2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
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/*
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2021-01-28 20:54:57 +08:00
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* Copyright 2013-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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2013-07-17 21:36:39 +08:00
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*
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2018-12-06 20:32:50 +08:00
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* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
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2016-05-18 02:52:22 +08:00
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* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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2013-07-17 21:36:39 +08:00
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*/
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2020-02-13 09:00:57 +08:00
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/*
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* Low level key APIs (DH etc) are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
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* internal use.
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*/
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#include "internal/deprecated.h"
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2015-05-14 22:56:48 +08:00
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#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
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2013-07-17 21:36:39 +08:00
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#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
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#include <openssl/pem.h>
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#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include <openssl/cms.h>
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#include <openssl/aes.h>
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2019-09-28 06:45:40 +08:00
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#include "cms_local.h"
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2019-09-28 06:45:33 +08:00
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#include "crypto/asn1.h"
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2013-07-17 21:36:39 +08:00
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/* Key Agreement Recipient Info (KARI) routines */
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int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_alg(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
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2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
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X509_ALGOR **palg,
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ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pukm)
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{
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if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) {
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2020-11-04 19:23:19 +08:00
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMS, CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT);
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2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
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return 0;
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}
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if (palg)
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*palg = ri->d.kari->keyEncryptionAlgorithm;
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if (pukm)
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*pukm = ri->d.kari->ukm;
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return 1;
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}
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2013-07-17 21:36:39 +08:00
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/* Retrieve recipient encrypted keys from a kari */
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2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
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STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey)
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*CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_reks(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
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{
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if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) {
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2020-11-04 19:23:19 +08:00
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMS, CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT);
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2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
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return NULL;
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}
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return ri->d.kari->recipientEncryptedKeys;
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}
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2013-07-17 21:36:39 +08:00
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int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_orig_id(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
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2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
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X509_ALGOR **pubalg,
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ASN1_BIT_STRING **pubkey,
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ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid,
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X509_NAME **issuer,
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ASN1_INTEGER **sno)
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{
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CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey *oik;
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2020-07-25 16:04:55 +08:00
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2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
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if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) {
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2020-11-04 19:23:19 +08:00
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMS, CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT);
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2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
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return 0;
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}
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oik = ri->d.kari->originator;
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if (issuer)
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*issuer = NULL;
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if (sno)
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*sno = NULL;
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if (keyid)
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*keyid = NULL;
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if (pubalg)
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*pubalg = NULL;
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if (pubkey)
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*pubkey = NULL;
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if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_ISSUER_SERIAL) {
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if (issuer)
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*issuer = oik->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->issuer;
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if (sno)
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*sno = oik->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->serialNumber;
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} else if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_KEYIDENTIFIER) {
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if (keyid)
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*keyid = oik->d.subjectKeyIdentifier;
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} else if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_PUBKEY) {
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if (pubalg)
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*pubalg = oik->d.originatorKey->algorithm;
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if (pubkey)
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*pubkey = oik->d.originatorKey->publicKey;
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} else
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return 0;
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return 1;
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}
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2013-07-17 21:36:39 +08:00
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int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_orig_id_cmp(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509 *cert)
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2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
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{
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CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey *oik;
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2020-07-25 16:04:55 +08:00
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2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
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if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) {
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2020-11-04 19:23:19 +08:00
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMS, CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT);
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2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
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return -2;
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}
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oik = ri->d.kari->originator;
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if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_ISSUER_SERIAL)
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2021-02-18 12:03:25 +08:00
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return ossl_cms_ias_cert_cmp(oik->d.issuerAndSerialNumber, cert);
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2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
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else if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_KEYIDENTIFIER)
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2021-02-18 12:03:25 +08:00
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return ossl_cms_keyid_cert_cmp(oik->d.subjectKeyIdentifier, cert);
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2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
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return -1;
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}
