2005-04-27 00:02:40 +08:00
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/* ssl/d1_both.c */
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/*
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* DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
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* (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.
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*/
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/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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*
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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*
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
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* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
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* distribution.
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*
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
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* software must display the following acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
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* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
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* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
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* openssl-core@openssl.org.
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*
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* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
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* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
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* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
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*
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* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
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* acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
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* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
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* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
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* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
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* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
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* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
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* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
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* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
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* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
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* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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* ====================================================================
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*
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* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
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* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
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* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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*/
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/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* This package is an SSL implementation written
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* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
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* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
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*
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* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
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* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
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* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
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* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
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* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
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* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
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* the code are not to be removed.
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* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
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* as the author of the parts of the library used.
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* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
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* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
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* must display the following acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
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* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
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* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
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* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
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* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
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* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*
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* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
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* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
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* copied and put under another distribution licence
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* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
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*/
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#include <limits.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include "ssl_locl.h"
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#include <openssl/buffer.h>
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#include <openssl/rand.h>
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#include <openssl/objects.h>
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
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#include <openssl/x509.h>
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/* XDTLS: figure out the right values */
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static unsigned int g_probable_mtu[] = {1500 - 28, 512 - 28, 256 - 28};
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static unsigned int dtls1_min_mtu(void);
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static unsigned int dtls1_guess_mtu(unsigned int curr_mtu);
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static void dtls1_fix_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned long frag_off,
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unsigned long frag_len);
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static unsigned char *dtls1_write_message_header(SSL *s,
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unsigned char *p);
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static void dtls1_set_message_header_int(SSL *s, unsigned char mt,
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unsigned long len, unsigned short seq_num, unsigned long frag_off,
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unsigned long frag_len);
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static int dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(SSL *s);
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static long dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn,
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long max, int *ok);
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static void dtls1_process_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int frag_len);
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static hm_fragment *
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dtls1_hm_fragment_new(unsigned long frag_len)
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{
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hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
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unsigned char *buf = NULL;
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frag = (hm_fragment *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(hm_fragment));
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if ( frag == NULL)
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return NULL;
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buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(frag_len
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+ DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
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if ( buf == NULL)
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{
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OPENSSL_free(frag);
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return NULL;
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}
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frag->fragment = buf;
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return frag;
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}
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static void
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dtls1_hm_fragment_free(hm_fragment *frag)
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{
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OPENSSL_free(frag->fragment);
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OPENSSL_free(frag);
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}
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/* send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) */
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int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
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{
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int ret;
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int curr_mtu;
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unsigned int len, frag_off;
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/* AHA! Figure out the MTU, and stick to the right size */
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if ( ! (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU))
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{
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s->d1->mtu =
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BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU, 0, NULL);
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/* I've seen the kernel return bogus numbers when it doesn't know
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* (initial write), so just make sure we have a reasonable number */
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if ( s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu())
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{
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s->d1->mtu = 0;
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s->d1->mtu = dtls1_guess_mtu(s->d1->mtu);
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BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_MTU,
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s->d1->mtu, NULL);
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}
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}
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#if 0
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mtu = s->d1->mtu;
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fprintf(stderr, "using MTU = %d\n", mtu);
