2016-03-17 22:14:30 +08:00
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/*
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* Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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*
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2016-05-18 02:20:24 +08:00
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* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
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* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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2016-03-17 22:14:30 +08:00
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* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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*/
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#include <stdio.h>
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Fix session ticket and SNI
When session tickets are used, it's possible that SNI might swtich the
SSL_CTX on an SSL. Normally, this is not a problem, because the
initial_ctx/session_ctx are used for all session ticket/id processes.
However, when the SNI callback occurs, it's possible that the callback
may update the options in the SSL from the SSL_CTX, and this could
cause SSL_OP_NO_TICKET to be set. If this occurs, then two bad things
can happen:
1. The session ticket TLSEXT may not be written when the ticket expected
flag is set. The state machine transistions to writing the ticket, and
the client responds with an error as its not expecting a ticket.
2. When creating the session ticket, if the ticket key cb returns 0
the crypto/hmac contexts are not initialized, and the code crashes when
trying to encrypt the session ticket.
To fix 1, if the ticket TLSEXT is not written out, clear the expected
ticket flag.
To fix 2, consider a return of 0 from the ticket key cb a recoverable
error, and write a 0 length ticket and continue. The client-side code
can explicitly handle this case.
Fix these two cases, and add unit test code to validate ticket behavior.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1098)
2016-05-13 06:16:52 +08:00
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#include <string.h>
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2016-03-17 22:14:30 +08:00
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#include <openssl/conf.h>
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include <openssl/ssl.h>
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#include "handshake_helper.h"
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#include "ssl_test_ctx.h"
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#include "testutil.h"
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static CONF *conf = NULL;
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/* Currently the section names are of the form test-<number>, e.g. test-15. */
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#define MAX_TESTCASE_NAME_LENGTH 100
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typedef struct ssl_test_ctx_test_fixture {
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const char *test_case_name;
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char test_app[MAX_TESTCASE_NAME_LENGTH];
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} SSL_TEST_FIXTURE;
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static SSL_TEST_FIXTURE set_up(const char *const test_case_name)
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{
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SSL_TEST_FIXTURE fixture;
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fixture.test_case_name = test_case_name;
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return fixture;
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}
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static const char *print_alert(int alert)
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{
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return alert ? SSL_alert_desc_string_long(alert) : "no alert";
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}
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2016-07-05 02:16:14 +08:00
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static int check_result(HANDSHAKE_RESULT *result, SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx)
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2016-03-17 22:14:30 +08:00
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{
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2016-07-05 02:16:14 +08:00
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if (result->result != test_ctx->expected_result) {
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2016-03-17 22:14:30 +08:00
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fprintf(stderr, "ExpectedResult mismatch: expected %s, got %s.\n",
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2016-04-08 01:07:50 +08:00
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ssl_test_result_name(test_ctx->expected_result),
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2016-07-05 02:16:14 +08:00
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ssl_test_result_name(result->result));
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2016-03-17 22:14:30 +08:00
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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2016-07-05 02:16:14 +08:00
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static int check_alerts(HANDSHAKE_RESULT *result, SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx)
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2016-03-17 22:14:30 +08:00
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{
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2016-07-05 02:16:14 +08:00
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if (result->client_alert_sent != result->client_alert_received) {
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2016-03-17 22:14:30 +08:00
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fprintf(stderr, "Client sent alert %s but server received %s\n.",
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2016-07-05 02:16:14 +08:00
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print_alert(result->client_alert_sent),
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print_alert(result->client_alert_received));
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2016-03-17 22:14:30 +08:00
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/*
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* We can't bail here because the peer doesn't always get far enough
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* to process a received alert. Specifically, in protocol version
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* negotiation tests, we have the following scenario.
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* Client supports TLS v1.2 only; Server supports TLS v1.1.
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* Client proposes TLS v1.2; server responds with 1.1;
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* Client now sends a protocol alert, using TLS v1.2 in the header.
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* The server, however, rejects the alert because of version mismatch
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* in the record layer; therefore, the server appears to never
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* receive the alert.