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2013-07-17 21:36:39 +08:00
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int CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_get0_id(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek,
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2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
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ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid,
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ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **tm,
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CMS_OtherKeyAttribute **other,
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X509_NAME **issuer, ASN1_INTEGER **sno)
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{
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CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier *rid = rek->rid;
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2020-07-25 16:04:55 +08:00
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2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
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if (rid->type == CMS_REK_ISSUER_SERIAL) {
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if (issuer)
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*issuer = rid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->issuer;
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if (sno)
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*sno = rid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->serialNumber;
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if (keyid)
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*keyid = NULL;
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if (tm)
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*tm = NULL;
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if (other)
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*other = NULL;
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} else if (rid->type == CMS_REK_KEYIDENTIFIER) {
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if (keyid)
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*keyid = rid->d.rKeyId->subjectKeyIdentifier;
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if (tm)
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*tm = rid->d.rKeyId->date;
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if (other)
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*other = rid->d.rKeyId->other;
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if (issuer)
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*issuer = NULL;
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if (sno)
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*sno = NULL;
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} else
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return 0;
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return 1;
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}
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2013-07-17 21:36:39 +08:00
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int CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_cert_cmp(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek,
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2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
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X509 *cert)
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{
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CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier *rid = rek->rid;
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2020-07-25 16:04:55 +08:00
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2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
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if (rid->type == CMS_REK_ISSUER_SERIAL)
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2021-02-18 12:03:25 +08:00
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return ossl_cms_ias_cert_cmp(rid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber, cert);
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2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
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else if (rid->type == CMS_REK_KEYIDENTIFIER)
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2021-02-18 12:03:25 +08:00
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return ossl_cms_keyid_cert_cmp(rid->d.rKeyId->subjectKeyIdentifier,
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cert);
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2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
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else
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return -1;
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}
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2013-07-17 21:36:39 +08:00
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2021-02-18 12:03:25 +08:00
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int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_set0_pkey_and_peer(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
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EVP_PKEY *pk, X509 *peer)
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2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
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{
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EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx;
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CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari = ri->d.kari;
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2015-05-02 02:37:16 +08:00
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EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(kari->pctx);
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kari->pctx = NULL;
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2019-09-17 03:28:57 +08:00
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if (pk == NULL)
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2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
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return 1;
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2020-01-20 23:17:44 +08:00
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2021-02-18 12:03:25 +08:00
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pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(ossl_cms_ctx_get0_libctx(kari->cms_ctx),
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pk,
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ossl_cms_ctx_get0_propq(kari->cms_ctx));
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2019-09-17 03:28:57 +08:00
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if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx) <= 0)
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2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
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goto err;
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2020-01-20 23:17:44 +08:00
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if (peer != NULL) {
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EVP_PKEY *pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer);
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if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pctx, pub_pkey) <= 0)
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goto err;
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}
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2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
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kari->pctx = pctx;
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return 1;
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err:
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2015-03-28 22:54:15 +08:00
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EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
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2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
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return 0;
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}
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2013-07-17 21:36:39 +08:00
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2020-01-20 23:17:44 +08:00
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int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_set0_pkey(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, EVP_PKEY *pk)
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{
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return CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_set0_pkey_and_peer(ri, pk, NULL);
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}
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2013-07-17 21:36:39 +08:00
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX *CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_ctx(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
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2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
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{
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if (ri->type == CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE)
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2015-12-14 05:08:41 +08:00
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return ri->d.kari->ctx;
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2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
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return NULL;
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}
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/*
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* Derive KEK and decrypt/encrypt with it to produce either the original CEK
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* or the encrypted CEK.
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2013-07-17 21:36:39 +08:00
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*/
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2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
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static int cms_kek_cipher(unsigned char **pout, size_t *poutlen,
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const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen,
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CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari, int enc)
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{
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/* Key encryption key */
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unsigned char kek[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
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size_t keklen;
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int rv = 0;
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unsigned char *out = NULL;
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int outlen;
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2020-07-25 16:04:55 +08:00
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Rename all getters to use get/get0 in name
For functions that exist in 1.1.1 provide a simple aliases via #define.
