2019-01-04 16:41:21 +08:00
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/*
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* Copyright 2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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* Copyright (c) 2019, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
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*
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* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
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* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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*/
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/*
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* Refer to https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-56c/rev-1/final
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* Section 4.1.
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*
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* The Single Step KDF algorithm is given by:
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*
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* Result(0) = empty bit string (i.e., the null string).
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* For i = 1 to reps, do the following:
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* Increment counter by 1.
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* Result(i) = Result(i – 1) || H(counter || Z || FixedInfo).
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* DKM = LeftmostBits(Result(reps), L))
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*
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* NOTES:
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* Z is a shared secret required to produce the derived key material.
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* counter is a 4 byte buffer.
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* FixedInfo is a bit string containing context specific data.
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* DKM is the output derived key material.
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* L is the required size of the DKM.
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* reps = [L / H_outputBits]
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* H(x) is the auxiliary function that can be either a hash, HMAC or KMAC.
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* H_outputBits is the length of the output of the auxiliary function H(x).
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*
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* Currently there is not a comprehensive list of test vectors for this
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* algorithm, especially for H(x) = HMAC and H(x) = KMAC.
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* Test vectors for H(x) = Hash are indirectly used by CAVS KAS tests.
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*/
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <stdarg.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <openssl/hmac.h>
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
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#include <openssl/kdf.h>
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#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
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#include "internal/evp_int.h"
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#include "kdf_local.h"
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struct evp_kdf_impl_st {
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const EVP_MAC *mac; /* H(x) = HMAC_hash OR H(x) = KMAC */
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const EVP_MD *md; /* H(x) = hash OR when H(x) = HMAC_hash */
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unsigned char *secret;
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size_t secret_len;
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unsigned char *info;
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size_t info_len;
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unsigned char *salt;
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size_t salt_len;
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size_t out_len; /* optional KMAC parameter */
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};
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#define SSKDF_MAX_INLEN (1<<30)
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#define SSKDF_KMAC128_DEFAULT_SALT_SIZE (168 - 4)
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#define SSKDF_KMAC256_DEFAULT_SALT_SIZE (136 - 4)
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/* KMAC uses a Customisation string of 'KDF' */
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static const unsigned char kmac_custom_str[] = { 0x4B, 0x44, 0x46 };
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/*
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* Refer to https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-56c/rev-1/final
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* Section 4. One-Step Key Derivation using H(x) = hash(x)
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*/
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static int SSKDF_hash_kdm(const EVP_MD *kdf_md,
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const unsigned char *z, size_t z_len,
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const unsigned char *info, size_t info_len,
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unsigned char *derived_key, size_t derived_key_len)
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{
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int ret = 0, hlen;
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size_t counter, out_len, len = derived_key_len;
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unsigned char c[4];
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unsigned char mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
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unsigned char *out = derived_key;
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EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL, *ctx_init = NULL;
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if (z_len > SSKDF_MAX_INLEN || info_len > SSKDF_MAX_INLEN
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|| derived_key_len > SSKDF_MAX_INLEN
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|| derived_key_len == 0)
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return 0;
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hlen = EVP_MD_size(kdf_md);
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if (hlen <= 0)
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return 0;
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out_len = (size_t)hlen;
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ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
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ctx_init = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
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if (ctx == NULL || ctx_init == NULL)
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goto end;
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if (!EVP_DigestInit(ctx_init, kdf_md))
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goto end;
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for (counter = 1;; counter++) {
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c[0] = (unsigned char)((counter >> 24) & 0xff);
