openssl/crypto/dh/dh_ameth.c

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/*
* Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
/*
* DH low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
* internal use.
*/
#include "internal/deprecated.h"
#include <stdio.h>
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/asn1.h>
#include "dh_local.h"
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include "crypto/asn1.h"
#include "crypto/dh.h"
#include "crypto/evp.h"
#include <openssl/cms.h>
#include <openssl/core_names.h>
#include <openssl/param_build.h>
#include "internal/ffc.h"
/*
* i2d/d2i like DH parameter functions which use the appropriate routine for
* PKCS#3 DH or X9.42 DH.
*/
static DH *d2i_dhp(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, const unsigned char **pp,
long length)
{
if (pkey->ameth == &dhx_asn1_meth)
return d2i_DHxparams(NULL, pp, length);
return d2i_DHparams(NULL, pp, length);
}
static int i2d_dhp(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, const DH *a, unsigned char **pp)
{
if (pkey->ameth == &dhx_asn1_meth)
return i2d_DHxparams(a, pp);
return i2d_DHparams(a, pp);
}
static void int_dh_free(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
DH_free(pkey->pkey.dh);
}
static int dh_pub_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509_PUBKEY *pubkey)
{
const unsigned char *p, *pm;
int pklen, pmlen;
int ptype;
const void *pval;
const ASN1_STRING *pstr;
X509_ALGOR *palg;
ASN1_INTEGER *public_key = NULL;
DH *dh = NULL;
if (!X509_PUBKEY_get0_param(NULL, &p, &pklen, &palg, pubkey))
return 0;
X509_ALGOR_get0(NULL, &ptype, &pval, palg);
if (ptype != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) {
DHerr(DH_F_DH_PUB_DECODE, DH_R_PARAMETER_ENCODING_ERROR);
goto err;
}
pstr = pval;
pm = pstr->data;
pmlen = pstr->length;
if ((dh = d2i_dhp(pkey, &pm, pmlen)) == NULL) {
DHerr(DH_F_DH_PUB_DECODE, DH_R_DECODE_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if ((public_key = d2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, &p, pklen)) == NULL) {
DHerr(DH_F_DH_PUB_DECODE, DH_R_DECODE_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/* We have parameters now set public key */
if ((dh->pub_key = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(public_key, NULL)) == NULL) {
DHerr(DH_F_DH_PUB_DECODE, DH_R_BN_DECODE_ERROR);
goto err;
}
ASN1_INTEGER_free(public_key);
EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, pkey->ameth->pkey_id, dh);
return 1;
err:
ASN1_INTEGER_free(public_key);
DH_free(dh);
return 0;
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}
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static int dh_pub_encode(X509_PUBKEY *pk, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
DH *dh;
int ptype;
unsigned char *penc = NULL;
int penclen;
ASN1_STRING *str;
ASN1_INTEGER *pub_key = NULL;
dh = pkey->pkey.dh;
str = ASN1_STRING_new();
if (str == NULL) {
DHerr(DH_F_DH_PUB_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
str->length = i2d_dhp(pkey, dh, &str->data);
if (str->length <= 0) {
DHerr(DH_F_DH_PUB_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
ptype = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE;
pub_key = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(dh->pub_key, NULL);
if (pub_key == NULL)
goto err;
penclen = i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(pub_key, &penc);
ASN1_INTEGER_free(pub_key);
if (penclen <= 0) {
DHerr(DH_F_DH_PUB_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (X509_PUBKEY_set0_param(pk, OBJ_nid2obj(pkey->ameth->pkey_id),
ptype, str, penc, penclen))
return 1;
err:
OPENSSL_free(penc);
ASN1_STRING_free(str);
return 0;
}
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/*
* PKCS#8 DH is defined in PKCS#11 of all places. It is similar to DH in that
* the AlgorithmIdentifier contains the parameters, the private key is
* explicitly included and the pubkey must be recalculated.
