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1998-04-21 18:00 Ulrich Drepper <drepper@cygnus.com> * iconv/gconv.c (__gconv): Remove bogus input buffer size computation. * iconv/gconv_open.c (__gconv_open): Initialize outbufend element. * iconv/gconv_simple.c (__gconv_transform_internal_ascii): Don't use character in comparison with uint32_t. (__gconv_transform_internal_utf8): Specify MAX_NEEDED_TO. (__gconv_transform_utf8_internal): Specify MAX_NEEDED_FROM. Optimize BODY a bit. * iconv/loop.c: Require MIN_NEEDED_INPUT and MIN_NEEDED_OUTPUT to be defined. * iconv/skeleton.c: Also reset converted counter in case of an error. Call reset function using correct value for output buffer start. * iconvdata/Makefile: Re-enable tests. * iconvdata/iso8859-1.c: Swap MIN_NEEDED_INPUT and MIN_NEEDED_OUTPUT value for to-conversion. * iconvdata/TESTS: Add new third column. * iconvdata/run-iconv-test.sh: Add support for charsets which are not ASCII based. * iconvdata/testdata/suntzus: New file. * elf/dl-minimal.c (__strtol_internal): Increment pointer to string while reading. Correctly used base. Little optimization. (__strtoul_internal): Likewise. * elf/rtld.c (dl_main): Test to avoid duplicate call of _dl_init_paths was wrong. Use explicit variable. 1998-04-20 23:49 Zack Weinberg <zack@rabi.phys.columbia.edu> * configure.in: Check for awk. * config.make.in: Add AWK to be substituted. * manual/xtract-typefun.awk: Rewrite to eliminate gawk extensions. * manual/users.texi: Fix typo exposed by above rewrite. * Makefile: Invoke awk using AWK variable. * csu/Makefile: Likewise. * elf/Makefile: Likewise. * mach/Makefile: Likewise. * manual/Makefile: Likewise. * sysdeps/gnu/Makefile: Likewise. * sysdeps/mach/hurd/Makefile: Likewise. * sysdeps/unix/Makefile: Likewise. * timezone/Makefile: Likewise. 1998-04-10 Gordon Matzigkeit <gord@profitpress.com> * sysdeps/gnu/errlist.awk (ERR_REMAP): Implement error code to array index translation. (SYS_ERRLIST_ALIAS, SYS_NERR_ALIAS): Make weak aliases only if these are defined. * sysdeps/mach/hurd/Dist: Add errlist.c to distribution. * sysdeps/mach/hurd/errlist.c: New file. (ERR_TRANSLATE): Map Hurd error codes into errlist indices. (_hurd_errlist): The Hurd error list doesn't have Unix sys_errlist semantics, so rename it. 1998-04-16 Andreas Schwab <schwab@issan.informatik.uni-dortmund.de> * iconvdata/run-iconv-test.sh: Make portable. Always test all conversions. 1998-04-21 12:30 H.J. Lu <hjl@gnu.org> * wcsmbs/wcsrtombs.c (__wcsrtombs): Initialize result to 0. * wcsmbs/wcsnrtombs.c: Likewise. 1998-04-21 Ulrich Drepper <drepper@cygnus.com> * sysdeps/generic/dl-sysdep.c: Handle _dl_hwcap correctly. * wcsmbs/btowc.c (__btowc): Declare inptr as const char *. * time/strftime.c (my_strftime): Initialize pad variable in declaration. * iconvdata/big5.c: Don't use character constants in comparisons with unsigned value. * sysdeps/generic/setutxent.c: New file. * sysdeps/generic/getutxent.c: New file. * sysdeps/generic/endutxent.c: New file. * sysdeps/generic/getutxid.c: New file. * sysdeps/generic/getutxline.c: New file. * sysdeps/generic/pututxline.c: New file. * sysdeps/generic/utmpxname.c: New file. * sysdeps/generic/updwtmpx.c: New file.
1694 lines
66 KiB
Plaintext
1694 lines
66 KiB
Plaintext
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SUN TZU ON THE ART OF WAR
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THE OLDEST MILITARY TREATISE IN THE WORLD
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Translated from the Chinese
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By LIONEL GILES, M.A. (1910)
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[This is the basic text of Sun Tzu on the Art of War. It was
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extracted from Mr. Giles' complete work as titled above. The
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commentary itself, which, of course includes this work embedded
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within it, has been released as suntzu10.txt (or suntzu10.zip).
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This is being released only as an adjunct to that work, which
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contains a wealth of commentary upon this text.]
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I. LAYING PLANS
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1. Sun Tzu said: The art of war is of vital importance
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to the State.
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2. It is a matter of life and death, a road either
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to safety or to ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry
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which can on no account be neglected.
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3. The art of war, then, is governed by five constant
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factors, to be taken into account in one's deliberations,
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when seeking to determine the conditions obtaining in the field.
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4. These are: (1) The Moral Law; (2) Heaven; (3) Earth;
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(4) The Commander; (5) Method and discipline.
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5,6. The Moral Law causes the people to be in complete
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accord with their ruler, so that they will follow him
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regardless of their lives, undismayed by any danger.
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7. Heaven signifies night and day, cold and heat,
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times and seasons.
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8. Earth comprises distances, great and small;
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danger and security; open ground and narrow passes;
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the chances of life and death.
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9. The Commander stands for the virtues of wisdom,
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sincerely, benevolence, courage and strictness.
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10. By method and discipline are to be understood
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the marshaling of the army in its proper subdivisions,
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the graduations of rank among the officers, the maintenance
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of roads by which supplies may reach the army, and the
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control of military expenditure.
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11. These five heads should be familiar to every general:
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he who knows them will be victorious; he who knows them
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not will fail.
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12. Therefore, in your deliberations, when seeking
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to determine the military conditions, let them be made
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the basis of a comparison, in this wise:--
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13. (1) Which of the two sovereigns is imbued
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with the Moral law?
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(2) Which of the two generals has most ability?
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(3) With whom lie the advantages derived from Heaven
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and Earth?
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(4) On which side is discipline most rigorously enforced?
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(5) Which army is stronger?
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(6) On which side are officers and men more highly trained?
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(7) In which army is there the greater constancy
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both in reward and punishment?
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14. By means of these seven considerations I can
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forecast victory or defeat.
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15. The general that hearkens to my counsel and acts
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upon it, will conquer: let such a one be retained in command!
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The general that hearkens not to my counsel nor acts upon it,
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will suffer defeat:--let such a one be dismissed!
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16. While heading the profit of my counsel,
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avail yourself also of any helpful circumstances
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over and beyond the ordinary rules.
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17. According as circumstances are favorable,
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one should modify one's plans.
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18. All warfare is based on deception.
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19. Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable;
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when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we
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are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away;
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when far away, we must make him believe we are near.
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20. Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign disorder,
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and crush him.
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21. If he is secure at all points, be prepared for him.
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If he is in superior strength, evade him.
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22. If your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to
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irritate him. Pretend to be weak, that he may grow arrogant.
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23. If he is taking his ease, give him no rest.
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If his forces are united, separate them.
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24. Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where
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you are not expected.
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25. These military devices, leading to victory,
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must not be divulged beforehand.
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26. Now the general who wins a battle makes many
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calculations in his temple ere the battle is fought.
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The general who loses a battle makes but few
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calculations beforehand. Thus do many calculations
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lead to victory, and few calculations to defeat:
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how much more no calculation at all! It is by attention
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to this point that I can foresee who is likely to win or lose.
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II. WAGING WAR
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1. Sun Tzu said: In the operations of war,
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where there are in the field a thousand swift chariots,
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as many heavy chariots, and a hundred thousand
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mail-clad soldiers, with provisions enough to carry them
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a thousand li, the expenditure at home and at the front,
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including entertainment of guests, small items such as
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glue and paint, and sums spent on chariots and armor,
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will reach the total of a thousand ounces of silver per day.
