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openldap/servers/slapd/sasl.c
Howard Chu ba68a94f11 Plug global_host race condition/leak
2007-01-25 12:16:55 +00:00

1805 lines
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/* $OpenLDAP$ */
/* This work is part of OpenLDAP Software <http://www.openldap.org/>.
*
* Copyright 1998-2007 The OpenLDAP Foundation.
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted only as authorized by the OpenLDAP
* Public License.
*
* A copy of this license is available in the file LICENSE in the
* top-level directory of the distribution or, alternatively, at
* <http://www.OpenLDAP.org/license.html>.
*/
#include "portable.h"
#include <stdio.h>
#ifdef HAVE_LIMITS_H
#include <limits.h>
#endif
#include <ac/stdlib.h>
#include <ac/string.h>
#include <lber.h>
#include <ldap_log.h>
#include "slap.h"
#ifdef HAVE_CYRUS_SASL
# ifdef HAVE_SASL_SASL_H
# include <sasl/sasl.h>
# else
# include <sasl.h>
# endif
# if SASL_VERSION_MAJOR >= 2
# ifdef HAVE_SASL_SASL_H
# include <sasl/saslplug.h>
# else
# include <saslplug.h>
# endif
# define SASL_CONST const
# else
# define SASL_CONST
# endif
#define SASL_VERSION_FULL ((SASL_VERSION_MAJOR << 16) |\
(SASL_VERSION_MINOR << 8) | SASL_VERSION_STEP)
static sasl_security_properties_t sasl_secprops;
#elif defined( SLAP_BUILTIN_SASL )
/*
* built-in SASL implementation
* only supports EXTERNAL
*/
typedef struct sasl_ctx {
slap_ssf_t sc_external_ssf;
struct berval sc_external_id;
} SASL_CTX;
#endif
#include <lutil.h>
static struct berval ext_bv = BER_BVC( "EXTERNAL" );
#ifdef HAVE_CYRUS_SASL
int
slap_sasl_log(
void *context,
int priority,
const char *message)
{
Connection *conn = context;
int level;
const char * label;
if ( message == NULL ) {
return SASL_BADPARAM;
}
switch (priority) {
#if SASL_VERSION_MAJOR >= 2
case SASL_LOG_NONE:
level = LDAP_DEBUG_NONE;
label = "None";
break;
case SASL_LOG_ERR:
level = LDAP_DEBUG_ANY;
label = "Error";
break;
case SASL_LOG_FAIL:
level = LDAP_DEBUG_ANY;
label = "Failure";
break;
case SASL_LOG_WARN:
level = LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE;
label = "Warning";
break;
case SASL_LOG_NOTE:
level = LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE;
label = "Notice";
break;
case SASL_LOG_DEBUG:
level = LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE;
label = "Debug";
break;
case SASL_LOG_TRACE:
level = LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE;
label = "Trace";
break;
case SASL_LOG_PASS:
level = LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE;
label = "Password Trace";
break;
#else
case SASL_LOG_ERR:
level = LDAP_DEBUG_ANY;
label = "Error";
break;
case SASL_LOG_WARNING:
level = LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE;
label = "Warning";
break;
case SASL_LOG_INFO:
level = LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE;
label = "Info";
break;
#endif
default:
return SASL_BADPARAM;
}
Debug( level, "SASL [conn=%ld] %s: %s\n",
conn ? conn->c_connid: -1,
label, message );
return SASL_OK;
}
#if SASL_VERSION_MAJOR >= 2
static const char *slap_propnames[] = {
"*slapConn", "*slapAuthcDN", "*slapAuthzDN", NULL };
static Filter generic_filter = { LDAP_FILTER_PRESENT, { 0 }, NULL };
static struct berval generic_filterstr = BER_BVC("(objectclass=*)");
#define SLAP_SASL_PROP_CONN 0
#define SLAP_SASL_PROP_AUTHC 1
#define SLAP_SASL_PROP_AUTHZ 2
#define SLAP_SASL_PROP_COUNT 3 /* Number of properties we used */
typedef struct lookup_info {
int flags;
const struct propval *list;
sasl_server_params_t *sparams;
} lookup_info;
static slap_response sasl_ap_lookup;
static struct berval sc_cleartext = BER_BVC("{CLEARTEXT}");
static int
sasl_ap_lookup( Operation *op, SlapReply *rs )
{
BerVarray bv;
AttributeDescription *ad;
Attribute *a;
const char *text;
int rc, i;
lookup_info *sl = (lookup_info *)op->o_callback->sc_private;
if (rs->sr_type != REP_SEARCH) return 0;
for( i = 0; sl->list[i].name; i++ ) {
const char *name = sl->list[i].name;
if ( name[0] == '*' ) {
if ( sl->flags & SASL_AUXPROP_AUTHZID ) continue;
/* Skip our private properties */
if ( !strcmp( name, slap_propnames[0] )) {
i += SLAP_SASL_PROP_COUNT - 1;
continue;
}
name++;
} else if ( !(sl->flags & SASL_AUXPROP_AUTHZID ) )
continue;
if ( sl->list[i].values ) {
if ( !(sl->flags & SASL_AUXPROP_OVERRIDE) ) continue;
}
ad = NULL;
rc = slap_str2ad( name, &ad, &text );
if ( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE,
"slap_ap_lookup: str2ad(%s): %s\n", name, text, 0 );
continue;
}
/* If it's the rootdn and a rootpw was present, we already set
* it so don't override it here.
*/
if ( ad == slap_schema.si_ad_userPassword && sl->list[i].values &&
be_isroot_dn( op->o_bd, &op->o_req_ndn ))
continue;
a = attr_find( rs->sr_entry->e_attrs, ad );
if ( !a ) continue;
if ( ! access_allowed( op, rs->sr_entry, ad, NULL, ACL_AUTH, NULL ) ) {
continue;
}
if ( sl->list[i].values && ( sl->flags & SASL_AUXPROP_OVERRIDE ) ) {
sl->sparams->utils->prop_erase( sl->sparams->propctx,
sl->list[i].name );
}
for ( bv = a->a_vals; bv->bv_val; bv++ ) {
/* ITS#3846 don't give hashed passwords to SASL */
if ( ad == slap_schema.si_ad_userPassword &&
bv->bv_val[0] == '{' /*}*/ )
{
if ( lutil_passwd_scheme( bv->bv_val ) ) {
/* If it's not a recognized scheme, just assume it's
* a cleartext password that happened to include brackets.
*
* If it's a recognized scheme, skip this value, unless the
* scheme is {CLEARTEXT}. In that case, skip over the
* scheme name and use the remainder. If there is nothing
* past the scheme name, skip this value.