*/
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static int dh_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, const PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8)
{
const unsigned char *p, *pm;
int pklen, pmlen;
int ptype;
const void *pval;
const ASN1_STRING *pstr;
const X509_ALGOR *palg;
ASN1_INTEGER *privkey = NULL;
DH *dh = NULL;
if (!PKCS8_pkey_get0(NULL, &p, &pklen, &palg, p8))
return 0;
X509_ALGOR_get0(NULL, &ptype, &pval, palg);
if (ptype != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)
goto decerr;
if ((privkey = d2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, &p, pklen)) == NULL)
goto decerr;
pstr = pval;
pm = pstr->data;
pmlen = pstr->length;
if ((dh = d2i_dhp(pkey, &pm, pmlen)) == NULL)
goto decerr;
/* We have parameters now set private key */
if ((dh->priv_key = BN_secure_new()) == NULL
|| !ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(privkey, dh->priv_key)) {
DHerr(DH_F_DH_PRIV_DECODE, DH_R_BN_ERROR);
goto dherr;
}
/* Calculate public key, increments dirty_cnt */
if (!DH_generate_key(dh))
goto dherr;
EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, pkey->ameth->pkey_id, dh);
ASN1_STRING_clear_free(privkey);
return 1;
decerr:
DHerr(DH_F_DH_PRIV_DECODE, EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR);
dherr:
DH_free(dh);
ASN1_STRING_clear_free(privkey);
return 0;
}
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static int dh_priv_encode(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
ASN1_STRING *params = NULL;
ASN1_INTEGER *prkey = NULL;
unsigned char *dp = NULL;
int dplen;
params = ASN1_STRING_new();
if (params == NULL) {
DHerr(DH_F_DH_PRIV_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
params->length = i2d_dhp(pkey, pkey->pkey.dh, &params->data);
if (params->length <= 0) {
DHerr(DH_F_DH_PRIV_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
params->type = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE;
/* Get private key into integer */
prkey = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(pkey->pkey.dh->priv_key, NULL);
if (prkey == NULL) {
DHerr(DH_F_DH_PRIV_ENCODE, DH_R_BN_ERROR);
goto err;
}
dplen = i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(prkey, &dp);
ASN1_STRING_clear_free(prkey);
prkey = NULL;
if (!PKCS8_pkey_set0(p8, OBJ_nid2obj(pkey->ameth->pkey_id), 0,
V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, params, dp, dplen))
goto err;
return 1;
err:
OPENSSL_free(dp);
ASN1_STRING_free(params);
ASN1_STRING_clear_free(prkey);
return 0;
2006-04-13 07:06:10 +08:00
}
static int dh_param_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey,
const unsigned char **pder, int derlen)
{
DH *dh;
if ((dh = d2i_dhp(pkey, pder, derlen)) == NULL) {
DHerr(DH_F_DH_PARAM_DECODE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
return 0;
}
dh->dirty_cnt++;
EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, pkey->ameth->pkey_id, dh);
return 1;
}
static int dh_param_encode(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, unsigned char **pder)
{
return i2d_dhp(pkey, pkey->pkey.dh, pder);
}
static int do_dh_print(BIO *bp, const DH *x, int indent, int ptype)
{
int reason = ERR_R_BUF_LIB;
const char *ktype = NULL;
BIGNUM *priv_key, *pub_key;
if (ptype == 2)
priv_key = x->priv_key;
else
priv_key = NULL;
if (ptype > 0)
pub_key = x->pub_key;
else
pub_key = NULL;
if (x->params.p == NULL || (ptype == 2 && priv_key == NULL)
|| (ptype > 0 && pub_key == NULL)) {
reason = ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER;
goto err;
}
if (ptype == 2)
ktype = "DH Private-Key";
else if (ptype == 1)
ktype = "DH Public-Key";
else
ktype = "DH Parameters";
if (!BIO_indent(bp, indent, 128)
|| BIO_printf(bp, "%s: (%d bit)\n", ktype, DH_bits(x)) <= 0)
goto err;
indent += 4;
if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "private-key:", priv_key, NULL, indent))
goto err;
if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "public-key:", pub_key, NULL, indent))
goto err;
if (!ffc_params_print(bp, &x->params, indent))
goto err;
if (x->length != 0) {
if (!BIO_indent(bp, indent, 128)
|| BIO_printf(bp, "recommended-private-length: %d bits\n",
(int)x->length) <= 0)
goto err;
}
return 1;
err:
DHerr(DH_F_DO_DH_PRINT, reason);
return 0;
}
static int int_dh_size(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
return DH_size(pkey->pkey.dh);
}
static int dh_bits(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
return DH_bits(pkey->pkey.dh);
}
static int dh_security_bits(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
return DH_security_bits(pkey->pkey.dh);
}
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static int dh_cmp_parameters(const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b)
