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https://git.openldap.org/openldap/openldap.git
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1781 lines
43 KiB
C
1781 lines
43 KiB
C
/* acl.c - routines to parse and check acl's */
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/* $OpenLDAP$ */
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/*
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* Copyright 1998-2002 The OpenLDAP Foundation, All Rights Reserved.
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* COPYING RESTRICTIONS APPLY, see COPYRIGHT file
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*/
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#include "portable.h"
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <ac/regex.h>
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#include <ac/socket.h>
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#include <ac/string.h>
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#include "slap.h"
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#include "sets.h"
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static AccessControl * acl_get(
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AccessControl *ac, int *count,
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Backend *be, Operation *op,
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Entry *e,
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AttributeDescription *desc,
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int nmatches, regmatch_t *matches );
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static slap_control_t acl_mask(
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AccessControl *ac, slap_mask_t *mask,
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Backend *be, Connection *conn, Operation *op,
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Entry *e,
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AttributeDescription *desc,
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struct berval *val,
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regmatch_t *matches );
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#ifdef SLAPD_ACI_ENABLED
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static int aci_mask(
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Backend *be,
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Connection *conn,
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Operation *op,
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Entry *e,
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AttributeDescription *desc,
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struct berval *val,
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struct berval *aci,
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regmatch_t *matches,
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slap_access_t *grant,
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slap_access_t *deny );
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#endif
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static int regex_matches(
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char *pat, char *str, char *buf, regmatch_t *matches);
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static void string_expand(
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struct berval *newbuf, char *pattern,
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char *match, regmatch_t *matches);
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typedef struct AciSetCookie {
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Backend *be;
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Entry *e;
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Connection *conn;
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Operation *op;
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} AciSetCookie;
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BVarray aci_set_gather (void *cookie, char *name, struct berval *attr);
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static int aci_match_set ( struct berval *subj, Backend *be,
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Entry *e, Connection *conn, Operation *op, int setref );
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/*
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* access_allowed - check whether op->o_ndn is allowed the requested access
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* to entry e, attribute attr, value val. if val is null, access to
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* the whole attribute is assumed (all values).
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*
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* This routine loops through all access controls and calls
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* acl_mask() on each applicable access control.
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* The loop exits when a definitive answer is reached or
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* or no more controls remain.
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*
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* returns:
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* 0 access denied
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* 1 access granted
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*/
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int
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access_allowed(
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Backend *be,
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Connection *conn,
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Operation *op,
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Entry *e,
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AttributeDescription *desc,
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struct berval *val,
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slap_access_t access )
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{
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int count;
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AccessControl *a;
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#ifdef LDAP_DEBUG
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char accessmaskbuf[ACCESSMASK_MAXLEN];
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#endif
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slap_mask_t mask;
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slap_control_t control;
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const char *attr;
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regmatch_t matches[MAXREMATCHES];
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assert( e != NULL );
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assert( desc != NULL );
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assert( access > ACL_NONE );
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attr = desc->ad_cname.bv_val;
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assert( attr != NULL );
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#ifdef NEW_LOGGING
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LDAP_LOG(( "acl", LDAP_LEVEL_ENTRY,
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"access_allowed: conn %d %s access to \"%s\" \"%s\" requested\n",
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conn ? conn->c_connid : -1, access2str( access ), e->e_dn, attr ));
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#else
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Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
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"=> access_allowed: %s access to \"%s\" \"%s\" requested\n",
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access2str( access ), e->e_dn, attr );
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#endif
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if ( op == NULL ) {
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/* no-op call */
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return 1;
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}
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if ( be == NULL ) be = &backends[0];
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assert( be != NULL );
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/* grant database root access */
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if ( be != NULL && be_isroot( be, &op->o_ndn ) ) {
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#ifdef NEW_LOGGING
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LDAP_LOG(( "acl", LDAP_LEVEL_INFO,
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"access_allowed: conn %d root access granted\n",
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conn->c_connid));
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#else
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Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
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"<= root access granted\n",
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0, 0, 0 );
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#endif
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return 1;
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}
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/*
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* no-user-modification operational attributes are ignored
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* by ACL_WRITE checking as any found here are not provided
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* by the user
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*/
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if ( access >= ACL_WRITE && is_at_no_user_mod( desc->ad_type )
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&& desc != slap_schema.si_ad_entry
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&& desc != slap_schema.si_ad_children )
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{
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#ifdef NEW_LOGGING
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LDAP_LOG(( "acl", LDAP_LEVEL_DETAIL1,
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"access_allowed: conn %d NoUserMod Operational attribute: %s access granted\n",
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conn->c_connid, attr ));
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#else
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Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "NoUserMod Operational attribute:"
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" %s access granted\n",
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attr, 0, 0 );
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#endif
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return 1;
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}
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/* use backend default access if no backend acls */
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if( be != NULL && be->be_acl == NULL ) {
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#ifdef NEW_LOGGING
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LDAP_LOG(( "acl", LDAP_LEVEL_DETAIL1,
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"access_allowed: conn %d backend default %s access %s to \"%s\"\n",
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conn->c_connid, access2str( access ),
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be->be_dfltaccess >= access ? "granted" : "denied", op->o_dn.bv_val ));
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#else
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Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
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"=> access_allowed: backend default %s access %s to \"%s\"\n",
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access2str( access ),
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be->be_dfltaccess >= access ? "granted" : "denied", op->o_dn.bv_val );
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#endif
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return be->be_dfltaccess >= access;
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#ifdef notdef
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/* be is always non-NULL */
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/* use global default access if no global acls */
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} else if ( be == NULL && global_acl == NULL ) {
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#ifdef NEW_LOGGING
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LDAP_LOG(( "acl", LDAP_LEVEL_DETAIL1,
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"access_allowed: conn %d global default %s access %s to \"%s\"\n",
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conn->c_connid, access2str( access ),
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global_default_access >= access ? "granted" : "denied", op->o_dn.bv_val ));
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#else
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Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
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"=> access_allowed: global default %s access %s to \"%s\"\n",
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access2str( access ),
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global_default_access >= access ? "granted" : "denied", op->o_dn.bv_val );
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#endif
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return global_default_access >= access;
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#endif
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}
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ACL_INIT(mask);
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memset(matches, '\0', sizeof(matches));
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control = ACL_BREAK;
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a = NULL;
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count = 0;
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while((a = acl_get( a, &count, be, op, e, desc, MAXREMATCHES, matches )) != NULL)
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{
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int i;
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for (i = 0; i < MAXREMATCHES && matches[i].rm_so > 0; i++) {
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#ifdef NEW_LOGGING
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LDAP_LOG(( "acl", LDAP_LEVEL_DETAIL1,
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"access_allowed: conn %d match[%d]: %d %d ",
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conn->c_connid, i, (int)matches[i].rm_so, (int)matches[i].rm_eo ));
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#else
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Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "=> match[%d]: %d %d ", i,
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(int)matches[i].rm_so, (int)matches[i].rm_eo );
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#endif
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if( matches[i].rm_so <= matches[0].rm_eo ) {
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int n;
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for ( n = matches[i].rm_so; n < matches[i].rm_eo; n++) {
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Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "%c", e->e_ndn[n], 0, 0 );
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}
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}
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#ifdef NEW_LOGGING
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LDAP_LOG(( "acl", LDAP_LEVEL_ARGS, "\n" ));
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#else
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Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ARGS, "\n", 0, 0, 0 );
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#endif
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}
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control = acl_mask( a, &mask, be, conn, op,
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e, desc, val, matches );
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if ( control != ACL_BREAK ) {
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break;
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}
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memset(matches, '\0', sizeof(matches));
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}
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if ( ACL_IS_INVALID( mask ) ) {
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#ifdef NEW_LOGGING
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LDAP_LOG(( "acl", LDAP_LEVEL_DETAIL1,
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"access_allowed: conn %d \"%s\" (%s) invalid!\n",
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conn->c_connid, e->e_dn, attr ));
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#else
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Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
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"=> access_allowed: \"%s\" (%s) invalid!\n",
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e->e_dn, attr, 0 );
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#endif
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ACL_INIT( mask );
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} else if ( control == ACL_BREAK ) {
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#ifdef NEW_LOGGING
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LDAP_LOG(( "acl", LDAP_LEVEL_DETAIL1,
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"access_allowed: conn %d no more rules\n", conn->c_connid ));
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#else
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Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
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"=> access_allowed: no more rules\n", 0, 0, 0);
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#endif
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ACL_INIT( mask );
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}
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#ifdef NEW_LOGGING
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LDAP_LOG(( "acl", LDAP_LEVEL_ENTRY,
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"access_allowed: conn %d %s access %s by %s\n",
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conn->c_connid,
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access2str( access ),
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ACL_GRANT( mask, access ) ? "granted" : "denied",
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accessmask2str( mask, accessmaskbuf ) ));
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#else
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Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
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"=> access_allowed: %s access %s by %s\n",
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access2str( access ),
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ACL_GRANT(mask, access) ? "granted" : "denied",
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accessmask2str( mask, accessmaskbuf ) );
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#endif
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return ACL_GRANT(mask, access);
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}
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/*
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* acl_get - return the acl applicable to entry e, attribute
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* attr. the acl returned is suitable for use in subsequent calls to
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* acl_access_allowed().