*/
#ifdef SLAPD_CLEARTEXT
if ( !ber_bvstrcasecmp( bv, &sc_cleartext ) ) {
struct berval cbv;
cbv.bv_len = bv->bv_len - sc_cleartext.bv_len;
if ( cbv.bv_len > 0 ) {
cbv.bv_val = bv->bv_val + sc_cleartext.bv_len;
sl->sparams->utils->prop_set( sl->sparams->propctx,
sl->list[i].name, cbv.bv_val, cbv.bv_len );
}
}
#endif
continue;
}
}
sl->sparams->utils->prop_set( sl->sparams->propctx,
sl->list[i].name, bv->bv_val, bv->bv_len );
}
}
return LDAP_SUCCESS;
}
static void
slap_auxprop_lookup(
void *glob_context,
sasl_server_params_t *sparams,
unsigned flags,
const char *user,
unsigned ulen)
{
Operation op = {0};
int i, doit = 0;
Connection *conn = NULL;
lookup_info sl;
sl.list = sparams->utils->prop_get( sparams->propctx );
sl.sparams = sparams;
sl.flags = flags;
/* Find our DN and conn first */
for( i = 0; sl.list[i].name; i++ ) {
if ( sl.list[i].name[0] == '*' ) {
if ( !strcmp( sl.list[i].name, slap_propnames[SLAP_SASL_PROP_CONN] ) ) {
if ( sl.list[i].values && sl.list[i].values[0] )
AC_MEMCPY( &conn, sl.list[i].values[0], sizeof( conn ) );
continue;
}
if ( (flags & SASL_AUXPROP_AUTHZID) &&
!strcmp( sl.list[i].name, slap_propnames[SLAP_SASL_PROP_AUTHZ] ) ) {
if ( sl.list[i].values && sl.list[i].values[0] )
AC_MEMCPY( &op.o_req_ndn, sl.list[i].values[0], sizeof( struct berval ) );
break;
}
if ( !strcmp( sl.list[i].name, slap_propnames[SLAP_SASL_PROP_AUTHC] ) ) {
if ( sl.list[i].values && sl.list[i].values[0] ) {
AC_MEMCPY( &op.o_req_ndn, sl.list[i].values[0], sizeof( struct berval ) );
if ( !(flags & SASL_AUXPROP_AUTHZID) )
break;
}
}
}
}
/* Now see what else needs to be fetched */
for( i = 0; sl.list[i].name; i++ ) {
const char *name = sl.list[i].name;
if ( name[0] == '*' ) {
if ( flags & SASL_AUXPROP_AUTHZID ) continue;
/* Skip our private properties */
if ( !strcmp( name, slap_propnames[0] )) {
i += SLAP_SASL_PROP_COUNT - 1;
continue;
}
name++;
} else if ( !(flags & SASL_AUXPROP_AUTHZID ) )
continue;
if ( sl.list[i].values ) {
if ( !(flags & SASL_AUXPROP_OVERRIDE) ) continue;
}
doit = 1;
break;
}
if (doit) {
slap_callback cb = { NULL, sasl_ap_lookup, NULL, NULL };
cb.sc_private = &sl;
op.o_bd = select_backend( &op.o_req_ndn, 0, 1 );
if ( op.o_bd ) {
/* For rootdn, see if we can use the rootpw */
if ( be_isroot_dn( op.o_bd, &op.o_req_ndn ) &&
!BER_BVISEMPTY( &op.o_bd->be_rootpw )) {
struct berval cbv = BER_BVNULL;
/* If there's a recognized scheme, see if it's CLEARTEXT */
if ( lutil_passwd_scheme( op.o_bd->be_rootpw.bv_val )) {
if ( !strncasecmp( op.o_bd->be_rootpw.bv_val,
sc_cleartext.bv_val, sc_cleartext.bv_len )) {
/* If it's CLEARTEXT, skip past scheme spec */
cbv.bv_len = op.o_bd->be_rootpw.bv_len -
sc_cleartext.bv_len;
if ( cbv.bv_len ) {
cbv.bv_val = op.o_bd->be_rootpw.bv_val +
sc_cleartext.bv_len;
}
}
/* No scheme, use the whole value */
} else {
cbv = op.o_bd->be_rootpw;
}
if ( !BER_BVISEMPTY( &cbv )) {
for( i = 0; sl.list[i].name; i++ ) {
const char *name = sl.list[i].name;
if ( name[0] == '*' ) {
if ( flags & SASL_AUXPROP_AUTHZID ) continue;
name++;
} else if ( !(flags & SASL_AUXPROP_AUTHZID ) )
continue;
if ( !strcasecmp(name,"userPassword") ) {
sl.sparams->utils->prop_set( sl.sparams->propctx,
sl.list[i].name, cbv.bv_val, cbv.bv_len );
break;
}
}
}
}
if ( op.o_bd->be_search ) {
SlapReply rs = {REP_RESULT};
op.o_hdr = conn->c_sasl_bindop->o_hdr;
op.o_tag = LDAP_REQ_SEARCH;
op.o_dn = conn->c_ndn;
op.o_ndn = conn->c_ndn;
op.o_callback = &cb;
slap_op_time( &op.o_time, &op.o_tincr );
op.o_do_not_cache = 1;
op.o_is_auth_check = 1;
op.o_req_dn = op.o_req_ndn;
op.ors_scope = LDAP_SCOPE_BASE;
op.ors_deref = LDAP_DEREF_NEVER;
op.ors_tlimit = SLAP_NO_LIMIT;
op.ors_slimit = 1;
op.ors_filter = &generic_filter;
op.ors_filterstr = generic_filterstr;
/* FIXME: we want all attributes, right? */
op.ors_attrs = NULL;
op.o_bd->be_search( &op, &rs );
}
}
}
}
#if SASL_VERSION_FULL >= 0x020110
static int
slap_auxprop_store(
void *glob_context,
sasl_server_params_t *sparams,
struct propctx *prctx,
const char *user,
unsigned ulen)
{
Operation op = {0};
SlapReply rs = {REP_RESULT};
int rc, i, j;
Connection *conn = NULL;
const struct propval *pr;
Modifications *modlist = NULL, **modtail = &modlist, *mod;
slap_callback cb = { NULL, slap_null_cb, NULL, NULL };
char textbuf[SLAP_TEXT_BUFLEN];
const char *text;
size_t textlen = sizeof(textbuf);
/* just checking if we are enabled */
if (!prctx) return SASL_OK;
if (!sparams || !user) return SASL_BADPARAM;
pr = sparams->utils->prop_get( sparams->propctx );
/* Find our DN and conn first */
for( i = 0; pr[i].name; i++ ) {
if ( pr[i].name[0] == '*' ) {
if ( !strcmp( pr[i].name, slap_propnames[SLAP_SASL_PROP_CONN] ) ) {
if ( pr[i].values && pr[i].values[0] )
AC_MEMCPY( &conn, pr[i].values[0], sizeof( conn ) );
continue;
}
if ( !strcmp( pr[i].name, slap_propnames[SLAP_SASL_PROP_AUTHC] ) ) {
if ( pr[i].values && pr[i].values[0] ) {
AC_MEMCPY( &op.o_req_ndn, pr[i].values[0], sizeof( struct berval ) );
}
}
}
}
if (!conn || !op.o_req_ndn.bv_val) return SASL_BADPARAM;
op.o_bd = select_backend( &op.o_req_ndn, 0, 1 );
if ( !op.o_bd || !op.o_bd->be_modify ) return SASL_FAIL;
pr = sparams->utils->prop_get( prctx );
if (!pr) return SASL_BADPARAM;
for (i=0; pr[i].name; i++);
if (!i) return SASL_BADPARAM;
for (i=0; pr[i].name; i++) {
mod = (Modifications *)ch_malloc( sizeof(Modifications) );
mod->sml_op = LDAP_MOD_REPLACE;
mod->sml_flags = 0;
ber_str2bv( pr[i].name, 0, 0, &mod->sml_type );
mod->sml_values = (struct berval *)ch_malloc( (pr[i].nvalues + 1) *
sizeof(struct berval));
for (j=0; j<pr[i].nvalues; j++) {
ber_str2bv( pr[i].values[j], 0, 1, &mod->sml_values[j]);
}
BER_BVZERO( &mod->sml_values[j] );
mod->sml_nvalues = NULL;