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*/
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/* return 0; */
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}
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2016-07-05 02:16:14 +08:00
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if (result->server_alert_sent != result->server_alert_received) {
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2016-03-17 22:14:30 +08:00
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fprintf(stderr, "Server sent alert %s but client received %s\n.",
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2016-07-05 02:16:14 +08:00
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print_alert(result->server_alert_sent),
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print_alert(result->server_alert_received));
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2016-03-17 22:14:30 +08:00
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/* return 0; */
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}
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/* Tolerate an alert if one wasn't explicitly specified in the test. */
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if (test_ctx->client_alert
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/*
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* The info callback alert value is computed as
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* (s->s3->send_alert[0] << 8) | s->s3->send_alert[1]
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* where the low byte is the alert code and the high byte is other stuff.
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*/
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2016-07-05 02:16:14 +08:00
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&& (result->client_alert_sent & 0xff) != test_ctx->client_alert) {
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2016-03-17 22:14:30 +08:00
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fprintf(stderr, "ClientAlert mismatch: expected %s, got %s.\n",
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print_alert(test_ctx->client_alert),
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2016-07-05 02:16:14 +08:00
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print_alert(result->client_alert_sent));
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2016-03-17 22:14:30 +08:00
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return 0;
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}
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if (test_ctx->server_alert
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2016-07-05 02:16:14 +08:00
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&& (result->server_alert_sent & 0xff) != test_ctx->server_alert) {
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2016-03-17 22:14:30 +08:00
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fprintf(stderr, "ServerAlert mismatch: expected %s, got %s.\n",
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print_alert(test_ctx->server_alert),
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2016-07-05 02:16:14 +08:00
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print_alert(result->server_alert_sent));
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2016-03-17 22:14:30 +08:00
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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2016-07-05 02:16:14 +08:00
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static int check_protocol(HANDSHAKE_RESULT *result, SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx)
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2016-03-17 22:14:30 +08:00
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{
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2016-07-05 02:16:14 +08:00
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if (result->client_protocol != result->server_protocol) {
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2016-03-17 22:14:30 +08:00
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fprintf(stderr, "Client has protocol %s but server has %s\n.",
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2016-07-05 02:16:14 +08:00
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ssl_protocol_name(result->client_protocol),
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ssl_protocol_name(result->server_protocol));
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2016-03-17 22:14:30 +08:00
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return 0;
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}
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if (test_ctx->protocol) {
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2016-07-05 02:16:14 +08:00
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if (result->client_protocol != test_ctx->protocol) {
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2016-03-17 22:14:30 +08:00
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fprintf(stderr, "Protocol mismatch: expected %s, got %s.\n",
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ssl_protocol_name(test_ctx->protocol),
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2016-07-05 02:16:14 +08:00
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ssl_protocol_name(result->client_protocol));
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2016-03-17 22:14:30 +08:00
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return 0;
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}
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}
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return 1;
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}
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2016-07-05 02:16:14 +08:00
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static int check_servername(HANDSHAKE_RESULT *result, SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx)
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Fix session ticket and SNI
When session tickets are used, it's possible that SNI might swtich the
SSL_CTX on an SSL. Normally, this is not a problem, because the
initial_ctx/session_ctx are used for all session ticket/id processes.
However, when the SNI callback occurs, it's possible that the callback
may update the options in the SSL from the SSL_CTX, and this could
cause SSL_OP_NO_TICKET to be set. If this occurs, then two bad things
can happen:
1. The session ticket TLSEXT may not be written when the ticket expected
flag is set. The state machine transistions to writing the ticket, and
the client responds with an error as its not expecting a ticket.
2. When creating the session ticket, if the ticket key cb returns 0
the crypto/hmac contexts are not initialized, and the code crashes when
trying to encrypt the session ticket.
To fix 1, if the ticket TLSEXT is not written out, clear the expected
ticket flag.
To fix 2, consider a return of 0 from the ticket key cb a recoverable
error, and write a 0 length ticket and continue. The client-side code
can explicitly handle this case.
Fix these two cases, and add unit test code to validate ticket behavior.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1098)
2016-05-13 06:16:52 +08:00
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{
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2016-07-05 02:16:14 +08:00
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if (result->servername != test_ctx->expected_servername) {
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2016-06-20 23:20:25 +08:00
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fprintf(stderr, "Client ServerName mismatch, expected %s, got %s\n.",
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ssl_servername_name(test_ctx->expected_servername),
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2016-07-05 02:16:14 +08:00
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ssl_servername_name(result->servername));
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2016-06-20 23:20:25 +08:00
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return 0;
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Fix session ticket and SNI
When session tickets are used, it's possible that SNI might swtich the
SSL_CTX on an SSL. Normally, this is not a problem, because the
initial_ctx/session_ctx are used for all session ticket/id processes.