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*/
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static AccessControl *
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acl_get(
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AccessControl *a,
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int *count,
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Backend *be,
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Operation *op,
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Entry *e,
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AttributeDescription *desc,
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int nmatch,
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regmatch_t *matches )
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{
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const char *attr;
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int dnlen, patlen;
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assert( e != NULL );
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assert( count != NULL );
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assert( desc != NULL );
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attr = desc->ad_cname.bv_val;
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assert( attr != NULL );
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if( a == NULL ) {
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if( be == NULL ) {
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a = global_acl;
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} else {
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a = be->be_acl;
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}
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assert( a != NULL );
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} else {
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a = a->acl_next;
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}
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dnlen = e->e_nname.bv_len;
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for ( ; a != NULL; a = a->acl_next ) {
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(*count) ++;
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if (a->acl_dn_pat.bv_len != 0) {
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if ( a->acl_dn_style == ACL_STYLE_REGEX ) {
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#ifdef NEW_LOGGING
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LDAP_LOG(( "acl", LDAP_LEVEL_DETAIL1,
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"acl_get: dnpat [%d] %s nsub: %d\n",
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*count, a->acl_dn_pat.bv_val, (int) a->acl_dn_re.re_nsub ));
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#else
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Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "=> dnpat: [%d] %s nsub: %d\n",
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*count, a->acl_dn_pat.bv_val, (int) a->acl_dn_re.re_nsub );
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#endif
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if (regexec(&a->acl_dn_re, e->e_ndn, nmatch, matches, 0))
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continue;
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} else {
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#ifdef NEW_LOGGING
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LDAP_LOG(( "acl", LDAP_LEVEL_DETAIL1,
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"acl_get: dn [%d] %s\n",
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*count, a->acl_dn_pat.bv_val ));
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#else
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Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "=> dn: [%d] %s\n",
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*count, a->acl_dn_pat.bv_val, 0 );
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#endif
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patlen = a->acl_dn_pat.bv_len;
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if ( dnlen < patlen )
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continue;
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if ( a->acl_dn_style == ACL_STYLE_BASE ) {
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/* base dn -- entire object DN must match */
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if ( dnlen != patlen )
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continue;
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} else if ( a->acl_dn_style == ACL_STYLE_ONE ) {
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int rdnlen = -1;
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if ( dnlen <= patlen )
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continue;
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if ( !DN_SEPARATOR( e->e_ndn[dnlen - patlen - 1] ) || DN_ESCAPE( e->e_ndn[dnlen - patlen - 2] ) )
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continue;
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rdnlen = dn_rdnlen( NULL, &e->e_nname );
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if ( rdnlen != dnlen - patlen - 1 )
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continue;
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} else if ( a->acl_dn_style == ACL_STYLE_SUBTREE ) {
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if ( dnlen > patlen && ( !DN_SEPARATOR( e->e_ndn[dnlen - patlen - 1] ) || DN_ESCAPE( e->e_ndn[dnlen - patlen - 2] ) ) )
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continue;
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} else if ( a->acl_dn_style == ACL_STYLE_CHILDREN ) {
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if ( dnlen <= patlen )
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continue;
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if ( !DN_SEPARATOR( e->e_ndn[dnlen - patlen - 1] ) || DN_ESCAPE( e->e_ndn[dnlen - patlen - 2] ) )
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continue;
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}
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if ( strcmp( a->acl_dn_pat.bv_val, e->e_ndn + dnlen - patlen ) != 0 )
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continue;
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}
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#ifdef NEW_LOGGING
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LDAP_LOG(( "acl", LDAP_LEVEL_DETAIL1,
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"acl_get: [%d] matched\n",
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*count ));
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#else
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Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "=> acl_get: [%d] matched\n",
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*count, 0, 0 );
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#endif
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}
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if ( a->acl_filter != NULL ) {
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ber_int_t rc = test_filter( NULL, NULL, NULL, e, a->acl_filter );
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if ( rc != LDAP_COMPARE_TRUE ) {
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continue;
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}
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}
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#ifdef NEW_LOGGING
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LDAP_LOG(( "acl", LDAP_LEVEL_DETAIL1,
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"acl_get: [%d] check attr %s\n",
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*count, attr ));
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#else
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Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "=> acl_get: [%d] check attr %s\n",
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*count, attr, 0);
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#endif
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if ( attr == NULL || a->acl_attrs == NULL ||
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ad_inlist( desc, a->acl_attrs ) )
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{
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#ifdef NEW_LOGGING
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LDAP_LOG(( "acl", LDAP_LEVEL_DETAIL1,
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"acl_get: [%d] acl %s attr: %s\n",
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*count, e->e_dn, attr ));
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#else
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Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
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"<= acl_get: [%d] acl %s attr: %s\n",
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*count, e->e_dn, attr );
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#endif
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return a;
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}
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matches[0].rm_so = matches[0].rm_eo = -1;
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}
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#ifdef NEW_LOGGING
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LDAP_LOG(( "acl", LDAP_LEVEL_ENTRY,
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"acl_get: done.\n" ));
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#else
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Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= acl_get: done.\n", 0, 0, 0 );
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#endif
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return( NULL );
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}
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/*
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* acl_mask - modifies mask based upon the given acl and the
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* requested access to entry e, attribute attr, value val. if val
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* is null, access to the whole attribute is assumed (all values).
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*
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* returns 0 access NOT allowed
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* 1 access allowed
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*/
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static slap_control_t
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acl_mask(
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AccessControl *a,
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slap_mask_t *mask,
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Backend *be,
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Connection *conn,
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Operation *op,
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Entry *e,
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AttributeDescription *desc,
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struct berval *val,
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regmatch_t *matches
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)
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{
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int i, odnlen, patlen;
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Access *b;
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#ifdef LDAP_DEBUG
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char accessmaskbuf[ACCESSMASK_MAXLEN];
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#endif
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const char *attr;
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assert( a != NULL );
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assert( mask != NULL );
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assert( desc != NULL );
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attr = desc->ad_cname.bv_val;
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assert( attr != NULL );
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#ifdef NEW_LOGGING
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LDAP_LOG(( "acl", LDAP_LEVEL_ENTRY,
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"acl_mask: conn %d access to entry \"%s\", attr \"%s\" requested\n",
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conn->c_connid, e->e_dn, attr ));
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LDAP_LOG(( "acl", LDAP_LEVEL_ARGS,
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" to %s by \"%s\", (%s) \n",
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val ? "value" : "all values",
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op->o_ndn.bv_val ? op->o_ndn.bv_val : "",
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accessmask2str( *mask, accessmaskbuf ) ));
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#else
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Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
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"=> acl_mask: access to entry \"%s\", attr \"%s\" requested\n",
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e->e_dn, attr, 0 );
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Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
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"=> acl_mask: to %s by \"%s\", (%s) \n",
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val ? "value" : "all values",
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op->o_ndn.bv_val ? op->o_ndn.bv_val : "",
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accessmask2str( *mask, accessmaskbuf ) );
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#endif
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for ( i = 1, b = a->acl_access; b != NULL; b = b->a_next, i++ ) {
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slap_mask_t oldmask, modmask;
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ACL_INVALIDATE( modmask );
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|
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/* AND <who> clauses */
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if ( b->a_dn_pat.bv_len != 0 ) {
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#ifdef NEW_LOGGING
|
|
LDAP_LOG(( "acl", LDAP_LEVEL_DETAIL1,
|
|
"acl_mask: conn %d check a_dn_pat: %s\n",
|
|
conn->c_connid, b->a_dn_pat.bv_val ));
|
|
#else
|
|
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= check a_dn_pat: %s\n",
|
|
b->a_dn_pat.bv_val, 0, 0);
|
|
#endif
|
|
/*
|
|
* if access applies to the entry itself, and the
|
|
* user is bound as somebody in the same namespace as
|
|
* the entry, OR the given dn matches the dn pattern
|
|
*/
|
|
if ( b->a_dn_pat.bv_len == sizeof("anonymous") -1 &&
|
|
strcmp( b->a_dn_pat.bv_val, "anonymous" ) == 0 ) {
|
|
if (op->o_ndn.bv_len != 0 ) {
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else if ( b->a_dn_pat.bv_len == sizeof("users") - 1 &&
|
|
strcmp( b->a_dn_pat.bv_val, "users" ) == 0 ) {
|
|
if (op->o_ndn.bv_len == 0 ) {
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else if ( b->a_dn_pat.bv_len == sizeof("self") - 1 &&
|
|
strcmp( b->a_dn_pat.bv_val, "self" ) == 0 ) {
|
|
if( op->o_ndn.bv_len == 0 ) {
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ( e->e_dn == NULL || strcmp( e->e_ndn, op->o_ndn.bv_val ) != 0 ) {
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else if ( b->a_dn_style == ACL_STYLE_REGEX ) {
|
|
if ( b->a_dn_pat.bv_len != 1 ||
|
|
strcmp( b->a_dn_pat.bv_val, "*" ) != 0 ) {
|
|
int ret = regex_matches( b->a_dn_pat.bv_val,
|
|
op->o_ndn.bv_val, e->e_ndn, matches );
|
|
|
|
if( ret == 0 ) {
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
if ( e->e_dn == NULL )
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
patlen = b->a_dn_pat.bv_len;
|
|
odnlen = op->o_ndn.bv_len;
|
|
if ( odnlen < patlen )
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
if ( b->a_dn_style == ACL_STYLE_BASE ) {
|
|
/* base dn -- entire object DN must match */
|
|
if ( odnlen != patlen )
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
} else if ( b->a_dn_style == ACL_STYLE_ONE ) {
|
|
int rdnlen = -1;
|
|
|
|
if ( odnlen <= patlen )
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
if ( !DN_SEPARATOR( op->o_ndn.bv_val[odnlen - patlen - 1] ) || DN_ESCAPE( op->o_ndn.bv_val[odnlen - patlen - 2] ) )
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
rdnlen = dn_rdnlen( NULL, &op->o_ndn );
|
|
if ( rdnlen != odnlen - patlen - 1 )
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
} else if ( b->a_dn_style == ACL_STYLE_SUBTREE ) {
|
|
if ( odnlen > patlen && ( !DN_SEPARATOR( op->o_ndn.bv_val[odnlen - patlen - 1] ) || DN_ESCAPE( op->o_ndn.bv_val[odnlen - patlen - 2] ) ) )
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
} else if ( b->a_dn_style == ACL_STYLE_CHILDREN ) {
|
|
if ( odnlen <= patlen )
|
|
continue;
|
|
if ( !DN_SEPARATOR( op->o_ndn.bv_val[odnlen - patlen - 1] ) || DN_ESCAPE( op->o_ndn.bv_val[odnlen - patlen - 2] ) )
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ( strcmp( b->a_dn_pat.bv_val, op->o_ndn.bv_val + odnlen - patlen ) != 0 )
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ( b->a_sockurl_pat != NULL ) {
|
|
#ifdef NEW_LOGGING
|
|
LDAP_LOG(( "acl", LDAP_LEVEL_DETAIL1,
|
|
"acl_mask: conn %d check a_sockurl_pat: %s\n",
|
|
conn->c_connid, b->a_sockurl_pat ));
|
|
#else
|
|
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= check a_sockurl_pat: %s\n",
|
|
b->a_sockurl_pat, 0, 0 );
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if ( strcmp( b->a_sockurl_pat, "*" ) != 0) {
|
|
if ( b->a_sockurl_style == ACL_STYLE_REGEX) {
|
|
if (!regex_matches( b->a_sockurl_pat, conn->c_listener_url,
|
|
e->e_ndn, matches ) )
|
|
{
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
if ( strcasecmp( b->a_sockurl_pat, conn->c_listener_url ) != 0 )
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ( b->a_domain_pat != NULL ) {
|
|
#ifdef NEW_LOGGING
|
|
LDAP_LOG(( "acl", LDAP_LEVEL_DETAIL1,
|
|
"acl_mask: conn %d check a_domain_pat: %s\n",
|
|
conn->c_connid, b->a_domain_pat ));
|
|
#else
|
|
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= check a_domain_pat: %s\n",
|
|
b->a_domain_pat, 0, 0 );
|
|
#endif
|
|
if ( strcmp( b->a_domain_pat, "*" ) != 0) {
|
|
if ( b->a_domain_style == ACL_STYLE_REGEX) {
|
|
if (!regex_matches( b->a_domain_pat, conn->c_peer_domain,
|
|
e->e_ndn, matches ) )
|
|
{
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
if ( strcasecmp( b->a_domain_pat, conn->c_peer_domain ) != 0 )
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ( b->a_peername_pat != NULL ) {
|
|
#ifdef NEW_LOGGING
|
|
LDAP_LOG(( "acl", LDAP_LEVEL_DETAIL1,
|
|
"acl_mask: conn %d check a_perrname_path: %s\n",
|
|
conn->c_connid, b->a_peername_pat ));
|
|
#else
|
|
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= check a_peername_path: %s\n",
|
|
b->a_peername_pat, 0, 0 );
|
|
#endif
|
|
if ( strcmp( b->a_peername_pat, "*" ) != 0) {
|
|
if ( b->a_peername_style == ACL_STYLE_REGEX) {
|
|
if (!regex_matches( b->a_peername_pat, conn->c_peer_name,
|
|
e->e_ndn, matches ) )
|
|
{
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
if ( strcasecmp( b->a_peername_pat, conn->c_peer_name ) != 0 )
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ( b->a_sockname_pat != NULL ) {
|
|
#ifdef NEW_LOGGING
|
|
LDAP_LOG(( "acl", LDAP_LEVEL_DETAIL1,
|
|
"acl_mask: conn %d check a_sockname_path: %s\n",
|
|
conn->c_connid, b->a_sockname_pat ));
|
|
#else
|
|
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= check a_sockname_path: %s\n",
|
|
b->a_sockname_pat, 0, 0 );
|
|
#endif
|
|
if ( strcmp( b->a_sockname_pat, "*" ) != 0) {
|
|
if ( b->a_sockname_style == ACL_STYLE_REGEX) {
|
|
if (!regex_matches( b->a_sockname_pat, conn->c_sock_name,
|
|
e->e_ndn, matches ) )
|
|
{
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
if ( strcasecmp( b->a_sockname_pat, conn->c_sock_name ) != 0 )
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ( b->a_dn_at != NULL && op->o_ndn.bv_len != 0 ) {
|
|
Attribute *at;
|
|
struct berval bv;
|
|
int rc, match = 0;
|
|
const char *text;
|
|
const char *attr = b->a_dn_at->ad_cname.bv_val;
|
|
|
|
assert( attr != NULL );
|
|
|
|
#ifdef NEW_LOGGING
|
|
LDAP_LOG(( "acl", LDAP_LEVEL_DETAIL1,
|
|
"acl_mask: conn %d check a_dn_pat: %s\n",
|
|
conn->c_connid, attr ));
|
|
#else
|
|
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= check a_dn_at: %s\n",
|
|
attr, 0, 0);
|
|
#endif
|
|
bv = op->o_ndn;
|
|
|
|
/* see if asker is listed in dnattr */
|
|
for( at = attrs_find( e->e_attrs, b->a_dn_at );
|
|
at != NULL;
|
|
at = attrs_find( at->a_next, b->a_dn_at ) )
|
|
{
|
|
if( value_find( b->a_dn_at, at->a_vals, &bv ) == 0 ) {
|
|
/* found it */
|
|
match = 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if( match ) {
|
|
/* have a dnattr match. if this is a self clause then
|
|
* the target must also match the op dn.