{
return ffc_params_cmp(&a->pkey.dh->params, &a->pkey.dh->params,
a->ameth != &dhx_asn1_meth);
}
static int int_dh_param_copy(DH *to, const DH *from, int is_x942)
{
if (is_x942 == -1)
is_x942 = (from->params.q != NULL);
if (!ffc_params_copy(&to->params, &from->params))
return 0;
if (!is_x942)
to->length = from->length;
to->dirty_cnt++;
return 1;
}
DH *DHparams_dup(const DH *dh)
{
DH *ret;
ret = DH_new();
if (ret == NULL)
return NULL;
if (!int_dh_param_copy(ret, dh, -1)) {
DH_free(ret);
return NULL;
}
return ret;
}
static int dh_copy_parameters(EVP_PKEY *to, const EVP_PKEY *from)
{
if (to->pkey.dh == NULL) {
to->pkey.dh = DH_new();
if (to->pkey.dh == NULL)
return 0;
}
return int_dh_param_copy(to->pkey.dh, from->pkey.dh,
from->ameth == &dhx_asn1_meth);
}
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static int dh_missing_parameters(const EVP_PKEY *a)
{
return a->pkey.dh == NULL
|| a->pkey.dh->params.p == NULL
|| a->pkey.dh->params.g == NULL;
}
static int dh_pub_cmp(const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b)
{
if (dh_cmp_parameters(a, b) == 0)
return 0;
if (BN_cmp(b->pkey.dh->pub_key, a->pkey.dh->pub_key) != 0)
return 0;
else
return 1;
}
static int dh_param_print(BIO *bp, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent,
ASN1_PCTX *ctx)
{
return do_dh_print(bp, pkey->pkey.dh, indent, 0);
}
static int dh_public_print(BIO *bp, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent,
ASN1_PCTX *ctx)
{
return do_dh_print(bp, pkey->pkey.dh, indent, 1);
}
static int dh_private_print(BIO *bp, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent,
ASN1_PCTX *ctx)
{
return do_dh_print(bp, pkey->pkey.dh, indent, 2);
}
int DHparams_print(BIO *bp, const DH *x)
{
return do_dh_print(bp, x, 4, 0);
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
static int dh_cms_decrypt(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri);
static int dh_cms_encrypt(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri);
#endif
static int dh_pkey_ctrl(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int op, long arg1, void *arg2)
{
switch (op) {
case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_SET1_TLS_ENCPT:
return dh_buf2key(EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(pkey), arg2, arg1);
case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_GET1_TLS_ENCPT:
return dh_key2buf(EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(pkey), arg2);
default:
return -2;
}
}
static int dhx_pkey_ctrl(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int op, long arg1, void *arg2)
{
switch (op) {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_ENVELOPE:
if (arg1 == 1)
return dh_cms_decrypt(arg2);
else if (arg1 == 0)
return dh_cms_encrypt(arg2);
return -2;
case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_RI_TYPE:
*(int *)arg2 = CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE;
return 1;
#endif
default:
return -2;
}
}
static int dh_pkey_public_check(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
DH *dh = pkey->pkey.dh;
if (dh->pub_key == NULL) {
DHerr(DH_F_DH_PKEY_PUBLIC_CHECK, DH_R_MISSING_PUBKEY);
return 0;
}
return DH_check_pub_key_ex(dh, dh->pub_key);
}
static int dh_pkey_param_check(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
DH *dh = pkey->pkey.dh;
return DH_check_ex(dh);
}
static size_t dh_pkey_dirty_cnt(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
return pkey->pkey.dh->dirty_cnt;
}
Redesign the KEYMGMT libcrypto <-> provider interface - the basics The KEYMGMT libcrypto <-> provider interface currently makes a few assumptions: 1. provider side domain parameters and key data isn't mutable. In other words, as soon as a key has been created in any (loaded, imported data, ...), it's set in stone. 2. provider side domain parameters can be strictly separated from the key data. This does work for the most part, but there are places where that's a bit too rigid for the functionality that the EVP_PKEY API delivers. Key data needs to be mutable to allow the flexibility that functions like EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters promise, as well as to provide the combinations of data that an EVP_PKEY is generally assumed to be able to hold: - domain parameters only - public key only - public key + private key - domain parameters + public key - domain parameters + public key + private key To remedy all this, we: 1. let go of the distinction between domain parameters and key material proper in the libcrypto <-> provider interface. As a consequence, functions that still need it gain a selection argument, which is a set of bits that indicate what parts of the key object are to be considered in a specific call. This allows a reduction of very similar functions into one. 2. Rework the libcrypto <-> provider interface so provider side key objects are created and destructed with a separate function, and get their data filled and extracted in through import and export. (future work will see other key object constructors and other functions to fill them with data) Fixes #10979 squash! Redesign the KEYMGMT libcrypto <-> provider interface - the basics Remedy 1 needs a rewrite: Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11006)
