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openldap/servers/slapd/acl.c

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/* acl.c - routines to parse and check acl's */
/* $OpenLDAP$ */
/*
* Copyright 1998-2000 The OpenLDAP Foundation, All Rights Reserved.
* COPYING RESTRICTIONS APPLY, see COPYRIGHT file
*/
#include "portable.h"
#include <stdio.h>
#include <ac/regex.h>
#include <ac/socket.h>
#include <ac/string.h>
#include "slap.h"
static AccessControl * acl_get(
AccessControl *ac, int *count,
Backend *be, Operation *op,
Entry *e,
AttributeDescription *desc,
int nmatches, regmatch_t *matches );
static slap_control_t acl_mask(
AccessControl *ac, slap_access_mask_t *mask,
Backend *be, Connection *conn, Operation *op,
Entry *e,
AttributeDescription *desc,
struct berval *val,
regmatch_t *matches );
#ifdef SLAPD_ACI_ENABLED
static int aci_mask(
Backend *be,
Operation *op,
Entry *e,
AttributeDescription *desc,
struct berval *val,
struct berval *aci,
regmatch_t *matches,
slap_access_t *grant,
slap_access_t *deny );
#endif
static int regex_matches(
char *pat, char *str, char *buf, regmatch_t *matches);
static void string_expand(
char *newbuf, int bufsiz, char *pattern,
char *match, regmatch_t *matches);
/*
* access_allowed - check whether op->o_ndn is allowed the requested access
* to entry e, attribute attr, value val. if val is null, access to
* the whole attribute is assumed (all values).
*
* This routine loops through all access controls and calls
* acl_mask() on each applicable access control.
* The loop exits when a definitive answer is reached or
* or no more controls remain.
*
* returns:
* 0 access denied
* 1 access granted
*/
int
access_allowed(
Backend *be,
Connection *conn,
Operation *op,
Entry *e,
AttributeDescription *desc,
struct berval *val,
slap_access_t access )
{
int count;
AccessControl *a;
#ifdef LDAP_DEBUG
char accessmaskbuf[ACCESSMASK_MAXLEN];
#endif
slap_access_mask_t mask;
slap_control_t control;
const char *attr = desc ? desc->ad_cname->bv_val : NULL;
regmatch_t matches[MAXREMATCHES];
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
"=> access_allowed: %s access to \"%s\" \"%s\" requested\n",
access2str( access ),
e->e_dn, attr );
assert( be != NULL );
assert( e != NULL );
assert( attr != NULL );
assert( access > ACL_NONE );
/* grant database root access */
if ( be != NULL && be_isroot( be, op->o_ndn ) ) {
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
"<= root access granted\n",
0, 0, 0 );
return 1;
}
/*
* no-user-modification operational attributes are ignored
* by ACL_WRITE checking as any found here are not provided
* by the user
*/
if ( access >= ACL_WRITE && is_at_no_user_mod( desc->ad_type ) )
{
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "NoUserMod Operational attribute:"
" %s access granted\n",
attr, 0, 0 );
return 1;
}
/* use backend default access if no backend acls */
if( be != NULL && be->be_acl == NULL ) {
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
"=> access_allowed: backend default %s access %s to \"%s\"\n",
access2str( access ),
be->be_dfltaccess >= access ? "granted" : "denied", op->o_dn );
return be->be_dfltaccess >= access;
#ifdef notdef
/* be is always non-NULL */
/* use global default access if no global acls */
} else if ( be == NULL && global_acl == NULL ) {
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