|
|
*/
|
|
if ( b->a_dn_self ) {
|
|
/* check if the target is an attribute. */
|
|
if ( val == NULL )
|
|
continue;
|
|
/* target is attribute, check if the attribute value
|
|
* is the op dn.
|
|
*/
|
|
rc = value_match( &match, b->a_dn_at,
|
|
b->a_dn_at->ad_type->sat_equality, 0,
|
|
val, &bv, &text );
|
|
/* on match error or no match, fail the ACL clause */
|
|
if (rc != LDAP_SUCCESS || match != 0 )
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* no dnattr match, check if this is a self clause */
|
|
if ( ! b->a_dn_self )
|
|
continue;
|
|
/* this is a self clause, check if the target is an
|
|
* attribute.
|
|
*/
|
|
if ( val == NULL )
|
|
continue;
|
|
/* target is attribute, check if the attribute value
|
|
* is the op dn.
|
|
*/
|
|
rc = value_match( &match, b->a_dn_at,
|
|
b->a_dn_at->ad_type->sat_equality, 0,
|
|
val, &bv, &text );
|
|
|
|
/* on match error or no match, fail the ACL clause */
|
|
if (rc != LDAP_SUCCESS || match != 0 )
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ( b->a_group_pat.bv_len && op->o_ndn.bv_len ) {
|
|
char buf[1024];
|
|
struct berval bv = { sizeof(buf) - 1, buf };
|
|
struct berval ndn = { 0, NULL };
|
|
int rc;
|
|
|
|
/* b->a_group is an unexpanded entry name, expanded it should be an
|
|
* entry with objectclass group* and we test to see if odn is one of
|
|
* the values in the attribute group
|
|
*/
|
|
/* see if asker is listed in dnattr */
|
|
if ( b->a_group_style == ACL_STYLE_REGEX ) {
|
|
string_expand(&bv, b->a_group_pat.bv_val, e->e_ndn, matches);
|
|
if ( dnNormalize2(NULL, &bv, &ndn) != LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
|
|
/* did not expand to a valid dn */
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
bv = ndn;
|
|
} else {
|
|
bv = b->a_group_pat;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rc = backend_group(be, conn, op, e, &bv, &op->o_ndn,
|
|
b->a_group_oc, b->a_group_at);
|
|
if ( ndn.bv_val )
|
|
free( ndn.bv_val );
|
|
if ( rc != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ( b->a_set_pat.bv_len != 0 ) {
|
|
if (aci_match_set( &b->a_set_pat, be, e, conn, op, 0 ) == 0) {
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ( b->a_authz.sai_ssf ) {
|
|
#ifdef NEW_LOGGING
|
|
LDAP_LOG(( "acl", LDAP_LEVEL_DETAIL1,
|
|
"acl_mask: conn %d check a_authz.sai_ssf: ACL %u > OP %u\n",
|
|
conn->c_connid, b->a_authz.sai_ssf, op->o_ssf ));
|
|
#else
|
|
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= check a_authz.sai_ssf: ACL %u > OP %u\n",
|
|
b->a_authz.sai_ssf, op->o_ssf, 0 );
|
|
#endif
|
|
if ( b->a_authz.sai_ssf > op->o_ssf ) {
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ( b->a_authz.sai_transport_ssf ) {
|
|
#ifdef NEW_LOGGING
|
|
LDAP_LOG(( "acl", LDAP_LEVEL_DETAIL1,
|
|
"acl_mask: conn %d check a_authz.sai_transport_ssf: ACL %u > OP %u\n",
|
|
conn->c_connid, b->a_authz.sai_transport_ssf, op->o_transport_ssf ));
|
|
#else
|
|
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
|
|
"<= check a_authz.sai_transport_ssf: ACL %u > OP %u\n",
|
|
b->a_authz.sai_transport_ssf, op->o_transport_ssf, 0 );
|
|
#endif
|
|
if ( b->a_authz.sai_transport_ssf > op->o_transport_ssf ) {
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ( b->a_authz.sai_tls_ssf ) {
|
|
#ifdef NEW_LOGGING
|
|
LDAP_LOG(( "acl", LDAP_LEVEL_DETAIL1,
|
|
"acl_mask: conn %d check a_authz.sai_tls_ssf: ACL %u > OP %u\n",
|
|
conn->c_connid, b->a_authz.sai_tls_ssf, op->o_tls_ssf ));
|
|
#else
|
|
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
|
|
"<= check a_authz.sai_tls_ssf: ACL %u > OP %u\n",
|
|
b->a_authz.sai_tls_ssf, op->o_tls_ssf, 0 );
|
|
#endif
|
|
if ( b->a_authz.sai_tls_ssf > op->o_tls_ssf ) {
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ( b->a_authz.sai_sasl_ssf ) {
|
|
#ifdef NEW_LOGGING
|
|
LDAP_LOG(( "acl", LDAP_LEVEL_DETAIL1,
|
|
"acl_mask: conn %d check a_authz.sai_sasl_ssf: ACL %u > OP %u\n",
|
|
conn->c_connid, b->a_authz.sai_sasl_ssf, op->o_sasl_ssf ));
|
|
#else
|
|
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
|
|
"<= check a_authz.sai_sasl_ssf: ACL %u > OP %u\n",
|
|
b->a_authz.sai_sasl_ssf, op->o_sasl_ssf, 0 );
|
|
#endif
|
|
if ( b->a_authz.sai_sasl_ssf > op->o_sasl_ssf ) {
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef SLAPD_ACI_ENABLED
|
|
if ( b->a_aci_at != NULL ) {
|
|
Attribute *at;
|
|
slap_access_t grant, deny, tgrant, tdeny;
|
|
|
|
/* this case works different from the others above.
|
|
* since aci's themselves give permissions, we need
|
|
* to first check b->a_access_mask, the ACL's access level.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if ( e->e_nname.bv_len == 0 ) {
|
|
/* no ACIs in the root DSE */
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* first check if the right being requested
|
|
* is allowed by the ACL clause.
|
|
*/
|
|
if ( ! ACL_GRANT( b->a_access_mask, *mask ) ) {
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* get the aci attribute */
|
|
at = attr_find( e->e_attrs, b->a_aci_at );
|
|
if ( at == NULL ) {
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* start out with nothing granted, nothing denied */
|
|
ACL_INIT(tgrant);
|
|
ACL_INIT(tdeny);
|
|
|
|
/* the aci is an multi-valued attribute. The
|
|
* rights are determined by OR'ing the individual
|
|
* rights given by the acis.
