2018-10-25 00:35:32 +08:00
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/*
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* Copyright 2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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*
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2018-12-06 20:40:06 +08:00
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* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
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2018-10-25 00:35:32 +08:00
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* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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*/
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2019-05-07 18:39:58 +08:00
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#include <string.h>
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2018-10-25 00:35:32 +08:00
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
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2019-05-07 18:39:58 +08:00
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#include <openssl/engine.h>
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#include <openssl/params.h>
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#include <openssl/core_names.h>
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2019-09-28 06:45:33 +08:00
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#include "crypto/evp.h"
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2019-09-28 06:45:40 +08:00
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#include "evp_local.h"
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2018-10-25 00:35:32 +08:00
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/* MAC PKEY context structure */
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typedef struct {
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EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx;
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/*
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* We know of two MAC types:
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*
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* 1. those who take a secret in raw form, i.e. raw data as a
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* ASN1_OCTET_STRING embedded in a EVP_PKEY. So far, that's
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* all of them but CMAC.
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* 2. those who take a secret with associated cipher in very generic
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* form, i.e. a complete EVP_MAC_CTX embedded in a PKEY. So far,
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* only CMAC does this.
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*
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* (one might wonder why the second form isn't used for all)
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*/
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#define MAC_TYPE_RAW 1 /* HMAC like MAC type (all but CMAC so far) */
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#define MAC_TYPE_MAC 2 /* CMAC like MAC type (only CMAC known so far) */
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int type;
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/* The following is only used for MAC_TYPE_RAW implementations */
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struct {
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const EVP_MD *md; /* temp storage of MD */
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ASN1_OCTET_STRING ktmp; /* temp storage for key */
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} raw_data;
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} MAC_PKEY_CTX;
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2019-05-07 18:39:58 +08:00
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static void pkey_mac_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx);
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2018-10-25 00:35:32 +08:00
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static int pkey_mac_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
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{
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MAC_PKEY_CTX *hctx;
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2019-05-07 18:39:58 +08:00
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/* We're being smart and using the same base NIDs for PKEY and for MAC */
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2018-10-25 00:35:32 +08:00
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int nid = ctx->pmeth->pkey_id;
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2019-05-07 18:39:58 +08:00
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EVP_MAC *mac = EVP_MAC_fetch(NULL, OBJ_nid2sn(nid), NULL);
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2018-10-25 00:35:32 +08:00
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if ((hctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*hctx))) == NULL) {
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EVPerr(EVP_F_PKEY_MAC_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return 0;
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}
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2019-05-07 18:39:58 +08:00
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hctx->ctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_new(mac);
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2018-10-25 00:35:32 +08:00
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if (hctx->ctx == NULL) {
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OPENSSL_free(hctx);
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return 0;
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}
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if (nid == EVP_PKEY_CMAC) {
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hctx->type = MAC_TYPE_MAC;
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} else {
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hctx->type = MAC_TYPE_RAW;
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hctx->raw_data.ktmp.type = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
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}
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2019-05-07 18:39:58 +08:00
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pkey_mac_cleanup(ctx);
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2018-10-25 00:35:32 +08:00
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EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_data(ctx, hctx);
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ctx->keygen_info_count = 0;
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return 1;
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}
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2019-01-16 04:51:25 +08:00
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static int pkey_mac_copy(EVP_PKEY_CTX *dst, const EVP_PKEY_CTX *src)
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2018-10-25 00:35:32 +08:00
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{
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MAC_PKEY_CTX *sctx, *dctx;
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2018-11-05 02:16:20 +08:00
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sctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(src);
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if (sctx->ctx->data == NULL)
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2018-10-25 00:35:32 +08:00
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return 0;
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2018-11-05 02:16:20 +08:00
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dctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*dctx));
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if (dctx == NULL) {
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EVPerr(EVP_F_PKEY_MAC_COPY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return 0;
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}
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EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_data(dst, dctx);
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dst->keygen_info_count = 0;
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2018-10-25 00:35:32 +08:00
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2018-11-05 02:16:20 +08:00
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dctx->ctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_dup(sctx->ctx);
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if (dctx->ctx == NULL)
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2018-10-25 00:35:32 +08:00
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goto err;
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2019-05-07 18:39:58 +08:00
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/*
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* Normally, nothing special would be done with the MAC method. In
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* this particular case, though, the MAC method was fetched internally
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* by pkey_mac_init() above or by EVP_PKEY_new_CMAC_key() and passed
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* via the EVP_MAC_CTX, so it is effectively like every new EVP_MAC_CTX
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* fetches the MAC method anew in this case. Therefore, its reference
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* count must be adjusted here.