"=> access_allowed: global default %s access %s to \"%s\"\n",
access2str( access ),
global_default_access >= access ? "granted" : "denied", op->o_dn );
return global_default_access >= access;
#endif
}
ACL_INIT(mask);
memset(matches, 0, sizeof(matches));
control = ACL_BREAK;
a = NULL;
count = 0;
while( a = acl_get( a, &count, be, op, e, desc, MAXREMATCHES, matches ) )
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < MAXREMATCHES && matches[i].rm_so > 0; i++) {
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "=> match[%d]: %d %d ", i,
(int)matches[i].rm_so, (int)matches[i].rm_eo );
if( matches[i].rm_so <= matches[0].rm_eo ) {
int n;
for ( n = matches[i].rm_so; n < matches[i].rm_eo; n++) {
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "%c", e->e_ndn[n], 0, 0 );
}
}
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ARGS, "\n", 0, 0, 0 );
}
control = acl_mask( a, &mask, be, conn, op,
e, desc, val, matches );
if ( control != ACL_BREAK ) {
break;
}
memset(matches, 0, sizeof(matches));
}
if ( ACL_IS_INVALID( mask ) ) {
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
"=> access_allowed: \"%s\" (%s) invalid!\n",
e->e_dn, attr, 0 );
ACL_INIT( mask );
} else if ( control == ACL_BREAK ) {
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
"=> access_allowed: no more rules\n", 0, 0, 0);
ACL_INIT( mask );
}
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
"=> access_allowed: %s access %s by %s\n",
access2str( access ),
ACL_GRANT(mask, access) ? "granted" : "denied",
accessmask2str( mask, accessmaskbuf ) );
return ACL_GRANT(mask, access);
}
/*
* acl_get - return the acl applicable to entry e, attribute
* attr. the acl returned is suitable for use in subsequent calls to
* acl_access_allowed().
*/
static AccessControl *
acl_get(
AccessControl *a,
int *count,
Backend *be,
Operation *op,
Entry *e,
AttributeDescription *desc,
int nmatch,
regmatch_t *matches )
{
const char *attr;
assert( e != NULL );
assert( count != NULL );
attr = desc ? desc->ad_cname->bv_val : NULL;
if( a == NULL ) {
if( be == NULL ) {
a = global_acl;
} else {
a = be->be_acl;
}
assert( a != NULL );
} else {
a = a->acl_next;
}
for ( ; a != NULL; a = a->acl_next ) {
(*count) ++;
if (a->acl_dn_pat != NULL) {
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "=> dnpat: [%d] %s nsub: %d\n",
*count, a->acl_dn_pat, (int) a->acl_dn_re.re_nsub );
if (regexec(&a->acl_dn_re, e->e_ndn, nmatch, matches, 0)) {
continue;
} else {
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "=> acl_get: [%d] matched\n",
*count, 0, 0);
}
}
if ( a->acl_filter != NULL ) {
ber_int_t rc = test_filter( NULL, NULL, NULL, e, a->acl_filter );
if ( rc != LDAP_COMPARE_TRUE ) {
continue;
}
}
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "=> acl_get: [%d] check attr %s\n",
*count, attr, 0);
if ( attr == NULL || a->acl_attrs == NULL ||
ad_inlist( desc, a->acl_attrs ) )
{
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
"<= acl_get: [%d] acl %s attr: %s\n",
*count, e->e_dn, attr );
return a;
}
matches[0].rm_so = matches[0].rm_eo = -1;
}
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= acl_get: done.\n", 0, 0, 0 );
return( NULL );
}
/*
* acl_mask - modifies mask based upon the given acl and the
* requested access to entry e, attribute attr, value val. if val
* is null, access to the whole attribute is assumed (all values).