2020-02-03 01:56:07 +08:00
static int dh_pkey_export_to(const EVP_PKEY *from, void *to_keydata,
EVP_KEYMGMT *to_keymgmt, OPENSSL_CTX *libctx,
const char *propq)
{
Redesign the KEYMGMT libcrypto <-> provider interface - the basics The KEYMGMT libcrypto <-> provider interface currently makes a few assumptions: 1. provider side domain parameters and key data isn't mutable. In other words, as soon as a key has been created in any (loaded, imported data, ...), it's set in stone. 2. provider side domain parameters can be strictly separated from the key data. This does work for the most part, but there are places where that's a bit too rigid for the functionality that the EVP_PKEY API delivers. Key data needs to be mutable to allow the flexibility that functions like EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters promise, as well as to provide the combinations of data that an EVP_PKEY is generally assumed to be able to hold: - domain parameters only - public key only - public key + private key - domain parameters + public key - domain parameters + public key + private key To remedy all this, we: 1. let go of the distinction between domain parameters and key material proper in the libcrypto <-> provider interface. As a consequence, functions that still need it gain a selection argument, which is a set of bits that indicate what parts of the key object are to be considered in a specific call. This allows a reduction of very similar functions into one. 2. Rework the libcrypto <-> provider interface so provider side key objects are created and destructed with a separate function, and get their data filled and extracted in through import and export. (future work will see other key object constructors and other functions to fill them with data) Fixes #10979 squash! Redesign the KEYMGMT libcrypto <-> provider interface - the basics Remedy 1 needs a rewrite: Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11006)
2020-02-03 01:56:07 +08:00
DH *dh = from->pkey.dh;
OSSL_PARAM_BLD *tmpl;
const BIGNUM *p = DH_get0_p(dh), *g = DH_get0_g(dh), *q = DH_get0_q(dh);
const BIGNUM *pub_key = DH_get0_pub_key(dh);
const BIGNUM *priv_key = DH_get0_priv_key(dh);
OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
int selection = 0;
int rv = 0;
/*
* If the DH method is foreign, then we can't be sure of anything, and
* can therefore not export or pretend to export.
*/
if (dh_get_method(dh) != DH_OpenSSL())
return 0;
if (p == NULL || g == NULL)
Redesign the KEYMGMT libcrypto <-> provider interface - the basics The KEYMGMT libcrypto <-> provider interface currently makes a few assumptions: 1. provider side domain parameters and key data isn't mutable. In other words, as soon as a key has been created in any (loaded, imported data, ...), it's set in stone. 2. provider side domain parameters can be strictly separated from the key data. This does work for the most part, but there are places where that's a bit too rigid for the functionality that the EVP_PKEY API delivers. Key data needs to be mutable to allow the flexibility that functions like EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters promise, as well as to provide the combinations of data that an EVP_PKEY is generally assumed to be able to hold: - domain parameters only - public key only - public key + private key - domain parameters + public key - domain parameters + public key + private key To remedy all this, we: 1. let go of the distinction between domain parameters and key material proper in the libcrypto <-> provider interface. As a consequence, functions that still need it gain a selection argument, which is a set of bits that indicate what parts of the key object are to be considered in a specific call. This allows a reduction of very similar functions into one. 2. Rework the libcrypto <-> provider interface so provider side key objects are created and destructed with a separate function, and get their data filled and extracted in through import and export. (future work will see other key object constructors and other functions to fill them with data) Fixes #10979 squash! Redesign the KEYMGMT libcrypto <-> provider interface - the basics Remedy 1 needs a rewrite: Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11006)
2020-02-03 01:56:07 +08:00
return 0;
tmpl = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new();
if (tmpl == NULL)
Redesign the KEYMGMT libcrypto <-> provider interface - the basics The KEYMGMT libcrypto <-> provider interface currently makes a few assumptions: 1. provider side domain parameters and key data isn't mutable. In other words, as soon as a key has been created in any (loaded, imported data, ...), it's set in stone. 2. provider side domain parameters can be strictly separated from the key data. This does work for the most part, but there are places where that's a bit too rigid for the functionality that the EVP_PKEY API delivers. Key data needs to be mutable to allow the flexibility that functions like EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters promise, as well as to provide the combinations of data that an EVP_PKEY is generally assumed to be able to hold: - domain parameters only - public key only - public key + private key - domain parameters + public key - domain parameters + public key + private key To remedy all this, we: 1. let go of the distinction between domain parameters and key material proper in the libcrypto <-> provider interface. As a consequence, functions that still need it gain a selection argument, which is a set of bits that indicate what parts of the key object are to be considered in a specific call. This allows a reduction of very similar functions into one. 2. Rework the libcrypto <-> provider interface so provider side key objects are created and destructed with a separate function, and get their data filled and extracted in through import and export. (future work will see other key object constructors and other functions to fill them with data) Fixes #10979 squash! Redesign the KEYMGMT libcrypto <-> provider interface - the basics Remedy 1 needs a rewrite: Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11006)
2020-02-03 01:56:07 +08:00
return 0;
if (!OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, p)
|| !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, g))
goto err;
if (q != NULL) {
if (!OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_Q, q))
goto err;
}
selection |= OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS;
if (pub_key != NULL) {
if (!OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, pub_key))
goto err;
selection |= OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_PUBLIC_KEY;
}
Redesign the KEYMGMT libcrypto <-> provider interface - the basics The KEYMGMT libcrypto <-> provider interface currently makes a few assumptions: 1. provider side domain parameters and key data isn't mutable. In other words, as soon as a key has been created in any (loaded, imported data, ...), it's set in stone. 2. provider side domain parameters can be strictly separated from the key data. This does work for the most part, but there are places where that's a bit too rigid for the functionality that the EVP_PKEY API delivers. Key data needs to be mutable to allow the flexibility that functions like EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters promise, as well as to provide the combinations of data that an EVP_PKEY is generally assumed to be able to hold: - domain parameters only - public key only - public key + private key - domain parameters + public key - domain parameters + public key + private key To remedy all this, we: 1. let go of the distinction between domain parameters and key material proper in the libcrypto <-> provider interface. As a consequence, functions that still need it gain a selection argument, which is a set of bits that indicate what parts of the key object are to be considered in a specific call. This allows a reduction of very similar functions into one. 2. Rework the libcrypto <-> provider interface so provider side key objects are created and destructed with a separate function, and get their data filled and extracted in through import and export. (future work will see other key object constructors and other functions to fill them with data) Fixes #10979 squash! Redesign the KEYMGMT libcrypto <-> provider interface - the basics Remedy 1 needs a rewrite: Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11006)
2020-02-03 01:56:07 +08:00
if (priv_key != NULL) {
if (!OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY,