mod->sml_desc = NULL;
*modtail = mod;
modtail = &mod->sml_next;
}
*modtail = NULL;
rc = slap_mods_check( &op, modlist, &text, textbuf, textlen, NULL );
if ( rc == LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
rc = slap_mods_no_user_mod_check( &op, modlist,
&text, textbuf, textlen );
if ( rc == LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
op.o_hdr = conn->c_sasl_bindop->o_hdr;
op.o_tag = LDAP_REQ_MODIFY;
op.o_ndn = op.o_req_ndn;
op.o_callback = &cb;
slap_op_time( &op.o_time, &op.o_tincr );
op.o_do_not_cache = 1;
op.o_is_auth_check = 1;
op.o_req_dn = op.o_req_ndn;
op.orm_modlist = modlist;
rc = op.o_bd->be_modify( &op, &rs );
}
}
slap_mods_free( modlist, 1 );
return rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ? SASL_FAIL : SASL_OK;
}
#endif /* SASL_VERSION_FULL >= 2.1.16 */
static sasl_auxprop_plug_t slap_auxprop_plugin = {
0, /* Features */
0, /* spare */
NULL, /* glob_context */
NULL, /* auxprop_free */
slap_auxprop_lookup,
"slapd", /* name */
#if SASL_VERSION_FULL >= 0x020110
slap_auxprop_store /* the declaration of this member changed
* in cyrus SASL from 2.1.15 to 2.1.16 */
#else
NULL
#endif
};
static int
slap_auxprop_init(
const sasl_utils_t *utils,
int max_version,
int *out_version,
sasl_auxprop_plug_t **plug,
const char *plugname)
{
if ( !out_version || !plug ) return SASL_BADPARAM;
if ( max_version < SASL_AUXPROP_PLUG_VERSION ) return SASL_BADVERS;
*out_version = SASL_AUXPROP_PLUG_VERSION;
*plug = &slap_auxprop_plugin;
return SASL_OK;
}
/* Convert a SASL authcid or authzid into a DN. Store the DN in an
* auxiliary property, so that we can refer to it in sasl_authorize
* without interfering with anything else. Also, the SASL username
* buffer is constrained to 256 characters, and our DNs could be
* much longer (SLAP_LDAPDN_MAXLEN, currently set to 8192)
*/
static int
slap_sasl_canonicalize(
sasl_conn_t *sconn,
void *context,
const char *in,
unsigned inlen,
unsigned flags,
const char *user_realm,
char *out,
unsigned out_max,
unsigned *out_len)
{
Connection *conn = (Connection *)context;
struct propctx *props = sasl_auxprop_getctx( sconn );
struct propval auxvals[ SLAP_SASL_PROP_COUNT ] = { { 0 } };
struct berval dn;
int rc, which;
const char *names[2];
struct berval bvin;
*out_len = 0;
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ARGS, "SASL Canonicalize [conn=%ld]: %s=\"%s\"\n",
conn ? conn->c_connid : -1,
(flags & SASL_CU_AUTHID) ? "authcid" : "authzid",
in ? in : "<empty>");
/* If name is too big, just truncate. We don't care, we're
* using DNs, not the usernames.
*/
if ( inlen > out_max )
inlen = out_max-1;
/* This is a Simple Bind using SPASSWD. That means the in-directory
* userPassword of the Binding user already points at SASL, so it
* cannot be used to actually satisfy a password comparison. Just
* ignore it, some other mech will process it.
*/
if ( !conn->c_sasl_bindop ||
conn->c_sasl_bindop->orb_method != LDAP_AUTH_SASL ) goto done;
/* See if we need to add request, can only do it once */
prop_getnames( props, slap_propnames, auxvals );
if ( !auxvals[0].name )
prop_request( props, slap_propnames );
if ( flags & SASL_CU_AUTHID )
which = SLAP_SASL_PROP_AUTHC;
else
which = SLAP_SASL_PROP_AUTHZ;
/* Need to store the Connection for auxprop_lookup */
if ( !auxvals[SLAP_SASL_PROP_CONN].values ) {
names[0] = slap_propnames[SLAP_SASL_PROP_CONN];
names[1] = NULL;
prop_set( props, names[0], (char *)&conn, sizeof( conn ) );
}
/* Already been here? */
if ( auxvals[which].values )
goto done;
/* Normally we require an authzID to have a u: or dn: prefix.
* However, SASL frequently gives us an authzID that is just
* an exact copy of the authcID, without a prefix. We need to
* detect and allow this condition. If SASL calls canonicalize
* with SASL_CU_AUTHID|SASL_CU_AUTHZID this is a no-brainer.
* But if it's broken into two calls, we need to remember the
* authcID so that we can compare the authzID later. We store
* the authcID temporarily in conn->c_sasl_dn. We necessarily
* finish Canonicalizing before Authorizing, so there is no
* conflict with slap_sasl_authorize's use of this temp var.
*
* The SASL EXTERNAL mech is backwards from all the other mechs,
* it does authzID before the authcID. If we see that authzID
* has already been done, don't do anything special with authcID.
*/
if ( flags == SASL_CU_AUTHID && !auxvals[SLAP_SASL_PROP_AUTHZ].values ) {
conn->c_sasl_dn.bv_val = (char *) in;
} else if ( flags == SASL_CU_AUTHZID && conn->c_sasl_dn.bv_val ) {
rc = strcmp( in, conn->c_sasl_dn.bv_val );
conn->c_sasl_dn.bv_val = NULL;
/* They were equal, no work needed */
if ( !rc ) goto done;
}
bvin.bv_val = (char *)in;
bvin.bv_len = inlen;
rc = slap_sasl_getdn( conn, NULL, &bvin, (char *)user_realm, &dn,
(flags & SASL_CU_AUTHID) ? SLAP_GETDN_AUTHCID : SLAP_GETDN_AUTHZID );
if ( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
sasl_seterror( sconn, 0, ldap_err2string( rc ) );
return SASL_NOAUTHZ;
}
names[0] = slap_propnames[which];
names[1] = NULL;
prop_set( props, names[0], (char *)&dn, sizeof( dn ) );
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ARGS, "SASL Canonicalize [conn=%ld]: %s=\"%s\"\n",
conn ? conn->c_connid : -1, names[0]+1,
dn.bv_val ? dn.bv_val : "<EMPTY>" );
done:
AC_MEMCPY( out, in, inlen );
out[inlen] = '\0';
*out_len = inlen;
return SASL_OK;
}
static int
slap_sasl_authorize(
sasl_conn_t *sconn,
void *context,
char *requested_user,
unsigned rlen,
char *auth_identity,
unsigned alen,
const char *def_realm,
unsigned urlen,
struct propctx *props)
{
Connection *conn = (Connection *)context;
/* actually:
* (SLAP_SASL_PROP_COUNT - 1) because we skip "conn",
* + 1 for NULL termination?