*
* returns 0 access NOT allowed
* 1 access allowed
*/
static slap_control_t
acl_mask(
AccessControl *a,
slap_access_mask_t *mask,
Backend *be,
Connection *conn,
Operation *op,
Entry *e,
AttributeDescription *desc,
struct berval *val,
regmatch_t *matches
)
{
int i;
Access *b;
#ifdef LDAP_DEBUG
char accessmaskbuf[ACCESSMASK_MAXLEN];
#endif
const char *attr = desc ? desc->ad_cname->bv_val : NULL;
assert( a != NULL );
assert( mask != NULL );
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
"=> acl_mask: access to entry \"%s\", attr \"%s\" requested\n",
e->e_dn, attr, 0 );
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
"=> acl_mask: to value \"%s\" by \"%s\", (%s) \n",
val ? val->bv_val : "*",
op->o_ndn ? op->o_ndn : "",
accessmask2str( *mask, accessmaskbuf ) );
for ( i = 1, b = a->acl_access; b != NULL; b = b->a_next, i++ ) {
slap_access_mask_t oldmask, modmask;
ACL_INVALIDATE( modmask );
/* AND <who> clauses */
if ( b->a_dn_pat != NULL ) {
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= check a_dn_pat: %s\n",
b->a_dn_pat, 0, 0);
/*
* if access applies to the entry itself, and the
* user is bound as somebody in the same namespace as
* the entry, OR the given dn matches the dn pattern
*/
if ( strcmp( b->a_dn_pat, "anonymous" ) == 0 ) {
if (op->o_ndn != NULL && op->o_ndn[0] != '\0' ) {
continue;
}
} else if ( strcmp( b->a_dn_pat, "users" ) == 0 ) {
if (op->o_ndn == NULL || op->o_ndn[0] == '\0' ) {
continue;
}
} else if ( strcmp( b->a_dn_pat, "self" ) == 0 ) {
if( op->o_ndn == NULL || op->o_ndn[0] == '\0' ) {
continue;
}
if ( e->e_dn == NULL || strcmp( e->e_ndn, op->o_ndn ) != 0 ) {
continue;
}
} else if ( strcmp( b->a_dn_pat, "*" ) != 0 ) {
int ret = regex_matches( b->a_dn_pat,
op->o_ndn, e->e_ndn, matches );
if( ret == 0 ) {
continue;
}
}
}
if ( b->a_sockurl_pat != NULL ) {
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= check a_sockurl_pat: %s\n",
b->a_sockurl_pat, 0, 0 );
if ( strcmp( b->a_sockurl_pat, "*" ) != 0 &&
!regex_matches( b->a_sockurl_pat, conn->c_listener_url,
e->e_ndn, matches ) )
{
continue;
}
}
if ( b->a_domain_pat != NULL ) {
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= check a_domain_pat: %s\n",
b->a_domain_pat, 0, 0 );
if ( strcmp( b->a_domain_pat, "*" ) != 0 &&
!regex_matches( b->a_domain_pat, conn->c_peer_domain,
e->e_ndn, matches ) )
{
continue;
}
}
if ( b->a_peername_pat != NULL ) {
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= check a_peername_path: %s\n",
b->a_peername_pat, 0, 0 );
if ( strcmp( b->a_peername_pat, "*" ) != 0 &&
!regex_matches( b->a_peername_pat, conn->c_peer_name,
e->e_ndn, matches ) )
{
continue;
}
}
if ( b->a_sockname_pat != NULL ) {
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= check a_sockname_path: %s\n",
b->a_sockname_pat, 0, 0 );
if ( strcmp( b->a_sockname_pat, "*" ) != 0 &&
!regex_matches( b->a_sockname_pat, conn->c_sock_name,
e->e_ndn, matches ) )
{
continue;
}
}
if ( b->a_dn_at != NULL && op->o_ndn != NULL ) {
Attribute *at;
struct berval bv;
int match;
const char *text;
const char *desc = b->a_dn_at->ad_cname->bv_val;
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= check a_dn_at: %s\n",
desc, 0, 0);
bv.bv_val = op->o_ndn;
bv.bv_len = strlen( bv.bv_val );
/* see if asker is listed in dnattr */
for( at = attrs_find( e->e_attrs, b->a_dn_at );
at == NULL;
at = attrs_find( e->e_attrs->a_next, b->a_dn_at ) )
{
if( value_find( b->a_dn_at, at->a_vals, &bv ) == 0 ) {
/* found it */
match = 1;
break;
}
}
if( match ) {
if ( b->a_dn_self && (val == NULL
|| value_match( &match, b->a_dn_at,
b->a_dn_at->ad_type->sat_equality, val, &bv, &text ) )
!= LDAP_SUCCESS
|| match )
{
continue;
}
} else if ( ! b->a_dn_self || val == NULL
|| value_match( &match, b->a_dn_at,
b->a_dn_at->ad_type->sat_equality, val, &bv, &text )
!= LDAP_SUCCESS
|| match )
{
continue;
}
}
if ( b->a_group_pat != NULL && op->o_ndn != NULL ) {
char buf[1024];
/* b->a_group is an unexpanded entry name, expanded it should be an
* entry with objectclass group* and we test to see if odn is one of
* the values in the attribute group
*/
/* see if asker is listed in dnattr */
string_expand(buf, sizeof(buf), b->a_group_pat, e->e_ndn, matches);
if ( dn_normalize(buf) == NULL ) {
/* did not expand to a valid dn */
continue;
}
if (backend_group(be, e, buf, op->o_ndn,
b->a_group_oc, b->a_group_at) != 0)
{
continue;
}
}
#ifdef SLAPD_ACI_ENABLED
if ( b->a_aci_at != NULL ) {
Attribute *at;
slap_access_t grant, deny, tgrant, tdeny;
/* this case works different from the others above.