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mtu -= (DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
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curr_mtu = mtu - BIO_wpending(SSL_get_wbio(s));
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if ( curr_mtu > 0)
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mtu = curr_mtu;
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else if ( ( ret = BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s))) <= 0)
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return ret;
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if ( BIO_wpending(SSL_get_wbio(s)) + s->init_num >= mtu)
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{
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ret = BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s));
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if ( ret <= 0)
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return ret;
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mtu = s->d1->mtu - (DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
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}
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OPENSSL_assert(mtu > 0); /* should have something reasonable now */
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#endif
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if ( s->init_off == 0 && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
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OPENSSL_assert(s->init_num ==
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2005-04-28 00:27:14 +08:00
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(int)s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
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2005-04-27 00:02:40 +08:00
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frag_off = 0;
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while( s->init_num)
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{
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curr_mtu = s->d1->mtu - BIO_wpending(SSL_get_wbio(s)) -
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DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
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if ( curr_mtu <= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
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{
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/* grr.. we could get an error if MTU picked was wrong */
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ret = BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s));
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if ( ret <= 0)
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return ret;
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curr_mtu = s->d1->mtu - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
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}
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if ( s->init_num > curr_mtu)
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len = curr_mtu;
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else
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len = s->init_num;
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/* XDTLS: this function is too long. split out the CCS part */
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if ( type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
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{
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if ( s->init_off != 0)
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{
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OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off > DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
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s->init_off -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
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s->init_num += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
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/* write atleast DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes */
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if ( len <= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
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len += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
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}
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dtls1_fix_message_header(s, frag_off,
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len - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
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2005-04-27 01:43:53 +08:00
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dtls1_write_message_header(s, (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off]);
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2005-04-27 00:02:40 +08:00
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OPENSSL_assert(len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
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}
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ret=dtls1_write_bytes(s,type,&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
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len);
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if (ret < 0)
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{
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/* might need to update MTU here, but we don't know
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* which previous packet caused the failure -- so can't
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* really retransmit anything. continue as if everything
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* is fine and wait for an alert to handle the
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* retransmit
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*/
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if ( BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
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BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_MTU_EXCEEDED, 0, NULL))
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s->d1->mtu = BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
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BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU, 0, NULL);
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else
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return(-1);
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}
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else
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{
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/* bad if this assert fails, only part of the handshake
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* message got sent. but why would this happen? */
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2005-04-28 00:27:14 +08:00
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OPENSSL_assert(len == (unsigned int)ret);
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2005-04-27 00:02:40 +08:00
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if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && ! s->d1->retransmitting)
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/* should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case
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* we'll ignore the result anyway */
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ssl3_finish_mac(s,
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(unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off +
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DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH], ret - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
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if (ret == s->init_num)
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{
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if (s->msg_callback)
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s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data,
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(size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s,
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s->msg_callback_arg);
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s->init_off = 0; /* done writing this message */
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s->init_num = 0;
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return(1);
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}
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s->init_off+=ret;
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s->init_num-=ret;
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frag_off += (ret -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
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}
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}
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return(0);
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}
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/* Obtain handshake message of message type 'mt' (any if mt == -1),
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* maximum acceptable body length 'max'.
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* Read an entire handshake message. Handshake messages arrive in
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* fragments.
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*/
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2005-04-27 02:08:00 +08:00
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long dtls1_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int *ok)
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2005-04-27 00:02:40 +08:00
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{
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int i, al;
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/* s3->tmp is used to store messages that are unexpected, caused
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* by the absence of an optional handshake message */
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if (s->s3->tmp.reuse_message)
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{
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s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=0;
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if ((mt >= 0) && (s->s3->tmp.message_type != mt))
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{
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al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
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2005-04-27 02:08:00 +08:00
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SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
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2005-04-27 00:02:40 +08:00
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goto f_err;
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}
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*ok=1;
|
|
|
|
s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
s->init_num = (int)s->s3->tmp.message_size;
|
|
|
|
return s->init_num;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
do
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if ( s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* s->d1->r_message_header.msg_len = 0; */
|
|
|
|
memset(&(s->d1->r_msg_hdr), 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
i = dtls1_get_message_fragment(s, st1, stn, max, ok);
|
|
|
|
if ( i == DTLS1_HM_BAD_FRAGMENT ||
|
|
|
|
i == DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY) /* bad fragment received */
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
else if ( i <= 0 && !*ok)
|
|
|
|
return i;
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-28 00:27:14 +08:00
|
|
|
if (s->d1->r_msg_hdr.msg_len == (unsigned int)s->init_num - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
|
2005-04-27 00:02:40 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
memset(&(s->d1->r_msg_hdr), 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
|
|
|
|
/* we just read a handshake message from the other side:
|
|
|
|
* this means that we don't need to retransmit of the
|
|
|
|
* buffered messages.