*/
struct propval auxvals[ SLAP_SASL_PROP_COUNT ] = { { 0 } };
struct berval authcDN, authzDN = BER_BVNULL;
int rc;
/* Simple Binds don't support proxy authorization, ignore it */
if ( !conn->c_sasl_bindop ||
conn->c_sasl_bindop->orb_method != LDAP_AUTH_SASL ) return SASL_OK;
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ARGS, "SASL proxy authorize [conn=%ld]: "
"authcid=\"%s\" authzid=\"%s\"\n",
conn ? conn->c_connid : -1, auth_identity, requested_user );
if ( conn->c_sasl_dn.bv_val ) {
ch_free( conn->c_sasl_dn.bv_val );
BER_BVZERO( &conn->c_sasl_dn );
}
/* Skip SLAP_SASL_PROP_CONN */
prop_getnames( props, slap_propnames+1, auxvals );
/* Should not happen */
if ( !auxvals[0].values ) {
sasl_seterror( sconn, 0, "invalid authcid" );
return SASL_NOAUTHZ;
}
AC_MEMCPY( &authcDN, auxvals[0].values[0], sizeof(authcDN) );
conn->c_sasl_dn = authcDN;
/* Nothing to do if no authzID was given */
if ( !auxvals[1].name || !auxvals[1].values ) {
goto ok;
}
AC_MEMCPY( &authzDN, auxvals[1].values[0], sizeof(authzDN) );
rc = slap_sasl_authorized( conn->c_sasl_bindop, &authcDN, &authzDN );
if ( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, "SASL Proxy Authorize [conn=%ld]: "
"proxy authorization disallowed (%d)\n",
(long) (conn ? conn->c_connid : -1), rc, 0 );
sasl_seterror( sconn, 0, "not authorized" );
ch_free( authzDN.bv_val );
return SASL_NOAUTHZ;
}
/* FIXME: we need yet another dup because slap_sasl_getdn()
* is using the bind operation slab */
if ( conn->c_sasl_bindop ) {
ber_dupbv( &conn->c_sasl_authz_dn, &authzDN );
slap_sl_free( authzDN.bv_val,
conn->c_sasl_bindop->o_tmpmemctx );
} else {
conn->c_sasl_authz_dn = authzDN;
}
ok:
if (conn->c_sasl_bindop) {
Statslog( LDAP_DEBUG_STATS,
"conn=%lu op=%lu BIND authcid=\"%s\" authzid=\"%s\"\n",
conn->c_connid, conn->c_sasl_bindop->o_opid,
auth_identity, requested_user, 0);
}
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, "SASL Authorize [conn=%ld]: "
" proxy authorization allowed authzDN=\"%s\"\n",
(long) (conn ? conn->c_connid : -1),
authzDN.bv_val ? authzDN.bv_val : "", 0 );
return SASL_OK;
}
#else
static int
slap_sasl_authorize(
void *context,
char *authcid,
char *authzid,
const char **user,
const char **errstr)
{
struct berval authcDN, authzDN = BER_BVNULL;
int rc;
Connection *conn = context;
char *realm;
struct berval bvauthcid, bvauthzid;
*user = NULL;
if ( conn->c_sasl_dn.bv_val ) {
ch_free( conn->c_sasl_dn.bv_val );
BER_BVZERO( &conn->c_sasl_dn );
}
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ARGS, "SASL Authorize [conn=%ld]: "
"authcid=\"%s\" authzid=\"%s\"\n",
(long) (conn ? conn->c_connid : -1),
authcid ? authcid : "<empty>",
authzid ? authzid : "<empty>" );
/* Figure out how much data we have for the dn */
rc = sasl_getprop( conn->c_sasl_authctx, SASL_REALM, (void **)&realm );
if( rc != SASL_OK && rc != SASL_NOTDONE ) {
Debug(LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE,
"authorize: getprop(REALM) failed!\n", 0,0,0);
*errstr = "Could not extract realm";
return SASL_NOAUTHZ;
}
/* Convert the identities to DN's. If no authzid was given, client will
be bound as the DN matching their username */
bvauthcid.bv_val = authcid;
bvauthcid.bv_len = authcid ? strlen( authcid ) : 0;
rc = slap_sasl_getdn( conn, NULL, &bvauthcid, realm,
&authcDN, SLAP_GETDN_AUTHCID );
if( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
*errstr = ldap_err2string( rc );
return SASL_NOAUTHZ;
}
conn->c_sasl_dn = authcDN;
if( ( authzid == NULL ) || !strcmp( authcid, authzid ) ) {
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, "SASL Authorize [conn=%ld]: "
"Using authcDN=%s\n", (long) (conn ? conn->c_connid : -1), authcDN.bv_val,0 );
goto ok;
}
bvauthzid.bv_val = authzid;
bvauthzid.bv_len = authzid ? strlen( authzid ) : 0;
rc = slap_sasl_getdn( conn, NULL, &bvauthzid, realm,
&authzDN, SLAP_GETDN_AUTHZID );
if( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
*errstr = ldap_err2string( rc );
return SASL_NOAUTHZ;
}
rc = slap_sasl_authorized( conn->c_sasl_bindop, &authcDN, &authzDN );
if( rc ) {
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, "SASL Authorize [conn=%ld]: "
"proxy authorization disallowed (%d)\n",
(long) (conn ? conn->c_connid : -1), rc, 0 );
*errstr = "not authorized";
ch_free( authzDN.bv_val );
return SASL_NOAUTHZ;
}
/* FIXME: we need yet another dup because slap_sasl_getdn()
* is using the bind operation slab */
if ( conn->c_sasl_bindop ) {
ber_dupbv( &conn->c_sasl_authz_dn, &authzDN );
slap_sl_free( authzDN.bv_val,
conn->c_sasl_bindop->o_tmpmemctx );
} else {
conn->c_sasl_authz_dn = authzDN;
}
ok:
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, "SASL Authorize [conn=%ld]: "
" authorization allowed authzDN=\"%s\"\n",
(long) (conn ? conn->c_connid : -1),
authzDN.bv_val ? authzDN.bv_val : "", 0 );
if ( conn->c_sasl_bindop ) {
Statslog( LDAP_DEBUG_STATS,
"conn=%lu op=%lu BIND authcid=\"%s\" authzid=\"%s\"\n",
conn->c_connid, conn->c_sasl_bindop->o_opid,
authcid, authzid ? authzid : "", 0);
}
*errstr = NULL;
return SASL_OK;
}
#endif /* SASL_VERSION_MAJOR >= 2 */
static int
slap_sasl_err2ldap( int saslerr )
{
int rc;
/* map SASL errors to LDAP resultCode returned by:
* sasl_server_new()
* SASL_OK, SASL_NOMEM
* sasl_server_step()
* SASL_OK, SASL_CONTINUE, SASL_TRANS, SASL_BADPARAM, SASL_BADPROT,
* ...
