openssl/crypto/rand/drbg_hmac.c

239 lines
8.1 KiB
C
Raw Normal View History

/*
* Copyright 2011-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include "internal/thread_once.h"
#include "rand_lcl.h"
/*
* Called twice by SP800-90Ar1 10.1.2.2 HMAC_DRBG_Update_Process.
*
* hmac is an object that holds the input/output Key and Value (K and V).
* inbyte is 0x00 on the first call and 0x01 on the second call.
* in1, in2, in3 are optional inputs that can be NULL.
* in1len, in2len, in3len are the lengths of the input buffers.
*
* The returned K,V is:
* hmac->K = HMAC(hmac->K, hmac->V || inbyte || [in1] || [in2] || [in3])
* hmac->V = HMAC(hmac->K, hmac->V)
*
* Returns zero if an error occurs otherwise it returns 1.
*/
static int do_hmac(RAND_DRBG_HMAC *hmac, unsigned char inbyte,
const unsigned char *in1, size_t in1len,
const unsigned char *in2, size_t in2len,
const unsigned char *in3, size_t in3len)
{
HMAC_CTX *ctx = hmac->ctx;
return HMAC_Init_ex(ctx, hmac->K, hmac->blocklen, hmac->md, NULL)
/* K = HMAC(K, V || inbyte || [in1] || [in2] || [in3]) */
&& HMAC_Update(ctx, hmac->V, hmac->blocklen)
&& HMAC_Update(ctx, &inbyte, 1)
&& (in1 == NULL || in1len == 0 || HMAC_Update(ctx, in1, in1len))
&& (in2 == NULL || in2len == 0 || HMAC_Update(ctx, in2, in2len))
&& (in3 == NULL || in3len == 0 || HMAC_Update(ctx, in3, in3len))
&& HMAC_Final(ctx, hmac->K, NULL)
/* V = HMAC(K, V) */
&& HMAC_Init_ex(ctx, hmac->K, hmac->blocklen, hmac->md, NULL)
&& HMAC_Update(ctx, hmac->V, hmac->blocklen)
&& HMAC_Final(ctx, hmac->V, NULL);
}
/*
* SP800-90Ar1 10.1.2.2 HMAC_DRBG_Update_Process
*
*
* Updates the drbg objects Key(K) and Value(V) using the following algorithm:
* K,V = do_hmac(hmac, 0, in1, in2, in3)
* if (any input is not NULL)
* K,V = do_hmac(hmac, 1, in1, in2, in3)
*
* where in1, in2, in3 are optional input buffers that can be NULL.
* in1len, in2len, in3len are the lengths of the input buffers.
*
* Returns zero if an error occurs otherwise it returns 1.
*/
static int drbg_hmac_update(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
const unsigned char *in1, size_t in1len,
const unsigned char *in2, size_t in2len,
const unsigned char *in3, size_t in3len)
{
RAND_DRBG_HMAC *hmac = &drbg->data.hmac;
/* (Steps 1-2) K = HMAC(K, V||0x00||provided_data). V = HMAC(K,V) */
if (!do_hmac(hmac, 0x00, in1, in1len, in2, in2len, in3, in3len))
return 0;
/* (Step 3) If provided_data == NULL then return (K,V) */
if (in1len == 0 && in2len == 0 && in3len == 0)
return 1;
/* (Steps 4-5) K = HMAC(K, V||0x01||provided_data). V = HMAC(K,V) */
return do_hmac(hmac, 0x01, in1, in1len, in2, in2len, in3, in3len);
}
/*
* SP800-90Ar1 10.1.2.3 HMAC_DRBG_Instantiate_Process:
*
* This sets the drbg Key (K) to all zeros, and Value (V) to all 1's.
* and then calls (K,V) = drbg_hmac_update() with input parameters:
* ent = entropy data (Can be NULL) of length ent_len.
* nonce = nonce data (Can be NULL) of length nonce_len.
