2016-04-22 08:06:49 +08:00
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/*
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2016-05-24 03:02:34 +08:00
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* Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
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2021-01-28 20:54:57 +08:00
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* Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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1999-04-24 08:15:18 +08:00
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*
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2018-12-06 20:08:51 +08:00
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* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
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2016-04-22 08:06:49 +08:00
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* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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1999-04-24 08:15:18 +08:00
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*/
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1999-04-24 06:13:45 +08:00
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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2017-06-08 03:12:03 +08:00
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#include <openssl/sslerr.h>
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2020-11-12 17:36:47 +08:00
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#include "sslerr.h"
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1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
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2001-02-20 16:13:47 +08:00
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
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2005-04-13 00:15:22 +08:00
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2017-06-08 03:12:03 +08:00
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static const ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[] = {
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2018-06-25 21:51:11 +08:00
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_APPLICATION_DATA_AFTER_CLOSE_NOTIFY),
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"application data after close notify"},
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2017-06-08 03:12:03 +08:00
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE),
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"app data in handshake"},
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT),
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"attempt to reuse session in different context"},
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE),
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"at least (D)TLS 1.2 needed in Suite B mode"},
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC),
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"bad change cipher spec"},
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_BAD_CIPHER), "bad cipher"},
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_BAD_DATA), "bad data"},
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK),
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"bad data returned by callback"},
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION), "bad decompression"},
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE), "bad dh value"},
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH), "bad digest length"},
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2017-11-22 01:18:43 +08:00
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_BAD_EARLY_DATA), "bad early data"},
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2017-06-08 03:12:03 +08:00
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT), "bad ecc cert"},
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT), "bad ecpoint"},
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION), "bad extension"},
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_LENGTH),
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"bad handshake length"},
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2017-11-22 01:18:43 +08:00
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE),
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"bad handshake state"},
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2017-06-08 03:12:03 +08:00
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST), "bad hello request"},
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2017-12-05 18:16:25 +08:00
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_BAD_HRR_VERSION), "bad hrr version"},
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2017-06-08 03:12:03 +08:00
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE), "bad key share"},
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE), "bad key update"},
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2018-07-19 23:51:58 +08:00
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_BAD_LEGACY_VERSION), "bad legacy version"},
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2017-06-08 03:12:03 +08:00
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH), "bad length"},
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2017-11-22 01:18:43 +08:00
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET), "bad packet"},
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2017-06-08 03:12:03 +08:00
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH), "bad packet length"},
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER),
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"bad protocol version number"},
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2017-06-12 20:30:21 +08:00
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_BAD_PSK), "bad psk"},
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2017-06-08 03:12:03 +08:00
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY), "bad psk identity"},
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_BAD_RECORD_TYPE), "bad record type"},
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT), "bad rsa encrypt"},
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE), "bad signature"},
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH), "bad srp a length"},
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS), "bad srp parameters"},
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE), "bad srtp mki value"},
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST),
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"bad srtp protection profile list"},
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_BAD_SSL_FILETYPE), "bad ssl filetype"},
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_BAD_VALUE), "bad value"},
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY), "bad write retry"},
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2017-11-23 19:41:40 +08:00
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_BINDER_DOES_NOT_VERIFY),
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"binder does not verify"},
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2017-06-08 03:12:03 +08:00
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET), "bio not set"},
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG),
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"block cipher pad is wrong"},
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_BN_LIB), "bn lib"},
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2017-11-22 01:18:43 +08:00
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED), "callback failed"},
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2017-06-08 03:12:03 +08:00
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER),
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"cannot change cipher"},
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2021-01-16 00:54:28 +08:00
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_CANNOT_GET_GROUP_NAME),
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"cannot get group name"},
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2017-06-08 03:12:03 +08:00
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH),
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"ca dn length mismatch"},
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL), "ca key too small"},
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK), "ca md too weak"},
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY), "ccs received early"},
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED),
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"certificate verify failed"},
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR), "cert cb error"},
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH),
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"cert length mismatch"},