|
|
*/
|
|
for ( i = 0; at->a_vals[i].bv_val != NULL; i++ ) {
|
|
if (aci_mask( be, conn, op,
|
|
e, desc, val, &at->a_vals[i],
|
|
matches, &grant, &deny ) != 0)
|
|
{
|
|
tgrant |= grant;
|
|
tdeny |= deny;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* remove anything that the ACL clause does not allow */
|
|
tgrant &= b->a_access_mask & ACL_PRIV_MASK;
|
|
tdeny &= ACL_PRIV_MASK;
|
|
|
|
/* see if we have anything to contribute */
|
|
if( ACL_IS_INVALID(tgrant) && ACL_IS_INVALID(tdeny) ) {
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* this could be improved by changing acl_mask so that it can deal with
|
|
* by clauses that return grant/deny pairs. Right now, it does either
|
|
* additive or subtractive rights, but not both at the same time. So,
|
|
* we need to combine the grant/deny pair into a single rights mask in
|
|
* a smart way: if either grant or deny is "empty", then we use the
|
|
* opposite as is, otherwise we remove any denied rights from the grant
|
|
* rights mask and construct an additive mask.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (ACL_IS_INVALID(tdeny)) {
|
|
modmask = tgrant | ACL_PRIV_ADDITIVE;
|
|
|
|
} else if (ACL_IS_INVALID(tgrant)) {
|
|
modmask = tdeny | ACL_PRIV_SUBSTRACTIVE;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
modmask = (tgrant & ~tdeny) | ACL_PRIV_ADDITIVE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else
|
|
#endif
|
|
{
|
|
modmask = b->a_access_mask;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef NEW_LOGGING
|
|
LDAP_LOG(( "acl", LDAP_LEVEL_RESULTS,
|
|
"acl_mask: conn %d [%d] applying %s (%s)\n",
|
|
conn->c_connid, i, accessmask2str( modmask, accessmaskbuf),
|
|
b->a_type == ACL_CONTINUE ? "continue" : b->a_type == ACL_BREAK
|
|
? "break" : "stop" ));
|
|
#else
|
|
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
|
|
"<= acl_mask: [%d] applying %s (%s)\n",
|
|
i, accessmask2str( modmask, accessmaskbuf ),
|
|
b->a_type == ACL_CONTINUE
|
|
? "continue"
|
|
: b->a_type == ACL_BREAK
|
|
? "break"
|
|
: "stop" );
|
|
#endif
|
|
/* save old mask */
|
|
oldmask = *mask;
|
|
|
|
if( ACL_IS_ADDITIVE(modmask) ) {
|
|
/* add privs */
|
|
ACL_PRIV_SET( *mask, modmask );
|
|
|
|
/* cleanup */
|
|
ACL_PRIV_CLR( *mask, ~ACL_PRIV_MASK );
|
|
|
|
} else if( ACL_IS_SUBTRACTIVE(modmask) ) {
|
|
/* substract privs */
|
|
ACL_PRIV_CLR( *mask, modmask );
|
|
|
|
/* cleanup */
|
|
ACL_PRIV_CLR( *mask, ~ACL_PRIV_MASK );
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* assign privs */
|
|
*mask = modmask;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef NEW_LOGGING
|
|
LDAP_LOG(( "aci", LDAP_LEVEL_DETAIL1,
|
|
"acl_mask: conn %d [%d] mask: %s\n",
|
|
conn->c_connid, i, accessmask2str( *mask, accessmaskbuf) ));
|
|
#else
|
|
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
|
|
"<= acl_mask: [%d] mask: %s\n",
|
|
i, accessmask2str(*mask, accessmaskbuf), 0 );
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if( b->a_type == ACL_CONTINUE ) {
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
} else if ( b->a_type == ACL_BREAK ) {
|
|
return ACL_BREAK;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
return ACL_STOP;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* implicit "by * none" clause */
|
|
ACL_INIT(*mask);
|
|
|
|
#ifdef NEW_LOGGING
|
|
LDAP_LOG(( "acl", LDAP_LEVEL_RESULTS,
|
|
"acl_mask: conn %d no more <who> clauses, returning %d (stop)\n",
|
|
conn->c_connid, accessmask2str( *mask, accessmaskbuf) ));
|
|
#else
|
|
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
|
|
"<= acl_mask: no more <who> clauses, returning %s (stop)\n",
|
|
accessmask2str(*mask, accessmaskbuf), 0, 0 );
|
|
#endif
|
|
return ACL_STOP;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* acl_check_modlist - check access control on the given entry to see if
|
|
* it allows the given modifications by the user associated with op.
|
|
* returns 1 if mods allowed ok
|
|
* 0 mods not allowed
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
acl_check_modlist(
|
|
Backend *be,
|
|
Connection *conn,
|
|
Operation *op,
|
|
Entry *e,
|
|
Modifications *mlist
|
|
)
|
|
{
|
|
struct berval *bv;
|
|
|
|
assert( be != NULL );
|
|
|
|
/* short circuit root database access */
|
|
if ( be_isroot( be, &op->o_ndn ) ) {
|
|
#ifdef NEW_LOGGING
|
|
LDAP_LOG(( "acl", LDAP_LEVEL_DETAIL1,
|
|
"acl_check_modlist: conn %d access granted to root user\n",
|
|
conn->c_connid ));
|
|
#else
|
|
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
|
|
"<= acl_access_allowed: granted to database root\n",
|
|
0, 0, 0 );
|
|
#endif
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* use backend default access if no backend acls */
|
|
if( be != NULL && be->be_acl == NULL ) {
|
|
#ifdef NEW_LOGGING
|
|
LDAP_LOG(( "aci", LDAP_LEVEL_DETAIL1,
|
|
"acl_check_modlist: conn %d backend default %s access %s to \"%s\"\n",
|
|
conn->c_connid, access2str( ACL_WRITE ),
|
|
be->be_dfltaccess >= ACL_WRITE ? "granted" : "denied", op->o_dn.bv_val ));
|
|
#else
|
|
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
|
|
"=> access_allowed: backend default %s access %s to \"%s\"\n",
|
|
access2str( ACL_WRITE ),
|
|
be->be_dfltaccess >= ACL_WRITE ? "granted" : "denied", op->o_dn.bv_val );
|
|
#endif
|
|
return be->be_dfltaccess >= ACL_WRITE;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef notdef
|
|
/* be is always non-NULL */
|
|
/* use global default access if no global acls */
|
|
} else if ( be == NULL && global_acl == NULL ) {
|
|
#ifdef NEW_LOGGING
|
|
LDAP_LOG(( "aci", LDAP_LEVEL_DETAIL1,
|
|
"acl_check_modlist: conn %d global default %s access %s to \"%s\"\n",
|
|
conn->c_connid, access2str( ACL_WRITE ),
|
|
global_default_access >= ACL_WRITE ? "granted" : "denied", op->o_dn ));
|
|
#else
|
|
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
|
|
"=> access_allowed: global default %s access %s to \"%s\"\n",
|
|
access2str( ACL_WRITE ),
|
|
global_default_access >= ACL_WRITE ? "granted" : "denied", op->o_dn );
|
|
#endif
|
|
return global_default_access >= ACL_WRITE;
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for ( ; mlist != NULL; mlist = mlist->sml_next ) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* no-user-modification operational attributes are ignored
|
|
* by ACL_WRITE checking as any found here are not provided
|
|
* by the user