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c[1] = (unsigned char)((counter >> 16) & 0xff);
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c[2] = (unsigned char)((counter >> 8) & 0xff);
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c[3] = (unsigned char)(counter & 0xff);
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if (!(EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(ctx, ctx_init)
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&& EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, c, sizeof(c))
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&& EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, z, z_len)
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&& EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, info, info_len)))
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goto end;
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if (len >= out_len) {
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if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, out, NULL))
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goto end;
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out += out_len;
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len -= out_len;
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if (len == 0)
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break;
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} else {
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if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, mac, NULL))
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goto end;
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memcpy(out, mac, len);
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break;
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}
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}
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ret = 1;
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end:
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EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ctx);
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EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ctx_init);
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OPENSSL_cleanse(mac, sizeof(mac));
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return ret;
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}
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static int kmac_init(EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *custom,
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size_t custom_len, size_t kmac_out_len,
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size_t derived_key_len, unsigned char **out)
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{
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/* Only KMAC has custom data - so return if not KMAC */
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if (custom == NULL)
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return 1;
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2019-03-26 20:11:12 +08:00
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if (EVP_MAC_ctrl(ctx, EVP_MAC_CTRL_SET_CUSTOM, custom, custom_len) <= 0)
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2019-01-04 16:41:21 +08:00
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return 0;
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/* By default only do one iteration if kmac_out_len is not specified */
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if (kmac_out_len == 0)
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kmac_out_len = derived_key_len;
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/* otherwise check the size is valid */
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else if (!(kmac_out_len == derived_key_len
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|| kmac_out_len == 20
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|| kmac_out_len == 28
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|| kmac_out_len == 32
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|| kmac_out_len == 48
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|| kmac_out_len == 64))
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return 0;
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2019-03-26 20:11:12 +08:00
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if (EVP_MAC_ctrl(ctx, EVP_MAC_CTRL_SET_SIZE, kmac_out_len) <= 0)
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2019-01-04 16:41:21 +08:00
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return 0;
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/*
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* For kmac the output buffer can be larger than EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE: so
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* alloc a buffer for this case.
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*/
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if (kmac_out_len > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE) {
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*out = OPENSSL_zalloc(kmac_out_len);
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if (*out == NULL)
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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/*
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* Refer to https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-56c/rev-1/final
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* Section 4. One-Step Key Derivation using MAC: i.e either
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* H(x) = HMAC-hash(salt, x) OR
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* H(x) = KMAC#(salt, x, outbits, CustomString='KDF')
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*/
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static int SSKDF_mac_kdm(const EVP_MAC *kdf_mac, const EVP_MD *hmac_md,
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const unsigned char *kmac_custom,
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size_t kmac_custom_len, size_t kmac_out_len,
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const unsigned char *salt, size_t salt_len,
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const unsigned char *z, size_t z_len,
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const unsigned char *info, size_t info_len,
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unsigned char *derived_key, size_t derived_key_len)
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{
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int ret = 0;
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size_t counter, out_len, len;
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unsigned char c[4];
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unsigned char mac_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
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unsigned char *out = derived_key;
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EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx = NULL, *ctx_init = NULL;
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unsigned char *mac = mac_buf, *kmac_buffer = NULL;
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if (z_len > SSKDF_MAX_INLEN || info_len > SSKDF_MAX_INLEN
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|| derived_key_len > SSKDF_MAX_INLEN
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|| derived_key_len == 0)
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return 0;