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2017-05-27 00:59:34 +08:00
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_CIPHERSUITE_DIGEST_HAS_CHANGED),
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"ciphersuite digest has changed"},
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2017-06-08 03:12:03 +08:00
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_CIPHER_CODE_WRONG_LENGTH),
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"cipher code wrong length"},
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT), "clienthello tlsext"},
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG),
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"compressed length too long"},
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED),
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"compression disabled"},
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE),
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"compression failure"},
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_ID_NOT_WITHIN_PRIVATE_RANGE),
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"compression id not within private range"},
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR),
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"compression library error"},
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_CONNECTION_TYPE_NOT_SET),
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"connection type not set"},
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_CONTEXT_NOT_DANE_ENABLED),
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"context not dane enabled"},
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE),
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"cookie gen callback failure"},
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH), "cookie mismatch"},
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2020-05-22 21:11:43 +08:00
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_COPY_PARAMETERS_FAILED),
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"copy parameters failed"},
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2017-06-08 03:12:03 +08:00
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_CUSTOM_EXT_HANDLER_ALREADY_INSTALLED),
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"custom ext handler already installed"},
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_DANE_ALREADY_ENABLED),
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"dane already enabled"},
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_DANE_CANNOT_OVERRIDE_MTYPE_FULL),
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"dane cannot override mtype full"},
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_DANE_NOT_ENABLED), "dane not enabled"},
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_CERTIFICATE),
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"dane tlsa bad certificate"},
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_CERTIFICATE_USAGE),
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"dane tlsa bad certificate usage"},
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_DATA_LENGTH),
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"dane tlsa bad data length"},
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH),
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"dane tlsa bad digest length"},
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_MATCHING_TYPE),
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"dane tlsa bad matching type"},
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_PUBLIC_KEY),
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"dane tlsa bad public key"},
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_SELECTOR),
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"dane tlsa bad selector"},
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_NULL_DATA),
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"dane tlsa null data"},
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED),
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"data between ccs and finished"},
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG),
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"data length too long"},
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED), "decryption failed"},
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC),
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"decryption failed or bad record mac"},
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL), "dh key too small"},
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG),
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"dh public value length is wrong"},
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED),
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"digest check failed"},
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_DTLS_MESSAGE_TOO_BIG),
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"dtls message too big"},
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_DUPLICATE_COMPRESSION_ID),
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"duplicate compression id"},
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_SIGNING),
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"ecc cert not for signing"},
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_ECDH_REQUIRED_FOR_SUITEB_MODE),
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"ecdh required for suiteb mode"},
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL), "ee key too small"},
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_EMPTY_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST),
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"empty srtp protection profile list"},
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG),
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"encrypted length too long"},
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST),
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"error in received cipher list"},
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_ERROR_SETTING_TLSA_BASE_DOMAIN),
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"error setting tlsa base domain"},
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_EXCEEDS_MAX_FRAGMENT_SIZE),
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"exceeds max fragment size"},
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE),
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"excessive message size"},
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Add TLSv1.3 post-handshake authentication (PHA)
Add SSL_verify_client_post_handshake() for servers to initiate PHA
Add SSL_force_post_handshake_auth() for clients that don't have certificates
initially configured, but use a certificate callback.
Update SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() mode:
* Add SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE to postpone client authentication until after
the initial handshake.
* Update SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE now only sends out one CertRequest regardless
of when the certificate authentication takes place; either initial handshake,
re-negotiation, or post-handshake authentication.
Add 'RequestPostHandshake' and 'RequirePostHandshake' SSL_CONF options that
add the SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE to the 'Request' and 'Require' options
Add support to s_client:
* Enabled automatically when cert is configured
* Can be forced enabled via -force_pha
Add support to s_server:
* Use 'c' to invoke PHA in s_server
* Remove some dead code
Update documentation
Update unit tests:
* Illegal use of PHA extension
* TLSv1.3 certificate tests
DTLS and TLS behave ever-so-slightly differently. So, when DTLS1.3 is
implemented, it's PHA support state machine may need to be different.
Add a TODO and a #error
Update handshake context to deal with PHA.
The handshake context for TLSv1.3 post-handshake auth is up through the
ClientFinish message, plus the CertificateRequest message. Subsequent
Certificate, CertificateVerify, and Finish messages are based on this
handshake context (not the Certificate message per se, but it's included
after the hash). KeyUpdate, NewSessionTicket, and prior Certificate
Request messages are not included in post-handshake authentication.
After the ClientFinished message is processed, save off the digest state
for future post-handshake authentication. When post-handshake auth occurs,
copy over the saved handshake context into the "main" handshake digest.
This effectively discards the any KeyUpdate or NewSessionTicket messages
and any prior post-handshake authentication.
This, of course, assumes that the ID-22 did not mean to include any
previous post-handshake authentication into the new handshake transcript.
This is implied by section 4.4.1 that lists messages only up to the
first ClientFinished.
