \
|
|
|
|
return aes_##mode##_newctx(provctx, kbits, blkbits, ivbits, \
|
|
|
|
EVP_CIPH_##UCMODE##_MODE, flags); \
|
|
|
|
} \
|
|
|
|
const OSSL_DISPATCH aes##kbits##mode##_functions[] = { \
|
|
|
|
{ OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_NEWCTX, \
|
|
|
|
(void (*)(void))aes_##kbits##_##mode##_newctx }, \
|
|
|
|
{ OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_INIT, (void (*)(void))aes_##mode##_einit }, \
|
|
|
|
{ OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_DECRYPT_INIT, (void (*)(void))aes_##mode##_dinit }, \
|
|
|
|
{ OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_UPDATE, (void (*)(void))aes_##mode##_block_update }, \
|
|
|
|
{ OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_FINAL, (void (*)(void))aes_##mode##_block_final }, \
|
|
|
|
{ OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_CIPHER, (void (*)(void))aes_ocb_cipher }, \
|
|
|
|
{ OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_FREECTX, (void (*)(void))aes_##mode##_freectx }, \
|
|
|
|
{ OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_DUPCTX, (void (*)(void))aes_##mode##_dupctx }, \
|
|
|
|
{ OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_GET_PARAMS, \
|
|
|
|
(void (*)(void))aes_##kbits##_##mode##_get_params }, \
|
|
|
|
{ OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_GET_CTX_PARAMS, \
|
|
|
|
(void (*)(void))aes_##mode##_get_ctx_params }, \
|
|
|
|
{ OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_SET_CTX_PARAMS, \
|
|
|
|
(void (*)(void))aes_##mode##_set_ctx_params }, \
|
|
|
|
{ OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_GETTABLE_PARAMS, \
|
|
|
|
(void (*)(void))cipher_generic_gettable_params }, \
|
|
|
|
{ OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS, \
|
|
|
|
(void (*)(void))cipher_ocb_gettable_ctx_params }, \
|
|
|
|
{ OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS, \
|
|
|
|
(void (*)(void))cipher_ocb_settable_ctx_params }, \
|
|
|
|
{ 0, NULL } \
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
IMPLEMENT_cipher(ocb, OCB, AES_OCB_FLAGS, 256, 128, OCB_DEFAULT_IV_LEN * 8);
|
|
|
|
IMPLEMENT_cipher(ocb, OCB, AES_OCB_FLAGS, 192, 128, OCB_DEFAULT_IV_LEN * 8);
|
|
|
|
IMPLEMENT_cipher(ocb, OCB, AES_OCB_FLAGS, 128, 128, OCB_DEFAULT_IV_LEN * 8);
|