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*/
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if (!EVP_MAC_up_ref(EVP_MAC_CTX_mac(dctx->ctx)))
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goto err;
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2018-11-05 02:16:20 +08:00
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dctx->type = sctx->type;
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2018-10-25 00:35:32 +08:00
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switch (dctx->type) {
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case MAC_TYPE_RAW:
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dctx->raw_data.md = sctx->raw_data.md;
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if (ASN1_STRING_get0_data(&sctx->raw_data.ktmp) != NULL &&
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!ASN1_STRING_copy(&dctx->raw_data.ktmp, &sctx->raw_data.ktmp))
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goto err;
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break;
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case MAC_TYPE_MAC:
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/* Nothing more to do */
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break;
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default:
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/* This should be dead code */
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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err:
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2018-11-05 02:16:20 +08:00
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pkey_mac_cleanup(dst);
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2018-10-25 00:35:32 +08:00
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return 0;
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}
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static void pkey_mac_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
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{
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2019-05-07 18:39:58 +08:00
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/*
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* For the exact same reasons the MAC reference count is incremented
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* in pkey_mac_copy() above, it must be explicitly freed here.
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*/
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MAC_PKEY_CTX *hctx = ctx == NULL ? NULL : EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(ctx);
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2018-10-25 00:35:32 +08:00
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if (hctx != NULL) {
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2019-05-07 18:39:58 +08:00
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EVP_MAC *mac = EVP_MAC_CTX_mac(hctx->ctx);
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2018-10-25 00:35:32 +08:00
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switch (hctx->type) {
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case MAC_TYPE_RAW:
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OPENSSL_clear_free(hctx->raw_data.ktmp.data,
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hctx->raw_data.ktmp.length);
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break;
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}
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EVP_MAC_CTX_free(hctx->ctx);
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2019-05-07 18:39:58 +08:00
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EVP_MAC_free(mac);
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2018-10-25 00:35:32 +08:00
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OPENSSL_free(hctx);
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EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_data(ctx, NULL);
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}
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}
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static int pkey_mac_keygen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
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{
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MAC_PKEY_CTX *hctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(ctx);
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int nid = ctx->pmeth->pkey_id;
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switch (hctx->type) {
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case MAC_TYPE_RAW:
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{
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ASN1_OCTET_STRING *hkey = NULL;
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if (!hctx->raw_data.ktmp.data)
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return 0;
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hkey = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_dup(&hctx->raw_data.ktmp);
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if (!hkey)
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return 0;
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EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, nid, hkey);
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}
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break;
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case MAC_TYPE_MAC:
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{
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2018-11-05 02:16:20 +08:00
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EVP_MAC_CTX *cmkey = EVP_MAC_CTX_dup(hctx->ctx);
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2018-10-25 00:35:32 +08:00
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if (cmkey == NULL)
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return 0;
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2019-05-07 18:39:58 +08:00
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if (!EVP_MAC_up_ref(EVP_MAC_CTX_mac(hctx->ctx)))
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return 0;
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2018-10-25 00:35:32 +08:00
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EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, nid, cmkey);
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}
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break;
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default:
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/* This should be dead code */
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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static int int_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count)
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{
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MAC_PKEY_CTX *hctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(EVP_MD_CTX_pkey_ctx(ctx));
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if (!EVP_MAC_update(hctx->ctx, data, count))
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return 0;
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return 1;
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}
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static int pkey_mac_signctx_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_MD_CTX *mctx)
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{
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MAC_PKEY_CTX *hctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(ctx);
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ASN1_OCTET_STRING *key = NULL;
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int rv = 1;
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/*
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* For MACs with the EVP_PKEY_FLAG_SIGCTX_CUSTOM flag set and that
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* gets the key passed as an ASN.1 OCTET STRING, we set the key here,
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* as this may be only time it's set during a DigestSign.