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4964)
2017-12-19 05:52:28 +08:00
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_EXTENSION_NOT_RECEIVED),
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"extension not received"},
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2017-06-08 03:12:03 +08:00
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE),
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"extra data in message"},
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_EXT_LENGTH_MISMATCH),
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"ext length mismatch"},
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_FAILED_TO_INIT_ASYNC),
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"failed to init async"},
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_FRAGMENTED_CLIENT_HELLO),
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"fragmented client hello"},
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS),
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"got a fin before a ccs"},
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST),
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"https proxy request"},
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST), "http request"},
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_ILLEGAL_POINT_COMPRESSION),
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"illegal point compression"},
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST),
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"illegal Suite B digest"},
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK),
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"inappropriate fallback"},
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION),
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"inconsistent compression"},
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2017-07-21 18:41:05 +08:00
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{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EARLY_DATA_ALPN),
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|
|
|
"inconsistent early data alpn"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EARLY_DATA_SNI),
|
|
|
|
|
"inconsistent early data sni"},
|
2017-06-08 03:12:03 +08:00
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS), "inconsistent extms"},
|
2017-11-23 01:18:39 +08:00
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY),
|
|
|
|
|
"insufficient security"},
|
2017-06-08 03:12:03 +08:00
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_INVALID_ALERT), "invalid alert"},
|
2017-11-08 00:36:51 +08:00
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_INVALID_CCS_MESSAGE),
|
|
|
|
|
"invalid ccs message"},
|
2017-11-22 01:18:43 +08:00
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_INVALID_CERTIFICATE_OR_ALG),
|
|
|
|
|
"invalid certificate or alg"},
|
2017-06-08 03:12:03 +08:00
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND), "invalid command"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM),
|
|
|
|
|
"invalid compression algorithm"},
|
Add TLSv1.3 post-handshake authentication (PHA)
Add SSL_verify_client_post_handshake() for servers to initiate PHA
Add SSL_force_post_handshake_auth() for clients that don't have certificates
initially configured, but use a certificate callback.
Update SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() mode:
* Add SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE to postpone client authentication until after
the initial handshake.
* Update SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE now only sends out one CertRequest regardless
of when the certificate authentication takes place; either initial handshake,
re-negotiation, or post-handshake authentication.
Add 'RequestPostHandshake' and 'RequirePostHandshake' SSL_CONF options that
add the SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE to the 'Request' and 'Require' options
Add support to s_client:
* Enabled automatically when cert is configured
* Can be forced enabled via -force_pha
Add support to s_server:
* Use 'c' to invoke PHA in s_server
* Remove some dead code
Update documentation
Update unit tests:
* Illegal use of PHA extension
* TLSv1.3 certificate tests
DTLS and TLS behave ever-so-slightly differently. So, when DTLS1.3 is
implemented, it's PHA support state machine may need to be different.
Add a TODO and a #error
Update handshake context to deal with PHA.
The handshake context for TLSv1.3 post-handshake auth is up through the
ClientFinish message, plus the CertificateRequest message. Subsequent
Certificate, CertificateVerify, and Finish messages are based on this
handshake context (not the Certificate message per se, but it's included
after the hash). KeyUpdate, NewSessionTicket, and prior Certificate
Request messages are not included in post-handshake authentication.
After the ClientFinished message is processed, save off the digest state
for future post-handshake authentication. When post-handshake auth occurs,
copy over the saved handshake context into the "main" handshake digest.
This effectively discards the any KeyUpdate or NewSessionTicket messages
and any prior post-handshake authentication.
This, of course, assumes that the ID-22 did not mean to include any
previous post-handshake authentication into the new handshake transcript.
This is implied by section 4.4.1 that lists messages only up to the
first ClientFinished.
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4964)
2017-12-19 05:52:28 +08:00
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_INVALID_CONFIG), "invalid config"},
|
2017-06-08 03:12:03 +08:00
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_INVALID_CONFIGURATION_NAME),
|
|
|
|
|
"invalid configuration name"},
|
Add TLSv1.3 post-handshake authentication (PHA)
Add SSL_verify_client_post_handshake() for servers to initiate PHA
Add SSL_force_post_handshake_auth() for clients that don't have certificates
initially configured, but use a certificate callback.
Update SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() mode:
* Add SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE to postpone client authentication until after
the initial handshake.
* Update SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE now only sends out one CertRequest regardless
of when the certificate authentication takes place; either initial handshake,
re-negotiation, or post-handshake authentication.
Add 'RequestPostHandshake' and 'RequirePostHandshake' SSL_CONF options that
add the SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE to the 'Request' and 'Require' options
Add support to s_client:
* Enabled automatically when cert is configured
* Can be forced enabled via -force_pha
Add support to s_server:
* Use 'c' to invoke PHA in s_server
* Remove some dead code
Update documentation
Update unit tests:
* Illegal use of PHA extension
* TLSv1.3 certificate tests
DTLS and TLS behave ever-so-slightly differently. So, when DTLS1.3 is
implemented, it's PHA support state machine may need to be different.
Add a TODO and a #error
Update handshake context to deal with PHA.