* sasl_server_start()
* + SASL_NOMECH
* sasl_setprop()
* SASL_OK, SASL_BADPARAM
*/
switch (saslerr) {
case SASL_OK:
rc = LDAP_SUCCESS;
break;
case SASL_CONTINUE:
rc = LDAP_SASL_BIND_IN_PROGRESS;
break;
case SASL_FAIL:
case SASL_NOMEM:
rc = LDAP_OTHER;
break;
case SASL_NOMECH:
rc = LDAP_AUTH_METHOD_NOT_SUPPORTED;
break;
case SASL_BADAUTH:
case SASL_NOUSER:
case SASL_TRANS:
case SASL_EXPIRED:
rc = LDAP_INVALID_CREDENTIALS;
break;
case SASL_NOAUTHZ:
rc = LDAP_INSUFFICIENT_ACCESS;
break;
case SASL_TOOWEAK:
case SASL_ENCRYPT:
rc = LDAP_INAPPROPRIATE_AUTH;
break;
case SASL_UNAVAIL:
case SASL_TRYAGAIN:
rc = LDAP_UNAVAILABLE;
break;
case SASL_DISABLED:
rc = LDAP_UNWILLING_TO_PERFORM;
break;
default:
rc = LDAP_OTHER;
break;
}
return rc;
}
#ifdef SLAPD_SPASSWD
static struct berval sasl_pwscheme = BER_BVC("{SASL}");
static int chk_sasl(
const struct berval *sc,
const struct berval * passwd,
const struct berval * cred,
const char **text )
{
unsigned int i;
int rtn;
void *ctx, *sconn = NULL;
for( i=0; i<cred->bv_len; i++) {
if(cred->bv_val[i] == '\0') {
return LUTIL_PASSWD_ERR; /* NUL character in password */
}
}
if( cred->bv_val[i] != '\0' ) {
return LUTIL_PASSWD_ERR; /* cred must behave like a string */
}
for( i=0; i<passwd->bv_len; i++) {
if(passwd->bv_val[i] == '\0') {
return LUTIL_PASSWD_ERR; /* NUL character in password */
}
}
if( passwd->bv_val[i] != '\0' ) {
return LUTIL_PASSWD_ERR; /* passwd must behave like a string */
}
rtn = LUTIL_PASSWD_ERR;
ctx = ldap_pvt_thread_pool_context();
ldap_pvt_thread_pool_getkey( ctx, slap_sasl_bind, &sconn, NULL );
if( sconn != NULL ) {
int sc;
# if SASL_VERSION_MAJOR < 2
sc = sasl_checkpass( sconn,
passwd->bv_val, passwd->bv_len,
cred->bv_val, cred->bv_len,
text );
# else
sc = sasl_checkpass( sconn,
passwd->bv_val, passwd->bv_len,
cred->bv_val, cred->bv_len );
# endif
rtn = ( sc != SASL_OK ) ? LUTIL_PASSWD_ERR : LUTIL_PASSWD_OK;
}
return rtn;
}
#endif /* SLAPD_SPASSWD */
#endif /* HAVE_CYRUS_SASL */
int slap_sasl_init( void )
{
#ifdef HAVE_CYRUS_SASL
int rc;
static sasl_callback_t server_callbacks[] = {
{ SASL_CB_LOG, &slap_sasl_log, NULL },
{ SASL_CB_LIST_END, NULL, NULL }
};
#ifdef HAVE_SASL_VERSION
/* stringify the version number, sasl.h doesn't do it for us */
#define VSTR0(maj, min, pat) #maj "." #min "." #pat
#define VSTR(maj, min, pat) VSTR0(maj, min, pat)
#define SASL_VERSION_STRING VSTR(SASL_VERSION_MAJOR, SASL_VERSION_MINOR, \
SASL_VERSION_STEP)
sasl_version( NULL, &rc );
if ( ((rc >> 16) != ((SASL_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)|SASL_VERSION_MINOR)) ||
(rc & 0xffff) < SASL_VERSION_STEP)
{
char version[sizeof("xxx.xxx.xxxxx")];
sprintf( version, "%u.%d.%d", (unsigned)rc >> 24, (rc >> 16) & 0xff,
rc & 0xffff );
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ANY, "slap_sasl_init: SASL library version mismatch:"
" expected " SASL_VERSION_STRING ","
" got %s\n", version, 0, 0 );
return -1;
}
#endif
/* SASL 2 does its own memory management internally */
#if SASL_VERSION_MAJOR < 2
sasl_set_alloc(
ber_memalloc,
ber_memcalloc,
ber_memrealloc,
ber_memfree );
#endif
sasl_set_mutex(
ldap_pvt_sasl_mutex_new,
ldap_pvt_sasl_mutex_lock,
ldap_pvt_sasl_mutex_unlock,
ldap_pvt_sasl_mutex_dispose );
#if SASL_VERSION_MAJOR >= 2
generic_filter.f_desc = slap_schema.si_ad_objectClass;
rc = sasl_auxprop_add_plugin( "slapd", slap_auxprop_init );
if( rc != SASL_OK ) {
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ANY, "slap_sasl_init: auxprop add plugin failed\n",
0, 0, 0 );
return -1;
}
#endif
/* should provide callbacks for logging */
/* server name should be configurable */
rc = sasl_server_init( server_callbacks, "slapd" );
if( rc != SASL_OK ) {
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ANY, "slap_sasl_init: server init failed\n",
0, 0, 0 );
#if SASL_VERSION_MAJOR < 2
/* A no-op used to make sure we linked with Cyrus 1.5 */
sasl_client_auth( NULL, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL );
#endif
return -1;
}
#ifdef SLAPD_SPASSWD
lutil_passwd_add( &sasl_pwscheme, chk_sasl, NULL );
#endif
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, "slap_sasl_init: initialized!\n",
0, 0, 0 );
/* default security properties */
memset( &sasl_secprops, '\0', sizeof(sasl_secprops) );
sasl_secprops.max_ssf = INT_MAX;
sasl_secprops.maxbufsize = 65536;
sasl_secprops.security_flags = SASL_SEC_NOPLAINTEXT|SASL_SEC_NOANONYMOUS;
#endif
return 0;
}
int slap_sasl_destroy( void )
{
#ifdef HAVE_CYRUS_SASL
sasl_done();
#endif
free( global_host );
global_host = NULL;
return 0;
}
#if SASL_VERSION_MAJOR >= 2
static char *
slap_sasl_peer2ipport( struct berval *peer )
{
int isv6 = 0;
char *ipport,
*p = &peer->bv_val[ STRLENOF( "IP=" ) ];
ber_len_t plen = peer->bv_len - STRLENOF( "IP=" );
/* IPv6? */
if ( p[0] == '[' ) {
isv6 = 1;
plen--;
}
ipport = ch_strdup( &p[isv6] );
/* Convert IPv6/IPv4 addresses to address;port syntax. */
p = strrchr( ipport, ':' );
if ( p != NULL ) {
*p = ';';
if ( isv6 ) {
assert( p[-1] == ']' );
AC_MEMCPY( &p[-1], p, plen - ( p - ipport ) + 1 );
}
} else if ( isv6 ) {
/* trim ']' */
plen--;
assert( p[plen] == ']' );
p[plen] = '\0';
}
return ipport;
}
#endif
int slap_sasl_open( Connection *conn, int reopen )
{
int sc = LDAP_SUCCESS;
#ifdef HAVE_CYRUS_SASL
int cb;
sasl_conn_t *ctx = NULL;
sasl_callback_t *session_callbacks;
#if SASL_VERSION_MAJOR >= 2
char *ipremoteport = NULL, *iplocalport = NULL;
#endif
assert( conn->c_sasl_authctx == NULL );
if ( !reopen ) {
assert( conn->c_sasl_extra == NULL );
session_callbacks =
#if SASL_VERSION_MAJOR >= 2
SLAP_CALLOC( 5, sizeof(sasl_callback_t));
#else
SLAP_CALLOC( 3, sizeof(sasl_callback_t));
#endif
if( session_callbacks == NULL ) {
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ANY,
"slap_sasl_open: SLAP_MALLOC failed", 0, 0, 0 );
return -1;
}
conn->c_sasl_extra = session_callbacks;
session_callbacks[cb=0].id = SASL_CB_LOG;
session_callbacks[cb].proc = &slap_sasl_log;
