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openldap/doc/rfc/rfc4531.txt
Kurt Zeilenga 019dcb7589 New LDAP RFCs, including the revised LDAP TS
2006-06-09 03:19:14 +00:00

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Network Working Group K. Zeilenga
Request for Comments: 4531 OpenLDAP Foundation
Category: Experimental June 2006
Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP)
Turn Operation
Status of This Memo
This memo defines an Experimental Protocol for the Internet
community. It does not specify an Internet standard of any kind.
Discussion and suggestions for improvement are requested.
Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).
Abstract
This specification describes a Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
(LDAP) extended operation to reverse (or "turn") the roles of client
and server for subsequent protocol exchanges in the session, or to
enable each peer to act as both client and server with respect to the
other.
Table of Contents
1. Background and Intent of Use ....................................2
1.1. Terminology ................................................2
2. Turn Operation ..................................................2
2.1. Turn Request ...............................................3
2.2. Turn Response ..............................................3
3. Authentication ..................................................3
3.1. Use with TLS and Simple Authentication .....................4
3.2. Use with TLS and SASL EXTERNAL .............................4
3.3. Use of Mutual Authentication and SASL EXTERNAL .............4
4. TLS and SASL Security Layers ....................................5
5. Security Considerations .........................................6
6. IANA Considerations .............................................6
6.1. Object Identifier ..........................................6
6.2. LDAP Protocol Mechanism ....................................7
7. References ......................................................7
7.1. Normative References .......................................7
7.2. Informative References .....................................8
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RFC 4531 LDAP Turn Operation June 2006
1. Background and Intent of Use
The Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) [RFC4510][RFC4511]
is a client-server protocol that typically operates over reliable
octet-stream transports, such as the Transport Control Protocol
(TCP). Generally, the client initiates the stream by connecting to
the server's listener at some well-known address.
There are cases where it is desirable for the server to initiate the
stream. Although it certainly is possible to write a technical
specification detailing how to implement server-initiated LDAP
sessions, this would require the design of new authentication and
other security mechanisms to support server-initiated LDAP sessions.
Instead, this document introduces an operation, the Turn operation,
which may be used to reverse the client-server roles of the protocol
peers. This allows the initiating protocol peer to become the server
(after the reversal).
As an additional feature, the Turn operation may be used to allow
both peers to act in both roles. This is useful where both peers are
directory servers that desire to request, as LDAP clients, that
operations be performed by the other. This may be useful in
replicated and/or distributed environments.
This operation is intended to be used between protocol peers that
have established a mutual agreement, by means outside of the
protocol, that requires reversal of client-server roles, or allows
both peers to act both as client and server.
1.1. Terminology
Protocol elements are described using ASN.1 [X.680] with implicit
tags. The term "BER-encoded" means the element is to be encoded
using the Basic Encoding Rules [X.690] under the restrictions
detailed in Section 5.1 of [RFC4511].
2. Turn Operation
The Turn operation is defined as an LDAP-Extended Operation
[Protocol, Section 4.12] identified by the 1.3.6.1.1.19 OID. The
function of the Turn Operation is to request that the client-server
roles be reversed, or, optionally, to request that both protocol
peers be able to act both as client and server in respect to the
other.
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RFC 4531 LDAP Turn Operation June 2006
2.1. Turn Request
The Turn request is an ExtendedRequest where the requestName field
contains the 1.3.6.1.1.19 OID and the requestValue field is a BER-
encoded turnValue:
turnValue ::= SEQUENCE {
mutual BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
identifier LDAPString
}
A TRUE mutual field value indicates a request to allow both peers to
act both as client and server. A FALSE mutual field value indicates
a request to reserve the client and server roles.
The value of the identifier field is a locally defined policy
identifier (typically associated with a mutual agreement for which
this turn is be executed as part of).
2.2. Turn Response
A Turn response is an ExtendedResponse where the responseName and
responseValue fields are absent. A resultCode of success is returned
if and only if the responder is willing and able to turn the session
as requested. Otherwise, a different resultCode is returned.
3. Authentication
This extension's authentication model assumes separate authentication
of the peers in each of their roles. A separate Bind exchange is
expected between the peers in their new roles to establish identities
in these roles.