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Such is the cost of raising an army of 100,000 men.
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2. When you engage in actual fighting, if victory
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is long in coming, then men's weapons will grow dull and
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their ardor will be damped. If you lay siege to a town,
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you will exhaust your strength.
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3. Again, if the campaign is protracted, the resources
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of the State will not be equal to the strain.
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4. Now, when your weapons are dulled, your ardor damped,
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your strength exhausted and your treasure spent,
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other chieftains will spring up to take advantage
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of your extremity. Then no man, however wise,
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will be able to avert the consequences that must ensue.
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5. Thus, though we have heard of stupid haste in war,
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cleverness has never been seen associated with long delays.
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6. There is no instance of a country having benefited
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from prolonged warfare.
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7. It is only one who is thoroughly acquainted
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with the evils of war that can thoroughly understand
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the profitable way of carrying it on.
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8. The skillful soldier does not raise a second levy,
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neither are his supply-wagons loaded more than twice.
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9. Bring war material with you from home, but forage
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on the enemy. Thus the army will have food enough
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for its needs.
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10. Poverty of the State exchequer causes an army
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to be maintained by contributions from a distance.
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Contributing to maintain an army at a distance causes
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the people to be impoverished.
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11. On the other hand, the proximity of an army causes
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prices to go up; and high prices cause the people's
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substance to be drained away.
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12. When their substance is drained away, the peasantry
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will be afflicted by heavy exactions.
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13,14. With this loss of substance and exhaustion
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of strength, the homes of the people will be stripped bare,
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and three-tenths of their income will be dissipated;
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while government expenses for broken chariots, worn-out horses,
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breast-plates and helmets, bows and arrows, spears and shields,
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protective mantles, draught-oxen and heavy wagons,
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will amount to four-tenths of its total revenue.
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15. Hence a wise general makes a point of foraging
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on the enemy. One cartload of the enemy's provisions
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is equivalent to twenty of one's own, and likewise
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a single picul of his provender is equivalent to twenty
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from one's own store.
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16. Now in order to kill the enemy, our men must
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be roused to anger; that there may be advantage from
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defeating the enemy, they must have their rewards.
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17. Therefore in chariot fighting, when ten or more chariots
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have been taken, those should be rewarded who took the first.
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Our own flags should be substituted for those of the enemy,
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and the chariots mingled and used in conjunction with ours.
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The captured soldiers should be kindly treated and kept.
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18. This is called, using the conquered foe to augment
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one's own strength.
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19. In war, then, let your great object be victory,
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not lengthy campaigns.
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20. Thus it may be known that the leader of armies
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is the arbiter of the people's fate, the man on whom it
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depends whether the nation shall be in peace or in peril.
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III. ATTACK BY STRATAGEM
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1. Sun Tzu said: In the practical art of war, the best
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thing of all is to take the enemy's country whole and intact;
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to shatter and destroy it is not so good. So, too, it is
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better to recapture an army entire than to destroy it,
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to capture a regiment, a detachment or a company entire
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than to destroy them.
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2. Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles
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is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists
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in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting.
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3. Thus the highest form of generalship is to
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balk the enemy's plans; the next best is to prevent
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the junction of the enemy's forces; the next in
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order is to attack the enemy's army in the field;
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and the worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities.
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4. The rule is, not to besiege walled cities if it
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can possibly be avoided. The preparation of mantlets,
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movable shelters, and various implements of war, will take
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up three whole months; and the piling up of mounds over
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against the walls will take three months more.
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5. The general, unable to control his irritation,
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will launch his men to the assault like swarming ants,
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with the result that one-third of his men are slain,
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while the town still remains untaken. Such are the disastrous
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effects of a siege.
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6. Therefore the skillful leader subdues the enemy's
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troops without any fighting; he captures their cities
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without laying siege to them; he overthrows their kingdom
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without lengthy operations in the field.
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7. With his forces intact he will dispute the mastery
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of the Empire, and thus, without losing a man, his triumph
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will be complete. This is the method of attacking by stratagem.
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8. It is the rule in war, if our forces are ten
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to the enemy's one, to surround him; if five to one,
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to attack him; if twice as numerous, to divide our army
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into two.
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9. If equally matched, we can offer battle;
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if slightly inferior in numbers, we can avoid the enemy;
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if quite unequal in every way, we can flee from him.
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10. Hence, though an obstinate fight may be made
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by a small force, in the end it must be captured
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by the larger force.
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11. Now the general is the bulwark of the State;
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if the bulwark is complete at all points; the State will
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be strong; if the bulwark is defective, the State will
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be weak.
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12. There are three ways in which a ruler can bring
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misfortune upon his army:--
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13. (1) By commanding the army to advance or to retreat,
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being ignorant of the fact that it cannot obey.
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This is called hobbling the army.
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14. (2) By attempting to govern an army in the
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same way as he administers a kingdom, being ignorant
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of the conditions which obtain in an army. This causes
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restlessness in the soldier's minds.
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15. (3) By employing the officers of his army
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without discrimination, through ignorance of the
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military principle of adaptation to circumstances.
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This shakes the confidence of the soldiers.
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16. But when the army is restless and distrustful,
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trouble is sure to come from the other feudal princes.
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This is simply bringing anarchy into the army, and flinging
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victory away.
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17. Thus we may know that there are five essentials
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for victory:
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(1) He will win who knows when to fight and when
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not to fight.
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(2) He will win who knows how to handle both superior
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and inferior forces.
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(3) He will win whose army is animated by the same
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spirit throughout all its ranks.
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(4) He will win who, prepared himself, waits to take
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the enemy unprepared.
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(5) He will win who has military capacity and is
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not interfered with by the sovereign.
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18. Hence the saying: If you know the enemy
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and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a
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hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy,
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for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat.
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If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will
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succumb in every battle.
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IV. TACTICAL DISPOSITIONS
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1. Sun Tzu said: The good fighters of old first put
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themselves beyond the possibility of defeat, and then
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waited for an opportunity of defeating the enemy.
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2. To secure ourselves against defeat lies in our
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own hands, but the opportunity of defeating the enemy
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is provided by the enemy himself.
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3. Thus the good fighter is able to secure himself against defeat,
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but cannot make certain of defeating the enemy.
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4. Hence the saying: One may know how to conquer
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without being able to do it.
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5. Security against defeat implies defensive tactics;
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ability to defeat the enemy means taking the offensive.
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6. Standing on the defensive indicates insufficient
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strength; attacking, a superabundance of strength.
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7. The general who is skilled in defense hides in the
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most secret recesses of the earth; he who is skilled in
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attack flashes forth from the topmost heights of heaven.
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Thus on the one hand we have ability to protect ourselves;
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on the other, a victory that is complete.
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8. To see victory only when it is within the ken
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of the common herd is not the acme of excellence.
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9. Neither is it the acme of excellence if you fight
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and conquer and the whole Empire says, "Well done!"
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10. To lift an autumn hair is no sign of great strength;
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to see the sun and moon is no sign of sharp sight;
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to hear the noise of thunder is no sign of a quick ear.
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11. What the ancients called a clever fighter is
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one who not only wins, but excels in winning with ease.
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12. Hence his victories bring him neither reputation
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for wisdom nor credit for courage.
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13. He wins his battles by making no mistakes.
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Making no mistakes is what establishes the certainty
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of victory, for it means conquering an enemy that is
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already defeated.
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14. Hence the skillful fighter puts himself into
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a position which makes defeat impossible, and does
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not miss the moment for defeating the enemy.
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15. Thus it is that in war the victorious strategist
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only seeks battle after the victory has been won,
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whereas he who is destined to defeat first fights
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and afterwards looks for victory.
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16. The consummate leader cultivates the moral law,
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and strictly adheres to method and discipline; thus it is
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in his power to control success.