The handshake context for TLSv1.3 post-handshake auth is up through the
ClientFinish message, plus the CertificateRequest message. Subsequent
Certificate, CertificateVerify, and Finish messages are based on this
handshake context (not the Certificate message per se, but it's included
after the hash). KeyUpdate, NewSessionTicket, and prior Certificate
Request messages are not included in post-handshake authentication.
After the ClientFinished message is processed, save off the digest state
for future post-handshake authentication. When post-handshake auth occurs,
copy over the saved handshake context into the "main" handshake digest.
This effectively discards the any KeyUpdate or NewSessionTicket messages
and any prior post-handshake authentication.
This, of course, assumes that the ID-22 did not mean to include any
previous post-handshake authentication into the new handshake transcript.
This is implied by section 4.4.1 that lists messages only up to the
first ClientFinished.
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4964)
2017-12-19 05:52:28 +08:00
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_INVALID_CONTEXT), "invalid context"},
|
2017-06-08 03:12:03 +08:00
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_INVALID_CT_VALIDATION_TYPE),
|
|
|
|
|
"invalid ct validation type"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_INVALID_KEY_UPDATE_TYPE),
|
|
|
|
|
"invalid key update type"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_INVALID_MAX_EARLY_DATA),
|
|
|
|
|
"invalid max early data"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_INVALID_NULL_CMD_NAME),
|
|
|
|
|
"invalid null cmd name"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_INVALID_SEQUENCE_NUMBER),
|
|
|
|
|
"invalid sequence number"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_INVALID_SERVERINFO_DATA),
|
|
|
|
|
"invalid serverinfo data"},
|
2017-11-07 18:45:43 +08:00
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_INVALID_SESSION_ID), "invalid session id"},
|
2017-06-08 03:12:03 +08:00
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_INVALID_SRP_USERNAME),
|
|
|
|
|
"invalid srp username"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE),
|
|
|
|
|
"invalid status response"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_INVALID_TICKET_KEYS_LENGTH),
|
|
|
|
|
"invalid ticket keys length"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH), "length mismatch"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG), "length too long"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT), "length too short"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG), "library bug"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS),
|
|
|
|
|
"library has no ciphers"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT),
|
|
|
|
|
"missing dsa signing cert"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT),
|
|
|
|
|
"missing ecdsa signing cert"},
|
2017-11-23 20:10:54 +08:00
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_MISSING_FATAL), "missing fatal"},
|
2015-12-28 22:13:20 +08:00
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS), "missing parameters"},
|
2021-03-30 14:08:10 +08:00
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_MISSING_PSK_KEX_MODES_EXTENSION),
|
|
|
|
|
"missing psk kex modes extension"},
|
2017-06-08 03:12:03 +08:00
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE),
|
|
|
|
|
"missing rsa certificate"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT),
|
|
|
|
|
"missing rsa encrypting cert"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT),
|
|
|
|
|
"missing rsa signing cert"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_MISSING_SIGALGS_EXTENSION),
|
|
|
|
|
"missing sigalgs extension"},
|
2017-07-09 06:16:09 +08:00
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_MISSING_SIGNING_CERT),
|
|
|
|
|
"missing signing cert"},
|
2017-06-08 03:12:03 +08:00
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM),
|
|
|
|
|
"can't find SRP server param"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_MISSING_SUPPORTED_GROUPS_EXTENSION),
|
|
|
|
|
"missing supported groups extension"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY), "missing tmp dh key"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY),
|
|
|
|
|
"missing tmp ecdh key"},
|
2019-02-09 00:36:32 +08:00
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_MIXED_HANDSHAKE_AND_NON_HANDSHAKE_DATA),
|
|
|
|
|
"mixed handshake and non handshake data"},
|
2017-06-08 03:12:03 +08:00
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY),
|
|
|
|
|
"not on record boundary"},
|
2015-12-28 22:13:20 +08:00
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_NOT_REPLACING_CERTIFICATE),
|
|
|
|
|
"not replacing certificate"},
|
Add TLSv1.3 post-handshake authentication (PHA)
Add SSL_verify_client_post_handshake() for servers to initiate PHA
Add SSL_force_post_handshake_auth() for clients that don't have certificates
initially configured, but use a certificate callback.
Update SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() mode:
* Add SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE to postpone client authentication until after
the initial handshake.
* Update SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE now only sends out one CertRequest regardless
of when the certificate authentication takes place; either initial handshake,
re-negotiation, or post-handshake authentication.