* since aci's themselves give permissions, we need
* to first check b->a_mask, the ACL's access level.
*/
if( op->o_ndn == NULL || op->o_ndn[0] == '\0' ) {
continue;
}
if ( e->e_dn == NULL ) {
continue;
}
/* first check if the right being requested
* is allowed by the ACL clause.
*/
if ( ! ACL_GRANT( b->a_mask, *mask ) ) {
continue;
}
/* get the aci attribute */
at = attr_find( e->e_attrs, b->a_aci_at );
if ( at == NULL ) {
continue;
}
/* start out with nothing granted, nothing denied */
ACL_INIT(tgrant);
ACL_INIT(tdeny);
/* the aci is an multi-valued attribute. The
* rights are determined by OR'ing the individual
* rights given by the acis.
*/
for ( i = 0; at->a_vals[i] != NULL; i++ ) {
if (aci_mask( be, op,
e, desc, val, at->a_vals[i],
matches, &grant, &deny ) != 0)
{
tgrant |= grant;
tdeny |= deny;
}
}
/* remove anything that the ACL clause does not allow */
tgrant &= b->a_mask & ACL_PRIV_MASK;
tdeny &= ACL_PRIV_MASK;
/* see if we have anything to contribute */
if( ACL_IS_INVALID(tgrant) && ACL_IS_INVALID(tdeny) ) {
continue;
}
/* this could be improved by changing acl_mask so that it can deal with
* by clauses that return grant/deny pairs. Right now, it does either
* additive or subtractive rights, but not both at the same time. So,
* we need to combine the grant/deny pair into a single rights mask in
* a smart way: if either grant or deny is "empty", then we use the
* opposite as is, otherwise we remove any denied rights from the grant
* rights mask and construct an additive mask.
*/
if (ACL_IS_INVALID(tdeny)) {
modmask = tgrant | ACL_PRIV_ADDITIVE;
} else if (ACL_IS_INVALID(tgrant)) {
modmask = tdeny | ACL_PRIV_SUBSTRACTIVE;
} else {
modmask = (tgrant & ~tdeny) | ACL_PRIV_ADDITIVE;
}
} else
#endif
{
modmask = b->a_mask;
}
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
"<= acl_mask: [%d] applying %s (%s)\n",
i, accessmask2str( modmask, accessmaskbuf ),
b->a_type == ACL_CONTINUE
? "continue"
: b->a_type == ACL_BREAK
? "break"
: "stop" );
/* save old mask */
oldmask = *mask;
if( ACL_IS_ADDITIVE(modmask) ) {
/* add privs */
ACL_PRIV_SET( *mask, modmask );
/* cleanup */
ACL_PRIV_CLR( *mask, ~ACL_PRIV_MASK );
} else if( ACL_IS_SUBTRACTIVE(modmask) ) {
/* substract privs */
ACL_PRIV_CLR( *mask, modmask );
/* cleanup */
ACL_PRIV_CLR( *mask, ~ACL_PRIV_MASK );
} else {
/* assign privs */
*mask = modmask;
}
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
"<= acl_mask: [%d] mask: %s\n",
i, accessmask2str(*mask, accessmaskbuf), 0 );
if( b->a_type == ACL_CONTINUE ) {
continue;
} else if ( b->a_type == ACL_BREAK ) {
return ACL_BREAK;
} else {
return ACL_STOP;
}
}
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
"<= acl_mask: no more <who> clauses, returning %s (stop)\n",
accessmask2str(*mask, accessmaskbuf), 0, 0 );
return ACL_STOP;
}
/*
* acl_check_modlist - check access control on the given entry to see if
* it allows the given modifications by the user associated with op.