Redesign the KEYMGMT libcrypto <-> provider interface - the basics The KEYMGMT libcrypto <-> provider interface currently makes a few assumptions: 1. provider side domain parameters and key data isn't mutable. In other words, as soon as a key has been created in any (loaded, imported data, ...), it's set in stone. 2. provider side domain parameters can be strictly separated from the key data. This does work for the most part, but there are places where that's a bit too rigid for the functionality that the EVP_PKEY API delivers. Key data needs to be mutable to allow the flexibility that functions like EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters promise, as well as to provide the combinations of data that an EVP_PKEY is generally assumed to be able to hold: - domain parameters only - public key only - public key + private key - domain parameters + public key - domain parameters + public key + private key To remedy all this, we: 1. let go of the distinction between domain parameters and key material proper in the libcrypto <-> provider interface. As a consequence, functions that still need it gain a selection argument, which is a set of bits that indicate what parts of the key object are to be considered in a specific call. This allows a reduction of very similar functions into one. 2. Rework the libcrypto <-> provider interface so provider side key objects are created and destructed with a separate function, and get their data filled and extracted in through import and export. (future work will see other key object constructors and other functions to fill them with data) Fixes #10979 squash! Redesign the KEYMGMT libcrypto <-> provider interface - the basics Remedy 1 needs a rewrite: Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11006)
2020-02-03 01:56:07 +08:00
priv_key))
goto err;
selection |= OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_PRIVATE_KEY;
}
if ((params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(tmpl)) == NULL)
goto err;
/* We export, the provider imports */
rv = evp_keymgmt_import(to_keymgmt, to_keydata, selection, params);
OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free_params(params);
err:
OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(tmpl);
Redesign the KEYMGMT libcrypto <-> provider interface - the basics The KEYMGMT libcrypto <-> provider interface currently makes a few assumptions: 1. provider side domain parameters and key data isn't mutable. In other words, as soon as a key has been created in any (loaded, imported data, ...), it's set in stone. 2. provider side domain parameters can be strictly separated from the key data. This does work for the most part, but there are places where that's a bit too rigid for the functionality that the EVP_PKEY API delivers. Key data needs to be mutable to allow the flexibility that functions like EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters promise, as well as to provide the combinations of data that an EVP_PKEY is generally assumed to be able to hold: - domain parameters only - public key only - public key + private key - domain parameters + public key - domain parameters + public key + private key To remedy all this, we: 1. let go of the distinction between domain parameters and key material proper in the libcrypto <-> provider interface. As a consequence, functions that still need it gain a selection argument, which is a set of bits that indicate what parts of the key object are to be considered in a specific call. This allows a reduction of very similar functions into one. 2. Rework the libcrypto <-> provider interface so provider side key objects are created and destructed with a separate function, and get their data filled and extracted in through import and export. (future work will see other key object constructors and other functions to fill them with data) Fixes #10979 squash! Redesign the KEYMGMT libcrypto <-> provider interface - the basics Remedy 1 needs a rewrite: Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11006)
2020-02-03 01:56:07 +08:00
return rv;
}
static int dh_pkey_import_from(const OSSL_PARAM params[], void *key)
{
EVP_PKEY *pkey = key;
DH *dh = DH_new();
if (dh == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
if (!ffc_params_fromdata(dh_get0_params(dh), params)
|| !dh_key_fromdata(dh, params)
|| !EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkey, dh)) {
DH_free(dh);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD dh_asn1_meth = {
EVP_PKEY_DH,
EVP_PKEY_DH,
0,
"DH",
"OpenSSL PKCS#3 DH method",
dh_pub_decode,
dh_pub_encode,
dh_pub_cmp,
dh_public_print,
dh_priv_decode,
dh_priv_encode,
dh_private_print,
int_dh_size,
dh_bits,
dh_security_bits,
dh_param_decode,
dh_param_encode,
dh_missing_parameters,
dh_copy_parameters,
dh_cmp_parameters,
dh_param_print,
0,
int_dh_free,
dh_pkey_ctrl,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0,
dh_pkey_public_check,
dh_pkey_param_check,
0, 0, 0, 0,
dh_pkey_dirty_cnt,
dh_pkey_export_to,
dh_pkey_import_from,
};
const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD dhx_asn1_meth = {
