2002-01-05 05:17:25 +08:00
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Copyright 1998-2002 The OpenLDAP Foundation, All Rights Reserved.
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2001-05-12 08:51:28 +08:00
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COPYING RESTRICTIONS APPLY, see COPYRIGHT file
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Copyright 2001, Pierangelo Masarati, All rights reserved. <ando@sys-net.it>
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Metadirectory backend.
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This is a brief introduction to the core functionalities of back-meta.
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- Introduction.
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Back-meta implements a backend for OpenLDAP's slapd. It performs basic
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LDAP proxying with respect to a set of remote LDAP servers, called
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"targets". The information contained in these servers can be presented
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as belonging to a single Directory Information Tree (DIT).
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A basic knowledge of the functionality of back-ldap is recommended.
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This backend has been designed as an enhancement of back-ldap.
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The two backends share many features (actually they also share portions
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of code). While back-ldap is intended to proxy operations directed
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to a single server, back-meta is mainly intended for proxying
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of multiple servers and possibly naming context masquerading.
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These features, although useful in many scenarios, may result in
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excessive overhead for some applications, so its use should be
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carefully considered.
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In the examples section, some typical scenarios will be discussed.
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- Common configuration directives
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The backend uses most of the common configuration directives. Its
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configuration block starts with the "database" directive:
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database meta
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At least a "suffix" directive is required.
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Note: as with back-ldap, operational attributes related to entry
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creation/modification should not be used, as they would be passed
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to the target servers, generating an error. Moreover, it makes
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little sense to use such attributes in proxying, as the proxy
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server doesn't actually store data, so it should have no knowledge
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of such attributes. While code to strip the modification attributes
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has been put in place (and #ifdef'd), it implies unmotivated overhead.
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So it is strongly recommended to set
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lastmod off
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for every back-ldap/back-meta backend.
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- Special configuration directives
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Target configuration starts with the "uri" directive. All the
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configuration directives that are not specific to targets should
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be defined first for clarity, including those that are common to
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all backends. They are:
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default-target none
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This directive forces the backend to reject all those operations
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that must resolve to a single target in case none or multiple
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targets are selected. They include: add, delete, modify, modrdn;
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compare is not included, as well as bind since, as they don't
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alter entries, in case of multiple matches an attempt is made
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to perform the operation on any candidate target, with the
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constraint that at most on must succeed. This directive can also
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be used when processing targets to mark a specific target as default.
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dncache-ttl {forever|disabled|<ttl>}
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This directive sets the time-to-live of the dn cache. This caches
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the target that holds a given dn to speed up target selection
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in case multiple targets would result from an uncached search;
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forever means cache never expires; disabled means no dn caching;
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otherwise a valid ( > 0 ) ttl in seconds is required.
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- Target specification
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Target specification starts with a "uri" directive:
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uri <protocol>://[<host>[:<port>]]/<naming context>
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The "server" directive that was allowed in back-ldap (although deprecated)
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has been discarded in back-meta. The <protocol> part can be anything
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ldap_initialize(3) accepts ({ldap|ldaps|ldapi} and variants); <host>
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and <port> may be omitted, defaulting to whatever is set in
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/etc/ldap.conf (correct me!?!).
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The <naming context> part is mandatory. It must end with one of the
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naming contexts defined for the backend, e.g.:
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suffix "dc=foo,dc=com"
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uri "ldap://x.foo.com/dc=x,dc=foo,dc=com"
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The <naming context> part doesn't need to be unique across the targets;
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it may also match one of the values of the "suffix" directive.
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default-target [<target>]
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the "default-target" directive can also be used during target
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specification. With no arguments it marks the current target as
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the default. The optional number marks target <target> as the
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default one, starting from 1. Target <target> must be defined.
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binddn <administrative dn for ac purposes>
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This directive, as in back-ldap, allows to define the dn that is
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used to query the target server for acl checking; it should have
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read access on the target server to attributes used on the proxy
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for acl checking. There is no risk of giving away such values;
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they are only used to check permissions.
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2001-05-20 01:02:39 +08:00
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bindpw <password for ac purposes>
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This directive sets the password for acl checking in conjunction
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with the above mentioned "binddn" directive.
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2001-05-20 01:02:39 +08:00
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pseudorootdn <substitute dn in case of rootdn bind>
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This directive, if present, sets the dn that will be substituted
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to the bind dn if a bind with the backend's "rootdn" succeeds. The true
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"rootdn" of the target server ought not be used; an arbitrary administrative
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dn should used instead.
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pseudorootpw <substitute password in case of rootdn bind>
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This directive sets the credential that will be used in case a bind
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with the backend's "rootdn" succeeds, and the bind is propagated to
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the target using the "pseudorootdn" dn.
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rewrite* ...
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suffixmassage <virtual naming context> <real naming context>
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All the directives starting with "rewrite" refer to the rewrite engine
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that has been added to slapd. The "suffixmassage" directive was
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introduced in back-ldap to allow suffix massaging while proxying.
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It has been obsoleted by the rewriting tools. However, both for
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backward compatibility and for ease of configuration when simple
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suffix massage is required, it has been preserved. It wraps the
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basic rewriting instructions that perform suffix massaging.
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Note: this also fixes a flaw in suffix massaging, which operated
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on (case insensitive) DNs instead of normalized DNs,
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so "dc=foo, dc=com" would not match "dc=foo,dc=com".
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See the "rewrite" section.