Add 'RequestPostHandshake' and 'RequirePostHandshake' SSL_CONF options that
add the SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE to the 'Request' and 'Require' options
Add support to s_client:
* Enabled automatically when cert is configured
* Can be forced enabled via -force_pha
Add support to s_server:
* Use 'c' to invoke PHA in s_server
* Remove some dead code
Update documentation
Update unit tests:
* Illegal use of PHA extension
* TLSv1.3 certificate tests
DTLS and TLS behave ever-so-slightly differently. So, when DTLS1.3 is
implemented, it's PHA support state machine may need to be different.
Add a TODO and a #error
Update handshake context to deal with PHA.
The handshake context for TLSv1.3 post-handshake auth is up through the
ClientFinish message, plus the CertificateRequest message. Subsequent
Certificate, CertificateVerify, and Finish messages are based on this
handshake context (not the Certificate message per se, but it's included
after the hash). KeyUpdate, NewSessionTicket, and prior Certificate
Request messages are not included in post-handshake authentication.
After the ClientFinished message is processed, save off the digest state
for future post-handshake authentication. When post-handshake auth occurs,
copy over the saved handshake context into the "main" handshake digest.
This effectively discards the any KeyUpdate or NewSessionTicket messages
and any prior post-handshake authentication.
This, of course, assumes that the ID-22 did not mean to include any
previous post-handshake authentication into the new handshake transcript.
This is implied by section 4.4.1 that lists messages only up to the
first ClientFinished.
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4964)
2017-12-19 05:52:28 +08:00
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_NOT_SERVER), "not server"},
|
2017-11-22 01:18:43 +08:00
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL),
|
|
|
|
|
"no application protocol"},
|
2017-06-08 03:12:03 +08:00
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED),
|
|
|
|
|
"no certificates returned"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED),
|
|
|
|
|
"no certificate assigned"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET), "no certificate set"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_NO_CHANGE_FOLLOWING_HRR),
|
|
|
|
|
"no change following hrr"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE),
|
|
|
|
|
"no ciphers available"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED),
|
|
|
|
|
"no ciphers specified"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH), "no cipher match"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_METHOD),
|
|
|
|
|
"no client cert method"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED),
|
|
|
|
|
"no compression specified"},
|
2018-03-09 01:44:12 +08:00
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_NO_COOKIE_CALLBACK_SET),
|
|
|
|
|
"no cookie callback set"},
|
2017-06-08 03:12:03 +08:00
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER),
|
|
|
|
|
"Peer haven't sent GOST certificate, required for selected ciphersuite"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_NO_METHOD_SPECIFIED),
|
|
|
|
|
"no method specified"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_NO_PEM_EXTENSIONS), "no pem extensions"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED),
|
|
|
|
|
"no private key assigned"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE),
|
|
|
|
|
"no protocols available"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION), "no renegotiation"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_NO_REQUIRED_DIGEST), "no required digest"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER), "no shared cipher"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_GROUPS), "no shared groups"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS),
|
|
|
|
|
"no shared signature algorithms"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_NO_SRTP_PROFILES), "no srtp profiles"},
|
2020-08-27 23:19:27 +08:00
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM),
|
|
|
|
|
"no suitable digest algorithm"},
|
2021-01-14 01:27:10 +08:00
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_GROUPS), "no suitable groups"},
|
2017-06-08 03:12:03 +08:00
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE),
|
|
|
|
|
"no suitable key share"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM),
|
|
|
|
|
"no suitable signature algorithm"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_NO_VALID_SCTS), "no valid scts"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_NO_VERIFY_COOKIE_CALLBACK),
|
|
|
|
|
"no verify cookie callback"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_NULL_SSL_CTX), "null ssl ctx"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_NULL_SSL_METHOD_PASSED),
|
|
|
|
|
"null ssl method passed"},
|
2021-04-30 17:27:19 +08:00
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_OCSP_CALLBACK_FAILURE),
|
|
|
|
|
"ocsp callback failure"},
|
2017-06-08 03:12:03 +08:00
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED),
|
|
|
|
|
"old session cipher not returned"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED),
|
|
|
|
|
"old session compression algorithm not returned"},
|
2017-11-22 01:18:43 +08:00
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_OVERFLOW_ERROR), "overflow error"},
|
2017-06-08 03:12:03 +08:00
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG),
|
|
|
|
|
"packet length too long"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT), "parse tlsext"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_PATH_TOO_LONG), "path too long"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE),
|
|
|
|
|
"peer did not return a certificate"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_PEM_NAME_BAD_PREFIX),
|
|
|
|
|
"pem name bad prefix"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_PEM_NAME_TOO_SHORT), "pem name too short"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE), "pipeline failure"},
|
Add TLSv1.3 post-handshake authentication (PHA)
Add SSL_verify_client_post_handshake() for servers to initiate PHA
Add SSL_force_post_handshake_auth() for clients that don't have certificates
initially configured, but use a certificate callback.