|
|
|
|
* XDTLS: may be able clear out this
|
|
|
|
* buffer a little sooner (i.e if an out-of-order
|
|
|
|
* handshake message/record is received at the record
|
|
|
|
* layer.
|
|
|
|
* XDTLS: exception is that the server needs to
|
|
|
|
* know that change cipher spec and finished messages
|
|
|
|
* have been received by the client before clearing this
|
|
|
|
* buffer. this can simply be done by waiting for the
|
|
|
|
* first data segment, but is there a better way? */
|
|
|
|
dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
return s->init_num - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off = i;
|
|
|
|
} while(1) ;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
f_err:
|
|
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
|
|
|
|
*ok = 0;
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(SSL *s, unsigned long *copied)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* (0) check whether the desired fragment is available
|
|
|
|
* if so:
|
|
|
|
* (1) copy over the fragment to s->init_buf->data[]
|
|
|
|
* (2) update s->init_num
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
pitem *item;
|
|
|
|
hm_fragment *frag;
|
|
|
|
unsigned long overlap;
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *p;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->buffered_messages);
|
|
|
|
if ( item == NULL)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ( s->d1->handshake_read_seq == frag->msg_header.seq &&
|
2005-04-28 00:27:14 +08:00
|
|
|
frag->msg_header.frag_off <= (unsigned int)s->init_num - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
|
2005-04-27 00:02:40 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_messages);
|
|
|
|
overlap = s->init_num - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
|
|
|
|
- frag->msg_header.frag_off;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
p = frag->fragment;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
memcpy(&s->init_buf->data[s->init_num],
|
|
|
|
p + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + overlap,
|
|
|
|
frag->msg_header.frag_len - overlap);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(frag->fragment);
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(frag);
|
|
|
|
pitem_free(item);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*copied = frag->msg_header.frag_len - overlap;
|
|
|
|
return *copied;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
dtls1_buffer_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
|
|
|
|
pitem *item = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(msg_hdr->frag_len);
|
|
|
|
if ( frag == NULL)
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
memcpy(frag->fragment, &(s->init_buf->data[s->init_num]),
|
|
|
|
msg_hdr->frag_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
memcpy(&(frag->msg_header), msg_hdr, sizeof(*msg_hdr));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
item = pitem_new(msg_hdr->seq, frag);
|
|
|
|
if ( item == NULL)
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
|
|
if ( frag != NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
|
|
|
|
if ( item != NULL) OPENSSL_free(item);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
dtls1_process_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int frag_len)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *p;
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-27 01:43:53 +08:00
|
|
|
p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
|
2005-04-27 00:02:40 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ssl3_finish_mac(s, &p[s->init_num - frag_len], frag_len);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr, int *ok)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *p;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* make sure there's enough room to read this fragment */
|
|
|
|
if ( (int)msg_hdr->frag_len && !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf,
|
|
|
|
(int)msg_hdr->frag_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + s->init_num))
|
|
|
|
{
|
2005-04-27 02:08:00 +08:00
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_OUT_OF_SEQ_MESSAGE,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
|
2005-04-27 00:02:40 +08:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-27 01:43:53 +08:00
|
|
|
p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
|
2005-04-27 00:02:40 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read */
|
|
|
|
if ( msg_hdr->frag_len > 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
i=s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
|
|
|
|
&p[s->init_num],
|
|
|
|
msg_hdr->frag_len,0);
|
|
|
|
if (i <= 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
*ok = 0;
|
|
|
|
return i;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ( msg_hdr->seq > s->d1->handshake_read_seq)
|
|
|
|
dtls1_buffer_handshake_fragment(s, msg_hdr);
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_assert(msg_hdr->seq < s->d1->handshake_read_seq);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
|
|
*ok = 0;
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-27 02:08:00 +08:00
|
|
|
static long
|
2005-04-27 00:02:40 +08:00
|
|
|
dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *p;
|
|
|
|
unsigned long l, frag_off, frag_len;
|
|
|
|
int i,al;
|
|
|
|
struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
|
|
|
|
unsigned long overlap;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* see if we have the required fragment already */
|
|
|
|
if (dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(s, &l))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* compute MAC, remove fragment headers */
|
|
|
|
dtls1_process_handshake_fragment(s, l);
|
|
|
|
s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
s->state = stn;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* get a handshake fragment from the record layer */
|
|
|
|
p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* read handshake message header */
|
|