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*
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* MACs that pass around the key in form of EVP_MAC_CTX are setting
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* the key through other mechanisms. (this is only CMAC for now)
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*/
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int set_key =
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hctx->type == MAC_TYPE_RAW
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&& (ctx->pmeth->flags & EVP_PKEY_FLAG_SIGCTX_CUSTOM) != 0;
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if (set_key) {
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2019-09-14 22:35:08 +08:00
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if (!EVP_MAC_is_a(EVP_MAC_CTX_mac(hctx->ctx),
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OBJ_nid2sn(EVP_PKEY_id(EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(ctx)))))
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2018-10-25 00:35:32 +08:00
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return 0;
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key = EVP_PKEY_get0(EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(ctx));
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if (key == NULL)
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return 0;
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}
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EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(mctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NO_INIT);
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EVP_MD_CTX_set_update_fn(mctx, int_update);
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2019-05-07 18:39:58 +08:00
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/* Some MACs don't support this control... that's fine */
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{
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OSSL_PARAM params[3];
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size_t params_n = 0;
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int flags = EVP_MD_CTX_test_flags(mctx, ~EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NO_INIT);
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/* TODO(3.0) "flags" isn't quite right, i.e. a quick hack for now */
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params[params_n++] =
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OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_FLAGS, &flags);
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if (set_key)
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params[params_n++] =
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OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_KEY,
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key->data, key->length);
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params[params_n++] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
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rv = EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(hctx->ctx, params);
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}
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return rv;
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2018-10-25 00:35:32 +08:00
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}
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static int pkey_mac_signctx(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig,
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size_t *siglen, EVP_MD_CTX *mctx)
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{
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MAC_PKEY_CTX *hctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(ctx);
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2019-05-07 18:39:58 +08:00
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return EVP_MAC_final(hctx->ctx, sig, siglen, EVP_MAC_size(hctx->ctx));
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2018-10-25 00:35:32 +08:00
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}
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static int pkey_mac_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2)
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{
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MAC_PKEY_CTX *hctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(ctx);
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switch (type) {
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case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CIPHER:
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switch (hctx->type) {
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case MAC_TYPE_RAW:
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return -2; /* The raw types don't support ciphers */
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case MAC_TYPE_MAC:
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{
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2019-05-07 18:39:58 +08:00
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OSSL_PARAM params[3];
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size_t params_n = 0;
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char *ciphname = (char *)OBJ_nid2sn(EVP_CIPHER_nid(p2));
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2019-08-28 23:18:05 +08:00
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
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2019-05-07 18:39:58 +08:00
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char *engineid = (char *)ENGINE_get_id(ctx->engine);
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params[params_n++] =
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2019-09-22 08:43:08 +08:00
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OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string("engine", engineid, 0);
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2019-08-28 23:18:05 +08:00
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#endif
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2019-05-07 18:39:58 +08:00
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params[params_n++] =
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2019-08-22 18:50:00 +08:00
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OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_CIPHER,
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2019-09-04 17:27:08 +08:00
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ciphname, 0);
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2019-05-07 18:39:58 +08:00
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params[params_n] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
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if (!EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(hctx->ctx, params)
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|| !EVP_MAC_init(hctx->ctx))
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return 0;
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2018-10-25 00:35:32 +08:00
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}
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break;
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default:
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/* This should be dead code */
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return 0;
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}
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break;
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case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_MD:
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switch (hctx->type) {
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case MAC_TYPE_RAW:
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hctx->raw_data.md = p2;
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break;
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2018-11-05 02:16:20 +08:00
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case MAC_TYPE_MAC: {
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EVP_MAC_CTX *new_mac_ctx;
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if (ctx->pkey == NULL)
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return 0;
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new_mac_ctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_dup((EVP_MAC_CTX *)ctx->pkey
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->pkey.ptr);
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if (new_mac_ctx == NULL)
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return 0;
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EVP_MAC_CTX_free(hctx->ctx);
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hctx->ctx = new_mac_ctx;
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}
|
2018-10-25 00:35:32 +08:00
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break;
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default:
|
|
|
|
/* This should be dead code */
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_DIGEST_SIZE:
|
2019-05-07 18:39:58 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
OSSL_PARAM params[2] = { OSSL_PARAM_END, OSSL_PARAM_END };
|
|
|
|
size_t size = (size_t)p1;
|
|
|
|
size_t verify = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* We verify that the length is actually set by getting back
|
|
|
|
* the same parameter and checking that it matches what we
|
|
|
|
* tried to set.