|
|
*/
|
|
if ( is_at_no_user_mod( mlist->sml_desc->ad_type ) ) {
|
|
#ifdef NEW_LOGGING
|
|
LDAP_LOG(( "aci", LDAP_LEVEL_DETAIL1,
|
|
"acl_check_modlist: conn %d no-user-mod %s: modify access granted\n",
|
|
conn->c_connid, mlist->sml_desc->ad_cname.bv_val ));
|
|
#else
|
|
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "acl: no-user-mod %s:"
|
|
" modify access granted\n",
|
|
mlist->sml_desc->ad_cname.bv_val, 0, 0 );
|
|
#endif
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch ( mlist->sml_op ) {
|
|
case LDAP_MOD_REPLACE:
|
|
case LDAP_MOD_ADD:
|
|
if ( mlist->sml_bvalues == NULL ) {
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
for ( bv = mlist->sml_bvalues; bv->bv_val != NULL; bv++ ) {
|
|
if ( ! access_allowed( be, conn, op, e,
|
|
mlist->sml_desc, bv, ACL_WRITE ) )
|
|
{
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case LDAP_MOD_DELETE:
|
|
if ( mlist->sml_bvalues == NULL ) {
|
|
if ( ! access_allowed( be, conn, op, e,
|
|
mlist->sml_desc, NULL, ACL_WRITE ) )
|
|
{
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
for ( bv = mlist->sml_bvalues; bv->bv_val != NULL; bv++ ) {
|
|
if ( ! access_allowed( be, conn, op, e,
|
|
mlist->sml_desc, bv, ACL_WRITE ) )
|
|
{
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return( 1 );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static char *
|
|
aci_bvstrdup( struct berval *bv )
|
|
{
|
|
char *s;
|
|
|
|
s = (char *)ch_malloc(bv->bv_len + 1);
|
|
if (s != NULL) {
|
|
AC_MEMCPY(s, bv->bv_val, bv->bv_len);
|
|
s[bv->bv_len] = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
return(s);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef SLAPD_ACI_ENABLED
|
|
static int
|
|
aci_strbvcmp(
|
|
const char *s,
|
|
struct berval *bv )
|
|
{
|
|
int res, len;
|
|
|
|
res = strncasecmp( s, bv->bv_val, bv->bv_len );
|
|
if (res)
|
|
return(res);
|
|
len = strlen(s);
|
|
if (len > (int)bv->bv_len)
|
|
return(1);
|
|
if (len < (int)bv->bv_len)
|
|
return(-1);
|
|
return(0);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
aci_get_part(
|
|
struct berval *list,
|
|
int ix,
|
|
char sep,
|
|
struct berval *bv )
|
|
{
|
|
int len;
|
|
char *p;
|
|
|
|
if (bv) {
|
|
bv->bv_len = 0;
|
|
bv->bv_val = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
len = list->bv_len;
|
|
p = list->bv_val;
|
|
while (len >= 0 && --ix >= 0) {
|
|
while (--len >= 0 && *p++ != sep) ;
|
|
}
|
|
while (len >= 0 && *p == ' ') {
|
|
len--;
|
|
p++;
|
|
}
|
|
if (len < 0)
|
|
return(-1);
|
|
|
|
if (!bv)
|
|
return(0);
|
|
|
|
bv->bv_val = p;
|
|
while (--len >= 0 && *p != sep) {
|
|
bv->bv_len++;
|
|
p++;
|
|
}
|
|
while (bv->bv_len > 0 && *--p == ' ')
|
|
bv->bv_len--;
|
|
return(bv->bv_len);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
BVarray
|
|
aci_set_gather (void *cookie, char *name, struct berval *attr)
|
|
{
|
|
AciSetCookie *cp = cookie;
|
|
BVarray bvals = NULL;
|
|
struct berval bv, ndn;
|
|
|
|
/* this routine needs to return the bervals instead of
|
|
* plain strings, since syntax is not known. It should
|
|
* also return the syntax or some "comparison cookie".
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
bv.bv_val = name;
|
|
bv.bv_len = strlen( name );
|
|
if (dnNormalize2(NULL, &bv, &ndn) == LDAP_SUCCESS) {
|
|
const char *text;
|
|
AttributeDescription *desc = NULL;
|
|
if (slap_bv2ad(attr, &desc, &text) == LDAP_SUCCESS) {
|
|
backend_attribute(cp->be, NULL, NULL,
|
|
cp->e, &ndn, desc, &bvals);
|
|
}
|
|
free(ndn.bv_val);
|
|
}
|
|
return(bvals);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
aci_match_set (
|
|
struct berval *subj,
|
|
Backend *be,
|
|
Entry *e,
|
|
Connection *conn,
|
|
Operation *op,
|
|
int setref
|
|
)
|
|
{
|
|
struct berval set = { 0, NULL };
|
|
int rc = 0;
|
|
AciSetCookie cookie;
|
|
|
|
if (setref == 0) {
|
|
ber_dupbv( &set, subj );
|
|
} else {
|
|
struct berval subjdn, ndn = { 0, NULL };
|
|
struct berval setat;
|
|
BVarray bvals;
|
|
const char *text;
|
|
AttributeDescription *desc = NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* format of string is "entry/setAttrName" */
|
|
if (aci_get_part(subj, 0, '/', &subjdn) < 0) {
|
|
return(0);
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* FIXME: If dnNormalize was based on ldap_bv2dn
|
|
* instead of ldap_str2dn and would honor the bv_len
|
|
* we could skip this step and not worry about the
|
|
* unterminated string.
|
|
*/
|
|
char *s = ch_malloc(subjdn.bv_len + 1);
|
|
AC_MEMCPY(s, subjdn.bv_val, subjdn.bv_len);
|
|
subjdn.bv_val = s;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ( aci_get_part(subj, 1, '/', &setat) < 0 ) {
|
|
setat.bv_val = SLAPD_ACI_SET_ATTR;
|
|
setat.bv_len = sizeof(SLAPD_ACI_SET_ATTR)-1;
|
|
}
|
|
if ( setat.bv_val != NULL ) {
|
|
if ( dnNormalize2(NULL, &subjdn, &ndn) == LDAP_SUCCESS
|
|
&& slap_bv2ad(&setat, &desc, &text) == LDAP_SUCCESS )
|
|
{
|
|
backend_attribute(be, NULL, NULL, e,
|
|
&ndn, desc, &bvals);
|
|
if ( bvals != NULL ) {
|
|
if ( bvals[0].bv_val != NULL ) {
|
|
int i;
|
|
set = bvals[0];
|
|
bvals[0].bv_val = NULL;
|
|
for (i=1;bvals[i].bv_val;i++);
|
|
bvals[0].bv_val = bvals[i-1].bv_val;
|
|
bvals[i-1].bv_val = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
bvarray_free(bvals);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (ndn.bv_val)
|
|
free(ndn.bv_val);
|
|
}
|
|
ch_free(subjdn.bv_val);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (set.bv_val != NULL) {
|
|
cookie.be = be;
|
|
cookie.e = e;
|
|
cookie.conn = conn;
|
|
cookie.op = op;
|
|
rc = (slap_set_filter(aci_set_gather, &cookie, &set,
|
|
op->o_ndn.bv_val, e->e_ndn, NULL) > 0);
|
|
ch_free(set.bv_val);
|
|
}
|
|
return(rc);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef SLAPD_ACI_ENABLED
|
|
static int
|
|
aci_list_map_rights(
|
|
struct berval *list )
|
|
{
|
|
struct berval bv;
|
|
slap_access_t mask;
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
ACL_INIT(mask);
|
|
for (i = 0; aci_get_part(list, i, ',', &bv) >= 0; i++) {
|
|
if (bv.bv_len <= 0)
|
|
continue;
|
|
switch (*bv.bv_val) {
|
|
case 'c':
|
|
ACL_PRIV_SET(mask, ACL_PRIV_COMPARE);
|
|
break;
|
|
case 's':
|
|
/* **** NOTE: draft-ietf-ldapext-aci-model-0.3.txt defines
|
|
* the right 's' to mean "set", but in the examples states
|
|
* that the right 's' means "search". The latter definition
|
|
* is used here.