|
|
i=s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,&p[s->init_num],
|
|
|
|
DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, 0);
|
|
|
|
if (i <= 0) /* nbio, or an error */
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
|
|
|
|
*ok = 0;
|
|
|
|
return i;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_assert(i == DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
p += s->init_num;
|
|
|
|
/* parse the message fragment header */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
dtls1_get_message_header(p, &msg_hdr);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* if this is a future (or stale) message it gets buffered
|
|
|
|
* (or dropped)--no further processing at this time
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if ( msg_hdr.seq != s->d1->handshake_read_seq)
|
|
|
|
return dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(s, &msg_hdr, ok);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
l = msg_hdr.msg_len;
|
|
|
|
frag_off = msg_hdr.frag_off;
|
|
|
|
frag_len = msg_hdr.frag_len;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* sanity checking */
|
|
|
|
if ( frag_off + frag_len > l)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
2005-04-27 02:08:00 +08:00
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
|
2005-04-27 00:02:40 +08:00
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!s->server && s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0 &&
|
|
|
|
p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
|
|
|
|
* we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them
|
|
|
|
* if their format is correct. Does not count for
|
|
|
|
* 'Finished' MAC. */
|
|
|
|
if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 &&p[3] == 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (s->msg_callback)
|
|
|
|
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
|
|
|
|
p, DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
|
|
|
|
s->msg_callback_arg);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s->init_num = 0;
|
|
|
|
return dtls1_get_message_fragment(s, st1, stn,
|
|
|
|
max, ok);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else /* Incorrectly formated Hello request */
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
|
2005-04-27 02:08:00 +08:00
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
|
2005-04-27 00:02:40 +08:00
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* XDTLS: do a sanity check on the fragment */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s->init_num += i;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ( s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0) /* first fragment */
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */
|
|
|
|
if (l > (INT_MAX-DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
2005-04-27 02:08:00 +08:00
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
|
2005-04-27 00:02:40 +08:00
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (l && !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf,(int)l
|
|
|
|
+ DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH))
|
|
|
|
{
|
2005-04-27 02:08:00 +08:00
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
|
2005-04-27 00:02:40 +08:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Only do this test when we're reading the expected message.
|
|
|
|
* Stale messages will be dropped and future messages will be buffered */
|
|
|
|
if ( l > (unsigned long)max)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
2005-04-27 02:08:00 +08:00
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
|
2005-04-27 00:02:40 +08:00
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s->s3->tmp.message_size=l;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ( frag_len > (unsigned long)max)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
2005-04-27 02:08:00 +08:00
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
|
2005-04-27 00:02:40 +08:00
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ( frag_len + s->init_num > (INT_MAX - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
2005-04-27 02:08:00 +08:00
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
|
2005-04-27 00:02:40 +08:00
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ( frag_len & !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf, (int)frag_len
|
|
|
|
+ DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + s->init_num))
|
|
|
|
{
|
2005-04-27 02:08:00 +08:00
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
|
2005-04-27 00:02:40 +08:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ( s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
s->s3->tmp.message_type = msg_hdr.type;
|
|
|
|
s->d1->r_msg_hdr.type = msg_hdr.type;
|
|
|
|
s->d1->r_msg_hdr.msg_len = l;
|
|
|
|
/* s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq = seq_num; */
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* XDTLS: ressurect this when restart is in place */
|
|
|
|
s->state=stn;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* next state (stn) */
|
2005-04-27 01:43:53 +08:00
|
|
|
p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
|
2005-04-27 00:02:40 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ( frag_len > 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
i=s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
|
|
|
|
&p[s->init_num],
|
|
|
|
frag_len,0);
|
|
|
|
/* XDTLS: fix this--message fragments cannot span multiple packets */
|
|
|
|
if (i <= 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
|
|
|
|
*ok = 0;
|
|
|
|
return i;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
i = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* XDTLS: an incorrectly formatted fragment should cause the
|
|
|
|
* handshake to fail */
|
2005-04-28 00:27:14 +08:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_assert(i == (int)frag_len);
|
2005-04-27 00:02:40 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#if 0
|
|
|
|
/* Successfully read a fragment.