* pstr = personalization data (Can be NULL) of length pstr_len.
*
* Returns zero if an error occurs otherwise it returns 1.
*/
static int drbg_hmac_instantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
const unsigned char *ent, size_t ent_len,
const unsigned char *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
const unsigned char *pstr, size_t pstr_len)
{
RAND_DRBG_HMAC *hmac = &drbg->data.hmac;
/* (Step 2) Key = 0x00 00...00 */
memset(hmac->K, 0x00, hmac->blocklen);
/* (Step 3) V = 0x01 01...01 */
memset(hmac->V, 0x01, hmac->blocklen);
/* (Step 4) (K,V) = HMAC_DRBG_Update(entropy||nonce||pers string, K, V) */
return drbg_hmac_update(drbg, ent, ent_len, nonce, nonce_len, pstr,
pstr_len);
}
/*
* SP800-90Ar1 10.1.2.4 HMAC_DRBG_Reseed_Process:
*
* Reseeds the drbg's Key (K) and Value (V) by calling
* (K,V) = drbg_hmac_update() with the following input parameters:
* ent = entropy input data (Can be NULL) of length ent_len.
* adin = additional input data (Can be NULL) of length adin_len.
*
* Returns zero if an error occurs otherwise it returns 1.
*/
static int drbg_hmac_reseed(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
const unsigned char *ent, size_t ent_len,
const unsigned char *adin, size_t adin_len)
{
/* (Step 2) (K,V) = HMAC_DRBG_Update(entropy||additional_input, K, V) */
return drbg_hmac_update(drbg, ent, ent_len, adin, adin_len, NULL, 0);
}
/*
* SP800-90Ar1 10.1.2.5 HMAC_DRBG_Generate_Process:
*
* Generates pseudo random bytes and updates the internal K,V for the drbg.
* out is a buffer to fill with outlen bytes of pseudo random data.
* adin is an additional_input string of size adin_len that may be NULL.
*
* Returns zero if an error occurs otherwise it returns 1.
*/
static int drbg_hmac_generate(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
unsigned char *out, size_t outlen,
const unsigned char *adin, size_t adin_len)
{
RAND_DRBG_HMAC *hmac = &drbg->data.hmac;
HMAC_CTX *ctx = hmac->ctx;
const unsigned char *temp = hmac->V;
/* (Step 2) if adin != NULL then (K,V) = HMAC_DRBG_Update(adin, K, V) */
if (adin != NULL
&& adin_len > 0
&& !drbg_hmac_update(drbg, adin, adin_len, NULL, 0, NULL, 0))
return 0;
/*
* (Steps 3-5) temp = NULL
* while (len(temp) < outlen) {
* V = HMAC(K, V)
* temp = temp || V
* }
*/
for (;;) {
if (!HMAC_Init_ex(ctx, hmac->K, hmac->blocklen, hmac->md, NULL)
|| !HMAC_Update(ctx, temp, hmac->blocklen))
return 0;
if (outlen > hmac->blocklen) {
if (!HMAC_Final(ctx, out, NULL))
return 0;
temp = out;
} else {
if (!HMAC_Final(ctx, hmac->V, NULL))
return 0;
memcpy(out, hmac->V, outlen);
break;
}
out += hmac->blocklen;
outlen -= hmac->blocklen;
}
/* (Step 6) (K,V) = HMAC_DRBG_Update(adin, K, V) */
if (!drbg_hmac_update(drbg, adin, adin_len, NULL, 0, NULL, 0))
return 0;
return 1;
}
static int drbg_hmac_uninstantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
{
HMAC_CTX_free(drbg->data.hmac.ctx);
OPENSSL_cleanse(&drbg->data.hmac, sizeof(drbg->data.hmac));
return 1;
}
static RAND_DRBG_METHOD drbg_hmac_meth = {
drbg_hmac_instantiate,
drbg_hmac_reseed,
drbg_hmac_generate,
drbg_hmac_uninstantiate
};
int drbg_hmac_init(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
{
const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
RAND_DRBG_HMAC *hmac = &drbg->data.hmac;
/* Any approved digest is allowed - assume we pass digest (not NID_hmac*) */
md = EVP_get_digestbynid(drbg->type);
if (md == NULL)
return 0;
drbg->meth = &drbg_hmac_meth;
if (hmac->ctx == NULL) {
hmac->ctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
if (hmac->ctx == NULL)
return 0;
}
/* These are taken from SP 800-90 10.1 Table 2 */
hmac->md = md;
hmac->blocklen = EVP_MD_size(md);
/* See SP800-57 Part1 Rev4 5.6.1 Table 3 */