session_callbacks[cb++].context = conn;
session_callbacks[cb].id = SASL_CB_PROXY_POLICY;
session_callbacks[cb].proc = &slap_sasl_authorize;
session_callbacks[cb++].context = conn;
#if SASL_VERSION_MAJOR >= 2
session_callbacks[cb].id = SASL_CB_CANON_USER;
session_callbacks[cb].proc = &slap_sasl_canonicalize;
session_callbacks[cb++].context = conn;
#endif
session_callbacks[cb].id = SASL_CB_LIST_END;
session_callbacks[cb].proc = NULL;
session_callbacks[cb++].context = NULL;
} else {
session_callbacks = conn->c_sasl_extra;
}
conn->c_sasl_layers = 0;
/* create new SASL context */
#if SASL_VERSION_MAJOR >= 2
if ( conn->c_sock_name.bv_len != 0 &&
strncmp( conn->c_sock_name.bv_val, "IP=", STRLENOF( "IP=" ) ) == 0 )
{
iplocalport = slap_sasl_peer2ipport( &conn->c_sock_name );
}
if ( conn->c_peer_name.bv_len != 0 &&
strncmp( conn->c_peer_name.bv_val, "IP=", STRLENOF( "IP=" ) ) == 0 )
{
ipremoteport = slap_sasl_peer2ipport( &conn->c_peer_name );
}
sc = sasl_server_new( "ldap", global_host, global_realm,
iplocalport, ipremoteport, session_callbacks, SASL_SUCCESS_DATA, &ctx );
if ( iplocalport != NULL ) {
ch_free( iplocalport );
}
if ( ipremoteport != NULL ) {
ch_free( ipremoteport );
}
#else
sc = sasl_server_new( "ldap", global_host, global_realm,
session_callbacks, SASL_SECURITY_LAYER, &ctx );
#endif
if( sc != SASL_OK ) {
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ANY, "sasl_server_new failed: %d\n",
sc, 0, 0 );
return -1;
}
conn->c_sasl_authctx = ctx;
if( sc == SASL_OK ) {
sc = sasl_setprop( ctx,
SASL_SEC_PROPS, &sasl_secprops );
if( sc != SASL_OK ) {
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ANY, "sasl_setprop failed: %d\n",
sc, 0, 0 );
slap_sasl_close( conn );
return -1;
}
}
sc = slap_sasl_err2ldap( sc );
#elif defined(SLAP_BUILTIN_SASL)
/* built-in SASL implementation */
SASL_CTX *ctx = (SASL_CTX *) SLAP_MALLOC(sizeof(SASL_CTX));
if( ctx == NULL ) return -1;
ctx->sc_external_ssf = 0;
BER_BVZERO( &ctx->sc_external_id );
conn->c_sasl_authctx = ctx;
#endif
return sc;
}
int slap_sasl_external(
Connection *conn,
slap_ssf_t ssf,
struct berval *auth_id )
{
#if SASL_VERSION_MAJOR >= 2
int sc;
sasl_conn_t *ctx = conn->c_sasl_authctx;
if ( ctx == NULL ) {
return LDAP_UNAVAILABLE;
}
sc = sasl_setprop( ctx, SASL_SSF_EXTERNAL, &ssf );
if ( sc != SASL_OK ) {
return LDAP_OTHER;
}
sc = sasl_setprop( ctx, SASL_AUTH_EXTERNAL,
auth_id ? auth_id->bv_val : NULL );
if ( sc != SASL_OK ) {
return LDAP_OTHER;
}
#elif defined(HAVE_CYRUS_SASL)
int sc;
sasl_conn_t *ctx = conn->c_sasl_authctx;
sasl_external_properties_t extprops;
if ( ctx == NULL ) {
return LDAP_UNAVAILABLE;
}
memset( &extprops, '\0', sizeof(extprops) );
extprops.ssf = ssf;
extprops.auth_id = auth_id ? auth_id->bv_val : NULL;
sc = sasl_setprop( ctx, SASL_SSF_EXTERNAL,
(void *) &extprops );
if ( sc != SASL_OK ) {
return LDAP_OTHER;
}
#elif defined(SLAP_BUILTIN_SASL)
/* built-in SASL implementation */
SASL_CTX *ctx = conn->c_sasl_authctx;
if ( ctx == NULL ) return LDAP_UNAVAILABLE;
ctx->sc_external_ssf = ssf;
if( auth_id ) {
ctx->sc_external_id = *auth_id;
BER_BVZERO( auth_id );
} else {
BER_BVZERO( &ctx->sc_external_id );
}
#endif
return LDAP_SUCCESS;
}
int slap_sasl_reset( Connection *conn )
{
return LDAP_SUCCESS;
}
char ** slap_sasl_mechs( Connection *conn )
{
char **mechs = NULL;
#ifdef HAVE_CYRUS_SASL
sasl_conn_t *ctx = conn->c_sasl_authctx;
if( ctx == NULL ) ctx = conn->c_sasl_sockctx;
if( ctx != NULL ) {
int sc;
SASL_CONST char *mechstr;
sc = sasl_listmech( ctx,
NULL, NULL, ",", NULL,
&mechstr, NULL, NULL );
if( sc != SASL_OK ) {
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ANY, "slap_sasl_listmech failed: %d\n",
sc, 0, 0 );
return NULL;
}
mechs = ldap_str2charray( mechstr, "," );
#if SASL_VERSION_MAJOR < 2
ch_free( mechstr );
#endif
}
#elif defined(SLAP_BUILTIN_SASL)
/* builtin SASL implementation */
SASL_CTX *ctx = conn->c_sasl_authctx;
if ( ctx != NULL && ctx->sc_external_id.bv_val ) {
/* should check ssf */
mechs = ldap_str2charray( "EXTERNAL", "," );
}
#endif
return mechs;
}
int slap_sasl_close( Connection *conn )
{
#ifdef HAVE_CYRUS_SASL
sasl_conn_t *ctx = conn->c_sasl_authctx;
if( ctx != NULL ) {
sasl_dispose( &ctx );
}
if ( conn->c_sasl_sockctx &&
conn->c_sasl_authctx != conn->c_sasl_sockctx )
{
ctx = conn->c_sasl_sockctx;
sasl_dispose( &ctx );
}
conn->c_sasl_authctx = NULL;
conn->c_sasl_sockctx = NULL;
conn->c_sasl_done = 0;
free( conn->c_sasl_extra );
conn->c_sasl_extra = NULL;
#elif defined(SLAP_BUILTIN_SASL)
SASL_CTX *ctx = conn->c_sasl_authctx;
if( ctx ) {
if( ctx->sc_external_id.bv_val ) {
free( ctx->sc_external_id.bv_val );
BER_BVZERO( &ctx->sc_external_id );
}
free( ctx );
conn->c_sasl_authctx = NULL;
}
#endif
return LDAP_SUCCESS;
}
int slap_sasl_bind( Operation *op, SlapReply *rs )
{
#ifdef HAVE_CYRUS_SASL
sasl_conn_t *ctx = op->o_conn->c_sasl_authctx;
struct berval response;
unsigned reslen = 0;
int sc;
Debug(LDAP_DEBUG_ARGS,
"==> sasl_bind: dn=\"%s\" mech=%s datalen=%ld\n",
op->o_req_dn.bv_len ? op->o_req_dn.bv_val : "",
op->o_conn->c_sasl_bind_in_progress ? "<continuing>" :
op->o_conn->c_sasl_bind_mech.bv_val,
op->orb_cred.bv_len );
if( ctx == NULL ) {
send_ldap_error( op, rs, LDAP_UNAVAILABLE,
"SASL unavailable on this session" );
return rs->sr_err;
}
#if SASL_VERSION_MAJOR >= 2
#define START( ctx, mech, cred, clen, resp, rlen, err ) \
sasl_server_start( ctx, mech, cred, clen, resp, rlen )
#define STEP( ctx, cred, clen, resp, rlen, err ) \
sasl_server_step( ctx, cred, clen, resp, rlen )
#else
#define START( ctx, mech, cred, clen, resp, rlen, err ) \
sasl_server_start( ctx, mech, cred, clen, resp, rlen, err )
#define STEP( ctx, cred, clen, resp, rlen, err ) \
sasl_server_step( ctx, cred, clen, resp, rlen, err )
#endif
if ( !op->o_conn->c_sasl_bind_in_progress ) {
/* If we already authenticated once, must use a new context */
if ( op->o_conn->c_sasl_done ) {