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17. In respect of military method, we have,
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firstly, Measurement; secondly, Estimation of quantity;
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thirdly, Calculation; fourthly, Balancing of chances;
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fifthly, Victory.
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18. Measurement owes its existence to Earth;
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Estimation of quantity to Measurement; Calculation to
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Estimation of quantity; Balancing of chances to Calculation;
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and Victory to Balancing of chances.
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19. A victorious army opposed to a routed one, is as
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a pound's weight placed in the scale against a single grain.
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20. The onrush of a conquering force is like the bursting
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of pent-up waters into a chasm a thousand fathoms deep.
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V. ENERGY
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1. Sun Tzu said: The control of a large force
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is the same principle as the control of a few men:
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it is merely a question of dividing up their numbers.
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2. Fighting with a large army under your command
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is nowise different from fighting with a small one:
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it is merely a question of instituting signs and signals.
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3. To ensure that your whole host may withstand
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the brunt of the enemy's attack and remain unshaken--
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this is effected by maneuvers direct and indirect.
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4. That the impact of your army may be like a grindstone
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dashed against an egg--this is effected by the science
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of weak points and strong.
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5. In all fighting, the direct method may be used
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for joining battle, but indirect methods will be needed
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in order to secure victory.
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6. Indirect tactics, efficiently applied, are inexhaustible
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as Heaven and Earth, unending as the flow of rivers and streams;
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like the sun and moon, they end but to begin anew;
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like the four seasons, they pass away to return once more.
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7. There are not more than five musical notes,
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yet the combinations of these five give rise to more
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melodies than can ever be heard.
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8. There are not more than five primary colors
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(blue, yellow, red, white, and black), yet in combination
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they produce more hues than can ever been seen.
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9. There are not more than five cardinal tastes
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(sour, acrid, salt, sweet, bitter), yet combinations
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of them yield more flavors than can ever be tasted.
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10. In battle, there are not more than two methods
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of attack--the direct and the indirect; yet these two
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in combination give rise to an endless series of maneuvers.
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11. The direct and the indirect lead on to each other in turn.
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It is like moving in a circle--you never come to an end.
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Who can exhaust the possibilities of their combination?
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12. The onset of troops is like the rush of a torrent
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which will even roll stones along in its course.
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13. The quality of decision is like the well-timed
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swoop of a falcon which enables it to strike and destroy
|
|
its victim.
|
|
|
|
14. Therefore the good fighter will be terrible
|
|
in his onset, and prompt in his decision.
|
|
|
|
15. Energy may be likened to the bending of a crossbow;
|
|
decision, to the releasing of a trigger.
|
|
|
|
16. Amid the turmoil and tumult of battle, there may
|
|
be seeming disorder and yet no real disorder at all;
|
|
amid confusion and chaos, your array may be without head
|
|
or tail, yet it will be proof against defeat.
|
|
|
|
17. Simulated disorder postulates perfect discipline,
|
|
simulated fear postulates courage; simulated weakness
|
|
postulates strength.
|
|
|
|
18. Hiding order beneath the cloak of disorder is
|
|
simply a question of subdivision; concealing courage under
|
|
a show of timidity presupposes a fund of latent energy;
|
|
masking strength with weakness is to be effected
|
|
by tactical dispositions.
|
|
|
|
19. Thus one who is skillful at keeping the enemy
|
|
on the move maintains deceitful appearances, according to
|
|
which the enemy will act. He sacrifices something,
|
|
that the enemy may snatch at it.
|
|
|
|
20. By holding out baits, he keeps him on the march;
|
|
then with a body of picked men he lies in wait for him.
|
|
|
|
21. The clever combatant looks to the effect of combined
|
|
energy, and does not require too much from individuals.
|
|
Hence his ability to pick out the right men and utilize
|
|
combined energy.
|
|
|
|
22. When he utilizes combined energy, his fighting
|
|
men become as it were like unto rolling logs or stones.
|
|
For it is the nature of a log or stone to remain
|
|
motionless on level ground, and to move when on a slope;
|
|
if four-cornered, to come to a standstill, but if
|
|
round-shaped, to go rolling down.
|
|
|
|
23. Thus the energy developed by good fighting men
|
|
is as the momentum of a round stone rolled down a mountain
|
|
thousands of feet in height. So much on the subject
|
|
of energy.
|
|
|
|
|
|
VI. WEAK POINTS AND STRONG
|
|
|
|
|
|
1. Sun Tzu said: Whoever is first in the field and
|
|
awaits the coming of the enemy, will be fresh for the fight;
|
|
whoever is second in the field and has to hasten to battle
|
|
will arrive exhausted.
|
|
|
|
2. Therefore the clever combatant imposes his will on
|
|
the enemy, but does not allow the enemy's will to be imposed on him.
|
|
|
|
3. By holding out advantages to him, he can cause the enemy
|
|
to approach of his own accord; or, by inflicting damage,
|
|
he can make it impossible for the enemy to draw near.
|
|
|
|
4. If the enemy is taking his ease, he can harass him;
|
|
if well supplied with food, he can starve him out;
|
|
if quietly encamped, he can force him to move.
|
|
|
|
5. Appear at points which the enemy must hasten to defend;
|
|
march swiftly to places where you are not expected.
|
|
|
|
6. An army may march great distances without distress,
|
|
if it marches through country where the enemy is not.
|
|
|
|
7. You can be sure of succeeding in your attacks
|
|
if you only attack places which are undefended.You can
|
|
ensure the safety of your defense if you only hold
|
|
positions that cannot be attacked.
|
|
|
|
8. Hence that general is skillful in attack whose
|
|
opponent does not know what to defend; and he is skillful
|
|
in defense whose opponent does not know what to attack.
|
|
|
|
9. O divine art of subtlety and secrecy! Through you
|
|
we learn to be invisible, through you inaudible;
|
|
and hence we can hold the enemy's fate in our hands.
|
|
|
|
10. You may advance and be absolutely irresistible,
|
|
if you make for the enemy's weak points; you may retire
|
|
and be safe from pursuit if your movements are more rapid
|
|
than those of the enemy.
|
|
|
|
11. If we wish to fight, the enemy can be forced
|
|
to an engagement even though he be sheltered behind a high
|
|
rampart and a deep ditch. All we need do is attack
|
|
some other place that he will be obliged to relieve.
|
|
|
|
12. If we do not wish to fight, we can prevent
|
|
the enemy from engaging us even though the lines
|
|
of our encampment be merely traced out on the ground.
|
|
All we need do is to throw something odd and unaccountable
|
|
in his way.
|
|
|
|
13. By discovering the enemy's dispositions and remaining
|
|
invisible ourselves, we can keep our forces concentrated,
|
|
while the enemy's must be divided.
|
|
|
|
14. We can form a single united body, while the
|
|
enemy must split up into fractions. Hence there will
|
|
be a whole pitted against separate parts of a whole,
|
|
which means that we shall be many to the enemy's few.
|
|
|
|
15. And if we are able thus to attack an inferior force
|
|
with a superior one, our opponents will be in dire straits.
|
|
|
|
16. The spot where we intend to fight must not be
|
|
made known; for then the enemy will have to prepare
|
|
against a possible attack at several different points;
|
|
and his forces being thus distributed in many directions,
|
|
the numbers we shall have to face at any given point will
|
|
be proportionately few.
|
|
|
|
17. For should the enemy strengthen his van,
|
|
he will weaken his rear; should he strengthen his rear,
|
|
he will weaken his van; should he strengthen his left,
|
|
he will weaken his right; should he strengthen his right,
|
|
he will weaken his left. If he sends reinforcements everywhere,
|
|
he will everywhere be weak.
|
|
|
|
18. Numerical weakness comes from having to prepare
|
|
against possible attacks; numerical strength, from compelling
|
|
our adversary to make these preparations against us.