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ctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_new(kdf_mac);
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ctx_init = EVP_MAC_CTX_new(kdf_mac);
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if (ctx == NULL || ctx_init == NULL)
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goto end;
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if (hmac_md != NULL &&
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2019-03-26 20:11:12 +08:00
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EVP_MAC_ctrl(ctx_init, EVP_MAC_CTRL_SET_MD, hmac_md) <= 0)
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2019-01-04 16:41:21 +08:00
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goto end;
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2019-03-26 20:11:12 +08:00
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if (EVP_MAC_ctrl(ctx_init, EVP_MAC_CTRL_SET_KEY, salt, salt_len) <= 0)
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2019-01-04 16:41:21 +08:00
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goto end;
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if (!kmac_init(ctx_init, kmac_custom, kmac_custom_len, kmac_out_len,
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derived_key_len, &kmac_buffer))
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goto end;
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if (kmac_buffer != NULL)
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mac = kmac_buffer;
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if (!EVP_MAC_init(ctx_init))
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goto end;
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out_len = EVP_MAC_size(ctx_init); /* output size */
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if (out_len <= 0)
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goto end;
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len = derived_key_len;
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for (counter = 1;; counter++) {
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c[0] = (unsigned char)((counter >> 24) & 0xff);
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c[1] = (unsigned char)((counter >> 16) & 0xff);
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c[2] = (unsigned char)((counter >> 8) & 0xff);
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c[3] = (unsigned char)(counter & 0xff);
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if (!(EVP_MAC_CTX_copy(ctx, ctx_init)
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&& EVP_MAC_update(ctx, c, sizeof(c))
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&& EVP_MAC_update(ctx, z, z_len)
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&& EVP_MAC_update(ctx, info, info_len)))
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goto end;
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if (len >= out_len) {
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if (!EVP_MAC_final(ctx, out, NULL))
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goto end;
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out += out_len;
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len -= out_len;
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if (len == 0)
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break;
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} else {
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if (!EVP_MAC_final(ctx, mac, NULL))
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goto end;
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memcpy(out, mac, len);
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break;
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}
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}
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ret = 1;
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end:
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2019-03-24 17:11:42 +08:00
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if (kmac_buffer != NULL)
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OPENSSL_clear_free(kmac_buffer, kmac_out_len);
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else
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OPENSSL_cleanse(mac_buf, sizeof(mac_buf));
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2019-01-04 16:41:21 +08:00
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EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx);
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EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx_init);
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return ret;
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}
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static EVP_KDF_IMPL *sskdf_new(void)
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{
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EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl;
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if ((impl = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*impl))) == NULL)
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KDFerr(KDF_F_SSKDF_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return impl;
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}
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static void sskdf_reset(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
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{
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OPENSSL_clear_free(impl->secret, impl->secret_len);
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OPENSSL_clear_free(impl->info, impl->info_len);
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OPENSSL_clear_free(impl->salt, impl->salt_len);
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memset(impl, 0, sizeof(*impl));
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}
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static void sskdf_free(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
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{
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sskdf_reset(impl);
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OPENSSL_free(impl);
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}
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static int sskdf_set_buffer(va_list args, unsigned char **out, size_t *out_len)
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{
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const unsigned char *p;
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size_t len;
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p = va_arg(args, const unsigned char *);
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len = va_arg(args, size_t);
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if (len == 0 || p == NULL)
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return 1;
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OPENSSL_free(*out);
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*out = OPENSSL_memdup(p, len);
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if (*out == NULL)
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return 0;
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*out_len = len;
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return 1;
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}
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static int sskdf_ctrl(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, int cmd, va_list args)
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{
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const EVP_MD *md;
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const EVP_MAC *mac;
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|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (cmd) {
|
|
|
|
|
case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY:
|
|
|
|
|
return sskdf_set_buffer(args, &impl->secret, &impl->secret_len);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSKDF_INFO:
|
|
|
|
|
return sskdf_set_buffer(args, &impl->info, &impl->info_len);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD:
|
|
|
|
|
md = va_arg(args, const EVP_MD *);
|
|
|
|
|
if (md == NULL)
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
impl->md = md;
|
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MAC:
|
|
|
|
|
mac = va_arg(args, const EVP_MAC *);
|
|
|
|
|
if (mac == NULL)
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
impl->mac = mac;
|
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT:
|
|
|
|
|
return sskdf_set_buffer(args, &impl->salt, &impl->salt_len);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MAC_SIZE:
|
|
|
|
|
impl->out_len = va_arg(args, size_t);
|
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
|
return -2;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Pass a mac to a ctrl */
|
|
|
|
|
static int sskdf_mac2ctrl(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl,
|
|
|
|
|
int (*ctrl)(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, int cmd, va_list args),
|
|
|
|
|
int cmd, const char *mac_name)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
const EVP_MAC *mac;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (mac_name == NULL || (mac = EVP_get_macbyname(mac_name)) == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
|
KDFerr(KDF_F_SSKDF_MAC2CTRL, KDF_R_INVALID_MAC_TYPE);
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
return call_ctrl(ctrl, impl, cmd, mac);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int sskdf_ctrl_str(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, const char *type,
|
|
|
|
|
const char *value)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
if (strcmp(type, "secret") == 0 || strcmp(type, "key") == 0)
|
|
|
|
|
return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, sskdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY,
|
|
|
|
|
value);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (strcmp(type, "hexsecret") == 0 || strcmp(type, "hexkey") == 0)
|
|
|
|
|
return kdf_hex2ctrl(impl, sskdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY,
|
|
|
|
|
value);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (strcmp(type, "info") == 0)
|
|
|
|
|
return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, sskdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSKDF_INFO,
|
|
|
|
|
value);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (strcmp(type, "hexinfo") == 0)
|
|
|
|
|
return kdf_hex2ctrl(impl, sskdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSKDF_INFO,
|
|
|
|
|
value);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (strcmp(type, "digest") == 0)
|
|
|
|
|
return kdf_md2ctrl(impl, sskdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD, value);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (strcmp(type, "mac") == 0)
|
|
|
|
|
return sskdf_mac2ctrl(impl, sskdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MAC, value);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (strcmp(type, "salt") == 0)
|
|
|
|
|
return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, sskdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT, value);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (strcmp(type, "hexsalt") == 0)
|
|
|
|
|
return kdf_hex2ctrl(impl, sskdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT, value);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (strcmp(type, "maclen") == 0) {
|
|
|
|
|
int val = atoi(value);
|
|
|
|
|
if (val < 0) {
|
|
|
|
|
KDFerr(KDF_F_SSKDF_CTRL_STR, KDF_R_VALUE_ERROR);
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
return call_ctrl(sskdf_ctrl, impl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MAC_SIZE,
|
|
|
|
|
(size_t)val);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
return -2;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static size_t sskdf_size(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
int len;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (impl->md == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
|
KDFerr(KDF_F_SSKDF_SIZE, KDF_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
len = EVP_MD_size(impl->md);
|
|
|
|
|
return (len <= 0) ? 0 : (size_t)len;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int sskdf_derive(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
if (impl->secret == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
|
KDFerr(KDF_F_SSKDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_SECRET);
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (impl->mac != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
|
/* H(x) = KMAC or H(x) = HMAC */
|
|
|
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
|
const unsigned char *custom = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
size_t custom_len = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
int nid;
|
|
|
|
|
int default_salt_len;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
nid = EVP_MAC_nid(impl->mac);
|
|
|
|
|
if (nid == EVP_MAC_HMAC) {
|
|
|
|
|
/* H(x) = HMAC(x, salt, hash) */
|
|
|
|
|
if (impl->md == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
|
KDFerr(KDF_F_SSKDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
default_salt_len = EVP_MD_block_size(impl->md);
|
|
|
|
|
if (default_salt_len <= 0)
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
} else if (nid == EVP_MAC_KMAC128 || nid == EVP_MAC_KMAC256) {
|
|
|
|
|
/* H(x) = KMACzzz(x, salt, custom) */
|
|
|
|
|
custom = kmac_custom_str;
|
|
|
|
|
custom_len = sizeof(kmac_custom_str);
|
|
|
|
|
if (nid == EVP_MAC_KMAC128)
|
|
|
|
|
default_salt_len = SSKDF_KMAC128_DEFAULT_SALT_SIZE;
|
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
|
default_salt_len = SSKDF_KMAC256_DEFAULT_SALT_SIZE;
|
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
|
KDFerr(KDF_F_SSKDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_UNSUPPORTED_MAC_TYPE);
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
/* If no salt is set then use a default_salt of zeros */
|
|
|
|
|
if (impl->salt == NULL || impl->salt_len <= 0) {
|
|
|
|
|
impl->salt = OPENSSL_zalloc(default_salt_len);
|
|
|
|
|
if (impl->salt == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
|
KDFerr(KDF_F_SSKDF_DERIVE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
impl->salt_len = default_salt_len;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
ret = SSKDF_mac_kdm(impl->mac, impl->md,
|
|
|
|
|
custom, custom_len, impl->out_len,
|
|
|
|
|
impl->salt, impl->salt_len,
|
|
|
|
|
impl->secret, impl->secret_len,
|
|
|
|
|
impl->info, impl->info_len, key, keylen);
|
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
|
/* H(x) = hash */
|
|
|
|
|
if (impl->md == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
|
KDFerr(KDF_F_SSKDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
return SSKDF_hash_kdm(impl->md, impl->secret, impl->secret_len,
|
|
|
|
|
impl->info, impl->info_len, key, keylen);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2019-04-22 15:18:56 +08:00
|
|
|
|
const EVP_KDF ss_kdf_meth = {
|
2019-01-04 16:41:21 +08:00
|
|
|
|
EVP_KDF_SS,
|
|
|
|
|
sskdf_new,
|
|
|
|
|
sskdf_free,
|
|
|
|
|
sskdf_reset,
|
|
|
|
|
sskdf_ctrl,
|
|
|
|
|
sskdf_ctrl_str,
|
|
|
|
|
sskdf_size,
|
|
|
|
|
sskdf_derive
|
|
|
|
|
};
|