However, when the SNI callback occurs, it's possible that the callback
may update the options in the SSL from the SSL_CTX, and this could
cause SSL_OP_NO_TICKET to be set. If this occurs, then two bad things
can happen:
1. The session ticket TLSEXT may not be written when the ticket expected
flag is set. The state machine transistions to writing the ticket, and
the client responds with an error as its not expecting a ticket.
2. When creating the session ticket, if the ticket key cb returns 0
the crypto/hmac contexts are not initialized, and the code crashes when
trying to encrypt the session ticket.
To fix 1, if the ticket TLSEXT is not written out, clear the expected
ticket flag.
To fix 2, consider a return of 0 from the ticket key cb a recoverable
error, and write a 0 length ticket and continue. The client-side code
can explicitly handle this case.
Fix these two cases, and add unit test code to validate ticket behavior.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1098)
2016-05-13 06:16:52 +08:00
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}
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2016-06-20 23:20:25 +08:00
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return 1;
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Fix session ticket and SNI
When session tickets are used, it's possible that SNI might swtich the
SSL_CTX on an SSL. Normally, this is not a problem, because the
initial_ctx/session_ctx are used for all session ticket/id processes.
However, when the SNI callback occurs, it's possible that the callback
may update the options in the SSL from the SSL_CTX, and this could
cause SSL_OP_NO_TICKET to be set. If this occurs, then two bad things
can happen:
1. The session ticket TLSEXT may not be written when the ticket expected
flag is set. The state machine transistions to writing the ticket, and
the client responds with an error as its not expecting a ticket.
2. When creating the session ticket, if the ticket key cb returns 0
the crypto/hmac contexts are not initialized, and the code crashes when
trying to encrypt the session ticket.
To fix 1, if the ticket TLSEXT is not written out, clear the expected
ticket flag.
To fix 2, consider a return of 0 from the ticket key cb a recoverable
error, and write a 0 length ticket and continue. The client-side code
can explicitly handle this case.
Fix these two cases, and add unit test code to validate ticket behavior.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1098)
2016-05-13 06:16:52 +08:00
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}
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2016-07-05 02:16:14 +08:00
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static int check_session_ticket(HANDSHAKE_RESULT *result, SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx)
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Fix session ticket and SNI
When session tickets are used, it's possible that SNI might swtich the
SSL_CTX on an SSL. Normally, this is not a problem, because the
initial_ctx/session_ctx are used for all session ticket/id processes.
However, when the SNI callback occurs, it's possible that the callback
may update the options in the SSL from the SSL_CTX, and this could
cause SSL_OP_NO_TICKET to be set. If this occurs, then two bad things
can happen:
1. The session ticket TLSEXT may not be written when the ticket expected
flag is set. The state machine transistions to writing the ticket, and
the client responds with an error as its not expecting a ticket.
2. When creating the session ticket, if the ticket key cb returns 0
the crypto/hmac contexts are not initialized, and the code crashes when
trying to encrypt the session ticket.
To fix 1, if the ticket TLSEXT is not written out, clear the expected
ticket flag.
To fix 2, consider a return of 0 from the ticket key cb a recoverable
error, and write a 0 length ticket and continue. The client-side code
can explicitly handle this case.
Fix these two cases, and add unit test code to validate ticket behavior.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1098)
2016-05-13 06:16:52 +08:00
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{
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if (test_ctx->session_ticket_expected == SSL_TEST_SESSION_TICKET_IGNORE)
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return 1;
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if (test_ctx->session_ticket_expected == SSL_TEST_SESSION_TICKET_BROKEN &&
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2016-07-05 02:16:14 +08:00
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result->session_ticket == SSL_TEST_SESSION_TICKET_NO)
|
Fix session ticket and SNI
When session tickets are used, it's possible that SNI might swtich the
SSL_CTX on an SSL. Normally, this is not a problem, because the
initial_ctx/session_ctx are used for all session ticket/id processes.
However, when the SNI callback occurs, it's possible that the callback
may update the options in the SSL from the SSL_CTX, and this could
cause SSL_OP_NO_TICKET to be set. If this occurs, then two bad things
can happen:
1. The session ticket TLSEXT may not be written when the ticket expected
flag is set. The state machine transistions to writing the ticket, and
the client responds with an error as its not expecting a ticket.