|
|
|
|
19. Knowing the place and the time of the coming battle,
|
|
we may concentrate from the greatest distances in order
|
|
to fight.
|
|
|
|
20. But if neither time nor place be known,
|
|
then the left wing will be impotent to succor the right,
|
|
the right equally impotent to succor the left, the van
|
|
unable to relieve the rear, or the rear to support the van.
|
|
How much more so if the furthest portions of the army are
|
|
anything under a hundred LI apart, and even the nearest
|
|
are separated by several LI!
|
|
|
|
21. Though according to my estimate the soldiers
|
|
of Yueh exceed our own in number, that shall advantage
|
|
them nothing in the matter of victory. I say then
|
|
that victory can be achieved.
|
|
|
|
22. Though the enemy be stronger in numbers, we may
|
|
prevent him from fighting. Scheme so as to discover
|
|
his plans and the likelihood of their success.
|
|
|
|
23. Rouse him, and learn the principle of his
|
|
activity or inactivity. Force him to reveal himself,
|
|
so as to find out his vulnerable spots.
|
|
|
|
24. Carefully compare the opposing army with your own,
|
|
so that you may know where strength is superabundant
|
|
and where it is deficient.
|
|
|
|
25. In making tactical dispositions, the highest pitch
|
|
you can attain is to conceal them; conceal your dispositions,
|
|
and you will be safe from the prying of the subtlest spies,
|
|
from the machinations of the wisest brains.
|
|
|
|
26. How victory may be produced for them out of the enemy's
|
|
own tactics--that is what the multitude cannot comprehend.
|
|
|
|
27. All men can see the tactics whereby I conquer,
|
|
but what none can see is the strategy out of which victory
|
|
is evolved.
|
|
|
|
28. Do not repeat the tactics which have gained
|
|
you one victory, but let your methods be regulated
|
|
by the infinite variety of circumstances.
|
|
|
|
29. Military tactics are like unto water; for water in its
|
|
natural course runs away from high places and hastens downwards.
|
|
|
|
30. So in war, the way is to avoid what is strong
|
|
and to strike at what is weak.
|
|
|
|
31. Water shapes its course according to the nature
|
|
of the ground over which it flows; the soldier works
|
|
out his victory in relation to the foe whom he is facing.
|
|
|
|
32. Therefore, just as water retains no constant shape,
|
|
so in warfare there are no constant conditions.
|
|
|
|
33. He who can modify his tactics in relation to his
|
|
opponent and thereby succeed in winning, may be called
|
|
a heaven-born captain.
|
|
|
|
34. The five elements (water, fire, wood, metal, earth)
|
|
are not always equally predominant; the four seasons make
|
|
way for each other in turn. There are short days and long;
|
|
the moon has its periods of waning and waxing.
|
|
|
|
|
|
VII. MANEUVERING
|
|
|
|
|
|
1. Sun Tzu said: In war, the general receives his
|
|
commands from the sovereign.
|
|
|
|
2. Having collected an army and concentrated his forces,
|
|
he must blend and harmonize the different elements thereof
|
|
before pitching his camp.
|
|
|
|
3. After that, comes tactical maneuvering,
|
|
than which there is nothing more difficult.
|
|
The difficulty of tactical maneuvering consists
|
|
in turning the devious into the direct, and misfortune into gain.
|
|
|
|
4. Thus, to take a long and circuitous route,
|
|
after enticing the enemy out of the way, and though starting
|
|
after him, to contrive to reach the goal before him,
|
|
shows knowledge of the artifice of DEVIATION.
|
|
|
|
5. Maneuvering with an army is advantageous;
|
|
with an undisciplined multitude, most dangerous.
|
|
|
|
6. If you set a fully equipped army in march in order
|
|
to snatch an advantage, the chances are that you will be
|
|
too late. On the other hand, to detach a flying column
|
|
for the purpose involves the sacrifice of its baggage
|
|
and stores.
|
|
|
|
7. Thus, if you order your men to roll up their
|
|
buff-coats, and make forced marches without halting day
|
|
or night, covering double the usual distance at a stretch,
|
|
doing a hundred LI in order to wrest an advantage,
|
|
the leaders of all your three divisions will fall into
|
|
the hands of the enemy.
|
|
|
|
8. The stronger men will be in front, the jaded
|
|
ones will fall behind, and on this plan only one-tenth
|
|
of your army will reach its destination.
|
|
|
|
9. If you march fifty LI in order to outmaneuver
|
|
the enemy, you will lose the leader of your first division,
|
|
and only half your force will reach the goal.
|
|
|
|
10. If you march thirty LI with the same object,
|
|
two-thirds of your army will arrive.
|
|
|
|
11. We may take it then that an army without its
|
|
baggage-train is lost; without provisions it is lost;
|
|
without bases of supply it is lost.
|
|
|
|
12. We cannot enter into alliances until we are
|
|
acquainted with the designs of our neighbors.
|
|
|
|
13. We are not fit to lead an army on the march
|
|
unless we are familiar with the face of the country--its
|
|
mountains and forests, its pitfalls and precipices,
|
|
its marshes and swamps.
|
|
|
|
14. We shall be unable to turn natural advantage
|
|
to account unless we make use of local guides.
|
|
|
|
15. In war, practice dissimulation, and you will succeed.
|
|
|
|
16. Whether to concentrate or to divide your troops,
|
|
must be decided by circumstances.
|
|
|
|
17. Let your rapidity be that of the wind,
|
|
your compactness that of the forest.
|
|
|
|
18. In raiding and plundering be like fire,
|
|
is immovability like a mountain.
|
|
|
|
19. Let your plans be dark and impenetrable as night,
|
|
and when you move, fall like a thunderbolt.
|
|
|
|
20. When you plunder a countryside, let the spoil be
|
|
divided amongst your men; when you capture new territory,
|
|
cut it up into allotments for the benefit of the soldiery.
|
|
|
|
21. Ponder and deliberate before you make a move.
|
|
|
|
22. He will conquer who has learnt the artifice
|
|
of deviation. Such is the art of maneuvering.
|
|
|
|
23. The Book of Army Management says: On the field
|
|
of battle, the spoken word does not carry far enough:
|
|
hence the institution of gongs and drums. Nor can ordinary
|
|
objects be seen clearly enough: hence the institution
|
|
of banners and flags.
|
|
|
|
24. Gongs and drums, banners and flags, are means
|
|
whereby the ears and eyes of the host may be focused
|
|
on one particular point.
|
|
|
|
25. The host thus forming a single united body,
|
|
is it impossible either for the brave to advance alone,
|
|
or for the cowardly to retreat alone. This is the art
|
|
of handling large masses of men.
|
|
|
|
26. In night-fighting, then, make much use of signal-fires
|
|
and drums, and in fighting by day, of flags and banners,
|
|
as a means of influencing the ears and eyes of your army.
|
|
|
|
27. A whole army may be robbed of its spirit;
|
|
a commander-in-chief may be robbed of his presence of mind.
|
|
|
|
28. Now a soldier's spirit is keenest in the morning;
|
|
by noonday it has begun to flag; and in the evening,
|
|
his mind is bent only on returning to camp.
|
|
|
|
29. A clever general, therefore, avoids an army when
|
|
its spirit is keen, but attacks it when it is sluggish
|
|
and inclined to return. This is the art of studying moods.
|
|
|
|
30. Disciplined and calm, to await the appearance
|
|
of disorder and hubbub amongst the enemy:--this is the art
|
|
of retaining self-possession.
|
|
|
|
31. To be near the goal while the enemy is still
|
|
far from it, to wait at ease while the enemy is
|
|
toiling and struggling, to be well-fed while the enemy
|
|
is famished:--this is the art of husbanding one's strength.
|
|
|
|
32. To refrain from intercepting an enemy whose
|
|
banners are in perfect order, to refrain from attacking
|
|
an army drawn up in calm and confident array:--this
|
|
is the art of studying circumstances.