Upon completion of the Turn, the responding peer in its new client
role has an anonymous association at the initiating peer in its new
server role. If the turn was mutual, the authentication association
of the initiating peer in its pre-existing client role is left intact
at the responding peer in its pre-existing server role. If the turn
was not mutual, this association is void.
The responding peer may establish its identity in its client role by
requesting and successfully completing a Bind operation.
The remainder of this section discusses some authentication
scenarios. In the protocol exchange illustrations, A refers to the
initiating peer (the original client) and B refers to the responding
peer (the original server).
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3.1. Use with TLS and Simple Authentication
A->B: StartTLS Request
B->A: StartTLS(success) Response
A->B: Bind(Simple(cn=B,dc=example,dc=net,B's secret)) Request
B->A: Bind(success) Response
A->B: Turn(TRUE,"XXYYZ") Request
B->A: Turn(success) Response
B->A: Bind(Simple(cn=A,dc=example,dc=net,A's secret)) Request
A->B: Bind(success) Response
In this scenario, TLS (Transport Layer Security) [RFC4346] is started
and the initiating peer (the original client) establishes its
identity with the responding peer prior to the Turn using the
DN/password mechanism of the Simple method of the Bind operation.
After the turn, the responding peer, in its new client role,
establishes its identity with the initiating peer in its new server
role.
3.2. Use with TLS and SASL EXTERNAL
A->B: StartTLS Request
B->A: StartTLS(success) Response
A->B: Bind(SASL(EXTERNAL)) Request
B->A: Bind(success) Response
A->B: Turn(TRUE,"XXYYZ") Request
B->A: Turn(success) Response
B->A: Bind(SASL(EXTERNAL)) Request
A->B: Bind(success) Response
In this scenario, TLS is started (with each peer providing a valid
certificate), and the initiating peer (the original client)
establishes its identity through the use of the EXTERNAL mechanism of
the SASL (Simple Authentication and Security Layer) [RFC4422] method
of the Bind operation prior to the Turn. After the turn, the
responding peer, in its new client role, establishes its identity
with the initiating peer in its new server role.
3.3. Use of Mutual Authentication and SASL EXTERNAL
A number of SASL mechanisms, such as GSSAPI [SASL-K5], support mutual
authentication. The initiating peer, in its new server role, may use
the identity of the responding peer, established by a prior
authentication exchange, as its source for "external" identity in
subsequent EXTERNAL exchange.
A->B: Bind(SASL(GSSAPI)) Request
<intermediate messages>
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B->A: Bind(success) Response
A->B: Turn(TRUE,"XXYYZ") Request
B->A: Turn(success) Response
B->A: Bind(SASL(EXTERNAL)) Request
A->B: Bind(success) Response
In this scenario, a GSSAPI mutual-authentication exchange is
completed between the initiating peer (the original client) and the
responding server (the original server) prior to the turn. After the
turn, the responding peer, in its new client role, requests that the
initiating peer utilize an "external" identity to establish its LDAP
authorization identity.
4. TLS and SASL Security Layers
As described in [RFC4511], LDAP supports both Transport Layer
Security (TLS) [RFC4346] and Simple Authentication and Security Layer
(SASL) [RFC4422] security frameworks. The following table
illustrates the relationship between the LDAP message layer, SASL
layer, TLS layer, and transport connection within an LDAP session.
+----------------------+
| LDAP message layer |
+----------------------+ > LDAP PDUs
+----------------------+ < data
| SASL layer |
+----------------------+ > SASL-protected data
+----------------------+ < data
| TLS layer |
Application +----------------------+ > TLS-protected data
------------+----------------------+ < data
Transport | transport connection |
+----------------------+
This extension does not alter this relationship, nor does it remove
the general restriction against multiple TLS layers, nor does it
remove the general restriction against multiple SASL layers.
As specified in [RFC4511], the StartTLS operation is used to initiate
negotiation of a TLS layer. If a TLS is already installed, the
StartTLS operation must fail. Upon establishment of the TLS layer,
regardless of which peer issued the request to start TLS, the peer
that initiated the LDAP session (the original client) performs the
"server identity check", as described in Section 3.1.5 of [RFC4513],
treating itself as the "client" and its peer as the "server".