Fixes #15236
Functions with OSSL_DECODER_, OSSL_ENCODER_, OSSL_STORE_LOADER_,
EVP_KEYEXCH_, EVP_KEM_, EVP_ASYM_CIPHER_, EVP_SIGNATURE_,
EVP_KEYMGMT_, EVP_RAND_, EVP_MAC_, EVP_KDF_, EVP_PKEY_,
EVP_MD_, and EVP_CIPHER_ prefixes are renamed.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/15405)
2021-05-21 22:58:08 +08:00
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keklen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(kari->ctx);
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2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
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if (keklen > EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH)
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return 0;
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/* Derive KEK */
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if (EVP_PKEY_derive(kari->pctx, kek, &keklen) <= 0)
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goto err;
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/* Set KEK in context */
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2015-12-14 05:08:41 +08:00
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if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(kari->ctx, NULL, NULL, kek, NULL, enc))
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2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
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goto err;
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/* obtain output length of ciphered key */
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2015-12-14 05:08:41 +08:00
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if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(kari->ctx, NULL, &outlen, in, inlen))
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2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
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goto err;
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out = OPENSSL_malloc(outlen);
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2015-10-30 19:12:26 +08:00
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if (out == NULL)
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2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
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goto err;
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2015-12-14 05:08:41 +08:00
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if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(kari->ctx, out, &outlen, in, inlen))
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2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
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goto err;
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*pout = out;
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*poutlen = (size_t)outlen;
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rv = 1;
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err:
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OPENSSL_cleanse(kek, keklen);
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2015-05-01 22:02:07 +08:00
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if (!rv)
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2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
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OPENSSL_free(out);
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2015-12-14 05:08:41 +08:00
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(kari->ctx);
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/* FIXME: WHY IS kari->pctx freed here? /RL */
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2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
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EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(kari->pctx);
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kari->pctx = NULL;
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return rv;
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}
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int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
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CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
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CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek)
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{
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int rv = 0;
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unsigned char *enckey = NULL, *cek = NULL;
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size_t enckeylen;
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size_t ceklen;
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CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec;
|
2020-04-08 21:41:05 +08:00
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2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
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enckeylen = rek->encryptedKey->length;
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enckey = rek->encryptedKey->data;
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/* Setup all parameters to derive KEK */
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2021-02-18 12:03:25 +08:00
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if (!ossl_cms_env_asn1_ctrl(ri, 1))
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2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
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goto err;