|
|
|
|
33. It is a military axiom not to advance uphill
|
|
against the enemy, nor to oppose him when he comes downhill.
|
|
|
|
34. Do not pursue an enemy who simulates flight;
|
|
do not attack soldiers whose temper is keen.
|
|
|
|
35. Do not swallow bait offered by the enemy.
|
|
Do not interfere with an army that is returning home.
|
|
|
|
36. When you surround an army, leave an outlet free.
|
|
Do not press a desperate foe too hard.
|
|
|
|
37. Such is the art of warfare.
|
|
|
|
|
|
VIII. VARIATION IN TACTICS
|
|
|
|
|
|
1. Sun Tzu said: In war, the general receives
|
|
his commands from the sovereign, collects his army
|
|
and concentrates his forces
|
|
|
|
2. When in difficult country, do not encamp. In country
|
|
where high roads intersect, join hands with your allies.
|
|
Do not linger in dangerously isolated positions.
|
|
In hemmed-in situations, you must resort to stratagem.
|
|
In desperate position, you must fight.
|
|
|
|
3. There are roads which must not be followed,
|
|
armies which must be not attacked, towns which must
|
|
be besieged, positions which must not be contested,
|
|
commands of the sovereign which must not be obeyed.
|
|
|
|
4. The general who thoroughly understands the advantages
|
|
that accompany variation of tactics knows how to handle
|
|
his troops.
|
|
|
|
5. The general who does not understand these, may be well
|
|
acquainted with the configuration of the country, yet he
|
|
will not be able to turn his knowledge to practical account.
|
|
|
|
6. So, the student of war who is unversed in the art
|
|
of war of varying his plans, even though he be acquainted
|
|
with the Five Advantages, will fail to make the best use
|
|
of his men.
|
|
|
|
7. Hence in the wise leader's plans, considerations of
|
|
advantage and of disadvantage will be blended together.
|
|
|
|
8. If our expectation of advantage be tempered in
|
|
this way, we may succeed in accomplishing the essential
|
|
part of our schemes.
|
|
|
|
9. If, on the other hand, in the midst of difficulties
|
|
we are always ready to seize an advantage, we may extricate
|
|
ourselves from misfortune.
|
|
|
|
10. Reduce the hostile chiefs by inflicting damage
|
|
on them; and make trouble for them, and keep them
|
|
constantly engaged; hold out specious allurements,
|
|
and make them rush to any given point.
|
|
|
|
11. The art of war teaches us to rely not on the
|
|
likelihood of the enemy's not coming, but on our own readiness
|
|
to receive him; not on the chance of his not attacking,
|
|
but rather on the fact that we have made our position unassailable.
|
|
|
|
12. There are five dangerous faults which may affect
|
|
a general:
|
|
(1) Recklessness, which leads to destruction;
|
|
(2) cowardice, which leads to capture;
|
|
(3) a hasty temper, which can be provoked by insults;
|
|
(4) a delicacy of honor which is sensitive to shame;
|
|
(5) over-solicitude for his men, which exposes him
|
|
to worry and trouble.
|
|
|
|
13. These are the five besetting sins of a general,
|
|
ruinous to the conduct of war.
|
|
|
|
14. When an army is overthrown and its leader slain,
|
|
the cause will surely be found among these five
|
|
dangerous faults. Let them be a subject of meditation.
|
|
|
|
|
|
IX. THE ARMY ON THE MARCH
|
|
|
|
|
|
1. Sun Tzu said: We come now to the question of
|
|
encamping the army, and observing signs of the enemy.
|
|
Pass quickly over mountains, and keep in the neighborhood
|
|
of valleys.
|
|
|
|
2. Camp in high places, facing the sun. Do not climb
|
|
heights in order to fight. So much for mountain warfare.
|
|
|
|
3. After crossing a river, you should get far away
|
|
from it.
|
|
|
|
4. When an invading force crosses a river in its
|
|
onward march, do not advance to meet it in mid-stream.
|
|
It will be best to let half the army get across,
|
|
and then deliver your attack.
|
|
|
|
5. If you are anxious to fight, you should not go
|
|
to meet the invader near a river which he has to cross.
|
|
|
|
6. Moor your craft higher up than the enemy, and facing
|
|
the sun. Do not move up-stream to meet the enemy.
|
|
So much for river warfare.
|
|
|
|
7. In crossing salt-marshes, your sole concern
|
|
should be to get over them quickly, without any delay.
|
|
|
|
8. If forced to fight in a salt-marsh, you should
|
|
have water and grass near you, and get your back
|
|
to a clump of trees. So much for operations in salt-marches.
|
|
|
|
9. In dry, level country, take up an easily accessible
|
|
position with rising ground to your right and on your rear,
|
|
so that the danger may be in front, and safety lie behind.
|
|
So much for campaigning in flat country.
|
|
|
|
10. These are the four useful branches of military
|
|
knowledge which enabled the Yellow Emperor to vanquish
|
|
four several sovereigns.
|
|
|
|
11. All armies prefer high ground to low and sunny
|
|
places to dark.
|
|
|
|
12. If you are careful of your men, and camp on hard
|
|
ground, the army will be free from disease of every kind,
|
|
and this will spell victory.
|
|
|
|
13. When you come to a hill or a bank, occupy the
|
|
sunny side, with the slope on your right rear.
|
|
Thus you will at once act for the benefit of your soldiers
|
|
and utilize the natural advantages of the ground.
|
|
|
|
14. When, in consequence of heavy rains up-country,
|
|
a river which you wish to ford is swollen and flecked
|
|
with foam, you must wait until it subsides.
|
|
|
|
15. Country in which there are precipitous cliffs
|
|
with torrents running between, deep natural hollows,
|
|
confined places, tangled thickets, quagmires and crevasses,
|
|
should be left with all possible speed and not approached.
|
|
|
|
16. While we keep away from such places, we should
|
|
get the enemy to approach them; while we face them,
|
|
we should let the enemy have them on his rear.
|
|
|
|
17. If in the neighborhood of your camp there should
|
|
be any hilly country, ponds surrounded by aquatic grass,
|
|
hollow basins filled with reeds, or woods with thick
|
|
undergrowth, they must be carefully routed out and searched;
|
|
for these are places where men in ambush or insidious
|
|
spies are likely to be lurking.
|
|
|
|
18. When the enemy is close at hand and remains quiet,
|
|
he is relying on the natural strength of his position.
|
|
|
|
19. When he keeps aloof and tries to provoke a battle,
|
|
he is anxious for the other side to advance.
|
|
|
|
20. If his place of encampment is easy of access,
|
|
he is tendering a bait.
|
|
|
|
21. Movement amongst the trees of a forest shows that the
|
|
enemy is advancing. The appearance of a number of screens
|
|
in the midst of thick grass means that the enemy wants to make us suspicious.
|
|
|
|
22. The rising of birds in their flight is the sign
|
|
of an ambuscade. Startled beasts indicate that a sudden
|
|
attack is coming.
|
|
|
|
23. When there is dust rising in a high column,
|
|
it is the sign of chariots advancing; when the dust is low,
|
|
but spread over a wide area, it betokens the approach
|
|
of infantry. When it branches out in different directions,
|
|
it shows that parties have been sent to collect firewood.
|
|
A few clouds of dust moving to and fro signify that the army
|
|
is encamping.
|
|
|
|
24. Humble words and increased preparations are signs
|
|
that the enemy is about to advance. Violent language
|
|
and driving forward as if to the attack are signs that he
|
|
will retreat.
|
|
|
|
25. When the light chariots come out first and take
|
|
up a position on the wings, it is a sign that the enemy
|
|
is forming for battle.
|
|
|
|
26. Peace proposals unaccompanied by a sworn covenant
|
|
indicate a plot.
|
|
|
|
27. When there is much running about and the soldiers
|
|
fall into rank, it means that the critical moment has come.
|
|
|
|
28. When some are seen advancing and some retreating,
|
|
it is a lure.
|
|
|
|
29. When the soldiers stand leaning on their spears,
|
|
they are faint from want of food.
|
|
|
|
30. If those who are sent to draw water begin
|
|
by drinking themselves, the army is suffering from thirst.
|
|
|
|
31. If the enemy sees an advantage to be gained and
|
|
makes no effort to secure it, the soldiers are exhausted.
|
|
|
|
32. If birds gather on any spot, it is unoccupied.
|
|
Clamor by night betokens nervousness.
|
|
|
|
33. If there is disturbance in the camp, the general's
|
|
authority is weak. If the banners and flags are shifted
|
|
about, sedition is afoot. If the officers are angry,
|
|
it means that the men are weary.
|
|
|
|
34. When an army feeds its horses with grain and kills
|
|
its cattle for food, and when the men do not hang their
|
|
cooking-pots over the camp-fires, showing that they
|
|
will not return to their tents, you may know that they
|
|
are determined to fight to the death.
|
|
|
|
35. The sight of men whispering together in small
|
|
knots or speaking in subdued tones points to disaffection
|
|
amongst the rank and file.
|
|
|
|
36. Too frequent rewards signify that the enemy is
|
|
at the end of his resources; too many punishments betray
|
|
a condition of dire distress.
|
|
|
|
37. To begin by bluster, but afterwards to take fright
|
|
at the enemy's numbers, shows a supreme lack of intelligence.
|
|
|
|
38. When envoys are sent with compliments in their mouths,
|
|
it is a sign that the enemy wishes for a truce.
|
|
|
|
39. If the enemy's troops march up angrily and remain
|
|
facing ours for a long time without either joining
|
|
battle or taking themselves off again, the situation
|
|
is one that demands great vigilance and circumspection.
|
|
|
|
40. If our troops are no more in number than the enemy,
|
|
that is amply sufficient; it only means that no direct attack
|
|
can be made. What we can do is simply to concentrate all
|
|
our available strength, keep a close watch on the enemy,
|
|
and obtain reinforcements.
|
|
|
|
41. He who exercises no forethought but makes light
|
|
of his opponents is sure to be captured by them.
|
|
|
|
42. If soldiers are punished before they have grown
|
|
attached to you, they will not prove submissive; and,
|
|
unless submissive, then will be practically useless.
|
|
If, when the soldiers have become attached to you,
|
|
punishments are not enforced, they will still be unless.
|
|
|
|
43. Therefore soldiers must be treated in the first
|
|
instance with humanity, but kept under control by means
|
|
of iron discipline. This is a certain road to victory.
|
|
|
|
44. If in training soldiers commands are habitually
|
|
enforced, the army will be well-disciplined; if not,
|
|
its discipline will be bad.
|
|
|
|
45. If a general shows confidence in his men but always
|
|
insists on his orders being obeyed, the gain will be mutual.
|
|
|
|
|
|
X. TERRAIN
|
|
|
|
|
|
1. Sun Tzu said: We may distinguish six kinds of terrain,
|
|
to wit: (1) Accessible ground; (2) entangling ground;
|
|
(3) temporizing ground; (4) narrow passes; (5) precipitous
|
|
heights; (6) positions at a great distance from the enemy.
|
|
|
|
2. Ground which can be freely traversed by both sides
|
|
is called accessible.
|
|
|
|
3. With regard to ground of this nature, be before
|
|
the enemy in occupying the raised and sunny spots,
|
|
and carefully guard your line of supplies. Then you
|
|
will be able to fight with advantage.
|
|
|
|
4. Ground which can be abandoned but is hard
|
|
to re-occupy is called entangling.
|
|
|
|
5. From a position of this sort, if the enemy
|
|
is unprepared, you may sally forth and defeat him.
|
|
But if the enemy is prepared for your coming, and you
|
|
fail to defeat him, then, return being impossible,
|
|
disaster will ensue.
|
|
|
|
6. When the position is such that neither side will gain
|
|
by making the first move, it is called temporizing ground.
|
|
|
|
7. In a position of this sort, even though the enemy
|
|
should offer us an attractive bait, it will be advisable
|
|
not to stir forth, but rather to retreat, thus enticing
|
|
the enemy in his turn; then, when part of his army has
|
|
come out, we may deliver our attack with advantage.
|
|
|
|
8. With regard to narrow passes, if you can occupy
|
|
them first, let them be strongly garrisoned and await
|
|
the advent of the enemy.
|
|
|
|
9. Should the army forestall you in occupying a pass,
|
|
do not go after him if the pass is fully garrisoned,
|
|
but only if it is weakly garrisoned.
|
|
|
|
10. With regard to precipitous heights, if you are
|
|
beforehand with your adversary, you should occupy the
|
|
raised and sunny spots, and there wait for him to come up.
|
|
|
|
11. If the enemy has occupied them before you,
|
|
do not follow him, but retreat and try to entice him away.
|
|
|
|
12. If you are situated at a great distance from
|
|
the enemy, and the strength of the two armies is equal,
|
|
it is not easy to provoke a battle, and fighting will be
|
|
to your disadvantage.
|
|
|
|
13. These six are the principles connected with Earth.
|
|
The general who has attained a responsible post must be
|
|
careful to study them.
|
|
|
|
14. Now an army is exposed to six several calamities,
|
|
not arising from natural causes, but from faults
|
|
for which the general is responsible. These are:
|
|
(1) Flight; (2) insubordination; (3) collapse; (4) ruin;
|
|
(5) disorganization; (6) rout.
|
|
|
|
15. Other conditions being equal, if one force is
|
|
hurled against another ten times its size, the result
|
|
will be the flight of the former.
|
|
|
|
16. When the common soldiers are too strong and
|
|
their officers too weak, the result is insubordination.
|
|
When the officers are too strong and the common soldiers
|
|
too weak, the result is collapse.
|
|
|
|
17. When the higher officers are angry and insubordinate,
|
|
and on meeting the enemy give battle on their own account
|
|
from a feeling of resentment, before the commander-in-chief
|
|
can tell whether or no he is in a position to fight,
|
|
the result is ruin.
|
|
|
|
18. When the general is weak and without authority;
|
|
when his orders are not clear and distinct; when there
|
|
are no fixes duties assigned to officers and men,
|
|
and the ranks are formed in a slovenly haphazard manner,
|
|
the result is utter disorganization.
|
|
|
|
19. When a general, unable to estimate the enemy's
|
|
strength, allows an inferior force to engage a larger one,
|
|
or hurls a weak detachment against a powerful one,
|
|
and neglects to place picked soldiers in the front rank,
|
|
the result must be rout.
|
|
|
|
20. These are six ways of courting defeat, which must
|
|
be carefully noted by the general who has attained
|
|
a responsible post.
|
|
|
|
21. The natural formation of the country is the soldier's
|
|
best ally; but a power of estimating the adversary,
|
|
of controlling the forces of victory, and of shrewdly
|
|
calculating difficulties, dangers and distances,
|
|
constitutes the test of a great general.
|
|
|
|
22. He who knows these things, and in fighting puts
|
|
his knowledge into practice, will win his battles.
|
|
He who knows them not, nor practices them, will surely
|
|
be defeated.
|
|
|
|
23. If fighting is sure to result in victory,
|
|
then you must fight, even though the ruler forbid it;
|
|
if fighting will not result in victory, then you must not
|
|
fight even at the ruler's bidding.
|
|
|
|
24. The general who advances without coveting fame
|
|
and retreats without fearing disgrace, whose only
|
|
thought is to protect his country and do good service
|
|
for his sovereign, is the jewel of the kingdom.
