2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
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/*
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2021-03-11 21:27:36 +08:00
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* Copyright 1999-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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1999-06-08 05:00:19 +08:00
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*
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2018-12-06 20:40:06 +08:00
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* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
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2016-05-18 02:24:46 +08:00
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* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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1999-06-08 05:00:19 +08:00
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*/
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2016-05-18 02:24:46 +08:00
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1999-06-08 05:00:19 +08:00
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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2015-05-14 22:56:48 +08:00
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#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
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2018-06-22 05:16:18 +08:00
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#include <openssl/x509.h>
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
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#include <openssl/kdf.h>
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#include <openssl/hmac.h>
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2018-12-13 08:53:13 +08:00
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#include <openssl/trace.h>
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2019-08-21 06:06:29 +08:00
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#include <openssl/core_names.h>
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2019-09-28 06:45:33 +08:00
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#include "crypto/evp.h"
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2019-09-28 06:45:40 +08:00
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#include "evp_local.h"
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1999-06-08 05:00:19 +08:00
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2021-03-09 12:44:51 +08:00
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int ossl_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac_ex(const char *pass, int passlen,
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const unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, int iter,
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const EVP_MD *digest, int keylen,
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unsigned char *out,
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OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, const char *propq)
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2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
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{
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2016-10-12 01:26:23 +08:00
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const char *empty = "";
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2019-08-21 06:06:29 +08:00
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int rv = 1, mode = 1;
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EVP_KDF *kdf;
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2018-06-22 05:16:18 +08:00
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EVP_KDF_CTX *kctx;
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2019-08-21 06:06:29 +08:00
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const char *mdname = EVP_MD_name(digest);
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OSSL_PARAM params[6], *p = params;
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2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
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2018-06-22 05:16:18 +08:00
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/* Keep documented behaviour. */
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2016-10-12 01:26:23 +08:00
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if (pass == NULL) {
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pass = empty;
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2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
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passlen = 0;
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2016-10-12 01:26:23 +08:00
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} else if (passlen == -1) {
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2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
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passlen = strlen(pass);
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2016-10-12 01:26:23 +08:00
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}
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2018-06-22 05:16:18 +08:00
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if (salt == NULL && saltlen == 0)
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salt = (unsigned char *)empty;
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2020-08-07 12:29:00 +08:00
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kdf = EVP_KDF_fetch(libctx, OSSL_KDF_NAME_PBKDF2, propq);
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2020-06-18 16:30:48 +08:00
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kctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new(kdf);
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2019-08-21 06:06:29 +08:00
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EVP_KDF_free(kdf);
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2018-06-22 05:16:18 +08:00
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if (kctx == NULL)
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2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
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return 0;
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2019-08-21 06:06:29 +08:00
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*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PASSWORD,
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(char *)pass, (size_t)passlen);
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*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PKCS5, &mode);
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*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SALT,
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(unsigned char *)salt, saltlen);
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*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_ITER, &iter);
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*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST,
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2020-02-05 13:13:49 +08:00
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(char *)mdname, 0);
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2019-08-21 06:06:29 +08:00
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*p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
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2021-02-26 08:08:45 +08:00
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if (EVP_KDF_derive(kctx, out, keylen, params) != 1)
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2018-06-22 05:16:18 +08:00
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rv = 0;
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2020-06-18 16:30:48 +08:00
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EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx);
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2018-06-22 05:16:18 +08:00
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2018-12-13 08:53:13 +08:00
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OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(PKCS5V2) {
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BIO_printf(trc_out, "Password:\n");
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BIO_hex_string(trc_out,
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0, passlen, pass, passlen);
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BIO_printf(trc_out, "\n");
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BIO_printf(trc_out, "Salt:\n");
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BIO_hex_string(trc_out,
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0, saltlen, salt, saltlen);
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BIO_printf(trc_out, "\n");
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BIO_printf(trc_out, "Iteration count %d\n", iter);
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BIO_printf(trc_out, "Key:\n");
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BIO_hex_string(trc_out,
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0, keylen, out, keylen);
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BIO_printf(trc_out, "\n");
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} OSSL_TRACE_END(PKCS5V2);
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2018-06-22 05:16:18 +08:00
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return rv;
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2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
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}
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2006-05-15 02:40:53 +08:00
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2020-08-07 12:29:00 +08:00
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int PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(const char *pass, int passlen, const unsigned char *salt,