drbg->strength = 64 * (int)(hmac->blocklen >> 3);
if (drbg->strength > 256)
drbg->strength = 256;
drbg->seedlen = hmac->blocklen;
drbg->min_entropylen = drbg->strength / 8;
DRBG: fix reseeding via RAND_add()/RAND_seed() with large input In pull request #4328 the seeding of the DRBG via RAND_add()/RAND_seed() was implemented by buffering the data in a random pool where it is picked up later by the rand_drbg_get_entropy() callback. This buffer was limited to the size of 4096 bytes. When a larger input was added via RAND_add() or RAND_seed() to the DRBG, the reseeding failed, but the error returned by the DRBG was ignored by the two calling functions, which both don't return an error code. As a consequence, the data provided by the application was effectively ignored. This commit fixes the problem by a more efficient implementation which does not copy the data in memory and by raising the buffer the size limit to INT32_MAX (2 gigabytes). This is less than the NIST limit of 2^35 bits but it was chosen intentionally to avoid platform dependent problems like integer sizes and/or signed/unsigned conversion. Additionally, the DRBG is now less permissive on errors: In addition to pushing a message to the openssl error stack, it enters the error state, which forces a reinstantiation on next call. Thanks go to Dr. Falko Strenzke for reporting this issue to the openssl-security mailing list. After internal discussion the issue has been categorized as not being security relevant, because the DRBG reseeds automatically and is fully functional even without additional randomness provided by the application. Fixes #7381 Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7382)
2018-10-10 07:53:29 +08:00
drbg->max_entropylen = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH;
drbg->min_noncelen = drbg->min_entropylen / 2;
DRBG: fix reseeding via RAND_add()/RAND_seed() with large input In pull request #4328 the seeding of the DRBG via RAND_add()/RAND_seed() was implemented by buffering the data in a random pool where it is picked up later by the rand_drbg_get_entropy() callback. This buffer was limited to the size of 4096 bytes. When a larger input was added via RAND_add() or RAND_seed() to the DRBG, the reseeding failed, but the error returned by the DRBG was ignored by the two calling functions, which both don't return an error code. As a consequence, the data provided by the application was effectively ignored. This commit fixes the problem by a more efficient implementation which does not copy the data in memory and by raising the buffer the size limit to INT32_MAX (2 gigabytes). This is less than the NIST limit of 2^35 bits but it was chosen intentionally to avoid platform dependent problems like integer sizes and/or signed/unsigned conversion. Additionally, the DRBG is now less permissive on errors: In addition to pushing a message to the openssl error stack, it enters the error state, which forces a reinstantiation on next call. Thanks go to Dr. Falko Strenzke for reporting this issue to the openssl-security mailing list. After internal discussion the issue has been categorized as not being security relevant, because the DRBG reseeds automatically and is fully functional even without additional randomness provided by the application. Fixes #7381 Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7382)
2018-10-10 07:53:29 +08:00
drbg->max_noncelen = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH;
drbg->max_perslen = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH;
drbg->max_adinlen = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH;
/* Maximum number of bits per request = 2^19 = 2^16 bytes*/
drbg->max_request = 1 << 16;
return 1;
}