|
|
|
|
25. Regard your soldiers as your children, and they
|
|
will follow you into the deepest valleys; look upon them
|
|
as your own beloved sons, and they will stand by you
|
|
even unto death.
|
|
|
|
26. If, however, you are indulgent, but unable to make
|
|
your authority felt; kind-hearted, but unable to enforce
|
|
your commands; and incapable, moreover, of quelling disorder:
|
|
then your soldiers must be likened to spoilt children;
|
|
they are useless for any practical purpose.
|
|
|
|
27. If we know that our own men are in a condition
|
|
to attack, but are unaware that the enemy is not open
|
|
to attack, we have gone only halfway towards victory.
|
|
|
|
28. If we know that the enemy is open to attack,
|
|
but are unaware that our own men are not in a condition
|
|
to attack, we have gone only halfway towards victory.
|
|
|
|
29. If we know that the enemy is open to attack,
|
|
and also know that our men are in a condition to attack,
|
|
but are unaware that the nature of the ground makes
|
|
fighting impracticable, we have still gone only halfway
|
|
towards victory.
|
|
|
|
30. Hence the experienced soldier, once in motion,
|
|
is never bewildered; once he has broken camp, he is never
|
|
at a loss.
|
|
|
|
31. Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and
|
|
know yourself, your victory will not stand in doubt;
|
|
if you know Heaven and know Earth, you may make your
|
|
victory complete.
|
|
|
|
|
|
XI. THE NINE SITUATIONS
|
|
|
|
|
|
1. Sun Tzu said: The art of war recognizes nine varieties of ground:
|
|
(1) Dispersive ground; (2) facile ground; (3) contentious ground;
|
|
(4) open ground; (5) ground of intersecting highways;
|
|
(6) serious ground; (7) difficult ground; (8) hemmed-in ground;
|
|
(9) desperate ground.
|
|
|
|
2. When a chieftain is fighting in his own territory,
|
|
it is dispersive ground.
|
|
|
|
3. When he has penetrated into hostile territory,
|
|
but to no great distance, it is facile ground.
|
|
|
|
4. Ground the possession of which imports great
|
|
advantage to either side, is contentious ground.
|
|
|
|
5. Ground on which each side has liberty of movement
|
|
is open ground.
|
|
|
|
6. Ground which forms the key to three contiguous states,
|
|
so that he who occupies it first has most of the Empire
|
|
at his command, is a ground of intersecting highways.
|
|
|
|
7. When an army has penetrated into the heart of a
|
|
hostile country, leaving a number of fortified cities
|
|
in its rear, it is serious ground.
|
|
|
|
8. Mountain forests, rugged steeps, marshes and fens--all
|
|
country that is hard to traverse: this is difficult ground.
|
|
|
|
9. Ground which is reached through narrow gorges,
|
|
and from which we can only retire by tortuous paths,
|
|
so that a small number of the enemy would suffice to crush
|
|
a large body of our men: this is hemmed in ground.
|
|
|
|
10. Ground on which we can only be saved from
|
|
destruction by fighting without delay, is desperate ground.
|
|
|
|
11. On dispersive ground, therefore, fight not.
|
|
On facile ground, halt not. On contentious ground,
|
|
attack not.
|
|
|
|
12. On open ground, do not try to block the enemy's way.
|
|
On the ground of intersecting highways, join hands
|
|
with your allies.
|
|
|
|
13. On serious ground, gather in plunder.
|
|
In difficult ground, keep steadily on the march.
|
|
|
|
14. On hemmed-in ground, resort to stratagem.
|
|
On desperate ground, fight.
|
|
|
|
15. Those who were called skillful leaders of old knew
|
|
how to drive a wedge between the enemy's front and rear;
|
|
to prevent co-operation between his large and small divisions;
|
|
to hinder the good troops from rescuing the bad,
|
|
the officers from rallying their men.
|
|
|
|
16. When the enemy's men were united, they managed
|
|
to keep them in disorder.
|
|
|
|
17. When it was to their advantage, they made
|
|
a forward move; when otherwise, they stopped still.
|
|
|
|
18. If asked how to cope with a great host of the enemy
|
|
in orderly array and on the point of marching to the attack,
|
|
I should say: "Begin by seizing something which your
|
|
opponent holds dear; then he will be amenable to your will."
|
|
|
|
19. Rapidity is the essence of war: take advantage of
|
|
the enemy's unreadiness, make your way by unexpected routes,
|
|
and attack unguarded spots.
|
|
|
|
20. The following are the principles to be observed
|
|
by an invading force: The further you penetrate into
|
|
a country, the greater will be the solidarity of your troops,
|
|
and thus the defenders will not prevail against you.
|
|
|
|
21. Make forays in fertile country in order to supply
|
|
your army with food.
|
|
|
|
22. Carefully study the well-being of your men,
|
|
and do not overtax them. Concentrate your energy and hoard
|
|
your strength. Keep your army continually on the move,
|
|
and devise unfathomable plans.
|
|
|
|
23. Throw your soldiers into positions whence there
|
|
is no escape, and they will prefer death to flight.
|
|
If they will face death, there is nothing they may
|
|
not achieve. Officers and men alike will put forth
|
|
their uttermost strength.
|
|
|
|
24. Soldiers when in desperate straits lose
|
|
the sense of fear. If there is no place of refuge,
|
|
they will stand firm. If they are in hostile country,
|
|
they will show a stubborn front. If there is no help
|
|
for it, they will fight hard.
|
|
|
|
25. Thus, without waiting to be marshaled, the soldiers
|
|
will be constantly on the qui vive; without waiting to
|
|
be asked, they will do your will; without restrictions,
|
|
they will be faithful; without giving orders, they can
|
|
be trusted.
|
|
|
|
26. Prohibit the taking of omens, and do away with
|
|
superstitious doubts. Then, until death itself comes,
|
|
no calamity need be feared.
|
|
|
|
27. If our soldiers are not overburdened with money,
|
|
it is not because they have a distaste for riches;
|
|
if their lives are not unduly long, it is not because they
|
|
are disinclined to longevity.
|
|
|
|
28. On the day they are ordered out to battle,
|
|
your soldiers may weep, those sitting up bedewing
|
|
their garments, and those lying down letting the tears run
|
|
down their cheeks. But let them once be brought to bay,
|
|
and they will display the courage of a Chu or a Kuei.
|
|
|
|
29. The skillful tactician may be likened to the
|
|
shuai-jan. Now the shuai-jan is a snake that is found
|
|
in the ChUng mountains. Strike at its head, and you
|
|
will be attacked by its tail; strike at its tail, and you
|
|
will be attacked by its head; strike at its middle,
|
|
and you will be attacked by head and tail both.
|
|
|
|
30. Asked if an army can be made to imitate the shuai-jan,
|
|
I should answer, Yes. For the men of Wu and the men
|
|
of Yueh are enemies; yet if they are crossing a river
|
|
in the same boat and are caught by a storm, they will come
|
|
to each other's assistance just as the left hand helps the right.
|
|
|
|
31. Hence it is not enough to put one's trust
|
|
in the tethering of horses, and the burying of chariot
|
|
wheels in the ground
|
|
|
|
32. The principle on which to manage an army is to set
|
|
up one standard of courage which all must reach.
|
|
|
|
33. How to make the best of both strong and weak--that
|
|
is a question involving the proper use of ground.
|
|
|
|
34. Thus the skillful general conducts his army just
|
|
as though he were leading a single man, willy-nilly, by
|
|
the hand.
|
|
|
|
35. It is the business of a general to be quiet and thus
|
|
ensure secrecy; upright and just, and thus maintain order.
|
|
|
|
36. He must be able to mystify his officers and men
|
|
by false reports and appearances, and thus keep them
|
|
in total ignorance.
|
|
|
|
37. By altering his arrangements and changing
|
|
his plans, he keeps the enemy without definite knowledge.