EVP_PKEY_DHX,
EVP_PKEY_DHX,
0,
"X9.42 DH",
"OpenSSL X9.42 DH method",
dh_pub_decode,
dh_pub_encode,
dh_pub_cmp,
dh_public_print,
dh_priv_decode,
dh_priv_encode,
dh_private_print,
int_dh_size,
dh_bits,
dh_security_bits,
dh_param_decode,
dh_param_encode,
dh_missing_parameters,
dh_copy_parameters,
dh_cmp_parameters,
dh_param_print,
0,
int_dh_free,
dhx_pkey_ctrl,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0,
dh_pkey_public_check,
dh_pkey_param_check
};
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
static int dh_cms_set_peerkey(EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx,
X509_ALGOR *alg, ASN1_BIT_STRING *pubkey)
{
const ASN1_OBJECT *aoid;
int atype;
const void *aval;
ASN1_INTEGER *public_key = NULL;
int rv = 0;
EVP_PKEY *pkpeer = NULL, *pk = NULL;
DH *dhpeer = NULL;
const unsigned char *p;
int plen;
X509_ALGOR_get0(&aoid, &atype, &aval, alg);
if (OBJ_obj2nid(aoid) != NID_dhpublicnumber)
goto err;
/* Only absent parameters allowed in RFC XXXX */
if (atype != V_ASN1_UNDEF && atype == V_ASN1_NULL)
goto err;
pk = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(pctx);
if (pk == NULL)
goto err;
if (pk->type != EVP_PKEY_DHX)
goto err;
/* Get parameters from parent key */
dhpeer = DHparams_dup(pk->pkey.dh);
/* We have parameters now set public key */
plen = ASN1_STRING_length(pubkey);
p = ASN1_STRING_get0_data(pubkey);
if (p == NULL || plen == 0)
goto err;
if ((public_key = d2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, &p, plen)) == NULL) {
DHerr(DH_F_DH_CMS_SET_PEERKEY, DH_R_DECODE_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/* We have parameters now set public key */
if ((dhpeer->pub_key = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(public_key, NULL)) == NULL) {
DHerr(DH_F_DH_CMS_SET_PEERKEY, DH_R_BN_DECODE_ERROR);
goto err;
}
pkpeer = EVP_PKEY_new();
if (pkpeer == NULL)
goto err;
EVP_PKEY_assign(pkpeer, pk->ameth->pkey_id, dhpeer);
dhpeer = NULL;
if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pctx, pkpeer) > 0)
rv = 1;
err:
ASN1_INTEGER_free(public_key);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkpeer);
DH_free(dhpeer);
return rv;
}
static int dh_cms_set_shared_info(EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx, CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
{
int rv = 0;
X509_ALGOR *alg, *kekalg = NULL;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ukm;
const unsigned char *p;
unsigned char *dukm = NULL;
size_t dukmlen = 0;
int keylen, plen;
const EVP_CIPHER *kekcipher;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *kekctx;
if (!CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_alg(ri, &alg, &ukm))
goto err;
/*
* For DH we only have one OID permissible. If ever any more get defined
* we will need something cleverer.
*/
if (OBJ_obj2nid(alg->algorithm) != NID_id_smime_alg_ESDH) {
DHerr(DH_F_DH_CMS_SET_SHARED_INFO, DH_R_KDF_PARAMETER_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_kdf_type(pctx, EVP_PKEY_DH_KDF_X9_42) <= 0)
goto err;
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_kdf_md(pctx, EVP_sha1()) <= 0)
goto err;
if (alg->parameter->type != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)
goto err;
p = alg->parameter->value.sequence->data;
plen = alg->parameter->value.sequence->length;
kekalg = d2i_X509_ALGOR(NULL, &p, plen);
if (!kekalg)
goto err;
kekctx = CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_ctx(ri);
if (!kekctx)
goto err;
kekcipher = EVP_get_cipherbyobj(kekalg->algorithm);
if (!kekcipher || EVP_CIPHER_mode(kekcipher) != EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE)
goto err;
if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(kekctx, kekcipher, NULL, NULL, NULL))
goto err;
if (EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param(kekctx, kekalg->parameter) <= 0)
goto err;
keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(kekctx);
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_kdf_outlen(pctx, keylen) <= 0)
goto err;
/* Use OBJ_nid2obj to ensure we use built in OID that isn't freed */
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_dh_kdf_oid(pctx,
OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_CIPHER_type(kekcipher)))
<= 0)
goto err;
if (ukm) {
dukmlen = ASN1_STRING_length(ukm);
dukm = OPENSSL_memdup(ASN1_STRING_get0_data(ukm), dukmlen);
if (!dukm)
goto err;
}
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_dh_kdf_ukm(pctx, dukm, dukmlen) <= 0)
goto err;
dukm = NULL;
rv = 1;
err:
X509_ALGOR_free(kekalg);
OPENSSL_free(dukm);
return rv;
}
static int dh_cms_decrypt(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
{
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx;
pctx = CMS_RecipientInfo_get0_pkey_ctx(ri);