|
|
|
|
* It may be (1) out of order, or
|
|
|
|
* (2) it's a repeat, in which case we dump it
|
|
|
|
* (3) the one we are expecting next (maybe with overlap)
|
|
|
|
* If it is next one, it may overlap with previously read bytes
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* case (1): buffer the future fragment
|
|
|
|
* (we can treat fragments from a future message the same
|
|
|
|
* as future fragments from the message being currently read, since
|
|
|
|
* they are sematically simply out of order.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if ( msg_hdr.seq > s->d1->handshake_read_seq ||
|
|
|
|
frag_off > s->init_num - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
dtls1_buffer_handshake_fragment(s, &msg_hdr);
|
|
|
|
return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* case (2): drop the entire fragment, and try again */
|
|
|
|
if ( msg_hdr.seq < s->d1->handshake_read_seq ||
|
|
|
|
frag_off + frag_len < s->init_num - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
s->init_num -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* case (3): received a immediately useful fragment. Determine the
|
|
|
|
* possible overlap and copy the fragment.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
overlap = (s->init_num - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) - frag_off;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* retain the header for the first fragment */
|
|
|
|
if ( s->init_num > DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
memmove(&(s->init_buf->data[s->init_num]),
|
|
|
|
&(s->init_buf->data[s->init_num + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + overlap]),
|
|
|
|
frag_len - overlap);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s->init_num += frag_len - overlap;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
s->init_num += frag_len;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
dtls1_process_handshake_fragment(s, frag_len - overlap);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (s->msg_callback)
|
|
|
|
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data,
|
|
|
|
(size_t)s->init_num, s,
|
|
|
|
s->msg_callback_arg);
|
|
|
|
*ok=1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return s->init_num;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
f_err:
|
|
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
|
|
|
|
s->init_num = 0;
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
|
|
*ok=0;
|
|
|
|
return(-1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int dtls1_send_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b, const char *sender, int slen)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *p,*d;
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
unsigned long l;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (s->state == a)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
|
|
|
|
p= &(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
i=s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
|
|
|
|
&(s->s3->finish_dgst1),
|
|
|
|
&(s->s3->finish_dgst2),
|
|
|
|
sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.finish_md);
|
|
|
|
s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = i;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(p, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
|
|
|
|
p+=i;
|
|
|
|
l=i;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16
|
|
|
|
/* MSVC 1.5 does not clear the top bytes of the word unless
|
|
|
|
* I do this.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
l&=0xffff;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
d = dtls1_set_message_header(s, d, SSL3_MT_FINISHED, l, 0, l);
|
|
|
|
s->init_num=(int)l+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
s->init_off=0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
|
|
|
|
dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s->state=b;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* SSL3_ST_SEND_xxxxxx_HELLO_B */
|
|
|
|
return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* for these 2 messages, we need to
|
|
|
|
* ssl->enc_read_ctx re-init
|
|
|
|
* ssl->s3->read_sequence zero
|
|
|
|
* ssl->s3->read_mac_secret re-init
|
|
|
|
* ssl->session->read_sym_enc assign
|
|
|
|
* ssl->session->read_compression assign
|
|
|
|
* ssl->session->read_hash assign
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int dtls1_send_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, int a, int b)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *p;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (s->state == a)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
|
|
|
|
*p++=SSL3_MT_CCS;
|
|
|
|
s->d1->handshake_write_seq = s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq;
|
|
|
|
s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq++;
|
|
|
|
s2n(s->d1->handshake_write_seq,p);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s->init_num=DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
s->init_off=0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
dtls1_set_message_header_int(s, SSL3_MT_CCS, 0,
|
|
|
|
s->d1->handshake_write_seq, 0, 0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
|
|
|
|
dtls1_buffer_message(s, 1);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s->state=b;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B */
|
|
|