Update SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() mode:
* Add SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE to postpone client authentication until after
the initial handshake.
* Update SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE now only sends out one CertRequest regardless
of when the certificate authentication takes place; either initial handshake,
re-negotiation, or post-handshake authentication.
Add 'RequestPostHandshake' and 'RequirePostHandshake' SSL_CONF options that
add the SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE to the 'Request' and 'Require' options
Add support to s_client:
* Enabled automatically when cert is configured
* Can be forced enabled via -force_pha
Add support to s_server:
* Use 'c' to invoke PHA in s_server
* Remove some dead code
Update documentation
Update unit tests:
* Illegal use of PHA extension
* TLSv1.3 certificate tests
DTLS and TLS behave ever-so-slightly differently. So, when DTLS1.3 is
implemented, it's PHA support state machine may need to be different.
Add a TODO and a #error
Update handshake context to deal with PHA.
The handshake context for TLSv1.3 post-handshake auth is up through the
ClientFinish message, plus the CertificateRequest message. Subsequent
Certificate, CertificateVerify, and Finish messages are based on this
handshake context (not the Certificate message per se, but it's included
after the hash). KeyUpdate, NewSessionTicket, and prior Certificate
Request messages are not included in post-handshake authentication.
After the ClientFinished message is processed, save off the digest state
for future post-handshake authentication. When post-handshake auth occurs,
copy over the saved handshake context into the "main" handshake digest.
This effectively discards the any KeyUpdate or NewSessionTicket messages
and any prior post-handshake authentication.
This, of course, assumes that the ID-22 did not mean to include any
previous post-handshake authentication into the new handshake transcript.
This is implied by section 4.4.1 that lists messages only up to the
first ClientFinished.
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4964)
2017-12-19 05:52:28 +08:00
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH_ENCODING_ERR),
|
|
|
|
|
"post handshake auth encoding err"},
|
2015-12-28 22:13:20 +08:00
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_PRIVATE_KEY_MISMATCH),
|
|
|
|
|
"private key mismatch"},
|
2017-06-08 03:12:03 +08:00
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN),
|
|
|
|
|
"protocol is shutdown"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND),
|
|
|
|
|
"psk identity not found"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB), "psk no client cb"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB), "psk no server cb"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET), "read bio not set"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_READ_TIMEOUT_EXPIRED),
|
|
|
|
|
"read timeout expired"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH),
|
|
|
|
|
"record length mismatch"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL), "record too small"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATE_EXT_TOO_LONG),
|
|
|
|
|
"renegotiate ext too long"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR),
|
|
|
|
|
"renegotiation encoding err"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH),
|
|
|
|
|
"renegotiation mismatch"},
|
Add TLSv1.3 post-handshake authentication (PHA)
Add SSL_verify_client_post_handshake() for servers to initiate PHA
Add SSL_force_post_handshake_auth() for clients that don't have certificates
initially configured, but use a certificate callback.
Update SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() mode:
* Add SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE to postpone client authentication until after
the initial handshake.
* Update SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE now only sends out one CertRequest regardless
of when the certificate authentication takes place; either initial handshake,
re-negotiation, or post-handshake authentication.
Add 'RequestPostHandshake' and 'RequirePostHandshake' SSL_CONF options that
add the SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE to the 'Request' and 'Require' options
Add support to s_client:
* Enabled automatically when cert is configured
* Can be forced enabled via -force_pha
Add support to s_server:
* Use 'c' to invoke PHA in s_server
* Remove some dead code
Update documentation
Update unit tests:
* Illegal use of PHA extension
* TLSv1.3 certificate tests
DTLS and TLS behave ever-so-slightly differently. So, when DTLS1.3 is
implemented, it's PHA support state machine may need to be different.
Add a TODO and a #error
Update handshake context to deal with PHA.
The handshake context for TLSv1.3 post-handshake auth is up through the
ClientFinish message, plus the CertificateRequest message. Subsequent
Certificate, CertificateVerify, and Finish messages are based on this
handshake context (not the Certificate message per se, but it's included
after the hash). KeyUpdate, NewSessionTicket, and prior Certificate
Request messages are not included in post-handshake authentication.
After the ClientFinished message is processed, save off the digest state
for future post-handshake authentication. When post-handshake auth occurs,
copy over the saved handshake context into the "main" handshake digest.
This effectively discards the any KeyUpdate or NewSessionTicket messages
and any prior post-handshake authentication.
This, of course, assumes that the ID-22 did not mean to include any
previous post-handshake authentication into the new handshake transcript.
This is implied by section 4.4.1 that lists messages only up to the
first ClientFinished.