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/* Attempt to decrypt CEK */
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if (!cms_kek_cipher(&cek, &ceklen, enckey, enckeylen, ri->d.kari, 0))
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goto err;
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2021-02-18 12:03:25 +08:00
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ec = ossl_cms_get0_env_enc_content(cms);
|
2015-05-01 05:57:32 +08:00
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OPENSSL_clear_free(ec->key, ec->keylen);
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2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
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ec->key = cek;
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ec->keylen = ceklen;
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cek = NULL;
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rv = 1;
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err:
|
2015-05-01 22:02:07 +08:00
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OPENSSL_free(cek);
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2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
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return rv;
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}
|
2013-07-17 21:36:39 +08:00
|
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/* Create ephemeral key and initialise context based on it */
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|
|
static int cms_kari_create_ephemeral_key(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari,
|
2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY *pk)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
|
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY *ekey = NULL;
|
|
|
|
int rv = 0;
|
2020-07-25 16:04:55 +08:00
|
|
|
const CMS_CTX *ctx = kari->cms_ctx;
|
2021-02-18 12:03:25 +08:00
|
|
|
OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx = ossl_cms_ctx_get0_libctx(ctx);
|
|
|
|
const char *propq = ossl_cms_ctx_get0_propq(ctx);
|
2019-09-17 03:28:57 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2020-12-11 17:19:37 +08:00
|
|
|
pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(libctx, pk, propq);
|
2019-09-17 03:28:57 +08:00
|
|
|
if (pctx == NULL)
|
2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(pctx) <= 0)
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
if (EVP_PKEY_keygen(pctx, &ekey) <= 0)
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
|
2020-12-11 17:19:37 +08:00
|
|
|
pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(libctx, ekey, propq);
|
2019-09-17 03:28:57 +08:00
|
|
|
if (pctx == NULL)
|
2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
if (EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx) <= 0)
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
kari->pctx = pctx;
|
|
|
|
rv = 1;
|
|
|
|
err:
|
2015-03-28 22:54:15 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!rv)
|
2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
|
2015-03-28 22:54:15 +08:00
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(ekey);
|
2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
|
|
|
return rv;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2013-07-17 21:36:39 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2020-01-20 23:17:44 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Set originator private key and initialise context based on it */
|
2020-07-25 16:04:55 +08:00
|
|
|
static int cms_kari_set_originator_private_key(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari,
|
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY *originatorPrivKey )
|
2020-01-20 23:17:44 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
|
|
|
|
int rv = 0;
|
2020-07-25 16:04:55 +08:00
|
|
|
const CMS_CTX *ctx = kari->cms_ctx;
|
2020-01-20 23:17:44 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2021-02-18 12:03:25 +08:00
|
|
|
pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(ossl_cms_ctx_get0_libctx(ctx),
|
2020-12-11 17:19:37 +08:00
|
|
|
originatorPrivKey,
|
2021-02-18 12:03:25 +08:00
|
|
|
ossl_cms_ctx_get0_propq(ctx));
|
2020-01-20 23:17:44 +08:00
|
|
|
if (pctx == NULL)
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
if (EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx) <= 0)
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
kari->pctx = pctx;
|
|
|
|
rv = 1;
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
|
|
if (rv == 0)
|
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
|
|
|
|
return rv;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2019-02-13 14:26:14 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Initialise a kari based on passed certificate and key */
|
2013-07-17 21:36:39 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2021-02-18 12:03:25 +08:00
|
|
|
int ossl_cms_RecipientInfo_kari_init(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509 *recip,
|
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY *recipPubKey, X509 *originator,
|
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY *originatorPrivKey,
|
|
|
|
unsigned int flags, const CMS_CTX *ctx)
|
2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari;
|
|
|
|
CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ri->d.kari = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo);
|
2020-07-25 16:04:55 +08:00
|
|
|
if (ri->d.kari == NULL)
|
2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
ri->type = CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
