2016-03-17 22:14:30 +08:00
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/*
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2021-02-18 22:57:13 +08:00
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* Copyright 2016-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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2016-03-17 22:14:30 +08:00
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*
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2018-12-06 20:05:25 +08:00
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* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
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2016-05-18 02:20:24 +08:00
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* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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2016-03-17 22:14:30 +08:00
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* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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*/
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2019-09-28 06:45:57 +08:00
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#ifndef OSSL_TEST_HANDSHAKE_HELPER_H
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#define OSSL_TEST_HANDSHAKE_HELPER_H
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2016-03-17 22:14:30 +08:00
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#include "ssl_test_ctx.h"
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2021-02-08 19:31:59 +08:00
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typedef struct ctx_data_st {
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unsigned char *npn_protocols;
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size_t npn_protocols_len;
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unsigned char *alpn_protocols;
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size_t alpn_protocols_len;
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char *srp_user;
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char *srp_password;
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char *session_ticket_app_data;
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} CTX_DATA;
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2016-03-17 22:14:30 +08:00
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typedef struct handshake_result {
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ssl_test_result_t result;
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/* These alerts are in the 2-byte format returned by the info_callback. */
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2016-08-12 20:29:24 +08:00
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/* (Latest) alert sent by the client; 0 if no alert. */
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2016-03-17 22:14:30 +08:00
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int client_alert_sent;
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2016-08-12 20:29:24 +08:00
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/* Number of fatal or close_notify alerts sent. */
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int client_num_fatal_alerts_sent;
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/* (Latest) alert received by the server; 0 if no alert. */
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2016-03-17 22:14:30 +08:00
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int client_alert_received;
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2016-08-12 20:29:24 +08:00
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/* (Latest) alert sent by the server; 0 if no alert. */
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2016-03-17 22:14:30 +08:00
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int server_alert_sent;
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2016-08-12 20:29:24 +08:00
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/* Number of fatal or close_notify alerts sent. */
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int server_num_fatal_alerts_sent;
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/* (Latest) alert received by the client; 0 if no alert. */
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2016-03-17 22:14:30 +08:00
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int server_alert_received;
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/* Negotiated protocol. On success, these should always match. */
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int server_protocol;
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int client_protocol;
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Fix session ticket and SNI
When session tickets are used, it's possible that SNI might swtich the
SSL_CTX on an SSL. Normally, this is not a problem, because the
initial_ctx/session_ctx are used for all session ticket/id processes.
However, when the SNI callback occurs, it's possible that the callback
may update the options in the SSL from the SSL_CTX, and this could
cause SSL_OP_NO_TICKET to be set. If this occurs, then two bad things
can happen:
1. The session ticket TLSEXT may not be written when the ticket expected
flag is set. The state machine transistions to writing the ticket, and
the client responds with an error as its not expecting a ticket.
2. When creating the session ticket, if the ticket key cb returns 0
the crypto/hmac contexts are not initialized, and the code crashes when
trying to encrypt the session ticket.
To fix 1, if the ticket TLSEXT is not written out, clear the expected
ticket flag.
To fix 2, consider a return of 0 from the ticket key cb a recoverable
error, and write a 0 length ticket and continue. The client-side code
can explicitly handle this case.
Fix these two cases, and add unit test code to validate ticket behavior.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1098)
2016-05-13 06:16:52 +08:00
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/* Server connection */
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2016-06-10 06:39:22 +08:00
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ssl_servername_t servername;
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Fix session ticket and SNI
When session tickets are used, it's possible that SNI might swtich the
SSL_CTX on an SSL. Normally, this is not a problem, because the
initial_ctx/session_ctx are used for all session ticket/id processes.
However, when the SNI callback occurs, it's possible that the callback
may update the options in the SSL from the SSL_CTX, and this could
cause SSL_OP_NO_TICKET to be set. If this occurs, then two bad things
can happen:
1. The session ticket TLSEXT may not be written when the ticket expected
flag is set. The state machine transistions to writing the ticket, and
the client responds with an error as its not expecting a ticket.
2. When creating the session ticket, if the ticket key cb returns 0
the crypto/hmac contexts are not initialized, and the code crashes when
trying to encrypt the session ticket.
To fix 1, if the ticket TLSEXT is not written out, clear the expected
ticket flag.
To fix 2, consider a return of 0 from the ticket key cb a recoverable
error, and write a 0 length ticket and continue. The client-side code
can explicitly handle this case.
Fix these two cases, and add unit test code to validate ticket behavior.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1098)
2016-05-13 06:16:52 +08:00
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/* Session ticket status */
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2016-06-10 06:39:22 +08:00
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ssl_session_ticket_t session_ticket;
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2017-03-02 21:41:10 +08:00
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int compression;
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Fix session ticket and SNI
When session tickets are used, it's possible that SNI might swtich the
SSL_CTX on an SSL. Normally, this is not a problem, because the
initial_ctx/session_ctx are used for all session ticket/id processes.
However, when the SNI callback occurs, it's possible that the callback
may update the options in the SSL from the SSL_CTX, and this could
cause SSL_OP_NO_TICKET to be set. If this occurs, then two bad things
can happen:
1. The session ticket TLSEXT may not be written when the ticket expected
flag is set. The state machine transistions to writing the ticket, and
the client responds with an error as its not expecting a ticket.
2. When creating the session ticket, if the ticket key cb returns 0
the crypto/hmac contexts are not initialized, and the code crashes when
trying to encrypt the session ticket.
To fix 1, if the ticket TLSEXT is not written out, clear the expected
ticket flag.
To fix 2, consider a return of 0 from the ticket key cb a recoverable
error, and write a 0 length ticket and continue. The client-side code
can explicitly handle this case.
Fix these two cases, and add unit test code to validate ticket behavior.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1098)
2016-05-13 06:16:52 +08:00
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/* Was this called on the second context? */
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int session_ticket_do_not_call;
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2016-07-05 02:16:14 +08:00
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char *client_npn_negotiated;
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char *server_npn_negotiated;
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char *client_alpn_negotiated;
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char *server_alpn_negotiated;
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2016-07-06 01:06:23 +08:00
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/* Was the handshake resumed? */
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int client_resumed;
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int server_resumed;
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2017-01-08 08:09:08 +08:00
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/* Temporary key type */
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int tmp_key_type;
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2017-01-09 03:30:41 +08:00
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/* server certificate key type */
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int server_cert_type;
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2017-01-13 23:20:42 +08:00
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/* server signing hash */
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int server_sign_hash;
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2017-01-27 23:06:16 +08:00
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/* server signature type */
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int server_sign_type;
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2017-04-01 05:35:28 +08:00
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/* server CA names */
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STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *server_ca_names;
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2017-01-09 03:30:41 +08:00
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/* client certificate key type */
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int client_cert_type;
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2017-01-13 23:20:42 +08:00
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/* client signing hash */
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int client_sign_hash;
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2017-01-27 23:06:16 +08:00
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/* client signature type */
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int client_sign_type;
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2017-03-16 00:07:07 +08:00
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/* Client CA names */
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STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *client_ca_names;
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Session resume broken switching contexts
When an SSL's context is swtiched from a ticket-enabled context to
a ticket-disabled context in the servername callback, no session-id
is generated, so the session can't be resumed.
If a servername callback changes the SSL_OP_NO_TICKET option, check
to see if it's changed to disable, and whether a session ticket is
expected (i.e. the client indicated ticket support and the SSL had
tickets enabled at the time), and whether we already have a previous
session (i.e. s->hit is set).
In this case, clear the ticket-expected flag, remove any ticket data
and generate a session-id in the session.
If the SSL hit (resumed) and switched to a ticket-disabled context,
assume that the resumption was via session-id, and don't bother to
update the session.
Before this fix, the updated unit-tests in 06-sni-ticket.conf would
fail test #4 (server1 = SNI, server2 = no SNI).
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1529)
2016-09-01 20:40:54 +08:00
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/* Session id status */
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ssl_session_id_t session_id;
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2015-12-22 04:19:29 +08:00
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char *cipher;
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2017-03-16 01:25:55 +08:00
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/* session ticket application data */
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char *result_session_ticket_app_data;
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2016-03-17 22:14:30 +08:00
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} HANDSHAKE_RESULT;
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2016-07-05 02:16:14 +08:00
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HANDSHAKE_RESULT *HANDSHAKE_RESULT_new(void);
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void HANDSHAKE_RESULT_free(HANDSHAKE_RESULT *result);
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2016-03-17 22:14:30 +08:00
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/* Do a handshake and report some information about the result. */
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2016-07-05 02:16:14 +08:00
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HANDSHAKE_RESULT *do_handshake(SSL_CTX *server_ctx, SSL_CTX *server2_ctx,
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2016-07-06 01:06:23 +08:00
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SSL_CTX *client_ctx, SSL_CTX *resume_server_ctx,
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2016-07-21 20:04:00 +08:00
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SSL_CTX *resume_client_ctx,
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2016-07-06 01:06:23 +08:00
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const SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx);
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Fix session ticket and SNI
When session tickets are used, it's possible that SNI might swtich the
SSL_CTX on an SSL. Normally, this is not a problem, because the
initial_ctx/session_ctx are used for all session ticket/id processes.
However, when the SNI callback occurs, it's possible that the callback
may update the options in the SSL from the SSL_CTX, and this could
cause SSL_OP_NO_TICKET to be set. If this occurs, then two bad things
can happen:
1. The session ticket TLSEXT may not be written when the ticket expected
flag is set. The state machine transistions to writing the ticket, and
the client responds with an error as its not expecting a ticket.
2. When creating the session ticket, if the ticket key cb returns 0
the crypto/hmac contexts are not initialized, and the code crashes when
trying to encrypt the session ticket.
To fix 1, if the ticket TLSEXT is not written out, clear the expected
ticket flag.
To fix 2, consider a return of 0 from the ticket key cb a recoverable
error, and write a 0 length ticket and continue. The client-side code
can explicitly handle this case.
Fix these two cases, and add unit test code to validate ticket behavior.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1098)
2016-05-13 06:16:52 +08:00
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2021-02-08 19:31:59 +08:00
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int configure_handshake_ctx_for_srp(SSL_CTX *server_ctx, SSL_CTX *server2_ctx,
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SSL_CTX *client_ctx,
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const SSL_TEST_EXTRA_CONF *extra,
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CTX_DATA *server_ctx_data,
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CTX_DATA *server2_ctx_data,
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CTX_DATA *client_ctx_data);
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2019-09-28 06:45:57 +08:00
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#endif /* OSSL_TEST_HANDSHAKE_HELPER_H */
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