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4964)
2017-12-19 05:52:28 +08:00
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_REQUEST_PENDING), "request pending"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_REQUEST_SENT), "request sent"},
|
2017-06-08 03:12:03 +08:00
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING),
|
|
|
|
|
"required cipher missing"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING),
|
|
|
|
|
"required compression algorithm missing"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING),
|
|
|
|
|
"scsv received when renegotiating"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_SCT_VERIFICATION_FAILED),
|
|
|
|
|
"sct verification failed"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT), "serverhello tlsext"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED),
|
|
|
|
|
"session id context uninitialized"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_SHUTDOWN_WHILE_IN_INIT),
|
|
|
|
|
"shutdown while in init"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR),
|
|
|
|
|
"signature algorithms error"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE),
|
|
|
|
|
"signature for non signing certificate"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC), "error with the srp params"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_SRTP_COULD_NOT_ALLOCATE_PROFILES),
|
|
|
|
|
"srtp could not allocate profiles"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST_TOO_LONG),
|
|
|
|
|
"srtp protection profile list too long"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_SRTP_UNKNOWN_PROTECTION_PROFILE),
|
|
|
|
|
"srtp unknown protection profile"},
|
2017-11-06 00:46:48 +08:00
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH),
|
|
|
|
|
"ssl3 ext invalid max fragment length"},
|
2017-06-08 03:12:03 +08:00
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_SERVERNAME),
|
|
|
|
|
"ssl3 ext invalid servername"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_SERVERNAME_TYPE),
|
|
|
|
|
"ssl3 ext invalid servername type"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG),
|
|
|
|
|
"ssl3 session id too long"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_BAD_CERTIFICATE),
|
|
|
|
|
"sslv3 alert bad certificate"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_BAD_RECORD_MAC),
|
|
|
|
|
"sslv3 alert bad record mac"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED),
|
|
|
|
|
"sslv3 alert certificate expired"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED),
|
|
|
|
|
"sslv3 alert certificate revoked"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN),
|
|
|
|
|
"sslv3 alert certificate unknown"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE),
|
|
|
|
|
"sslv3 alert decompression failure"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE),
|
|
|
|
|
"sslv3 alert handshake failure"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER),
|
|
|
|
|
"sslv3 alert illegal parameter"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_NO_CERTIFICATE),
|
|
|
|
|
"sslv3 alert no certificate"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE),
|
|
|
|
|
"sslv3 alert unexpected message"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE),
|
|
|
|
|
"sslv3 alert unsupported certificate"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_SSL_COMMAND_SECTION_EMPTY),
|
|
|
|
|
"ssl command section empty"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_SSL_COMMAND_SECTION_NOT_FOUND),
|
|
|
|
|
"ssl command section not found"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_SSL_CTX_HAS_NO_DEFAULT_SSL_VERSION),
|
|
|
|
|
"ssl ctx has no default ssl version"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE),
|
|
|
|
|
"ssl handshake failure"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_SSL_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS),
|
|
|
|
|
"ssl library has no ciphers"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_SSL_NEGATIVE_LENGTH),
|
|
|
|
|
"ssl negative length"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_SSL_SECTION_EMPTY), "ssl section empty"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_SSL_SECTION_NOT_FOUND),
|
|
|
|
|
"ssl section not found"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CALLBACK_FAILED),
|
|
|
|
|
"ssl session id callback failed"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONFLICT),
|
|
|
|
|
"ssl session id conflict"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG),
|
|
|
|
|
"ssl session id context too long"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_HAS_BAD_LENGTH),
|
|
|
|
|
"ssl session id has bad length"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG),
|
|
|
|
|
"ssl session id too long"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH),
|
|
|
|
|
"ssl session version mismatch"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_STILL_IN_INIT), "still in init"},
|
2018-07-30 16:13:14 +08:00
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_TLSV13_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED),
|
|
|
|
|
"tlsv13 alert certificate required"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_TLSV13_ALERT_MISSING_EXTENSION),
|
|
|
|
|
"tlsv13 alert missing extension"},
|
2017-06-08 03:12:03 +08:00
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_ACCESS_DENIED),
|
|
|
|
|
"tlsv1 alert access denied"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECODE_ERROR),
|
|
|
|
|
"tlsv1 alert decode error"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPTION_FAILED),
|
|
|
|
|
"tlsv1 alert decryption failed"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPT_ERROR),
|
|
|
|
|
"tlsv1 alert decrypt error"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_EXPORT_RESTRICTION),
|
|
|
|
|
"tlsv1 alert export restriction"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK),
|
|
|
|
|
"tlsv1 alert inappropriate fallback"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY),
|
|
|
|
|
"tlsv1 alert insufficient security"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INTERNAL_ERROR),
|
|
|
|
|
"tlsv1 alert internal error"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_NO_RENEGOTIATION),
|
|
|
|
|
"tlsv1 alert no renegotiation"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_PROTOCOL_VERSION),
|
|
|
|
|