|
return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
unsigned long dtls1_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *p;
|
|
|
|
int n,i;
|
|
|
|
unsigned long l= 3 + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
BUF_MEM *buf;
|
|
|
|
X509_STORE_CTX xs_ctx;
|
|
|
|
X509_OBJECT obj;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* TLSv1 sends a chain with nothing in it, instead of an alert */
|
|
|
|
buf=s->init_buf;
|
|
|
|
if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,10))
|
|
|
|
{
|
2005-04-27 02:08:00 +08:00
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
|
2005-04-27 00:02:40 +08:00
|
|
|
return(0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (x != NULL)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if(!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&xs_ctx,s->ctx->cert_store,NULL,NULL))
|
|
|
|
{
|
2005-04-27 02:08:00 +08:00
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN,ERR_R_X509_LIB);
|
2005-04-27 00:02:40 +08:00
|
|
|
return(0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (;;)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
n=i2d_X509(x,NULL);
|
|
|
|
if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,(int)(n+l+3)))
|
|
|
|
{
|
2005-04-27 02:08:00 +08:00
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
|
2005-04-27 00:02:40 +08:00
|
|
|
return(0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[l]);
|
|
|
|
l2n3(n,p);
|
|
|
|
i2d_X509(x,&p);
|
|
|
|
l+=n+3;
|
|
|
|
if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x),
|
|
|
|
X509_get_issuer_name(x)) == 0) break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
i=X509_STORE_get_by_subject(&xs_ctx,X509_LU_X509,
|
|
|
|
X509_get_issuer_name(x),&obj);
|
|
|
|
if (i <= 0) break;
|
|
|
|
x=obj.data.x509;
|
|
|
|
/* Count is one too high since the X509_STORE_get uped the
|
|
|
|
* ref count */
|
|
|
|
X509_free(x);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Thawte special :-) */
|
|
|
|
if (s->ctx->extra_certs != NULL)
|
|
|
|
for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(s->ctx->extra_certs); i++)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
x=sk_X509_value(s->ctx->extra_certs,i);
|
|
|
|
n=i2d_X509(x,NULL);
|
|
|
|
if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,(int)(n+l+3)))
|
|
|
|
{
|
2005-04-27 02:08:00 +08:00
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
|
2005-04-27 00:02:40 +08:00
|
|
|
return(0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[l]);
|
|
|
|
l2n3(n,p);
|
|
|
|
i2d_X509(x,&p);
|
|
|
|
l+=n+3;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
l-= (3 + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
|
|
|
|
l2n3(l,p);
|
|
|
|
l+=3;
|
|
|
|
p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[0]);
|
|
|
|
p = dtls1_set_message_header(s, p, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE, l, 0, l);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
l+=DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
return(l);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int dtls1_read_failed(SSL *s, int code)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
DTLS1_STATE *state;
|
|
|
|
BIO *bio;
|
|
|
|
int send_alert = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ( code > 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
fprintf( stderr, "invalid state reached %s:%d", __FILE__, __LINE__);
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
|
|
|
|
if ( ! BIO_dgram_recv_timedout(bio))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* not a timeout, none of our business,
|
|
|
|
let higher layers handle this. in fact it's probably an error */
|
|
|
|
return code;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ( ! SSL_in_init(s)) /* done, no need to send a retransmit */
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
BIO_set_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_FLAGS_READ);
|
|
|
|
return code;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
state = s->d1;
|
|
|
|
state->timeout.num_alerts++;
|
|
|
|
if ( state->timeout.num_alerts > DTLS1_TMO_ALERT_COUNT)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* fail the connection, enough alerts have been sent */
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_FAILED,SSL_R_READ_TIMEOUT_EXPIRED);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
state->timeout.read_timeouts++;
|
|
|
|
if ( state->timeout.read_timeouts > DTLS1_TMO_READ_COUNT)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
send_alert = 1;
|
|
|
|
state->timeout.read_timeouts = 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#if 0 /* for now, each alert contains only one record number */
|
|
|
|
item = pqueue_peek(state->rcvd_records);
|
|
|
|
if ( item )
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* send an alert immediately for all the missing records */
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#if 0 /* no more alert sending, just retransmit the last set of messages */
|
|
|
|
if ( send_alert)
|
|
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,
|
|
|
|
DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE);
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(s) ;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(SSL *s)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
pqueue sent = s->d1->sent_messages;
|
|
|
|
piterator iter;
