openssl/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_decrypt.pod

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=pod
=head1 NAME
EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init, EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init_ex,
EVP_PKEY_decrypt - decrypt using a public key algorithm
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=head1 SYNOPSIS
#include <openssl/evp.h>
int EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx);
int EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init_ex(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[]);
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int EVP_PKEY_decrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen);
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=head1 DESCRIPTION
The EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init() function initializes a public key algorithm
context using key I<pkey> for a decryption operation.
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The EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init_ex() function initializes a public key algorithm
context using key I<pkey> for a decryption operation and sets the
algorithm specific I<params>.
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The EVP_PKEY_decrypt() function performs a public key decryption operation
using I<ctx>. The data to be decrypted is specified using the I<in> and
I<inlen> parameters. If I<out> is NULL then the minimum required size of
the output buffer is written to the I<*outlen> parameter.
If I<out> is not NULL then before the call the I<*outlen> parameter must
contain the length of the I<out> buffer. If the call is successful the
decrypted data is written to I<out> and the amount of the decrypted data
written to I<*outlen>, otherwise an error is returned.
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=head1 NOTES
After the call to EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init() algorithm specific control
operations can be performed to set any appropriate parameters for the
operation. These operations can be included in the EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init_ex()
call.
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The function EVP_PKEY_decrypt() can be called more than once on the same
context if several operations are performed using the same parameters.
=head1 RETURN VALUES
EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(), EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init_ex() and EVP_PKEY_decrypt()
return 1 for success and 0 or a negative value for failure. In particular a
return value of -2 indicates the operation is not supported by the public key
algorithm.
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rsa: add implicit rejection in PKCS#1 v1.5 The RSA decryption as implemented before required very careful handling of both the exit code returned by OpenSSL and the potentially returned ciphertext. Looking at the recent security vulnerabilities (CVE-2020-25659 and CVE-2020-25657) it is unlikely that most users of OpenSSL do it correctly. Given that correct code requires side channel secure programming in application code, we can classify the existing RSA decryption methods as CWE-676, which in turn likely causes CWE-208 and CWE-385 in application code. To prevent that, we can use a technique called "implicit rejection". For that we generate a random message to be returned in case the padding check fails. We generate the message based on static secret data (the private exponent) and the provided ciphertext (so that the attacker cannot determine that the returned value is randomly generated instead of result of decryption and de-padding). We return it in case any part of padding check fails. The upshot of this approach is that then not only is the length of the returned message useless as the Bleichenbacher oracle, so are the actual bytes of the returned message. So application code doesn't have to perform any operations on the returned message in side-channel free way to remain secure against Bleichenbacher attacks. Note: this patch implements a specific algorithm, shared with Mozilla NSS, so that the attacker cannot use one library as an oracle against the other in heterogeneous environments. Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13817)
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=head1 WARNINGS
In OpenSSL versions before 3.2.0, when used in PKCS#1 v1.5 padding,
rsa: add implicit rejection in PKCS#1 v1.5 The RSA decryption as implemented before required very careful handling of both the exit code returned by OpenSSL and the potentially returned ciphertext. Looking at the recent security vulnerabilities (CVE-2020-25659 and CVE-2020-25657) it is unlikely that most users of OpenSSL do it correctly. Given that correct code requires side channel secure programming in application code, we can classify the existing RSA decryption methods as CWE-676, which in turn likely causes CWE-208 and CWE-385 in application code. To prevent that, we can use a technique called "implicit rejection". For that we generate a random message to be returned in case the padding check fails. We generate the message based on static secret data (the private exponent) and the provided ciphertext (so that the attacker cannot determine that the returned value is randomly generated instead of result of decryption and de-padding). We return it in case any part of padding check fails. The upshot of this approach is that then not only is the length of the returned message useless as the Bleichenbacher oracle, so are the actual bytes of the returned message. So application code doesn't have to perform any operations on the returned message in side-channel free way to remain secure against Bleichenbacher attacks. Note: this patch implements a specific algorithm, shared with Mozilla NSS, so that the attacker cannot use one library as an oracle against the other in heterogeneous environments. Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13817)
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both the return value from the EVP_PKEY_decrypt() and the B<outlen> provided
information useful in mounting a Bleichenbacher attack against the
used private key. They had to processed in a side-channel free way.
Since version 3.2.0, the EVP_PKEY_decrypt() method when used with PKCS#1
rsa: add implicit rejection in PKCS#1 v1.5 The RSA decryption as implemented before required very careful handling of both the exit code returned by OpenSSL and the potentially returned ciphertext. Looking at the recent security vulnerabilities (CVE-2020-25659 and CVE-2020-25657) it is unlikely that most users of OpenSSL do it correctly. Given that correct code requires side channel secure programming in application code, we can classify the existing RSA decryption methods as CWE-676, which in turn likely causes CWE-208 and CWE-385 in application code. To prevent that, we can use a technique called "implicit rejection". For that we generate a random message to be returned in case the padding check fails. We generate the message based on static secret data (the private exponent) and the provided ciphertext (so that the attacker cannot determine that the returned value is randomly generated instead of result of decryption and de-padding). We return it in case any part of padding check fails. The upshot of this approach is that then not only is the length of the returned message useless as the Bleichenbacher oracle, so are the actual bytes of the returned message. So application code doesn't have to perform any operations on the returned message in side-channel free way to remain secure against Bleichenbacher attacks. Note: this patch implements a specific algorithm, shared with Mozilla NSS, so that the attacker cannot use one library as an oracle against the other in heterogeneous environments. Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13817)
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v1.5 padding doesn't return an error in case it detects an error in padding,
instead it returns a pseudo-randomly generated message, removing the need
of side-channel secure code from applications using OpenSSL.
=head1 EXAMPLES
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Decrypt data using OAEP (for RSA keys):
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx;
ENGINE *eng;
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unsigned char *out, *in;
size_t outlen, inlen;
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EVP_PKEY *key;
/*
* NB: assumes key, eng, in, inlen are already set up
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* and that key is an RSA private key
*/
ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(key, eng);
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if (!ctx)
/* Error occurred */
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if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(ctx) <= 0)
/* Error */
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) <= 0)
/* Error */
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/* Determine buffer length */
if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(ctx, NULL, &outlen, in, inlen) <= 0)
/* Error */
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out = OPENSSL_malloc(outlen);
if (!out)
/* malloc failure */
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if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(ctx, out, &outlen, in, inlen) <= 0)
/* Error */
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/* Decrypted data is outlen bytes written to buffer out */
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=head1 SEE ALSO
L<EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(3)>,
L<EVP_PKEY_encrypt(3)>,
L<EVP_PKEY_sign(3)>,
L<EVP_PKEY_verify(3)>,
L<EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(3)>,
L<EVP_PKEY_derive(3)>
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=head1 HISTORY
These functions were added in OpenSSL 1.0.0.
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=head1 COPYRIGHT
Copyright 2006-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
=cut