slap_ssf_t ssf = 0;
const char *authid = NULL;
#if SASL_VERSION_MAJOR >= 2
sasl_getprop( ctx, SASL_SSF_EXTERNAL, (void *)&ssf );
sasl_getprop( ctx, SASL_AUTH_EXTERNAL, (void *)&authid );
if ( authid ) authid = ch_strdup( authid );
#endif
if ( ctx != op->o_conn->c_sasl_sockctx ) {
sasl_dispose( &ctx );
}
op->o_conn->c_sasl_authctx = NULL;
slap_sasl_open( op->o_conn, 1 );
ctx = op->o_conn->c_sasl_authctx;
#if SASL_VERSION_MAJOR >= 2
if ( authid ) {
sasl_setprop( ctx, SASL_SSF_EXTERNAL, &ssf );
sasl_setprop( ctx, SASL_AUTH_EXTERNAL, authid );
ch_free( (char *)authid );
}
#endif
}
sc = START( ctx,
op->o_conn->c_sasl_bind_mech.bv_val,
op->orb_cred.bv_val, op->orb_cred.bv_len,
(SASL_CONST char **)&response.bv_val, &reslen, &rs->sr_text );
} else {
sc = STEP( ctx,
op->orb_cred.bv_val, op->orb_cred.bv_len,
(SASL_CONST char **)&response.bv_val, &reslen, &rs->sr_text );
}
response.bv_len = reslen;
if ( sc == SASL_OK ) {
sasl_ssf_t *ssf = NULL;
op->orb_edn = op->o_conn->c_sasl_dn;
BER_BVZERO( &op->o_conn->c_sasl_dn );
op->o_conn->c_sasl_done = 1;
rs->sr_err = LDAP_SUCCESS;
(void) sasl_getprop( ctx, SASL_SSF, (void *)&ssf );
op->orb_ssf = ssf ? *ssf : 0;
ctx = NULL;
if( op->orb_ssf ) {
ldap_pvt_thread_mutex_lock( &op->o_conn->c_mutex );
op->o_conn->c_sasl_layers++;
/* If there's an old layer, set sockctx to NULL to
* tell connection_read() to wait for us to finish.
* Otherwise there is a race condition: we have to
* send the Bind response using the old security
* context and then remove it before reading any
* new messages.
*/
if ( op->o_conn->c_sasl_sockctx ) {
ctx = op->o_conn->c_sasl_sockctx;
op->o_conn->c_sasl_sockctx = NULL;
} else {
op->o_conn->c_sasl_sockctx = op->o_conn->c_sasl_authctx;
}
ldap_pvt_thread_mutex_unlock( &op->o_conn->c_mutex );
}
/* Must send response using old security layer */
if (response.bv_len) rs->sr_sasldata = &response;
send_ldap_sasl( op, rs );
/* Now dispose of the old security layer.
*/
if ( ctx ) {
ldap_pvt_thread_mutex_lock( &op->o_conn->c_mutex );
ldap_pvt_sasl_remove( op->o_conn->c_sb );
op->o_conn->c_sasl_sockctx = op->o_conn->c_sasl_authctx;
ldap_pvt_thread_mutex_unlock( &op->o_conn->c_mutex );
sasl_dispose( &ctx );
}
} else if ( sc == SASL_CONTINUE ) {
rs->sr_err = LDAP_SASL_BIND_IN_PROGRESS,
#if SASL_VERSION_MAJOR >= 2
rs->sr_text = sasl_errdetail( ctx );
#endif
rs->sr_sasldata = &response;
send_ldap_sasl( op, rs );
} else {
#if SASL_VERSION_MAJOR >= 2
rs->sr_text = sasl_errdetail( ctx );
#endif
rs->sr_err = slap_sasl_err2ldap( sc ),
send_ldap_result( op, rs );
}
#if SASL_VERSION_MAJOR < 2
if( response.bv_len ) ch_free( response.bv_val );
#endif
Debug(LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, "<== slap_sasl_bind: rc=%d\n", rs->sr_err, 0, 0);
#elif defined(SLAP_BUILTIN_SASL)
/* built-in SASL implementation */
SASL_CTX *ctx = op->o_conn->c_sasl_authctx;
if ( ctx == NULL ) {
send_ldap_error( op, rs, LDAP_OTHER,
"Internal SASL Error" );
} else if ( bvmatch( &ext_bv, &op->o_conn->c_sasl_bind_mech ) ) {
/* EXTERNAL */
if( op->orb_cred.bv_len ) {
rs->sr_text = "proxy authorization not support";
rs->sr_err = LDAP_UNWILLING_TO_PERFORM;
send_ldap_result( op, rs );
} else {
op->orb_edn = ctx->sc_external_id;
rs->sr_err = LDAP_SUCCESS;
rs->sr_sasldata = NULL;
send_ldap_sasl( op, rs );
}
} else {
send_ldap_error( op, rs, LDAP_AUTH_METHOD_NOT_SUPPORTED,
"requested SASL mechanism not supported" );
}
#else
send_ldap_error( op, rs, LDAP_AUTH_METHOD_NOT_SUPPORTED,
"SASL not supported" );
#endif
return rs->sr_err;
}
char* slap_sasl_secprops( const char *in )
{
#ifdef HAVE_CYRUS_SASL
int rc = ldap_pvt_sasl_secprops( in, &sasl_secprops );
return rc == LDAP_SUCCESS ? NULL : "Invalid security properties";
#else
return "SASL not supported";
#endif
}
void slap_sasl_secprops_unparse( struct berval *bv )
{
#ifdef HAVE_CYRUS_SASL
ldap_pvt_sasl_secprops_unparse( &sasl_secprops, bv );
#endif
}
#ifdef HAVE_CYRUS_SASL
int
slap_sasl_setpass( Operation *op, SlapReply *rs )
{
struct berval id = BER_BVNULL; /* needs to come from connection */
struct berval new = BER_BVNULL;
struct berval old = BER_BVNULL;
assert( ber_bvcmp( &slap_EXOP_MODIFY_PASSWD, &op->ore_reqoid ) == 0 );
rs->sr_err = sasl_getprop( op->o_conn->c_sasl_authctx, SASL_USERNAME,
(SASL_CONST void **)(char *)&id.bv_val );
if( rs->sr_err != SASL_OK ) {
rs->sr_text = "unable to retrieve SASL username";
rs->sr_err = LDAP_OTHER;
goto done;
}
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ARGS, "==> slap_sasl_setpass: \"%s\"\n",
id.bv_val ? id.bv_val : "", 0, 0 );
rs->sr_err = slap_passwd_parse( op->ore_reqdata,
NULL, &old, &new, &rs->sr_text );
if( rs->sr_err != LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
goto done;
}
if( new.bv_len == 0 ) {
slap_passwd_generate(&new);
if( new.bv_len == 0 ) {
rs->sr_text = "password generation failed.";
rs->sr_err = LDAP_OTHER;
goto done;
}
rs->sr_rspdata = slap_passwd_return( &new );
}
#if SASL_VERSION_MAJOR < 2
rs->sr_err = sasl_setpass( op->o_conn->c_sasl_authctx,
id.bv_val, new.bv_val, new.bv_len, 0, &rs->sr_text );
#else
rs->sr_err = sasl_setpass( op->o_conn->c_sasl_authctx, id.bv_val,
new.bv_val, new.bv_len, old.bv_val, old.bv_len, 0 );
if( rs->sr_err != SASL_OK ) {
rs->sr_text = sasl_errdetail( op->o_conn->c_sasl_authctx );
}
#endif
switch(rs->sr_err) {
case SASL_OK:
rs->sr_err = LDAP_SUCCESS;
break;
case SASL_NOCHANGE:
case SASL_NOMECH:
case SASL_DISABLED:
case SASL_PWLOCK:
case SASL_FAIL:
case SASL_BADPARAM:
default:
rs->sr_err = LDAP_OTHER;
}
done:
return rs->sr_err;
}
#endif /* HAVE_CYRUS_SASL */
/* Take any sort of identity string and return a DN with the "dn:" prefix. The
* string returned in *dn is in its own allocated memory, and must be free'd
* by the calling process. -Mark Adamson, Carnegie Mellon
*
* The "dn:" prefix is no longer used anywhere inside slapd. It is only used
* on strings passed in directly from SASL. -Howard Chu, Symas Corp.