if (pctx == NULL)
return 0;
/* See if we need to set peer key */
if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_peerkey(pctx)) {
X509_ALGOR *alg;
ASN1_BIT_STRING *pubkey;
if (!CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_orig_id(ri, &alg, &pubkey,
NULL, NULL, NULL))
return 0;
if (!alg || !pubkey)
return 0;
if (!dh_cms_set_peerkey(pctx, alg, pubkey)) {
DHerr(DH_F_DH_CMS_DECRYPT, DH_R_PEER_KEY_ERROR);
return 0;
}
}
/* Set DH derivation parameters and initialise unwrap context */
if (!dh_cms_set_shared_info(pctx, ri)) {
DHerr(DH_F_DH_CMS_DECRYPT, DH_R_SHARED_INFO_ERROR);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
static int dh_cms_encrypt(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
{
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx;
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
int keylen;
X509_ALGOR *talg, *wrap_alg = NULL;
const ASN1_OBJECT *aoid;
ASN1_BIT_STRING *pubkey;
ASN1_STRING *wrap_str;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ukm;
unsigned char *penc = NULL, *dukm = NULL;
int penclen;
size_t dukmlen = 0;
int rv = 0;
int kdf_type, wrap_nid;
const EVP_MD *kdf_md;
pctx = CMS_RecipientInfo_get0_pkey_ctx(ri);
if (pctx == NULL)
return 0;
/* Get ephemeral key */
pkey = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(pctx);
if (!CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_orig_id(ri, &talg, &pubkey,
NULL, NULL, NULL))
goto err;
X509_ALGOR_get0(&aoid, NULL, NULL, talg);
/* Is everything uninitialised? */
if (aoid == OBJ_nid2obj(NID_undef)) {
ASN1_INTEGER *pubk = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(pkey->pkey.dh->pub_key, NULL);
if (pubk == NULL)
goto err;
/* Set the key */
penclen = i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(pubk, &penc);
ASN1_INTEGER_free(pubk);
if (penclen <= 0)
goto err;
ASN1_STRING_set0(pubkey, penc, penclen);
pubkey->flags &= ~(ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT | 0x07);
pubkey->flags |= ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT;
penc = NULL;
X509_ALGOR_set0(talg, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_dhpublicnumber),
V_ASN1_UNDEF, NULL);
}
/* See if custom parameters set */
kdf_type = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_dh_kdf_type(pctx);
if (kdf_type <= 0)
goto err;
if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_dh_kdf_md(pctx, &kdf_md))
goto err;
if (kdf_type == EVP_PKEY_DH_KDF_NONE) {
kdf_type = EVP_PKEY_DH_KDF_X9_42;
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_kdf_type(pctx, kdf_type) <= 0)
goto err;
} else if (kdf_type != EVP_PKEY_DH_KDF_X9_42)
/* Unknown KDF */
goto err;
if (kdf_md == NULL) {
/* Only SHA1 supported */
kdf_md = EVP_sha1();
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_kdf_md(pctx, kdf_md) <= 0)
goto err;
} else if (EVP_MD_type(kdf_md) != NID_sha1)
/* Unsupported digest */
goto err;
if (!CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_alg(ri, &talg, &ukm))
goto err;
/* Get wrap NID */
ctx = CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_ctx(ri);
wrap_nid = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_type(ctx);
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_dh_kdf_oid(pctx, OBJ_nid2obj(wrap_nid)) <= 0)
goto err;
keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx);
/* Package wrap algorithm in an AlgorithmIdentifier */
wrap_alg = X509_ALGOR_new();
if (wrap_alg == NULL)
goto err;
wrap_alg->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(wrap_nid);
wrap_alg->parameter = ASN1_TYPE_new();
if (wrap_alg->parameter == NULL)
goto err;
if (EVP_CIPHER_param_to_asn1(ctx, wrap_alg->parameter) <= 0)
goto err;
if (ASN1_TYPE_get(wrap_alg->parameter) == NID_undef) {
ASN1_TYPE_free(wrap_alg->parameter);
wrap_alg->parameter = NULL;
}
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_kdf_outlen(pctx, keylen) <= 0)
goto err;
if (ukm) {
dukmlen = ASN1_STRING_length(ukm);
dukm = OPENSSL_memdup(ASN1_STRING_get0_data(ukm), dukmlen);
if (!dukm)
goto err;
}
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_dh_kdf_ukm(pctx, dukm, dukmlen) <= 0)
goto err;
dukm = NULL;
/*
* Now need to wrap encoding of wrap AlgorithmIdentifier into parameter
* of another AlgorithmIdentifier.
*/
penc = NULL;
penclen = i2d_X509_ALGOR(wrap_alg, &penc);
if (penc == NULL || penclen == 0)
goto err;
wrap_str = ASN1_STRING_new();
if (wrap_str == NULL)
goto err;
ASN1_STRING_set0(wrap_str, penc, penclen);
penc = NULL;
X509_ALGOR_set0(talg, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_id_smime_alg_ESDH),
V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, wrap_str);
rv = 1;
err:
OPENSSL_free(penc);
X509_ALGOR_free(wrap_alg);
OPENSSL_free(dukm);
return rv;
}
#endif