2. When creating the session ticket, if the ticket key cb returns 0
the crypto/hmac contexts are not initialized, and the code crashes when
trying to encrypt the session ticket.
To fix 1, if the ticket TLSEXT is not written out, clear the expected
ticket flag.
To fix 2, consider a return of 0 from the ticket key cb a recoverable
error, and write a 0 length ticket and continue. The client-side code
can explicitly handle this case.
Fix these two cases, and add unit test code to validate ticket behavior.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1098)
2016-05-13 06:16:52 +08:00
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return 1;
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2016-07-05 02:16:14 +08:00
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if (result->session_ticket != test_ctx->session_ticket_expected) {
|
Fix session ticket and SNI
When session tickets are used, it's possible that SNI might swtich the
SSL_CTX on an SSL. Normally, this is not a problem, because the
initial_ctx/session_ctx are used for all session ticket/id processes.
However, when the SNI callback occurs, it's possible that the callback
may update the options in the SSL from the SSL_CTX, and this could
cause SSL_OP_NO_TICKET to be set. If this occurs, then two bad things
can happen:
1. The session ticket TLSEXT may not be written when the ticket expected
flag is set. The state machine transistions to writing the ticket, and
the client responds with an error as its not expecting a ticket.
2. When creating the session ticket, if the ticket key cb returns 0
the crypto/hmac contexts are not initialized, and the code crashes when
trying to encrypt the session ticket.
To fix 1, if the ticket TLSEXT is not written out, clear the expected
ticket flag.
To fix 2, consider a return of 0 from the ticket key cb a recoverable
error, and write a 0 length ticket and continue. The client-side code
can explicitly handle this case.
Fix these two cases, and add unit test code to validate ticket behavior.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1098)
2016-05-13 06:16:52 +08:00
|
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fprintf(stderr, "Client SessionTicketExpected mismatch, expected %s, got %s\n.",
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2016-06-10 06:39:22 +08:00
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ssl_session_ticket_name(test_ctx->session_ticket_expected),
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2016-07-05 02:16:14 +08:00
|
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ssl_session_ticket_name(result->session_ticket));
|
Fix session ticket and SNI
When session tickets are used, it's possible that SNI might swtich the
SSL_CTX on an SSL. Normally, this is not a problem, because the
initial_ctx/session_ctx are used for all session ticket/id processes.
However, when the SNI callback occurs, it's possible that the callback
may update the options in the SSL from the SSL_CTX, and this could
cause SSL_OP_NO_TICKET to be set. If this occurs, then two bad things
can happen:
1. The session ticket TLSEXT may not be written when the ticket expected
flag is set. The state machine transistions to writing the ticket, and
the client responds with an error as its not expecting a ticket.
2. When creating the session ticket, if the ticket key cb returns 0
the crypto/hmac contexts are not initialized, and the code crashes when
trying to encrypt the session ticket.
To fix 1, if the ticket TLSEXT is not written out, clear the expected
ticket flag.
To fix 2, consider a return of 0 from the ticket key cb a recoverable
error, and write a 0 length ticket and continue. The client-side code
can explicitly handle this case.