|
|
|
|
* TODO(3.0) when we have a more direct mechanism to check if
|
|
|
|
* a parameter was used, we must refactor this to use that.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
params[0] =
|
2019-08-22 18:50:00 +08:00
|
|
|
OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_SIZE, &size);
|
2019-05-07 18:39:58 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(hctx->ctx, params))
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2018-10-25 00:35:32 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2019-05-07 18:39:58 +08:00
|
|
|
params[0] =
|
2019-08-22 18:50:00 +08:00
|
|
|
OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_SIZE, &verify);
|
2019-05-07 18:39:58 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!EVP_MAC_CTX_get_params(hctx->ctx, params))
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Since EVP_MAC_CTX_{get,set}_params() returned successfully,
|
|
|
|
* we can only assume that the size was ignored, i.e. this
|
|
|
|
* control is unsupported.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (verify != size)
|
|
|
|
return -2;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2018-10-25 00:35:32 +08:00
|
|
|
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_MAC_KEY:
|
|
|
|
switch (hctx->type) {
|
|
|
|
case MAC_TYPE_RAW:
|
|
|
|
if ((!p2 && p1 > 0) || (p1 < -1))
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(&hctx->raw_data.ktmp, p2, p1))
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case MAC_TYPE_MAC:
|
2019-05-07 18:39:58 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
OSSL_PARAM params[2];
|
|
|
|
size_t params_n = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
params[params_n++] =
|
|
|
|
OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_KEY,
|
|
|
|
p2, p1);
|
|
|
|
params[params_n] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(hctx->ctx, params);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2018-10-25 00:35:32 +08:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
/* This should be dead code */
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DIGESTINIT:
|
|
|
|
switch (hctx->type) {
|
|
|
|
case MAC_TYPE_RAW:
|
|
|
|
/* Ensure that we have attached the implementation */
|
|
|
|
if (!EVP_MAC_init(hctx->ctx))
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *key =
|
|
|
|
(ASN1_OCTET_STRING *)ctx->pkey->pkey.ptr;
|
2019-05-07 18:39:58 +08:00
|
|
|
OSSL_PARAM params[4];
|
|
|
|
size_t params_n = 0;
|
|
|
|
char *mdname =
|
|
|
|
(char *)OBJ_nid2sn(EVP_MD_nid(hctx->raw_data.md));
|
2019-08-28 23:18:05 +08:00
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
|
2019-05-07 18:39:58 +08:00
|
|
|
char *engineid = ctx->engine == NULL
|
|
|
|
? NULL : (char *)ENGINE_get_id(ctx->engine);
|
|
|
|
|
2019-09-22 08:43:08 +08:00
|
|
|
if (engineid != NULL)
|
2019-05-07 18:39:58 +08:00
|
|
|
params[params_n++] =
|
2019-09-22 08:43:08 +08:00
|
|
|
OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string("engine", engineid, 0);
|
2019-08-28 23:18:05 +08:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2019-05-07 18:39:58 +08:00
|
|
|
params[params_n++] =
|
2019-08-22 18:50:00 +08:00
|
|
|
OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_DIGEST,
|
2019-09-04 17:27:08 +08:00
|
|
|
mdname, 0);
|
2019-05-07 18:39:58 +08:00
|
|
|
params[params_n++] =
|
|
|
|
OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_KEY,
|
|
|
|
key->data, key->length);
|
|
|
|
params[params_n] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(hctx->ctx, params);
|
2018-10-25 00:35:32 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case MAC_TYPE_MAC:
|
|
|
|
return -2; /* The mac types don't support ciphers */
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
/* This should be dead code */
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
return -2;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int pkey_mac_ctrl_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
|
|
|
|
const char *type, const char *value)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
MAC_PKEY_CTX *hctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(ctx);
|
2019-05-07 18:39:58 +08:00
|
|
|
const EVP_MAC *mac = EVP_MAC_CTX_mac(hctx->ctx);
|
|
|
|
OSSL_PARAM params[2];
|
|
|
|
int ok = 0;
|
2018-10-25 00:35:32 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2019-08-22 18:50:00 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Translation of some control names that are equivalent to a single
|
|
|
|
* parameter name.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* "md" and "digest" are the same thing, we use the single "digest"
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* "digestsize" was a setting control in siphash, but naming wise,
|
|
|
|
* it's really the same as "size".