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map {objectClass|attribute} {<source>|*} [<dest>|*]
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objectClass/attribute mapping stuff. This has been inherited from
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the work made by Mark Valence on the back-ldap backend.
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See the mapping section.
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- Scenarios
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A powerful (and in some sense dangerous) rewrite engine has been added
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to both back-ldap and back-meta. While the former can gain limited
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beneficial effects from rewriting stuff, the latter can become
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an amazingly powerful tool.
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Consider a couple of scenarios first.
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1) Two directory servers share two levels of naming context;
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say "dc=a,dc=foo,dc=com" and "dc=b,dc=foo,dc=com". Then, an
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unambiguous back-meta can be configured as:
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database meta
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suffix "dc=foo,dc=com"
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uri "ldap://a.foo.com/dc=a,dc=foo,dc=com"
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uri "ldap://b.foo.com/dc=b,dc=foo,dc=com"
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Operations directed to a specific target can be easily resolved
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because there are no ambiguities. The only operation that may
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resolve to multiple targets is a search with base "dc=foo,dc=com"
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and scope at least "one", which results in spawning two searches
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to the targets.
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2a) Two directory servers don't share any portion of naming context,
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but they'd present as a single DIT. [Caveat: uniqueness of
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(massaged) entries among the two servers is assumed; integrity
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checks risk to incurr in excessive overhead and have not been implemented.]
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Say we have "dc=bar,dc=org" and "o=Foo,c=US", and we'd like them to
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appear as branches of "dc=foo,dc=com", say "dc=a,dc=foo,dc=com"
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and "dc=b,dc=foo,dc=com". Then we need to configure our back-meta as:
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database meta
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suffix "dc=foo,dc=com"
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uri "ldap://a.bar.com/dc=a,dc=foo,dc=com"
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suffixmassage "dc=a,dc=foo,dc=com" "dc=bar,dc=org"
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uri "ldap://b.foo.com/dc=b,dc=foo,dc=com"
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suffixmassage "dc=b,dc=foo,dc=com" "o=Foo,c=US"
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Again, operations can be resolved without ambiguity, although
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some rewriting is required. Notice that the virtual naming context
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of each target is a branch of the database's naming context; it
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is rewritten back and forth when operations are performed towards
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the target servers. What "back and forth" means will be clarified
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later.
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When a search with base "dc=foo,dc=com" is attempted, if the
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scope is "base" it fails with "no such object"; in fact, the
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common root of the two targets (prior to massaging) does not
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exist. If the scope is "one", both targets are contacted with
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the base replaced by each target's base; the scope is derated
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to "base". In general, a scope "one" search is honored,
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and the scope is derated, only when the incoming base is
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at most one level lower of a target's naming context (prior
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to massaging).
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Finally, if the scope is "sub" the incoming base is replaced
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by each target's unmassaged naming context, and the scope
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is not altered.
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2b) Consider the above reported scenario with the two servers
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sharing the same naming context:
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database meta
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suffix "dc=foo,dc=com"
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uri "ldap://a.bar.com/dc=foo,dc=com"
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suffixmassage "dc=foo,dc=com" "dc=bar,dc=org"
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uri "ldap://b.foo.com/dc=foo,dc=com"
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suffixmassage "dc=foo,dc=com" "o=Foo,c=US"
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All the previous considerations hold, except that now there is
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no way to unambiguously resolve a dn. In this case, all the
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operations that require an unambiguous target selection will
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fail unless the dn is already cached or a default target has
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been set.
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- Rewriting
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This part of the document is being prepared. At present you may consult
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the RATIONALE in libraries/librewrite.
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- Objectclass/attribute mapping
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This part of the document is being prepared. At present you may stick with
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http://www.openldap.org/lists/openldap-devel/200102/msg00006.html
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- ACL
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Note on ACLs: at present you may add whatever ACL rule you desire
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to back-meta (as well as to back-ldap). However, the meaning of an ACL
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on a proxy may require some considerations. Two philosophies may be
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considered:
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a) the remote server dictates the permissions; the proxy simply passes
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back what it gets from the remote server.
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b) the remote server unveils "everything"; the proxy is responsible
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for protecting data from unauthorized access.
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Of course the latter sounds unreasonable, but it is not. It is possible
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to imagine scenarios in which a remote host discloses data that can
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be considered "public" inside an intranet, and a proxy that connects it
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to the internet may impose additional constraints. To this purpose, the
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proxy should be able to comply with all the ACL matching criteria that
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the server supports. This has been achieved with regard to all the
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criteria supported by slapd except a special subtle case (please drop
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me a note if you can find other exceptions: <ando@openldap.org>).
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The rule
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access to dn="<dn>" attr=<attr>
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by dnattr=<dnattr> read
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by * none
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cannot be matched IFF:
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- the attribute that is being requested, <attr>, is NOT <dnattr>, and
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- the attribute that determines membership, <dnattr>, has not
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been requested (e.g. in a search)
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In fact this ACL is resolved by slapd using the portion of entry it retrieved
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from the remote server without requiring any further intervention of the
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backend, so, if the <dnattr> attribute has not been fetched, the match
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cannot be assessed because the attribute is not present, not because
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no value matches the requirement!
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Note on ACLS and attribute mapping: ACLs are applied to the mapped
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attributes; for instance, if the attribute locally known as "foo"
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is mapped to "bar" on a remote server, then local ACLs apply to
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attribute "foo" and are totally unaware of its remote name. The
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remote server will check permissions for "bar", and the local server
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will possibly enforce additional restrictions to "foo".
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