Fix these two cases, and add unit test code to validate ticket behavior.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1098)
2016-05-13 06:16:52 +08:00
|
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return 0;
|
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}
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return 1;
|
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}
|
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|
2016-07-05 02:16:14 +08:00
|
|
|
static int check_npn(HANDSHAKE_RESULT *result, SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx)
|
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{
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int ret = 1;
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ret &= strings_equal("NPN Negotiated (client vs server)",
|
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result->client_npn_negotiated,
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result->server_npn_negotiated);
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ret &= strings_equal("ExpectedNPNProtocol",
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test_ctx->expected_npn_protocol,
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result->client_npn_negotiated);
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return ret;
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}
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static int check_alpn(HANDSHAKE_RESULT *result, SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx)
|
|
|
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{
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int ret = 1;
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ret &= strings_equal("ALPN Negotiated (client vs server)",
|
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result->client_alpn_negotiated,
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result->server_alpn_negotiated);
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ret &= strings_equal("ExpectedALPNProtocol",
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test_ctx->expected_alpn_protocol,
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result->client_alpn_negotiated);
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return ret;
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}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-07-06 01:06:23 +08:00
|
|
|
static int check_resumption(HANDSHAKE_RESULT *result, SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx)
|
|
|
|
{
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|
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|
if (result->client_resumed != result->server_resumed) {
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|
|
fprintf(stderr, "Resumption mismatch (client vs server): %d vs %d\n",
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|
|
|
result->client_resumed, result->server_resumed);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (result->client_resumed != test_ctx->resumption_expected) {
|
|
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "ResumptionExpected mismatch: %d vs %d\n",
|
|
|
|
test_ctx->resumption_expected, result->client_resumed);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-03-17 22:14:30 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* This could be further simplified by constructing an expected
|
|
|
|
* HANDSHAKE_RESULT, and implementing comparison methods for
|
|
|
|
* its fields.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2016-07-05 02:16:14 +08:00
|
|
|
static int check_test(HANDSHAKE_RESULT *result, SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx)
|
2016-03-17 22:14:30 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int ret = 1;
|
|
|
|
ret &= check_result(result, test_ctx);
|
|
|
|
ret &= check_alerts(result, test_ctx);
|
2016-07-05 02:16:14 +08:00
|
|
|
if (result->result == SSL_TEST_SUCCESS) {
|
2016-03-17 22:14:30 +08:00
|
|
|
ret &= check_protocol(result, test_ctx);
|
Fix session ticket and SNI
When session tickets are used, it's possible that SNI might swtich the
SSL_CTX on an SSL. Normally, this is not a problem, because the
initial_ctx/session_ctx are used for all session ticket/id processes.
However, when the SNI callback occurs, it's possible that the callback
may update the options in the SSL from the SSL_CTX, and this could
cause SSL_OP_NO_TICKET to be set. If this occurs, then two bad things
can happen:
1. The session ticket TLSEXT may not be written when the ticket expected
flag is set. The state machine transistions to writing the ticket, and
the client responds with an error as its not expecting a ticket.
2. When creating the session ticket, if the ticket key cb returns 0
the crypto/hmac contexts are not initialized, and the code crashes when
trying to encrypt the session ticket.
To fix 1, if the ticket TLSEXT is not written out, clear the expected
ticket flag.
To fix 2, consider a return of 0 from the ticket key cb a recoverable
error, and write a 0 length ticket and continue. The client-side code
can explicitly handle this case.
Fix these two cases, and add unit test code to validate ticket behavior.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1098)
2016-05-13 06:16:52 +08:00
|
|
|
ret &= check_servername(result, test_ctx);
|
2016-06-10 06:39:22 +08:00
|
|
|
ret &= check_session_ticket(result, test_ctx);
|
2016-07-05 02:16:14 +08:00
|
|
|
ret &= (result->session_ticket_do_not_call == 0);
|
|
|
|
ret &= check_npn(result, test_ctx);
|
|
|
|
ret &= check_alpn(result, test_ctx);
|
2016-07-06 01:06:23 +08:00
|
|
|
ret &= check_resumption(result, test_ctx);
|
Fix session ticket and SNI
When session tickets are used, it's possible that SNI might swtich the
SSL_CTX on an SSL. Normally, this is not a problem, because the
initial_ctx/session_ctx are used for all session ticket/id processes.
However, when the SNI callback occurs, it's possible that the callback
may update the options in the SSL from the SSL_CTX, and this could
cause SSL_OP_NO_TICKET to be set. If this occurs, then two bad things
can happen:
1. The session ticket TLSEXT may not be written when the ticket expected
flag is set. The state machine transistions to writing the ticket, and
the client responds with an error as its not expecting a ticket.
2. When creating the session ticket, if the ticket key cb returns 0
the crypto/hmac contexts are not initialized, and the code crashes when
trying to encrypt the session ticket.
To fix 1, if the ticket TLSEXT is not written out, clear the expected
ticket flag.
To fix 2, consider a return of 0 from the ticket key cb a recoverable
error, and write a 0 length ticket and continue. The client-side code
can explicitly handle this case.