* returns 1 if mods allowed ok
* 0 mods not allowed
*/
int
acl_check_modlist(
Backend *be,
Connection *conn,
Operation *op,
Entry *e,
Modifications *mlist
)
{
int i;
assert( be != NULL );
/* short circuit root database access */
if ( be_isroot( be, op->o_ndn ) ) {
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
"<= acl_access_allowed: granted to database root\n",
0, 0, 0 );
return 1;
}
/* use backend default access if no backend acls */
if( be != NULL && be->be_acl == NULL ) {
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
"=> access_allowed: backend default %s access %s to \"%s\"\n",
access2str( ACL_WRITE ),
be->be_dfltaccess >= ACL_WRITE ? "granted" : "denied", op->o_dn );
return be->be_dfltaccess >= ACL_WRITE;
#ifdef notdef
/* be is always non-NULL */
/* use global default access if no global acls */
} else if ( be == NULL && global_acl == NULL ) {
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
"=> access_allowed: global default %s access %s to \"%s\"\n",
access2str( ACL_WRITE ),
global_default_access >= ACL_WRITE ? "granted" : "denied", op->o_dn );
return global_default_access >= ACL_WRITE;
#endif
}
for ( ; mlist != NULL; mlist = mlist->sml_next ) {
/*
* no-user-modification operational attributes are ignored
* by ACL_WRITE checking as any found here are not provided
* by the user
*/
if ( is_at_no_user_mod( mlist->sml_desc->ad_type ) ) {
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "acl: no-user-mod %s:"
" modify access granted\n",
mlist->sml_desc->ad_cname->bv_val, 0, 0 );
continue;
}
switch ( mlist->sml_op ) {
case LDAP_MOD_REPLACE:
case LDAP_MOD_ADD:
if ( mlist->sml_bvalues == NULL ) {
break;
}
for ( i = 0; mlist->sml_bvalues[i] != NULL; i++ ) {
if ( ! access_allowed( be, conn, op, e,
mlist->sml_desc, mlist->sml_bvalues[i], ACL_WRITE ) )
{
return( 0 );
}
}
break;
case LDAP_MOD_DELETE:
if ( mlist->sml_bvalues == NULL ) {
if ( ! access_allowed( be, conn, op, e,
mlist->sml_desc, NULL, ACL_WRITE ) )
{
return( 0 );
}
break;
}
for ( i = 0; mlist->sml_bvalues[i] != NULL; i++ ) {
if ( ! access_allowed( be, conn, op, e,
mlist->sml_desc, mlist->sml_bvalues[i], ACL_WRITE ) )
{
return( 0 );
}
}
break;
}
}
return( 1 );
}
#ifdef SLAPD_ACI_ENABLED
static char *
aci_bvstrdup( struct berval *bv )
{
char *s;
s = (char *)ch_malloc(bv->bv_len + 1);
if (s != NULL) {
memcpy(s, bv->bv_val, bv->bv_len);
s[bv->bv_len] = 0;
}
return(s);
}
static int
aci_strbvcmp(
const char *s,
struct berval *bv )
{
int res, len;
res = strncasecmp( s, bv->bv_val, bv->bv_len );
if (res)
return(res);
len = strlen(s);
if (len > (int)bv->bv_len)
return(1);
if (len < (int)bv->bv_len)
return(-1);
return(0);
}
static int
aci_get_part(
struct berval *list,
int ix,
char sep,
struct berval *bv )
{
int len;
char *p;
if (bv) {
bv->bv_len = 0;
bv->bv_val = NULL;
}
len = list->bv_len;
p = list->bv_val;
while (len >= 0 && --ix >= 0) {
while (--len >= 0 && *p++ != sep) ;
}
while (len >= 0 && *p == ' ') {
len--;
p++;
}
if (len < 0)
return(-1);
if (!bv)
return(0);
bv->bv_val = p;
while (--len >= 0 && *p != sep) {
bv->bv_len++;
p++;
}
while (bv->bv_len > 0 && *--p == ' ')
bv->bv_len--;
return(bv->bv_len);
}
static int
aci_list_map_rights(
struct berval *list )
{
struct berval bv;
slap_access_t mask;
int i;
ACL_INIT(mask);
for (i = 0; aci_get_part(list, i, ',', &bv) >= 0; i++) {
if (bv.bv_len <= 0)
continue;
switch (*bv.bv_val) {
case 'c':
ACL_PRIV_SET(mask, ACL_PRIV_COMPARE);
break;
case 's':
/* **** NOTE: draft-ietf-ldapext-aci-model-0.3.txt defines
* the right 's' to mean "set", but in the examples states
* that the right 's' means "search". The latter definition
* is used here.
