openssl/providers/common/securitycheck.c

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/*
* Copyright 2020-2024 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include "internal/deprecated.h"
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#include <openssl/dsa.h>
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include <openssl/ec.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/proverr.h>
#include <openssl/core_names.h>
#include <openssl/obj_mac.h>
#include "prov/securitycheck.h"
#define OSSL_FIPS_MIN_SECURITY_STRENGTH_BITS 112
int ossl_rsa_key_op_get_protect(const RSA *rsa, int operation, int *outprotect)
{
int protect = 0;
switch (operation) {
case EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN:
case EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGNMSG:
protect = 1;
/* fallthrough */
case EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY:
case EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFYMSG:
break;
case EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCAPSULATE:
case EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT:
protect = 1;
/* fallthrough */
case EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFYRECOVER:
case EVP_PKEY_OP_DECAPSULATE:
case EVP_PKEY_OP_DECRYPT:
if (RSA_test_flags(rsa,
RSA_FLAG_TYPE_MASK) == RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSASSAPSS) {
ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV,
PROV_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE,
"operation: %d", operation);
return 0;
}
break;
default:
ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR,
"invalid operation: %d", operation);
return 0;
}
*outprotect = protect;
return 1;
}
/*
* FIPS requires a minimum security strength of 112 bits (for encryption or
* signing), and for legacy purposes 80 bits (for decryption or verifying).
* Set protect = 1 for encryption or signing operations, or 0 otherwise. See
* https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-131Ar2.pdf.
*/
int ossl_rsa_check_key_size(const RSA *rsa, int protect)
{
int sz = RSA_bits(rsa);
if (protect ? (sz < 2048) : (sz < 1024))
return 0;
return 1;
}
/*
* FIPS requires a minimum security strength of 112 bits for key-derivation key.
* https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-131Ar2.pdf.
*/
int ossl_kdf_check_key_size(size_t keylen)
{
return (keylen * 8) >= OSSL_FIPS_MIN_SECURITY_STRENGTH_BITS;
}
int ossl_mac_check_key_size(size_t keylen)
{
return ossl_kdf_check_key_size(keylen);
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
int ossl_ec_check_curve_allowed(const EC_GROUP *group)
{
const char *curve_name;
int nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group);
/* Explicit curves are not FIPS approved */
if (nid == NID_undef)
return 0;
/* Only NIST curves are FIPS approved */
curve_name = EC_curve_nid2nist(nid);
if (curve_name == NULL)
return 0;
return 1;
}
/*
* In FIPS mode:
* protect should be 1 for any operations that need 112 bits of security
* strength (such as signing, and key exchange), or 0 for operations that allow
* a lower security strength (such as verify).
*
* For ECDH key agreement refer to SP800-56A
* https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-56Ar3.pdf
* "Appendix D"
*
* For ECDSA signatures refer to
* https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-131Ar2.pdf
* "Table 2"
*/
int ossl_ec_check_security_strength(const EC_GROUP *group, int protect)
{
/*
* For EC the security strength is the (order_bits / 2)
* e.g. P-224 is 112 bits.
*/
int strength = EC_GROUP_order_bits(group) / 2;
/* The min security strength allowed for legacy verification is 80 bits */
if (strength < 80)
return 0;
/*
* For signing or key agreement only allow curves with at least 112 bits of
* security strength
*/
if (protect && strength < OSSL_FIPS_MIN_SECURITY_STRENGTH_BITS)
return 0;
return 1;
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
/*
* Check for valid key sizes if fips mode. Refer to
* https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-131Ar2.pdf
* "Table 2"
*/
int ossl_dsa_check_key(const DSA *dsa, int sign)
{
size_t L, N;
const BIGNUM *p, *q;
if (dsa == NULL)
return 0;
p = DSA_get0_p(dsa);
q = DSA_get0_q(dsa);
if (p == NULL || q == NULL)
return 0;
L = BN_num_bits(p);
N = BN_num_bits(q);
/*
* For Digital signature verification DSA keys with < 112 bits of
* security strength, are still allowed for legacy
* use. The bounds given in SP 800-131Ar2 - Table 2 are
* (512 <= L < 2048 or 160 <= N < 224).
*
* We are a little stricter and insist that both minimums are met.
* For example a L = 256, N = 160 key *would* be allowed by SP 800-131Ar2
* but we don't.
*/
if (!sign) {
if (L < 512 || N < 160)
return 0;
if (L < 2048 || N < 224)
return 1;
}
/* Valid sizes for both sign and verify */
if (L == 2048 && (N == 224 || N == 256)) /* 112 bits */
return 1;
return (L == 3072 && N == 256); /* 128 bits */
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
/*
* For DH key agreement refer to SP800-56A
* https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-56Ar3.pdf
* "Section 5.5.1.1FFC Domain Parameter Selection/Generation" and
* "Appendix D" FFC Safe-prime Groups
*/
int ossl_dh_check_key(const DH *dh)
{
size_t L, N;
const BIGNUM *p, *q;
if (dh == NULL)
return 0;
p = DH_get0_p(dh);
q = DH_get0_q(dh);
if (p == NULL || q == NULL)
return 0;
L = BN_num_bits(p);
if (L < 2048)
return 0;
/* If it is a safe prime group then it is ok */
if (DH_get_nid(dh))
return 1;
/* If not then it must be FFC, which only allows certain sizes. */
N = BN_num_bits(q);
return (L == 2048 && (N == 224 || N == 256));
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */