.TH SLAPD-LDAP 5 "RELEASEDATE" "OpenLDAP LDVERSION" .\" Copyright 1998-2005 The OpenLDAP Foundation All Rights Reserved. .\" Copying restrictions apply. See COPYRIGHT/LICENSE. .\" $OpenLDAP$ .SH NAME slapd-ldap \- LDAP backend to slapd .SH SYNOPSIS ETCDIR/slapd.conf .SH DESCRIPTION The LDAP backend to .BR slapd (8) is not an actual database; instead it acts as a proxy to forward incoming requests to another LDAP server. While processing requests it will also chase referrals, so that referrals are fully processed instead of being returned to the slapd client. Sessions that explicitly Bind to the back-ldap database always create their own private connection to the remote LDAP server. Anonymous sessions will share a single anonymous connection to the remote server. For sessions bound through other mechanisms, all sessions with the same DN will share the same connection. This connection pooling strategy can enhance the proxy's efficiency by reducing the overhead of repeatedly making/breaking multiple connections. The ldap database can also act as an information service, i.e. the identity of locally authenticated clients is asserted to the remote server, possibly in some modified form. For this purpose, the proxy binds to the remote server with some administrative identity, and, if required, authorizes the asserted identity. See the .IR idassert- * rules below. The administrative identity of the proxy, on the remote server, must be allowed to authorize by means of appropriate .B authzTo rules; see .BR slapd.conf (5) for details. .SH CONFIGURATION These .B slapd.conf options apply to the LDAP backend database. That is, they must follow a "database ldap" line and come before any subsequent "backend" or "database" lines. Other database options are described in the .BR slapd.conf (5) manual page. .LP Note: In early versions of back-ldap it was recommended to always set .LP .RS .nf lastmod off .fi .RE .LP for every .B ldap and .B meta database. This is because operational attributes related to entry creation and modification should not be proxied, as they could be mistakenly written to the target server(s), generating an error. The current implementation automatically sets lastmod to off, so its use is redundant and should be omitted, because the lastmod directive will be deprecated in the future. .TP .B uri LDAP server to use. Multiple URIs can be set in in a single .B ldapurl argument, resulting in the underlying library automatically call the first server of the list that responds, e.g. \fBuri "ldap://host/ ldap://backup-host"\fP The URI list is space- or comma-separated. This statement is mandatory. .\".TP .\".B server .\"Obsolete option; same as `uri ldap:///'. .HP .hy 0 .B acl-bind .B bindmethod=simple|sasl [binddn=] [credentials=] .B [saslmech=] [secprops=] [realm=] .B [authcId=] [authzId=] .RS Allows to define the parameters of the authentication method that is internally used by the proxy to collect info related to access control. The identity defined by this directive, according to the properties associated to the authentication method, is supposed to have read access on the target server to attributes used on the proxy for ACL checking. There is no risk of giving away such values; they are only used to check permissions. The default is to use .BR simple bind, with empty \fIbinddn\fP and \fIcredentials\fP, which means that the related operations will be performed anonymously. .B This identity is by no means implicitly used by the proxy .B when the client connects anonymously. The .B idassert-bind feature, instead, in some cases can be crafted to implement that behavior, which is \fIintrinsically unsafe and should be used with extreme care\fP. This directive obsoletes .BR acl-authcDN , and .BR acl-passwd . .RE .HP .hy 0 .B idassert-bind .B bindmethod=none|simple|sasl [binddn=] [credentials=] .B [saslmech=] [secprops=] [realm=] .B [authcId=] [authzId=] .B [authz={native|proxyauthz}] [mode=] [flags=] .RS Allows to define the parameters of the authentication method that is internally used by the proxy to authorize connections that are authenticated by other databases. The identity defined by this directive, according to the properties associated to the authentication method, is supposed to have auth access on the target server to attributes used on the proxy for authentication and authorization, and to be allowed to authorize the users. This requires to have .B proxyAuthz privileges on a wide set of DNs, e.g. .BR authzTo=dn.subtree:"" , and the remote server to have .B authz-policy set to .B to or .BR both . See .BR slapd.conf (5) for details on these statements and for remarks and drawbacks about their usage. The supported bindmethods are \fBnone|simple|sasl\fP where .B none is the default, i.e. no \fIidentity assertion\fP is performed. The authz parameter is used to instruct the SASL bind to exploit .B native SASL authorization, if available; since connections are cached, this should only be used when authorizing with a fixed identity (e.g. by