*/
ACL_PRIV_SET(mask, ACL_PRIV_SEARCH);
break;
case 'r':
ACL_PRIV_SET(mask, ACL_PRIV_READ);
break;
case 'w':
ACL_PRIV_SET(mask, ACL_PRIV_WRITE);
break;
case 'x':
/* **** NOTE: draft-ietf-ldapext-aci-model-0.3.txt does not
* define any equivalent to the AUTH right, so I've just used
* 'x' for now.
*/
ACL_PRIV_SET(mask, ACL_PRIV_AUTH);
break;
default:
break;
}
}
return(mask);
}
static int
aci_list_has_attr(
struct berval *list,
const char *attr,
struct berval *val )
{
struct berval bv, left, right;
int i;
for (i = 0; aci_get_part(list, i, ',', &bv) >= 0; i++) {
if (aci_get_part(&bv, 0, '=', &left) < 0
|| aci_get_part(&bv, 1, '=', &right) < 0)
{
if (aci_strbvcmp(attr, &bv) == 0)
return(1);
} else if (val == NULL) {
if (aci_strbvcmp(attr, &left) == 0)
return(1);
} else {
if (aci_strbvcmp(attr, &left) == 0) {
/* this is experimental code that implements a
* simple (prefix) match of the attribute value.
* the ACI draft does not provide for aci's that
* apply to specific values, but it would be
* nice to have. If the <attr> part of an aci's
* rights list is of the form <attr>=<value>,
* that means the aci applies only to attrs with
* the given value. Furthermore, if the attr is
* of the form <attr>=<value>*, then <value> is
* treated as a prefix, and the aci applies to
* any value with that prefix.
*
* Ideally, this would allow r.e. matches.