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (strcmp(type, "md") == 0)
|
|
|
|
type = OSSL_MAC_PARAM_DIGEST;
|
|
|
|
else if (strcmp(type, "digestsize") == 0)
|
|
|
|
type = OSSL_MAC_PARAM_SIZE;
|
|
|
|
|
2019-05-07 18:39:58 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!OSSL_PARAM_allocate_from_text(¶ms[0],
|
|
|
|
EVP_MAC_CTX_settable_params(mac),
|
|
|
|
type, value, strlen(value) + 1))
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
params[1] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
|
|
|
|
ok = EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(hctx->ctx, params);
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(params[0].data);
|
|
|
|
return ok;
|
2018-10-25 00:35:32 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2019-09-19 21:31:27 +08:00
|
|
|
static const EVP_PKEY_METHOD cmac_pkey_meth = {
|
2018-10-25 03:35:00 +08:00
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CMAC,
|
2018-10-25 00:35:32 +08:00
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY_FLAG_SIGCTX_CUSTOM,
|
|
|
|
pkey_mac_init,
|
|
|
|
pkey_mac_copy,
|
|
|
|
pkey_mac_cleanup,
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0, 0,
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0,
|
|
|
|
pkey_mac_keygen,
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0, 0,
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0, 0,
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0, 0,
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
pkey_mac_signctx_init,
|
|
|
|
pkey_mac_signctx,
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0, 0,
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0, 0,
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0, 0,
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0, 0,
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
pkey_mac_ctrl,
|
|
|
|
pkey_mac_ctrl_str
|
|
|
|
};
|
2018-10-25 03:25:00 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2019-09-19 21:31:27 +08:00
|
|
|
const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *cmac_pkey_method(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return &cmac_pkey_meth;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static const EVP_PKEY_METHOD hmac_pkey_meth = {
|
2018-10-25 03:25:00 +08:00
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY_HMAC,
|
|
|
|
0,
|
|
|
|
pkey_mac_init,
|
|
|
|
pkey_mac_copy,
|
|
|
|
pkey_mac_cleanup,
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0, 0,
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0,
|
|
|
|
pkey_mac_keygen,
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0, 0,
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0, 0,
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0, 0,
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
pkey_mac_signctx_init,
|
|
|
|
pkey_mac_signctx,
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0, 0,
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0, 0,
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0, 0,
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0, 0,
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
pkey_mac_ctrl,
|
|
|
|
pkey_mac_ctrl_str
|
|
|
|
};
|
2018-10-25 06:20:48 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2019-09-19 21:31:27 +08:00
|
|
|
const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *hmac_pkey_method(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return &hmac_pkey_meth;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static const EVP_PKEY_METHOD siphash_pkey_meth = {
|
2018-10-25 06:20:48 +08:00
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY_SIPHASH,
|
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY_FLAG_SIGCTX_CUSTOM,
|
|
|
|
pkey_mac_init,
|
|
|
|
pkey_mac_copy,
|
|
|
|
pkey_mac_cleanup,
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0, 0,
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0,
|
|
|
|
pkey_mac_keygen,
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0, 0,
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0, 0,
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0, 0,
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
pkey_mac_signctx_init,
|
|
|
|
pkey_mac_signctx,
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0, 0,
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0, 0,
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0, 0,
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0, 0,
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
pkey_mac_ctrl,
|
|
|
|
pkey_mac_ctrl_str
|
|
|
|
};
|
2018-10-22 14:54:24 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2019-09-19 21:31:27 +08:00
|
|
|
const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *siphash_pkey_method(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return &siphash_pkey_meth;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static const EVP_PKEY_METHOD poly1305_pkey_meth = {
|
2018-10-22 14:54:24 +08:00
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY_POLY1305,
|
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY_FLAG_SIGCTX_CUSTOM,
|
|
|
|
pkey_mac_init,
|
|
|
|
pkey_mac_copy,
|
|
|
|
pkey_mac_cleanup,
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0, 0,
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0,
|
|
|
|
pkey_mac_keygen,
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0, 0,
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0, 0,
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0, 0,
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
pkey_mac_signctx_init,
|
|
|
|
pkey_mac_signctx,
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0, 0,
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0, 0,
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0, 0,
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0, 0,
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
pkey_mac_ctrl,
|
|
|
|
pkey_mac_ctrl_str
|
|
|
|
};
|
2019-09-19 21:31:27 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *poly1305_pkey_method(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return &poly1305_pkey_meth;
|
|
|
|
}
|