means of the .B authzDN or .B authzID parameters). Otherwise, the default .B proxyauthz is used, i.e. the proxyAuthz control is added to all operations. The supported modes are: \fB := {legacy|anonymous|none|self}\fP If .B is not present, and .B authzId is given, the proxy always authorizes that identity. .B can be \fBu:\fP \fB[dn:]\fP The former is supposed to be expanded by the remote server according to the authz rules; see .BR slapd.conf (5) for details. In the latter case, whether or not the .B dn: prefix is present, the string must pass DN validation and normalization. The default mode is .BR legacy , which implies that the proxy will either perform a simple bind as the .I authcDN or a SASL bind as the .I authcID and assert the client's identity when it is not anonymous. Direct binds are always proxied. The other modes imply that the proxy will always either perform a simple bind as the .IR authcDN or a SASL bind as the .IR authcID , unless restricted by .BR idassert-authzFrom rules (see below), in which case the operation will fail; eventually, it will assert some other identity according to .BR . Other identity assertion modes are .BR anonymous and .BR self , which respectively mean that the .I empty or the .IR client 's identity will be asserted; .BR none , which means that no proxyAuthz control will be used, so the .I authcDN or the .I authcID identity will be asserted. For all modes that require the use of the .I proxyAuthz control, on the remote server the proxy identity must have appropriate .I authzTo permissions, or the asserted identities must have appropriate .I authzFrom permissions. Note, however, that the ID assertion feature is mostly useful when the asserted identities do not exist on the remote server. Flags can be \fBoverride,{prescriptive|non-prescriptive}\fP When the .B override flag is used, identity assertion takes place even when the database is authorizing for the identity of the client, i.e. after binding with the provided identity, and thus authenticating it, the proxy performs the identity assertion using the configured identity and authentication method. When the .B prescriptive flag is used (the default), operations fail with \fIinappropriateAuthentication\fP for those identities whose assertion is not allowed by the .B idassert-authzFrom patterns. If the .B non-prescriptive flag is used, operations are performed anonymously for those identities whose assertion is not allowed by the .B idassert-authzFrom patterns. This directive obsoletes .BR idassert-authcDN , .BR idassert-passwd , .BR idassert-mode , and .BR idassert-method . .RE .TP .B idassert-authzFrom if defined, selects what .I local identities are authorized to exploit the identity assertion feature. The string .B follows the rules defined for the .I authzFrom attribute. See .BR slapd.conf (5), section related to .BR authz-policy , for details on the syntax of this field. .TP .B proxy-whoami {NO|yes} Turns on proxying of the WhoAmI extended operation. If this option is given, back-ldap will replace slapd's original WhoAmI routine with its own. On slapd sessions that were authenticated by back-ldap, the WhoAmI request will be forwarded to the remote LDAP server. Other sessions will be handled by the local slapd, as before. This option is mainly useful in conjunction with Proxy Authorization. .TP .B rebind-as-user {NO|yes} If this option is given, the client's bind credentials are remembered for rebinds when chasing referrals. Useful when \fBchase-referrals\fP is set to \fByes\fP, useless otherwise. .TP .B chase-referrals {YES|no} enable/disable automatic referral chasing, which is delegated to the underlying libldap, with rebinding eventually performed if the \fBrebind-as-user\fP directive is used. The default is to chase referrals. .TP .B tls {[try-]start|[try-]propagate} execute the StartTLS extended operation when the connection is initialized; only works if the URI directive protocol scheme is not \fBldaps://\fP. \fBpropagate\fP issues the StartTLS operation only if the original connection did. The \fBtry-\fP prefix instructs the proxy to continue operations if the StartTLS operation failed; its use is highly deprecated. .TP .B t-f-support {NO|yes|discover} enable if the remote server supports absolute filters (see \fIdraft-zeilenga-ldap-t-f\fP for details). If set to .BR discover , support is detected by reading the remote server's root DSE. .TP .B timeout [{add|delete|modify|modrdn}=] [...] This directive allows to set per-operation timeouts. If no operation is specified, it affects all. Currently, only write operations are addressed, because searches can already be limited by means of the .B limits directive (see .BR slapd.conf (5) for details), and other operations are not supposed to incur into the need for timeouts. Note: if the timelimit is exceeded, the operation is abandoned; the protocol does not provide any means to rollback the operation, so the client will not know if the operation eventually succeeded or not. .TP .B idle-timeout