*/
if (aci_get_part(&right, 0, '*', &left) < 0
|| right.bv_len <= left.bv_len)
{
if (aci_strbvcmp(val->bv_val, &right) == 0)
return(1);
} else if (val->bv_len >= left.bv_len) {
if (strncasecmp( val->bv_val, left.bv_val, left.bv_len ) == 0)
return(1);
}
}
}
}
return(0);
}
static slap_access_t
aci_list_get_attr_rights(
struct berval *list,
const char *attr,
struct berval *val )
{
struct berval bv;
slap_access_t mask;
int i;
/* loop through each rights/attr pair, skip first part (action) */
ACL_INIT(mask);
for (i = 1; aci_get_part(list, i + 1, ';', &bv) >= 0; i += 2) {
if (aci_list_has_attr(&bv, attr, val) == 0)
continue;
if (aci_get_part(list, i, ';', &bv) < 0)
continue;
mask |= aci_list_map_rights(&bv);
}
return(mask);
}
static int
aci_list_get_rights(
struct berval *list,
const char *attr,
struct berval *val,
slap_access_t *grant,
slap_access_t *deny )
{
struct berval perm, actn;
slap_access_t *mask;
int i, found;
if (attr == NULL || *attr == 0 || strcasecmp(attr, "entry") == 0) {
attr = "[entry]";
}
found = 0;
ACL_INIT(*grant);
ACL_INIT(*deny);
/* loop through each permissions clause */
for (i = 0; aci_get_part(list, i, '$', &perm) >= 0; i++) {
if (aci_get_part(&perm, 0, ';', &actn) < 0)
continue;
if (aci_strbvcmp( "grant", &actn ) == 0) {
mask = grant;
} else if (aci_strbvcmp( "deny", &actn ) == 0) {
mask = deny;
} else {
continue;
}
found = 1;
*mask |= aci_list_get_attr_rights(&perm, attr, val);
*mask |= aci_list_get_attr_rights(&perm, "[all]", NULL);
}
return(found);
}
static int
aci_group_member (
struct berval *subj,
const char *defgrpoc,
const char *defgrpat,
Backend *be,
Entry *e,
Operation *op,
regmatch_t *matches
)
{
struct berval bv;
char *subjdn, *grpdn = NULL;
char *grpoc;
char *grpat;
ObjectClass *grp_oc = NULL;
AttributeDescription *grp_ad = NULL;
char *text;
int rc;
/* format of string is "group/objectClassValue/groupAttrName" */
if (aci_get_part(subj, 0, '/', &bv) < 0) {
return(0);
}
subjdn = aci_bvstrdup(&bv);
if (subjdn == NULL) {
return(0);
}
if (aci_get_part(subj, 1, '/', &bv) < 0) {
grpoc = ch_strdup( defgrpoc );
} else {
grpoc = aci_bvstrdup(&bv);
}
if (aci_get_part(subj, 2, '/', &bv) < 0) {
grpat = ch_strdup( defgrpat );
} else {
grpat = aci_bvstrdup(&bv);
}
rc = slap_str2ad( grpat, &grp_ad, &text );
if( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
rc = 0;
goto done;
}
rc = 0;
grpdn = (char *)ch_malloc(1024);
if (grp_oc != NULL && grp_ad != NULL && grpdn != NULL) {
string_expand(grpdn, 1024, subjdn, e->e_ndn, matches);
if ( dn_normalize(grpdn) != NULL ) {
rc = (backend_group(be, e, grpdn, op->o_ndn, grp_oc, grp_ad) == 0);
}
}
done:
if( grp_ad != NULL ) ad_free( grp_ad, 1 );
ch_free(grpdn);
ch_free(grpat);
ch_free(grpoc);
ch_free(subjdn);
return(rc);
}
static int
aci_mask(
Backend *be,
Operation *op,
Entry *e,
AttributeDescription *desc,
struct berval *val,
struct berval *aci,
regmatch_t *matches,
slap_access_t *grant,
slap_access_t *deny
)
{
struct berval bv, perms, sdn;
char *subjdn;
int rc, i;
char *attr;
/* parse an aci of the form:
oid#scope#action;rights;attr;rights;attr$action;rights;attr;rights;attr#dnType#subjectDN
See draft-ietf-ldapext-aci-model-04.txt section 9.1 for
a full description of the format for this attribute.
For now, this routine only supports scope=entry.