|
|
*/
|
|
ACL_PRIV_SET(mask, ACL_PRIV_SEARCH);
|
|
break;
|
|
case 'r':
|
|
ACL_PRIV_SET(mask, ACL_PRIV_READ);
|
|
break;
|
|
case 'w':
|
|
ACL_PRIV_SET(mask, ACL_PRIV_WRITE);
|
|
break;
|
|
case 'x':
|
|
/* **** NOTE: draft-ietf-ldapext-aci-model-0.3.txt does not
|
|
* define any equivalent to the AUTH right, so I've just used
|
|
* 'x' for now.
|
|
*/
|
|
ACL_PRIV_SET(mask, ACL_PRIV_AUTH);
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
return(mask);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
aci_list_has_attr(
|
|
struct berval *list,
|
|
const char *attr,
|
|
struct berval *val )
|
|
{
|
|
struct berval bv, left, right;
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; aci_get_part(list, i, ',', &bv) >= 0; i++) {
|
|
if (aci_get_part(&bv, 0, '=', &left) < 0
|
|
|| aci_get_part(&bv, 1, '=', &right) < 0)
|
|
{
|
|
if (aci_strbvcmp(attr, &bv) == 0)
|
|
return(1);
|
|
} else if (val == NULL) {
|
|
if (aci_strbvcmp(attr, &left) == 0)
|
|
return(1);
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (aci_strbvcmp(attr, &left) == 0) {
|
|
/* this is experimental code that implements a
|
|
* simple (prefix) match of the attribute value.
|
|
* the ACI draft does not provide for aci's that
|
|
* apply to specific values, but it would be
|
|
* nice to have. If the <attr> part of an aci's
|
|
* rights list is of the form <attr>=<value>,
|
|
* that means the aci applies only to attrs with
|
|
* the given value. Furthermore, if the attr is
|
|
* of the form <attr>=<value>*, then <value> is
|
|
* treated as a prefix, and the aci applies to
|
|
* any value with that prefix.
|
|
*
|
|
* Ideally, this would allow r.e. matches.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (aci_get_part(&right, 0, '*', &left) < 0
|
|
|| right.bv_len <= left.bv_len)
|
|
{
|
|
if (aci_strbvcmp(val->bv_val, &right) == 0)
|
|
return(1);
|
|
} else if (val->bv_len >= left.bv_len) {
|
|
if (strncasecmp( val->bv_val, left.bv_val, left.bv_len ) == 0)
|
|
return(1);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return(0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static slap_access_t
|
|
aci_list_get_attr_rights(
|
|
struct berval *list,
|
|
const char *attr,
|
|
struct berval *val )
|
|
{
|
|
struct berval bv;
|
|
slap_access_t mask;
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
/* loop through each rights/attr pair, skip first part (action) */
|
|
ACL_INIT(mask);
|
|
for (i = 1; aci_get_part(list, i + 1, ';', &bv) >= 0; i += 2) {
|
|
if (aci_list_has_attr(&bv, attr, val) == 0)
|
|
continue;
|
|
if (aci_get_part(list, i, ';', &bv) < 0)
|
|
continue;
|
|
mask |= aci_list_map_rights(&bv);
|
|
}
|
|
return(mask);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
aci_list_get_rights(
|
|
struct berval *list,
|
|
const char *attr,
|
|
struct berval *val,
|
|
slap_access_t *grant,
|
|
slap_access_t *deny )
|
|
{
|
|
struct berval perm, actn;
|
|
slap_access_t *mask;
|
|
int i, found;
|
|
|
|
if (attr == NULL || *attr == 0 || strcasecmp(attr, "entry") == 0) {
|
|
attr = "[entry]";
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
found = 0;
|
|
ACL_INIT(*grant);
|
|
ACL_INIT(*deny);
|
|
/* loop through each permissions clause */
|
|
for (i = 0; aci_get_part(list, i, '$', &perm) >= 0; i++) {
|
|
if (aci_get_part(&perm, 0, ';', &actn) < 0)
|
|
continue;
|
|
if (aci_strbvcmp( "grant", &actn ) == 0) {
|
|
mask = grant;
|
|
} else if (aci_strbvcmp( "deny", &actn ) == 0) {
|
|
mask = deny;
|
|
} else {
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
found = 1;
|
|
*mask |= aci_list_get_attr_rights(&perm, attr, val);
|
|
*mask |= aci_list_get_attr_rights(&perm, "[all]", NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
return(found);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
aci_group_member (
|
|
struct berval *subj,
|
|
struct berval *defgrpoc,
|
|
struct berval *defgrpat,
|
|
Backend *be,
|
|
Entry *e,
|
|
Connection *conn,
|
|
Operation *op,
|
|
regmatch_t *matches
|
|
)
|
|
{
|
|
struct berval bv;
|
|
char *subjdn;
|
|
struct berval grpoc;
|
|
struct berval grpat;
|
|
ObjectClass *grp_oc = NULL;
|
|
AttributeDescription *grp_ad = NULL;
|
|
const char *text;
|
|
int rc;
|
|
|
|
/* format of string is "group/objectClassValue/groupAttrName" */
|
|
if (aci_get_part(subj, 0, '/', &bv) < 0) {
|
|
return(0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
subjdn = aci_bvstrdup(&bv);
|
|
if (subjdn == NULL) {
|
|
return(0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (aci_get_part(subj, 1, '/', &grpoc) < 0) {
|
|
grpoc = *defgrpoc;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (aci_get_part(subj, 2, '/', &grpat) < 0) {
|
|
grpat = *defgrpat;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rc = slap_bv2ad( &grpat, &grp_ad, &text );
|
|
if( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
|
|
rc = 0;
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
rc = 0;
|
|
|
|
grp_oc = oc_bvfind( &grpoc );
|
|
|
|
if (grp_oc != NULL && grp_ad != NULL ) {
|
|
struct berval ndn;
|
|
bv.bv_val = (char *)ch_malloc(1024);
|
|
bv.bv_len = 1024;
|
|
string_expand(&bv, subjdn, e->e_ndn, matches);
|
|
if ( dnNormalize2(NULL, &bv, &ndn) == LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
|
|
rc = (backend_group(be, conn, op, e, &ndn, &op->o_ndn, grp_oc, grp_ad) == 0);
|
|
free( ndn.bv_val );
|
|
}
|
|
ch_free(bv.bv_val);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
ch_free(subjdn);
|
|
return(rc);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static struct berval GroupClass = {
|
|
sizeof(SLAPD_GROUP_CLASS)-1, SLAPD_GROUP_CLASS };
|
|
static struct berval GroupAttr = {
|
|
sizeof(SLAPD_GROUP_ATTR)-1, SLAPD_GROUP_ATTR };
|
|
static struct berval RoleClass = {
|
|
sizeof(SLAPD_ROLE_CLASS)-1, SLAPD_ROLE_CLASS };
|
|
static struct berval RoleAttr = {
|
|
sizeof(SLAPD_ROLE_ATTR)-1, SLAPD_ROLE_ATTR };
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
aci_mask(
|
|
Backend *be,
|
|
Connection *conn,
|
|
Operation *op,
|
|
Entry *e,
|
|
AttributeDescription *desc,
|
|
struct berval *val,
|
|
struct berval *aci,
|
|
regmatch_t *matches,
|
|
slap_access_t *grant,
|
|
slap_access_t *deny
|
|
)
|
|
{
|
|
struct berval bv, perms, sdn;
|
|
int rc;
|
|
char *attr = desc->ad_cname.bv_val;
|
|
|
|
assert( attr != NULL );
|
|
|
|
/* parse an aci of the form:
|
|
oid#scope#action;rights;attr;rights;attr$action;rights;attr;rights;attr#dnType#subjectDN
|
|
|
|
See draft-ietf-ldapext-aci-model-04.txt section 9.1 for
|
|
a full description of the format for this attribute.