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int saltlen, int iter, const EVP_MD *digest, int keylen,
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unsigned char *out)
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{
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2021-03-09 12:44:51 +08:00
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return ossl_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac_ex(pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, iter, digest,
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keylen, out, NULL, NULL);
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2020-08-07 12:29:00 +08:00
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}
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2006-05-15 02:40:53 +08:00
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int PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC_SHA1(const char *pass, int passlen,
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2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
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const unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, int iter,
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int keylen, unsigned char *out)
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{
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2021-04-15 08:42:01 +08:00
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EVP_MD *digest;
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int r = 0;
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if ((digest = EVP_MD_fetch(NULL, SN_sha1, NULL)) != NULL)
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r = ossl_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac_ex(pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, iter,
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digest, keylen, out, NULL, NULL);
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EVP_MD_free(digest);
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return r;
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2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
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}
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/*
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* Now the key derivation function itself. This is a bit evil because it has
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* to check the ASN1 parameters are valid: and there are quite a few of
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* them...
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1999-06-08 05:00:19 +08:00
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*/
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int PKCS5_v2_PBE_keyivgen(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const char *pass, int passlen,
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2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
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ASN1_TYPE *param, const EVP_CIPHER *c,
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const EVP_MD *md, int en_de)
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1999-06-08 05:00:19 +08:00
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{
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2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
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PBE2PARAM *pbe2 = NULL;
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const EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
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2015-02-06 20:08:45 +08:00
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EVP_PBE_KEYGEN *kdf;
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2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
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int rv = 0;
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2015-03-28 23:10:54 +08:00
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pbe2 = ASN1_TYPE_unpack_sequence(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PBE2PARAM), param);
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if (pbe2 == NULL) {
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2020-11-04 19:23:19 +08:00
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR);
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2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
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goto err;
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}
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/* See if we recognise the key derivation function */
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2015-02-06 20:08:45 +08:00
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if (!EVP_PBE_find(EVP_PBE_TYPE_KDF, OBJ_obj2nid(pbe2->keyfunc->algorithm),
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2016-05-04 04:40:33 +08:00
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NULL, NULL, &kdf)) {
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2020-11-04 19:23:19 +08:00
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_DERIVATION_FUNCTION);
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2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
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goto err;
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}
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/*
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* lets see if we recognise the encryption algorithm.
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*/
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cipher = EVP_get_cipherbyobj(pbe2->encryption->algorithm);
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if (!cipher) {
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2020-11-04 19:23:19 +08:00
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER);
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2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
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goto err;
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}
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/* Fixup cipher based on AlgorithmIdentifier */
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if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL, NULL, NULL, en_de))
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goto err;
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if (EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param(ctx, pbe2->encryption->parameter) < 0) {
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2020-11-04 19:23:19 +08:00
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_CIPHER_PARAMETER_ERROR);
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2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
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goto err;
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}
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2015-02-06 20:08:45 +08:00
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rv = kdf(ctx, pass, passlen, pbe2->keyfunc->parameter, NULL, NULL, en_de);
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2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
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err:
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PBE2PARAM_free(pbe2);
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return rv;
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2009-11-26 06:01:06 +08:00
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}
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2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
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int PKCS5_v2_PBKDF2_keyivgen(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const char *pass,
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int passlen, ASN1_TYPE *param,
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const EVP_CIPHER *c, const EVP_MD *md, int en_de)
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2009-11-26 06:01:06 +08:00
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{
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2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
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unsigned char *salt, key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
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2019-05-07 08:26:32 +08:00
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int saltlen, iter, t;
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2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
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int rv = 0;
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unsigned int keylen = 0;
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int prf_nid, hmac_md_nid;
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PBKDF2PARAM *kdf = NULL;
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const EVP_MD *prfmd;
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Add "origin" field to EVP_CIPHER, EVP_MD
Add a "where did this EVP_{CIPHER,MD} come from" flag: global, via fetch,
or via EVP_{CIPHER,MD}_meth_new. Update EVP_{CIPHER,MD}_free to handle all
three origins. The flag is deliberately right before some function pointers,
so that compile-time failures (int/pointer) will occur, as opposed to
taking a bit in the existing "flags" field. The "global variable" flag
is non-zero, so the default case of using OPENSSL_zalloc (for provider
ciphers), will do the right thing. Ref-counting is a no-op for
Make up_ref no-op for global MD and CIPHER objects
Deprecate EVP_MD_CTX_md(). Added EVP_MD_CTX_get0_md() (same semantics as
the deprecated function) and EVP_MD_CTX_get1_md(). Likewise, deprecate
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher() in favor of EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(), and add
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get1_CIPHER().