kari = ri->d.kari;
|
|
|
|
kari->version = 3;
|
2020-07-25 16:04:55 +08:00
|
|
|
kari->cms_ctx = ctx;
|
2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rek = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey);
|
2019-02-13 14:26:14 +08:00
|
|
|
if (rek == NULL)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_push(kari->recipientEncryptedKeys, rek)) {
|
|
|
|
M_ASN1_free_of(rek, CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (flags & CMS_USE_KEYID) {
|
|
|
|
rek->rid->type = CMS_REK_KEYIDENTIFIER;
|
2015-04-10 09:33:44 +08:00
|
|
|
rek->rid->d.rKeyId = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_RecipientKeyIdentifier);
|
|
|
|
if (rek->rid->d.rKeyId == NULL)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2021-02-18 12:03:25 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!ossl_cms_set1_keyid(&rek->rid->d.rKeyId->subjectKeyIdentifier, recip))
|
2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
rek->rid->type = CMS_REK_ISSUER_SERIAL;
|
2021-02-18 12:03:25 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!ossl_cms_set1_ias(&rek->rid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber, recip))
|
2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-01-20 23:17:44 +08:00
|
|
|
if (originatorPrivKey == NULL && originator == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
/* Create ephemeral key */
|
|
|
|
if (!cms_kari_create_ephemeral_key(kari, recipPubKey))
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
2020-04-27 06:05:23 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Use originator key */
|
|
|
|
CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey *oik = ri->d.kari->originator;
|
2020-01-20 23:17:44 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2020-04-27 06:05:23 +08:00
|
|
|
if (originatorPrivKey == NULL || originator == NULL)
|
2020-01-20 23:17:44 +08:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2020-04-27 06:05:23 +08:00
|
|
|
if (flags & CMS_USE_ORIGINATOR_KEYID) {
|
|
|
|
oik->type = CMS_OIK_KEYIDENTIFIER;
|
|
|
|
oik->d.subjectKeyIdentifier = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
|
|
|
|
if (oik->d.subjectKeyIdentifier == NULL)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2021-02-18 12:03:25 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!ossl_cms_set1_keyid(&oik->d.subjectKeyIdentifier, originator))
|
2020-04-27 06:05:23 +08:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
oik->type = CMS_REK_ISSUER_SERIAL;
|
2021-02-18 12:03:25 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!ossl_cms_set1_ias(&oik->d.issuerAndSerialNumber, originator))
|
2020-04-27 06:05:23 +08:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!cms_kari_set_originator_private_key(kari, originatorPrivKey))
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2020-01-20 23:17:44 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY_up_ref(recipPubKey);
|
|
|
|
rek->pkey = recipPubKey;
|
2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2013-07-17 21:36:39 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int cms_wrap_init(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari,
|
2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
|
|
|
const EVP_CIPHER *cipher)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2020-07-25 16:04:55 +08:00
|
|
|
const CMS_CTX *cms_ctx = kari->cms_ctx;
|
2015-12-14 05:08:41 +08:00
|
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = kari->ctx;
|
2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
|
|
|
const EVP_CIPHER *kekcipher;
|
2020-07-25 16:04:55 +08:00
|
|
|
EVP_CIPHER *fetched_kekcipher;
|
|
|
|
const char *kekcipher_name;
|
2020-04-27 05:48:32 +08:00
|
|
|
int keylen;
|
2020-01-20 23:17:44 +08:00
|
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
|
2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
|
|
|
/* If a suitable wrap algorithm is already set nothing to do */
|
Add "origin" field to EVP_CIPHER, EVP_MD
Add a "where did this EVP_{CIPHER,MD} come from" flag: global, via fetch,
or via EVP_{CIPHER,MD}_meth_new. Update EVP_{CIPHER,MD}_free to handle all
three origins. The flag is deliberately right before some function pointers,
so that compile-time failures (int/pointer) will occur, as opposed to
taking a bit in the existing "flags" field. The "global variable" flag
is non-zero, so the default case of using OPENSSL_zalloc (for provider
ciphers), will do the right thing. Ref-counting is a no-op for
Make up_ref no-op for global MD and CIPHER objects
Deprecate EVP_MD_CTX_md(). Added EVP_MD_CTX_get0_md() (same semantics as
the deprecated function) and EVP_MD_CTX_get1_md(). Likewise, deprecate
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher() in favor of EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(), and add
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get1_CIPHER().
Refactor EVP_MD_free() and EVP_MD_meth_free() to call new common
evp_md_free_int() function.
Refactor EVP_CIPHER_free() and EVP_CIPHER_meth_free() to call new common
evp_cipher_free_int() function.
Also change some flags tests to explicit test == or != zero. E.g.,
if (flags & x) --> if ((flags & x) != 0)
if (!(flags & x)) --> if ((flags & x) == 0)
Only done for those lines where "get0_cipher" calls were made.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14193)
2021-02-17 06:51:56 +08:00
|
|
|
kekcipher = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(ctx);
|
2020-01-20 23:17:44 +08:00
|
|
|
if (kekcipher != NULL) {
|
Rename all getters to use get/get0 in name
For functions that exist in 1.1.1 provide a simple aliases via #define.