*/
/* check that the aci has all 5 components */
if (aci_get_part(aci, 4, '#', NULL) < 0)
return(0);
/* check that the aci family is supported */
if (aci_get_part(aci, 0, '#', &bv) < 0)
return(0);
/* check that the scope is "entry" */
if (aci_get_part(aci, 1, '#', &bv) < 0
|| aci_strbvcmp( "entry", &bv ) != 0)
{
return(0);
}
/* get the list of permissions clauses, bail if empty */
if (aci_get_part(aci, 2, '#', &perms) <= 0)
return(0);
/* check if any permissions allow desired access */
if (aci_list_get_rights(&perms, attr, val, grant, deny) == 0)
return(0);
/* see if we have a DN match */
if (aci_get_part(aci, 3, '#', &bv) < 0)
return(0);
if (aci_get_part(aci, 4, '#', &sdn) < 0)
return(0);
if (aci_strbvcmp( "access-id", &bv ) == 0) {
subjdn = aci_bvstrdup(&sdn);
if (subjdn == NULL)
return(0);
rc = 1;
if ( dn_normalize(subjdn) != NULL )
if (strcasecmp(op->o_ndn, subjdn) != 0)
rc = 0;
ch_free(subjdn);
return(rc);
}
if (aci_strbvcmp( "self", &bv ) == 0) {
if (strcasecmp(op->o_ndn, e->e_ndn) == 0)
return(1);
} else if (aci_strbvcmp( "dnattr", &bv ) == 0) {
char *dnattr = aci_bvstrdup(&sdn);
Attribute *at;
AttributeDescription *ad = NULL;
const char *text;
rc = slap_str2ad( dnattr, &ad, &text );
ch_free( dnattr );
if( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
return 0;
}
rc = 0;
bv.bv_val = op->o_ndn;
bv.bv_len = strlen( bv.bv_val );
for(at = attrs_find( e->e_attrs, ad );
at != NULL;
at = attrs_find( at->a_next, ad ) )
{
if (value_find( ad, at->a_vals, &bv) == 0 ) {
rc = 1;
break;
}
}
ad_free( ad, 1 );
return rc;
} else if (aci_strbvcmp( "group", &bv ) == 0) {
if (aci_group_member(&sdn, SLAPD_GROUP_CLASS, SLAPD_GROUP_ATTR, be, e, op, matches))
return(1);
} else if (aci_strbvcmp( "role", &bv ) == 0) {
if (aci_group_member(&sdn, SLAPD_ROLE_CLASS, SLAPD_ROLE_ATTR, be, e, op, matches))
return(1);
}
return(0);
}
#endif /* SLAPD_ACI_ENABLED */
static void
string_expand(
char *newbuf,
int bufsiz,
char *pat,
char *match,
regmatch_t *matches)
{
int size;
char *sp;
char *dp;
int flag;
size = 0;
newbuf[0] = '\0';
bufsiz--; /* leave space for lone $ */
flag = 0;
for ( dp = newbuf, sp = pat; size < bufsiz && *sp ; sp++) {
/* did we previously see a $ */
if (flag) {
if (*sp == '$') {
*dp++ = '$';
size++;
} else if (*sp >= '0' && *sp <= '9' ) {
int n;
int i;
int l;
n = *sp - '0';
*dp = '\0';
i = matches[n].rm_so;
l = matches[n].rm_eo;
for ( ; size < 512 && i < l; size++, i++ ) {
*dp++ = match[i];
size++;
}
*dp = '\0';
}
flag = 0;
} else {
if (*sp == '$') {
flag = 1;
} else {
*dp++ = *sp;
size++;
}
}
}
if (flag) {
/* must have ended with a single $ */
*dp++ = '$';
size++;
}
*dp = '\0';
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, "=> string_expand: pattern: %s\n", pat, 0, 0 );
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, "=> string_expand: expanded: %s\n", newbuf, 0, 0 );
}
static int
regex_matches(
char *pat, /* pattern to expand and match against */
char *str, /* string to match against pattern */
char *buf, /* buffer with $N expansion variables */
regmatch_t *matches /* offsets in buffer for $N expansion variables */
)
{
regex_t re;
char newbuf[512];
int rc;
if(str == NULL) str = "";
string_expand(newbuf, sizeof(newbuf), pat, buf, matches);
if (( rc = regcomp(&re, newbuf, REG_EXTENDED|REG_ICASE))) {
char error[512];
regerror(rc, &re, error, sizeof(error));
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE,
"compile( \"%s\", \"%s\") failed %s\n",
pat, str, error );
return( 0 );
}
rc = regexec(&re, str, 0, NULL, 0);
regfree( &re );
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE,
"=> regex_matches: string: %s\n", str, 0, 0 );
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE,
"=> regex_matches: rc: %d %s\n",
rc, !rc ? "matches" : "no matches", 0 );
return( !rc );
}
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