|
|
|
|
pitem *item;
|
|
|
|
hm_fragment *frag;
|
|
|
|
int found = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
iter = pqueue_iterator(sent);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for ( item = pqueue_next(&iter); item != NULL; item = pqueue_next(&iter))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
|
|
|
|
if ( dtls1_retransmit_message(s, frag->msg_header.seq, 0, &found) <= 0 &&
|
|
|
|
found)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "dtls1_retransmit_message() failed\n");
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#if 0
|
|
|
|
static dtls1_message_buffer *
|
|
|
|
dtls1_message_buffer_new(unsigned int len)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
dtls1_message_buffer *msg_buf;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
msg_buf = (dtls1_message_buffer *)
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(dtls1_message_buffer));
|
|
|
|
if ( msg_buf == NULL)
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
memset(msg_buf, 0x00, sizeof(dtls1_message_buffer));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
msg_buf->data = (unsigned char *) OPENSSL_malloc(len);
|
|
|
|
if ( msg_buf->data == NULL)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(msg_buf);
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
memset(msg_buf->data, 0x00, len);
|
|
|
|
return msg_buf;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#if 0
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
dtls1_message_buffer_free(dtls1_message_buffer *msg_buf)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (msg_buf != NULL)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(msg_buf->data);
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(msg_buf);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
dtls1_buffer_message(SSL *s, int is_ccs)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
pitem *item;
|
|
|
|
hm_fragment *frag;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* this function is called immediately after a message has
|
|
|
|
* been serialized */
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off == 0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(s->init_num);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
memcpy(frag->fragment, s->init_buf->data, s->init_num);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ( is_ccs)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len +
|
2005-04-28 00:27:14 +08:00
|
|
|
DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH == (unsigned int)s->init_num);
|
2005-04-27 00:02:40 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len +
|
2005-04-28 00:27:14 +08:00
|
|
|
DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH == (unsigned int)s->init_num);
|
2005-04-27 00:02:40 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
frag->msg_header.msg_len = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len;
|
|
|
|
frag->msg_header.seq = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.seq;
|
|
|
|
frag->msg_header.type = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.type;
|
|
|
|
frag->msg_header.frag_off = 0;
|
|
|
|
frag->msg_header.frag_len = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len;
|
|
|
|
frag->msg_header.is_ccs = is_ccs;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
item = pitem_new(frag->msg_header.seq, frag);
|
|
|
|
if ( item == NULL)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#if 0
|
|
|
|
fprintf( stderr, "buffered messge: \ttype = %xx\n", msg_buf->type);
|
|
|
|
fprintf( stderr, "\t\t\t\t\tlen = %d\n", msg_buf->len);
|
|
|
|
fprintf( stderr, "\t\t\t\t\tseq_num = %d\n", msg_buf->seq_num);
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
pqueue_insert(s->d1->sent_messages, item);
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
dtls1_retransmit_message(SSL *s, unsigned short seq, unsigned long frag_off,
|
|
|
|
int *found)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
/* XDTLS: for now assuming that read/writes are blocking */
|
|
|
|
pitem *item;
|
|
|
|
hm_fragment *frag ;
|
|
|
|
unsigned long header_length;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_assert(s->init_num == 0);
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off == 0);
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* XDTLS: the requested message ought to be found, otherwise error */
|
|
|
|
item = pqueue_find(s->d1->sent_messages, seq);
|
|
|
|
if ( item == NULL)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "retransmit: message %d non-existant\n", seq);
|
|
|
|
*found = 0;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*found = 1;
|
|
|
|
frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ( frag->msg_header.is_ccs)
|
|
|
|
header_length = DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
header_length = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
memcpy(s->init_buf->data, frag->fragment,
|
|
|
|
frag->msg_header.msg_len + header_length);
|
|
|
|
s->init_num = frag->msg_header.msg_len + header_length;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
dtls1_set_message_header_int(s, frag->msg_header.type,
|
|
|
|
frag->msg_header.msg_len, frag->msg_header.seq, 0,
|
|
|
|
frag->msg_header.frag_len);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s->d1->retransmitting = 1;
|
|
|
|
ret = dtls1_do_write(s, frag->msg_header.is_ccs ?