Fixes #15236
Functions with OSSL_DECODER_, OSSL_ENCODER_, OSSL_STORE_LOADER_,
EVP_KEYEXCH_, EVP_KEM_, EVP_ASYM_CIPHER_, EVP_SIGNATURE_,
EVP_KEYMGMT_, EVP_RAND_, EVP_MAC_, EVP_KDF_, EVP_PKEY_,
EVP_MD_, and EVP_CIPHER_ prefixes are renamed.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/15405)
2021-05-21 22:58:08 +08:00
|
|
|
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_mode(ctx) != EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE)
|
2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2020-04-27 05:48:32 +08:00
|
|
|
if (cipher == NULL)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
Rename all getters to use get/get0 in name
For functions that exist in 1.1.1 provide a simple aliases via #define.
Fixes #15236
Functions with OSSL_DECODER_, OSSL_ENCODER_, OSSL_STORE_LOADER_,
EVP_KEYEXCH_, EVP_KEM_, EVP_ASYM_CIPHER_, EVP_SIGNATURE_,
EVP_KEYMGMT_, EVP_RAND_, EVP_MAC_, EVP_KDF_, EVP_PKEY_,
EVP_MD_, and EVP_CIPHER_ prefixes are renamed.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/15405)
2021-05-21 22:58:08 +08:00
|
|
|
keylen = EVP_CIPHER_get_key_length(cipher);
|
|
|
|
if ((EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_GET_WRAP_CIPHER) != 0) {
|
2020-01-20 23:17:44 +08:00
|
|
|
ret = EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_ctrl(cipher)(NULL, EVP_CTRL_GET_WRAP_CIPHER,
|
|
|
|
0, &kekcipher);
|
|
|
|
if (ret <= 0)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (kekcipher != NULL) {
|
Rename all getters to use get/get0 in name
For functions that exist in 1.1.1 provide a simple aliases via #define.
Fixes #15236
Functions with OSSL_DECODER_, OSSL_ENCODER_, OSSL_STORE_LOADER_,
EVP_KEYEXCH_, EVP_KEM_, EVP_ASYM_CIPHER_, EVP_SIGNATURE_,
EVP_KEYMGMT_, EVP_RAND_, EVP_MAC_, EVP_KDF_, EVP_PKEY_,
EVP_MD_, and EVP_CIPHER_ prefixes are renamed.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/15405)
2021-05-21 22:58:08 +08:00
|
|
|
if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(kekcipher) != EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE)
|
2020-01-20 23:17:44 +08:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
Rename all getters to use get/get0 in name
For functions that exist in 1.1.1 provide a simple aliases via #define.
Fixes #15236
Functions with OSSL_DECODER_, OSSL_ENCODER_, OSSL_STORE_LOADER_,
EVP_KEYEXCH_, EVP_KEM_, EVP_ASYM_CIPHER_, EVP_SIGNATURE_,
EVP_KEYMGMT_, EVP_RAND_, EVP_MAC_, EVP_KDF_, EVP_PKEY_,
EVP_MD_, and EVP_CIPHER_ prefixes are renamed.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/15405)
2021-05-21 22:58:08 +08:00
|
|
|
kekcipher_name = EVP_CIPHER_get0_name(kekcipher);
|
2020-07-25 16:04:55 +08:00
|
|
|
goto enc;
|
2020-01-20 23:17:44 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Pick a cipher based on content encryption cipher. If it is DES3 use
|
|
|
|
* DES3 wrap otherwise use AES wrap similar to key size.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2016-03-18 23:56:06 +08:00
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
|
Rename all getters to use get/get0 in name
For functions that exist in 1.1.1 provide a simple aliases via #define.