"tlsv1 alert protocol version"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_RECORD_OVERFLOW),
|
|
|
|
|
"tlsv1 alert record overflow"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_UNKNOWN_CA),
|
|
|
|
|
"tlsv1 alert unknown ca"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_USER_CANCELLED),
|
|
|
|
|
"tlsv1 alert user cancelled"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_TLSV1_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE),
|
|
|
|
|
"tlsv1 bad certificate hash value"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_TLSV1_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE),
|
|
|
|
|
"tlsv1 bad certificate status response"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_TLSV1_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE),
|
|
|
|
|
"tlsv1 certificate unobtainable"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_TLSV1_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME),
|
|
|
|
|
"tlsv1 unrecognized name"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_TLSV1_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION),
|
|
|
|
|
"tlsv1 unsupported extension"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL),
|
|
|
|
|
"tls illegal exporter label"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST),
|
|
|
|
|
"tls invalid ecpointformat list"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_KEY_UPDATES),
|
|
|
|
|
"too many key updates"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS),
|
|
|
|
|
"too many warn alerts"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_TOO_MUCH_EARLY_DATA),
|
|
|
|
|
"too much early data"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS),
|
|
|
|
|
"unable to find ecdh parameters"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS),
|
|
|
|
|
"unable to find public key parameters"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_MD5_ROUTINES),
|
|
|
|
|
"unable to load ssl3 md5 routines"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_SHA1_ROUTINES),
|
|
|
|
|
"unable to load ssl3 sha1 routines"},
|
2017-11-08 00:36:51 +08:00
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_CCS_MESSAGE),
|
|
|
|
|
"unexpected ccs message"},
|
2017-06-08 03:12:03 +08:00
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_END_OF_EARLY_DATA),
|
|
|
|
|
"unexpected end of early data"},
|
2020-01-18 01:39:19 +08:00
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_EOF_WHILE_READING),
|
|
|
|
|
"unexpected eof while reading"},
|
2017-06-08 03:12:03 +08:00
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE), "unexpected message"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD), "unexpected record"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED), "uninitialized"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE), "unknown alert type"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE),
|
|
|
|
|
"unknown certificate type"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED),
|
|
|
|
|
"unknown cipher returned"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE),
|
|
|
|
|
"unknown cipher type"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CMD_NAME), "unknown cmd name"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_COMMAND), "unknown command"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST), "unknown digest"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE),
|
|
|
|
|
"unknown key exchange type"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE), "unknown pkey type"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL), "unknown protocol"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_SSL_VERSION),
|
|
|
|
|
"unknown ssl version"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE), "unknown state"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED),
|
|
|
|
|
"unsafe legacy renegotiation disabled"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_UNSOLICITED_EXTENSION),
|
|
|
|
|
"unsolicited extension"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM),
|
|
|
|
|
"unsupported compression algorithm"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE),
|
|
|
|
|
"unsupported elliptic curve"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL),
|
|
|
|
|
"unsupported protocol"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_SSL_VERSION),
|
|
|
|
|
"unsupported ssl version"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE),
|
|
|
|
|
"unsupported status type"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_USE_SRTP_NOT_NEGOTIATED),
|
|
|
|
|
"use srtp not negotiated"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH), "version too high"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW), "version too low"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE),
|
|
|
|
|
"wrong certificate type"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED),
|
|
|
|
|
"wrong cipher returned"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE), "wrong curve"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH),
|
|
|
|
|
"wrong signature length"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE),
|
|
|
|
|
"wrong signature size"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE),
|
|
|
|
|
"wrong signature type"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION), "wrong ssl version"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER),
|
|
|
|
|
"wrong version number"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_X509_LIB), "x509 lib"},
|
|
|
|
|
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_X509_VERIFICATION_SETUP_PROBLEMS),
|
|
|
|
|
"x509 verification setup problems"},
|
2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
|
|
|
{0, NULL}
|
|
|
|
|
};
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
2021-05-25 10:04:22 +08:00
|
|
|
int ossl_err_load_SSL_strings(void)
|
2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2006-11-22 05:29:44 +08:00
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
|
2019-09-05 03:45:56 +08:00
|
|
|
if (ERR_reason_error_string(SSL_str_reasons[0].error) == NULL)
|
2017-06-08 03:12:03 +08:00
|
|
|
ERR_load_strings_const(SSL_str_reasons);
|
2006-11-22 05:29:44 +08:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2016-07-12 21:50:06 +08:00
|
|
|
return 1;
|
2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