Fix these two cases, and add unit test code to validate ticket behavior.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1098)
2016-05-13 06:16:52 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2016-03-17 22:14:30 +08:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int execute_test(SSL_TEST_FIXTURE fixture)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2016-04-05 20:29:06 +08:00
|
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
2016-07-06 01:06:23 +08:00
|
|
|
SSL_CTX *server_ctx = NULL, *server2_ctx = NULL, *client_ctx = NULL,
|
2016-07-21 20:04:00 +08:00
|
|
|
*resume_server_ctx = NULL, *resume_client_ctx = NULL;
|
2016-03-17 22:14:30 +08:00
|
|
|
SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx = NULL;
|
2016-07-05 02:16:14 +08:00
|
|
|
HANDSHAKE_RESULT *result = NULL;
|
2016-03-17 22:14:30 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2016-06-03 23:49:04 +08:00
|
|
|
test_ctx = SSL_TEST_CTX_create(conf, fixture.test_app);
|
|
|
|
if (test_ctx == NULL)
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS
|
|
|
|
if (test_ctx->method == SSL_TEST_METHOD_DTLS) {
|
|
|
|
server_ctx = SSL_CTX_new(DTLS_server_method());
|
2016-06-20 23:20:25 +08:00
|
|
|
if (test_ctx->servername_callback != SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_CB_NONE) {
|
|
|
|
server2_ctx = SSL_CTX_new(DTLS_server_method());
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_assert(server2_ctx != NULL);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-06-03 23:49:04 +08:00
|
|
|
client_ctx = SSL_CTX_new(DTLS_client_method());
|
2016-07-06 01:06:23 +08:00
|
|
|
if (test_ctx->handshake_mode == SSL_TEST_HANDSHAKE_RESUME) {
|
|
|
|
resume_server_ctx = SSL_CTX_new(DTLS_server_method());
|
2016-07-21 20:04:00 +08:00
|
|
|
resume_client_ctx = SSL_CTX_new(DTLS_client_method());
|
2016-07-06 01:06:23 +08:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_assert(resume_server_ctx != NULL);
|
2016-07-21 20:04:00 +08:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_assert(resume_client_ctx != NULL);
|
2016-07-06 01:06:23 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2016-06-03 23:49:04 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if (test_ctx->method == SSL_TEST_METHOD_TLS) {
|
|
|
|
server_ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_server_method());
|
2016-06-20 23:20:25 +08:00
|
|
|
if (test_ctx->servername_callback != SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_CB_NONE) {
|
|
|
|
server2_ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_server_method());
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_assert(server2_ctx != NULL);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-06-03 23:49:04 +08:00
|
|
|
client_ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_client_method());
|
2016-07-06 01:06:23 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (test_ctx->handshake_mode == SSL_TEST_HANDSHAKE_RESUME) {
|
|
|
|
resume_server_ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_server_method());
|
2016-07-21 20:04:00 +08:00
|
|
|
resume_client_ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_client_method());
|
2016-07-06 01:06:23 +08:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_assert(resume_server_ctx != NULL);
|
2016-07-21 20:04:00 +08:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_assert(resume_client_ctx != NULL);
|
2016-07-06 01:06:23 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2016-06-03 23:49:04 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-07-21 20:04:00 +08:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_assert(server_ctx != NULL);
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_assert(client_ctx != NULL);
|
2016-03-17 22:14:30 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_assert(CONF_modules_load(conf, fixture.test_app, 0) > 0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!SSL_CTX_config(server_ctx, "server")
|
Fix session ticket and SNI
When session tickets are used, it's possible that SNI might swtich the
SSL_CTX on an SSL. Normally, this is not a problem, because the
initial_ctx/session_ctx are used for all session ticket/id processes.
However, when the SNI callback occurs, it's possible that the callback
may update the options in the SSL from the SSL_CTX, and this could
cause SSL_OP_NO_TICKET to be set. If this occurs, then two bad things
can happen:
1. The session ticket TLSEXT may not be written when the ticket expected
flag is set. The state machine transistions to writing the ticket, and
the client responds with an error as its not expecting a ticket.
2. When creating the session ticket, if the ticket key cb returns 0
the crypto/hmac contexts are not initialized, and the code crashes when
trying to encrypt the session ticket.
To fix 1, if the ticket TLSEXT is not written out, clear the expected
ticket flag.
To fix 2, consider a return of 0 from the ticket key cb a recoverable
error, and write a 0 length ticket and continue. The client-side code
can explicitly handle this case.