As specified in [RFC4422], a newly negotiated SASL security layer
replaces the installed SASL security layer. Though the client/server
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RFC 4531 LDAP Turn Operation June 2006
roles in LDAP, and hence SASL, may be reversed in subsequent
exchanges, only one SASL security layer may be installed at any
instance.
5. Security Considerations
Implementors should be aware that the reversing of client/server
roles and/or allowing both peers to act as client and server likely
introduces security considerations not foreseen by the authors of
this document. In particular, the security implications of the
design choices made in the authentication and data security models
for this extension (discussed in Sections 3 and 4, respectively) are
not fully studied. It is hoped that experimentation with this
extension will lead to better understanding of the security
implications of these models and other aspects of this extension, and
that appropriate considerations will be documented in a future
document. The following security considerations are apparent at this
time.
Implementors should take special care to process LDAP, SASL, TLS, and
other events in the appropriate roles for the peers. Note that while
the Turn reverses the client/server roles with LDAP, and in SASL
authentication exchanges, it does not reverse the roles within the
TLS layer or the transport connection.
The responding server (the original server) should restrict use of
this operation to authorized clients. Client knowledge of a valid
identifier should not be the sole factor in determining authorization
to turn.
Where the peers except to establish TLS, TLS should be started prior
to the Turn and any request to authenticate via the Bind operation.
LDAP security considerations [RFC4511][RFC4513] generally apply to
this extension.
6. IANA Considerations
The following values [RFC4520] have been registered by the IANA.
6.1. Object Identifier
The IANA has assigned an LDAP Object Identifier to identify the LDAP
Turn Operation, as defined in this document.
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RFC 4531 LDAP Turn Operation June 2006
Subject: Request for LDAP Object Identifier Registration
Person & email address to contact for further information:
Kurt Zeilenga <kurt@OpenLDAP.org>
Specification: RFC 4531
Author/Change Controller: Author
Comments:
Identifies the LDAP Turn Operation
6.2. LDAP Protocol Mechanism
The IANA has registered the LDAP Protocol Mechanism described in this
document.
Subject: Request for LDAP Protocol Mechanism Registration
Object Identifier: 1.3.6.1.1.19
Description: LDAP Turn Operation
Person & email address to contact for further information:
Kurt Zeilenga <kurt@openldap.org>
Usage: Extended Operation
Specification: RFC 4531
Author/Change Controller: Author
Comments: none
7. References
7.1. Normative References
[RFC4346] Dierks, T. and, E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer
Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.1", RFC 4346, April
2006.
[RFC4422] Melnikov, A., Ed. and K. Zeilenga, Ed., "Simple
Authentication and Security Layer (SASL)", RFC 4422,
June 2006.
[RFC4510] Zeilenga, K., Ed., "Lightweight Directory Access
Protocol (LDAP): Technical Specification Road Map", RFC
4510, June 2006.
[RFC4511] Sermersheim, J., Ed., "Lightweight Directory Access
Protocol (LDAP): The Protocol", RFC 4511, June 2006.
[RFC4513] Harrison, R., Ed., "Lightweight Directory Access
Protocol (LDAP): Authentication Methods and Security
Mechanisms", RFC 4513, June 2006.
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[X.680] International Telecommunication Union -
Telecommunication Standardization Sector, "Abstract
Syntax Notation One (ASN.1) - Specification of Basic
Notation", X.680(2002) (also ISO/IEC 8824-1:2002).
[X.690] International Telecommunication Union -
Telecommunication Standardization Sector,
"Specification of ASN.1 encoding rules: Basic Encoding
Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER), and
Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)", X.690(2002) (also
ISO/IEC 8825-1:2002).
7.2. Informative References
[RFC4520] Zeilenga, K., "Internet Assigned Numbers Authority
(IANA) Considerations for the Lightweight Directory
Access Protocol (LDAP)", BCP 64, RFC 4520, June 2006.
[SASL-K5] Melnikov, A., Ed., "The Kerberos V5 ("GSSAPI") SASL
Mechanism", Work in Progress, May 2006.
Author's Address
Kurt D. Zeilenga
OpenLDAP Foundation
EMail: Kurt@OpenLDAP.org
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RFC 4531 LDAP Turn Operation June 2006
Full Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).
This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
retain all their rights.
This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
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OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET
ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,
INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE
INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
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Acknowledgement
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