Refactor EVP_MD_free() and EVP_MD_meth_free() to call new common
evp_md_free_int() function.
Refactor EVP_CIPHER_free() and EVP_CIPHER_meth_free() to call new common
evp_cipher_free_int() function.
Also change some flags tests to explicit test == or != zero. E.g.,
if (flags & x) --> if ((flags & x) != 0)
if (!(flags & x)) --> if ((flags & x) == 0)
Only done for those lines where "get0_cipher" calls were made.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14193)
2021-02-17 06:51:56 +08:00
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if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(ctx) == NULL) {
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2020-11-04 19:23:19 +08:00
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_NO_CIPHER_SET);
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2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
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goto err;
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}
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keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx);
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2017-12-08 02:39:34 +08:00
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OPENSSL_assert(keylen <= sizeof(key));
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2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
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/* Decode parameter */
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2015-03-28 23:10:54 +08:00
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kdf = ASN1_TYPE_unpack_sequence(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PBKDF2PARAM), param);
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2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
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2015-03-28 23:10:54 +08:00
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if (kdf == NULL) {
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2020-11-04 19:23:19 +08:00
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR);
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2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
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goto err;
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}
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2019-05-07 08:26:32 +08:00
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t = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx);
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if (t < 0) {
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2020-11-04 19:23:19 +08:00
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
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2019-05-07 08:26:32 +08:00
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goto err;
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}
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keylen = t;
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2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
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/* Now check the parameters of the kdf */
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if (kdf->keylength && (ASN1_INTEGER_get(kdf->keylength) != (int)keylen)) {
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2020-11-04 19:23:19 +08:00
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEYLENGTH);
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2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
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goto err;
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}
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if (kdf->prf)
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prf_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(kdf->prf->algorithm);
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else
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prf_nid = NID_hmacWithSHA1;
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if (!EVP_PBE_find(EVP_PBE_TYPE_PRF, prf_nid, NULL, &hmac_md_nid, 0)) {
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2020-11-04 19:23:19 +08:00
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_PRF);
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2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
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goto err;
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}
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prfmd = EVP_get_digestbynid(hmac_md_nid);
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if (prfmd == NULL) {
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2020-11-04 19:23:19 +08:00
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_PRF);
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2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
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goto err;
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}
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if (kdf->salt->type != V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING) {
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2020-11-04 19:23:19 +08:00
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_SALT_TYPE);
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2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
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goto err;
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}
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/* it seems that its all OK */
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salt = kdf->salt->value.octet_string->data;
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saltlen = kdf->salt->value.octet_string->length;
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iter = ASN1_INTEGER_get(kdf->iter);
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if (!PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, iter, prfmd,
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keylen, key))
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goto err;
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rv = EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, key, NULL, en_de);
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err:
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OPENSSL_cleanse(key, keylen);
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PBKDF2PARAM_free(kdf);
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return rv;
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1999-06-08 05:00:19 +08:00
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}
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