*/
#define SET_NONE 0
#define SET_DN 1
#define SET_U 2
int slap_sasl_getdn( Connection *conn, Operation *op, struct berval *id,
char *user_realm, struct berval *dn, int flags )
{
int rc, is_dn = SET_NONE, do_norm = 1;
struct berval dn2, *mech;
assert( conn != NULL );
assert( id != NULL );
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ARGS, "slap_sasl_getdn: conn %lu id=%s [len=%lu]\n",
conn->c_connid,
BER_BVISNULL( id ) ? "NULL" : ( BER_BVISEMPTY( id ) ? "<empty>" : id->bv_val ),
BER_BVISNULL( id ) ? 0 : ( BER_BVISEMPTY( id ) ? 0 :
(unsigned long) id->bv_len ) );
if ( !op ) {
op = conn->c_sasl_bindop;
}
assert( op != NULL );
BER_BVZERO( dn );
if ( !BER_BVISNULL( id ) ) {
/* Blatantly anonymous ID */
static struct berval bv_anonymous = BER_BVC( "anonymous" );
if ( ber_bvstrcasecmp( id, &bv_anonymous ) == 0 ) {
return( LDAP_SUCCESS );
}
} else {
/* FIXME: if empty, should we stop? */
BER_BVSTR( id, "" );
}
if ( !BER_BVISEMPTY( &conn->c_sasl_bind_mech ) ) {
mech = &conn->c_sasl_bind_mech;
} else {
mech = &conn->c_authmech;
}
/* An authcID needs to be converted to authzID form. Set the
* values directly into *dn; they will be normalized later. (and
* normalizing always makes a new copy.) An ID from a TLS certificate
* is already normalized, so copy it and skip normalization.
*/
if( flags & SLAP_GETDN_AUTHCID ) {
if( bvmatch( mech, &ext_bv )) {
/* EXTERNAL DNs are already normalized */
assert( !BER_BVISNULL( id ) );
do_norm = 0;
is_dn = SET_DN;
ber_dupbv_x( dn, id, op->o_tmpmemctx );
} else {
/* convert to u:<username> form */
is_dn = SET_U;
*dn = *id;
}
}
if( is_dn == SET_NONE ) {
if( !strncasecmp( id->bv_val, "u:", STRLENOF( "u:" ) ) ) {
is_dn = SET_U;
dn->bv_val = id->bv_val + STRLENOF( "u:" );
dn->bv_len = id->bv_len - STRLENOF( "u:" );
} else if ( !strncasecmp( id->bv_val, "dn:", STRLENOF( "dn:" ) ) ) {
is_dn = SET_DN;
dn->bv_val = id->bv_val + STRLENOF( "dn:" );
dn->bv_len = id->bv_len - STRLENOF( "dn:" );
}
}
/* No other possibilities from here */
if( is_dn == SET_NONE ) {
BER_BVZERO( dn );
return( LDAP_INAPPROPRIATE_AUTH );
}
/* Username strings */
if( is_dn == SET_U ) {
/* ITS#3419: values may need escape */
LDAPRDN DN[ 5 ];
LDAPAVA *RDNs[ 4 ][ 2 ];
LDAPAVA AVAs[ 4 ];
int irdn;
irdn = 0;
DN[ irdn ] = RDNs[ irdn ];
RDNs[ irdn ][ 0 ] = &AVAs[ irdn ];
AVAs[ irdn ].la_attr = slap_schema.si_ad_uid->ad_cname;
AVAs[ irdn ].la_value = *dn;
AVAs[ irdn ].la_flags = LDAP_AVA_NULL;
AVAs[ irdn ].la_private = NULL;
RDNs[ irdn ][ 1 ] = NULL;
if ( user_realm && *user_realm ) {
irdn++;
DN[ irdn ] = RDNs[ irdn ];
RDNs[ irdn ][ 0 ] = &AVAs[ irdn ];
AVAs[ irdn ].la_attr = slap_schema.si_ad_cn->ad_cname;
ber_str2bv( user_realm, 0, 0, &AVAs[ irdn ].la_value );
AVAs[ irdn ].la_flags = LDAP_AVA_NULL;
AVAs[ irdn ].la_private = NULL;
RDNs[ irdn ][ 1 ] = NULL;
}
if ( !BER_BVISNULL( mech ) ) {
irdn++;
DN[ irdn ] = RDNs[ irdn ];
RDNs[ irdn ][ 0 ] = &AVAs[ irdn ];
AVAs[ irdn ].la_attr = slap_schema.si_ad_cn->ad_cname;
AVAs[ irdn ].la_value = *mech;
AVAs[ irdn ].la_flags = LDAP_AVA_NULL;
AVAs[ irdn ].la_private = NULL;
RDNs[ irdn ][ 1 ] = NULL;
}
irdn++;
DN[ irdn ] = RDNs[ irdn ];
RDNs[ irdn ][ 0 ] = &AVAs[ irdn ];
AVAs[ irdn ].la_attr = slap_schema.si_ad_cn->ad_cname;
BER_BVSTR( &AVAs[ irdn ].la_value, "auth" );
AVAs[ irdn ].la_flags = LDAP_AVA_NULL;
AVAs[ irdn ].la_private = NULL;
RDNs[ irdn ][ 1 ] = NULL;
irdn++;
DN[ irdn ] = NULL;
rc = ldap_dn2bv_x( DN, dn, LDAP_DN_FORMAT_LDAPV3,
op->o_tmpmemctx );
if ( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
BER_BVZERO( dn );
return rc;
}
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE,
"slap_sasl_getdn: u:id converted to %s\n",
dn->bv_val, 0, 0 );
} else {
/* Dup the DN in any case, so we don't risk
* leaks or dangling pointers later,
* and the DN value is '\0' terminated */
ber_dupbv_x( &dn2, dn, op->o_tmpmemctx );
dn->bv_val = dn2.bv_val;
}
/* All strings are in DN form now. Normalize if needed. */
if ( do_norm ) {
rc = dnNormalize( 0, NULL, NULL, dn, &dn2, op->o_tmpmemctx );
/* User DNs were constructed above and must be freed now */
slap_sl_free( dn->bv_val, op->o_tmpmemctx );
if ( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
BER_BVZERO( dn );
return rc;
}
*dn = dn2;
}
/* Run thru regexp */
slap_sasl2dn( op, dn, &dn2, flags );
if( !BER_BVISNULL( &dn2 ) ) {
slap_sl_free( dn->bv_val, op->o_tmpmemctx );
*dn = dn2;
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE,
"slap_sasl_getdn: dn:id converted to %s\n",
dn->bv_val, 0, 0 );
}
return( LDAP_SUCCESS );
}
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