|
|
|
|
SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC : SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
|
|
|
|
s->d1->retransmitting = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s));
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* call this function when the buffered messages are no longer needed */
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
|
|
dtls1_clear_record_buffer(SSL *s)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
pitem *item;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for(item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->sent_messages);
|
|
|
|
item != NULL; item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->sent_messages))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
dtls1_hm_fragment_free((hm_fragment *)item->data);
|
|
|
|
pitem_free(item);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *
|
|
|
|
dtls1_set_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char mt,
|
|
|
|
unsigned long len, unsigned long frag_off, unsigned long frag_len)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if ( frag_off == 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
s->d1->handshake_write_seq = s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq;
|
|
|
|
s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq++;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
dtls1_set_message_header_int(s, mt, len, s->d1->handshake_write_seq,
|
|
|
|
frag_off, frag_len);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return p += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* don't actually do the writing, wait till the MTU has been retrieved */
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
dtls1_set_message_header_int(SSL *s, unsigned char mt,
|
|
|
|
unsigned long len, unsigned short seq_num, unsigned long frag_off,
|
|
|
|
unsigned long frag_len)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
msg_hdr->type = mt;
|
|
|
|
msg_hdr->msg_len = len;
|
|
|
|
msg_hdr->seq = seq_num;
|
|
|
|
msg_hdr->frag_off = frag_off;
|
|
|
|
msg_hdr->frag_len = frag_len;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
dtls1_fix_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned long frag_off,
|
|
|
|
unsigned long frag_len)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
msg_hdr->frag_off = frag_off;
|
|
|
|
msg_hdr->frag_len = frag_len;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static unsigned char *
|
|
|
|
dtls1_write_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*p++ = msg_hdr->type;
|
|
|
|
l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len, p);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s2n(msg_hdr->seq, p);
|
|
|
|
l2n3(msg_hdr->frag_off, p);
|
|
|
|
l2n3(msg_hdr->frag_len, p);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return p;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static unsigned int
|
|
|
|
dtls1_min_mtu(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
g_probable_mtu[(sizeof(g_probable_mtu) /
|
|
|
|
sizeof(g_probable_mtu[0])) - 1];
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static unsigned int
|
|
|
|
dtls1_guess_mtu(unsigned int curr_mtu)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ( curr_mtu == 0 )
|
|
|
|
return g_probable_mtu[0] ;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for ( i = 0; i < sizeof(g_probable_mtu)/sizeof(g_probable_mtu[0]); i++)
|
|
|
|
if ( curr_mtu > g_probable_mtu[i])
|
|
|
|
return g_probable_mtu[i];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return curr_mtu;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
|
|
dtls1_get_message_header(unsigned char *data, struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
memset(msg_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st));
|
|
|
|
msg_hdr->type = *(data++);
|
|
|
|
n2l3(data, msg_hdr->msg_len);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
n2s(data, msg_hdr->seq);
|
|
|
|
n2l3(data, msg_hdr->frag_off);
|
|
|
|
n2l3(data, msg_hdr->frag_len);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
|
|
dtls1_get_ccs_header(unsigned char *data, struct ccs_header_st *ccs_hdr)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
memset(ccs_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct ccs_header_st));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ccs_hdr->type = *(data++);
|
|
|
|
n2s(data, ccs_hdr->seq);
|
|
|
|
}
|