|
|
|
|
For now, this routine only supports scope=entry.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/* check that the aci has all 5 components */
|
|
if (aci_get_part(aci, 4, '#', NULL) < 0)
|
|
return(0);
|
|
|
|
/* check that the aci family is supported */
|
|
if (aci_get_part(aci, 0, '#', &bv) < 0)
|
|
return(0);
|
|
|
|
/* check that the scope is "entry" */
|
|
if (aci_get_part(aci, 1, '#', &bv) < 0
|
|
|| aci_strbvcmp( "entry", &bv ) != 0)
|
|
{
|
|
return(0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* get the list of permissions clauses, bail if empty */
|
|
if (aci_get_part(aci, 2, '#', &perms) <= 0)
|
|
return(0);
|
|
|
|
/* check if any permissions allow desired access */
|
|
if (aci_list_get_rights(&perms, attr, val, grant, deny) == 0)
|
|
return(0);
|
|
|
|
/* see if we have a DN match */
|
|
if (aci_get_part(aci, 3, '#', &bv) < 0)
|
|
return(0);
|
|
|
|
if (aci_get_part(aci, 4, '#', &sdn) < 0)
|
|
return(0);
|
|
|
|
if (aci_strbvcmp( "access-id", &bv ) == 0) {
|
|
struct berval ndn;
|
|
rc = 1;
|
|
if ( dnNormalize2(NULL, &sdn, &ndn) == LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
|
|
if (strcasecmp(op->o_ndn.bv_val, ndn.bv_val) != 0)
|
|
rc = 0;
|
|
free(ndn.bv_val);
|
|
}
|
|
return(rc);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (aci_strbvcmp( "self", &bv ) == 0) {
|
|
if (dn_match(&op->o_ndn, &e->e_nname))
|
|
return(1);
|
|
|
|
} else if (aci_strbvcmp( "dnattr", &bv ) == 0) {
|
|
char *dnattr = aci_bvstrdup(&sdn);
|
|
Attribute *at;
|
|
AttributeDescription *ad = NULL;
|
|
const char *text;
|
|
|
|
rc = slap_str2ad( dnattr, &ad, &text );
|
|
ch_free( dnattr );
|
|
|
|
if( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rc = 0;
|
|
|
|
bv = op->o_ndn;
|
|
|
|
for(at = attrs_find( e->e_attrs, ad );
|
|
at != NULL;
|
|
at = attrs_find( at->a_next, ad ) )
|
|
{
|
|
if (value_find( ad, at->a_vals, &bv) == 0 ) {
|
|
rc = 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
|
|
} else if (aci_strbvcmp( "group", &bv ) == 0) {
|
|
if (aci_group_member(&sdn, &GroupClass, &GroupAttr, be, e, conn, op, matches))
|
|
return(1);
|
|
|
|
} else if (aci_strbvcmp( "role", &bv ) == 0) {
|
|
if (aci_group_member(&sdn, &RoleClass, &RoleAttr, be, e, conn, op, matches))
|
|
return(1);
|
|
|
|
} else if (aci_strbvcmp( "set", &bv ) == 0) {
|
|
if (aci_match_set(&sdn, be, e, conn, op, 0))
|
|
return(1);
|
|
|
|
} else if (aci_strbvcmp( "set-ref", &bv ) == 0) {
|
|
if (aci_match_set(&sdn, be, e, conn, op, 1))
|
|
return(1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return(0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif /* SLAPD_ACI_ENABLED */
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
string_expand(
|
|
struct berval *bv,
|
|
char *pat,
|
|
char *match,
|
|
regmatch_t *matches)
|
|
{
|
|
ber_len_t size;
|
|
char *sp;
|
|
char *dp;
|
|
int flag;
|
|
|
|
size = 0;
|
|
bv->bv_val[0] = '\0';
|
|
bv->bv_len--; /* leave space for lone $ */
|
|
|
|
flag = 0;
|
|
for ( dp = bv->bv_val, sp = pat; size < bv->bv_len && *sp ; sp++) {
|
|
/* did we previously see a $ */
|
|
if (flag) {
|
|
if (*sp == '$') {
|
|
*dp++ = '$';
|
|
size++;
|
|
} else if (*sp >= '0' && *sp <= '9' ) {
|
|
int n;
|
|
int i;
|
|
int l;
|
|
|
|
n = *sp - '0';
|
|
*dp = '\0';
|
|
i = matches[n].rm_so;
|
|
l = matches[n].rm_eo;
|
|
for ( ; size < bv->bv_len && i < l; size++, i++ ) {
|
|
*dp++ = match[i];
|
|
size++;
|
|
}
|
|
*dp = '\0';
|
|
}
|
|
flag = 0;
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (*sp == '$') {
|
|
flag = 1;
|
|
} else {
|
|
*dp++ = *sp;
|
|
size++;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (flag) {
|
|
/* must have ended with a single $ */
|
|
*dp++ = '$';
|
|
size++;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*dp = '\0';
|
|
bv->bv_len = size;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef NEW_LOGGING
|
|
LDAP_LOG(( "aci", LDAP_LEVEL_DETAIL1,
|
|
"string_expand: pattern = %s\n", pat ));
|
|
LDAP_LOG(( "aci", LDAP_LEVEL_DETAIL1,
|
|
"string_expand: expanded = %s\n", bv->bv_val ));
|
|
#else
|
|
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, "=> string_expand: pattern: %s\n", pat, 0, 0 );
|
|
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, "=> string_expand: expanded: %s\n", bv->bv_val, 0, 0 );
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
regex_matches(
|
|
char *pat, /* pattern to expand and match against */
|
|
char *str, /* string to match against pattern */
|
|
char *buf, /* buffer with $N expansion variables */
|
|
regmatch_t *matches /* offsets in buffer for $N expansion variables */
|
|
)
|
|
{
|
|
regex_t re;
|
|
char newbuf[512];
|
|
struct berval bv = {sizeof(newbuf), newbuf};
|
|
int rc;
|
|
|
|
if(str == NULL) str = "";
|
|
|
|
string_expand(&bv, pat, buf, matches);
|
|
if (( rc = regcomp(&re, newbuf, REG_EXTENDED|REG_ICASE))) {
|
|
char error[512];
|
|
regerror(rc, &re, error, sizeof(error));
|
|
|
|
#ifdef NEW_LOGGING
|
|
LDAP_LOG(( "aci", LDAP_LEVEL_ERR,
|
|
"regex_matches: compile( \"%s\", \"%s\") failed %s\n",
|
|
pat, str, error ));
|
|
#else
|
|
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE,
|
|
"compile( \"%s\", \"%s\") failed %s\n",
|
|
pat, str, error );
|
|
#endif
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rc = regexec(&re, str, 0, NULL, 0);
|
|
regfree( &re );
|
|
|
|
#ifdef NEW_LOGGING
|
|
LDAP_LOG(( "aci", LDAP_LEVEL_DETAIL2,
|
|
"regex_matches: string: %s\n", str ));
|
|
LDAP_LOG(( "aci", LDAP_LEVEL_DETAIL2,
|
|
"regex_matches: rc: %d %s\n",
|
|
rc, rc ? "matches" : "no matches" ));
|
|
#else
|
|
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE,
|
|
"=> regex_matches: string: %s\n", str, 0, 0 );
|
|
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE,
|
|
"=> regex_matches: rc: %d %s\n",
|
|
rc, !rc ? "matches" : "no matches", 0 );
|
|
#endif
|
|
return( !rc );
|
|
}
|
|
|