Fixes #15236
Functions with OSSL_DECODER_, OSSL_ENCODER_, OSSL_STORE_LOADER_,
EVP_KEYEXCH_, EVP_KEM_, EVP_ASYM_CIPHER_, EVP_SIGNATURE_,
EVP_KEYMGMT_, EVP_RAND_, EVP_MAC_, EVP_KDF_, EVP_PKEY_,
EVP_MD_, and EVP_CIPHER_ prefixes are renamed.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/15405)
2021-05-21 22:58:08 +08:00
|
|
|
if (EVP_CIPHER_get_type(cipher) == NID_des_ede3_cbc)
|
2020-07-25 16:04:55 +08:00
|
|
|
kekcipher_name = SN_id_smime_alg_CMS3DESwrap;
|
2016-03-18 23:56:06 +08:00
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if (keylen <= 16)
|
2020-07-25 16:04:55 +08:00
|
|
|
kekcipher_name = SN_id_aes128_wrap;
|
2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
|
|
|
else if (keylen <= 24)
|
2020-07-25 16:04:55 +08:00
|
|
|
kekcipher_name = SN_id_aes192_wrap;
|
2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
|
|
|
else
|
2020-07-25 16:04:55 +08:00
|
|
|
kekcipher_name = SN_id_aes256_wrap;
|
|
|
|
enc:
|
2021-02-18 12:03:25 +08:00
|
|
|
fetched_kekcipher = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(ossl_cms_ctx_get0_libctx(cms_ctx),
|
2020-12-11 17:19:37 +08:00
|
|
|
kekcipher_name,
|
2021-02-18 12:03:25 +08:00
|
|
|
ossl_cms_ctx_get0_propq(cms_ctx));
|
2020-07-25 16:04:55 +08:00
|
|
|
if (fetched_kekcipher == NULL)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
ret = EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, fetched_kekcipher, NULL, NULL, NULL);
|
|
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_free(fetched_kekcipher);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2013-07-17 21:36:39 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Encrypt content key in key agreement recipient info */
|
|
|
|
|
2021-02-18 12:03:25 +08:00
|
|
|
int ossl_cms_RecipientInfo_kari_encrypt(const CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
|
|
|
|
CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
|
2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari;
|
|
|
|
CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec;
|
|
|
|
CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek;
|
|
|
|
STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey) *reks;
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) {
|
2020-11-04 19:23:19 +08:00
|
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMS, CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT);
|
2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
kari = ri->d.kari;
|
|
|
|
reks = kari->recipientEncryptedKeys;
|
2021-02-18 12:03:25 +08:00
|
|
|
ec = ossl_cms_get0_env_enc_content(cms);
|
2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Initialise wrap algorithm parameters */
|
|
|
|
if (!cms_wrap_init(kari, ec->cipher))
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2016-02-06 04:23:54 +08:00
|
|
|
* If no originator key set up initialise for ephemeral key the public key
|
2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
|
|
|
* ASN1 structure will set the actual public key value.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (kari->originator->type == -1) {
|
|
|
|
CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey *oik = kari->originator;
|
|
|
|
oik->type = CMS_OIK_PUBKEY;
|
|
|
|
oik->d.originatorKey = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_OriginatorPublicKey);
|
|
|
|
if (!oik->d.originatorKey)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Initialise KDF algorithm */
|
2021-02-18 12:03:25 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!ossl_cms_env_asn1_ctrl(ri, 0))
|
2015-01-22 11:40:55 +08:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/* For each rek, derive KEK, encrypt CEK */
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_num(reks); i++) {
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *enckey;
|
|
|
|
size_t enckeylen;
|
|
|
|
rek = sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_value(reks, i);
|
|
|
|
if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(kari->pctx, rek->pkey) <= 0)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
if (!cms_kek_cipher(&enckey, &enckeylen, ec->key, ec->keylen,
|
|
|
|
kari, 1))
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
ASN1_STRING_set0(rek->encryptedKey, enckey, enckeylen);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|