Fix these two cases, and add unit test code to validate ticket behavior.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1098)
2016-05-13 06:16:52 +08:00
|
|
|
|| !SSL_CTX_config(client_ctx, "client")) {
|
2016-03-17 22:14:30 +08:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-06-20 23:20:25 +08:00
|
|
|
if (server2_ctx != NULL && !SSL_CTX_config(server2_ctx, "server2"))
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
2016-07-06 01:06:23 +08:00
|
|
|
if (resume_server_ctx != NULL
|
|
|
|
&& !SSL_CTX_config(resume_server_ctx, "resume-server"))
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
2016-07-21 20:04:00 +08:00
|
|
|
if (resume_client_ctx != NULL
|
|
|
|
&& !SSL_CTX_config(resume_client_ctx, "resume-client"))
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
2016-06-20 23:20:25 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2016-07-06 01:06:23 +08:00
|
|
|
result = do_handshake(server_ctx, server2_ctx, client_ctx,
|
2016-07-21 20:04:00 +08:00
|
|
|
resume_server_ctx, resume_client_ctx, test_ctx);
|
2016-03-17 22:14:30 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2016-04-05 20:29:06 +08:00
|
|
|
ret = check_test(result, test_ctx);
|
2016-03-17 22:14:30 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
|
|
CONF_modules_unload(0);
|
|
|
|
SSL_CTX_free(server_ctx);
|
Fix session ticket and SNI
When session tickets are used, it's possible that SNI might swtich the
SSL_CTX on an SSL. Normally, this is not a problem, because the
initial_ctx/session_ctx are used for all session ticket/id processes.
However, when the SNI callback occurs, it's possible that the callback
may update the options in the SSL from the SSL_CTX, and this could
cause SSL_OP_NO_TICKET to be set. If this occurs, then two bad things
can happen:
1. The session ticket TLSEXT may not be written when the ticket expected
flag is set. The state machine transistions to writing the ticket, and
the client responds with an error as its not expecting a ticket.
2. When creating the session ticket, if the ticket key cb returns 0
the crypto/hmac contexts are not initialized, and the code crashes when
trying to encrypt the session ticket.
To fix 1, if the ticket TLSEXT is not written out, clear the expected
ticket flag.
To fix 2, consider a return of 0 from the ticket key cb a recoverable
error, and write a 0 length ticket and continue. The client-side code
can explicitly handle this case.
Fix these two cases, and add unit test code to validate ticket behavior.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1098)
2016-05-13 06:16:52 +08:00
|
|
|
SSL_CTX_free(server2_ctx);
|
2016-03-17 22:14:30 +08:00
|
|
|
SSL_CTX_free(client_ctx);
|
2016-07-06 01:06:23 +08:00
|
|
|
SSL_CTX_free(resume_server_ctx);
|
2016-07-21 20:04:00 +08:00
|
|
|
SSL_CTX_free(resume_client_ctx);
|
2016-03-17 22:14:30 +08:00
|
|
|
SSL_TEST_CTX_free(test_ctx);
|
2016-04-05 20:29:06 +08:00
|
|
|
if (ret != 1)
|
2016-03-17 22:14:30 +08:00
|
|
|
ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
|
2016-07-05 02:16:14 +08:00
|
|
|
HANDSHAKE_RESULT_free(result);
|
2016-03-17 22:14:30 +08:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void tear_down(SSL_TEST_FIXTURE fixture)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define SETUP_SSL_TEST_FIXTURE() \
|
|
|
|
SETUP_TEST_FIXTURE(SSL_TEST_FIXTURE, set_up)
|
|
|
|
#define EXECUTE_SSL_TEST() \
|
|
|
|
EXECUTE_TEST(execute_test, tear_down)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int test_handshake(int idx)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SETUP_SSL_TEST_FIXTURE();
|
2016-04-07 19:03:29 +08:00
|
|
|
BIO_snprintf(fixture.test_app, sizeof(fixture.test_app),
|
|
|
|
"test-%d", idx);
|
2016-03-17 22:14:30 +08:00
|
|
|
EXECUTE_SSL_TEST();
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int main(int argc, char **argv)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int result = 0;
|
|
|
|
long num_tests;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (argc != 2)
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
conf = NCONF_new(NULL);
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_assert(conf != NULL);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* argv[1] should point to the test conf file */
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_assert(NCONF_load(conf, argv[1], NULL) > 0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_assert(NCONF_get_number_e(conf, NULL, "num_tests", &num_tests));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_handshake, (int)(num_tests));
|
|
|
|
result = run_tests(argv[0]);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return result;
|
|
|
|
}
|