|
|
By shifting his camp and taking circuitous routes,
|
|
he prevents the enemy from anticipating his purpose.
|
|
|
|
38. At the critical moment, the leader of an army
|
|
acts like one who has climbed up a height and then kicks
|
|
away the ladder behind him. He carries his men deep
|
|
into hostile territory before he shows his hand.
|
|
|
|
39. He burns his boats and breaks his cooking-pots;
|
|
like a shepherd driving a flock of sheep, he drives
|
|
his men this way and that, and nothing knows whither he
|
|
is going.
|
|
|
|
40. To muster his host and bring it into danger:--this
|
|
may be termed the business of the general.
|
|
|
|
41. The different measures suited to the nine
|
|
varieties of ground; the expediency of aggressive or
|
|
defensive tactics; and the fundamental laws of human nature:
|
|
these are things that must most certainly be studied.
|
|
|
|
42. When invading hostile territory, the general
|
|
principle is, that penetrating deeply brings cohesion;
|
|
penetrating but a short way means dispersion.
|
|
|
|
43. When you leave your own country behind, and take
|
|
your army across neighborhood territory, you find yourself
|
|
on critical ground. When there are means of communication
|
|
on all four sides, the ground is one of intersecting highways.
|
|
|
|
44. When you penetrate deeply into a country, it is
|
|
serious ground. When you penetrate but a little way,
|
|
it is facile ground.
|
|
|
|
45. When you have the enemy's strongholds on your rear,
|
|
and narrow passes in front, it is hemmed-in ground.
|
|
When there is no place of refuge at all, it is desperate ground.
|
|
|
|
46. Therefore, on dispersive ground, I would inspire
|
|
my men with unity of purpose. On facile ground, I would
|
|
see that there is close connection between all parts
|
|
of my army.
|
|
|
|
47. On contentious ground, I would hurry up my rear.
|
|
|
|
48. On open ground, I would keep a vigilant eye
|
|
on my defenses. On ground of intersecting highways,
|
|
I would consolidate my alliances.
|
|
|
|
49. On serious ground, I would try to ensure
|
|
a continuous stream of supplies. On difficult ground,
|
|
I would keep pushing on along the road.
|
|
|
|
50. On hemmed-in ground, I would block any way
|
|
of retreat. On desperate ground, I would proclaim
|
|
to my soldiers the hopelessness of saving their lives.
|
|
|
|
51. For it is the soldier's disposition to offer
|
|
an obstinate resistance when surrounded, to fight hard
|
|
when he cannot help himself, and to obey promptly when he
|
|
has fallen into danger.
|
|
|
|
52. We cannot enter into alliance with neighboring
|
|
princes until we are acquainted with their designs. We are
|
|
not fit to lead an army on the march unless we are familiar
|
|
with the face of the country--its mountains and forests,
|
|
its pitfalls and precipices, its marshes and swamps.
|
|
We shall be unable to turn natural advantages to account
|
|
unless we make use of local guides.
|
|
|
|
53. To be ignored of any one of the following four
|
|
or five principles does not befit a warlike prince.
|
|
|
|
54. When a warlike prince attacks a powerful state,
|
|
his generalship shows itself in preventing the concentration
|
|
of the enemy's forces. He overawes his opponents,
|
|
and their allies are prevented from joining against him.
|
|
|
|
55. Hence he does not strive to ally himself with all
|
|
and sundry, nor does he foster the power of other states.
|
|
He carries out his own secret designs, keeping his
|
|
antagonists in awe. Thus he is able to capture their
|
|
cities and overthrow their kingdoms.
|
|
|
|
56. Bestow rewards without regard to rule,
|
|
issue orders without regard to previous arrangements;
|
|
and you will be able to handle a whole army as though
|
|
you had to do with but a single man.
|
|
|
|
57. Confront your soldiers with the deed itself;
|
|
never let them know your design. When the outlook is bright,
|
|
bring it before their eyes; but tell them nothing when
|
|
the situation is gloomy.
|
|
|
|
58. Place your army in deadly peril, and it will survive;
|
|
plunge it into desperate straits, and it will come off
|
|
in safety.
|
|
|
|
59. For it is precisely when a force has fallen into
|
|
harm's way that is capable of striking a blow for victory.
|
|
|
|
60. Success in warfare is gained by carefully
|
|
accommodating ourselves to the enemy's purpose.
|
|
|
|
61. By persistently hanging on the enemy's flank, we shall
|
|
succeed in the long run in killing the commander-in-chief.
|
|
|
|
62. This is called ability to accomplish a thing
|
|
by sheer cunning.
|
|
|
|
63. On the day that you take up your command,
|
|
block the frontier passes, destroy the official tallies,
|
|
and stop the passage of all emissaries.
|
|
|
|
64. Be stern in the council-chamber, so that you
|
|
may control the situation.
|
|
|
|
65. If the enemy leaves a door open, you must rush in.
|
|
|
|
66. Forestall your opponent by seizing what he holds dear,
|
|
and subtly contrive to time his arrival on the ground.
|
|
|
|
67. Walk in the path defined by rule, and accommodate
|
|
yourself to the enemy until you can fight a decisive battle.
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68. At first, then, exhibit the coyness of a maiden,
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until the enemy gives you an opening; afterwards emulate
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the rapidity of a running hare, and it will be too late
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for the enemy to oppose you.
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XII. THE ATTACK BY FIRE
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1. Sun Tzu said: There are five ways of attacking
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with fire. The first is to burn soldiers in their camp;
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the second is to burn stores; the third is to burn
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baggage trains; the fourth is to burn arsenals and magazines;
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the fifth is to hurl dropping fire amongst the enemy.
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2. In order to carry out an attack, we must have
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means available. The material for raising fire should
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always be kept in readiness.
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3. There is a proper season for making attacks with fire,
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and special days for starting a conflagration.
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4. The proper season is when the weather is very dry;
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the special days are those when the moon is in the
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constellations of the Sieve, the Wall, the Wing
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or the Cross-bar; for these four are all days of rising wind.
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5. In attacking with fire, one should be prepared
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to meet five possible developments:
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6. (1) When fire breaks out inside to enemy's camp,
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respond at once with an attack from without.
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7. (2) If there is an outbreak of fire, but the enemy's
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soldiers remain quiet, bide your time and do not attack.
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8. (3) When the force of the flames has reached its height,
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follow it up with an attack, if that is practicable;
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if not, stay where you are.
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9. (4) If it is possible to make an assault with fire
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from without, do not wait for it to break out within,
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but deliver your attack at a favorable moment.
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10. (5) When you start a fire, be to windward of it.
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Do not attack from the leeward.
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11. A wind that rises in the daytime lasts long,
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but a night breeze soon falls.
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12. In every army, the five developments connected with
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fire must be known, the movements of the stars calculated,
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and a watch kept for the proper days.
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13. Hence those who use fire as an aid to the attack show intelligence;
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those who use water as an aid to the attack gain an accession of strength.
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14. By means of water, an enemy may be intercepted,
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|
but not robbed of all his belongings.
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15. Unhappy is the fate of one who tries to win his
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battles and succeed in his attacks without cultivating
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the spirit of enterprise; for the result is waste of time
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and general stagnation.
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16. Hence the saying: The enlightened ruler lays his
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plans well ahead; the good general cultivates his resources.
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17. Move not unless you see an advantage; use not
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your troops unless there is something to be gained;
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|
fight not unless the position is critical.
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18. No ruler should put troops into the field merely
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to gratify his own spleen; no general should fight
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a battle simply out of pique.
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19. If it is to your advantage, make a forward move;
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if not, stay where you are.
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20. Anger may in time change to gladness; vexation may
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be succeeded by content.
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21. But a kingdom that has once been destroyed can
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never come again into being; nor can the dead ever
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be brought back to life.
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22. Hence the enlightened ruler is heedful,
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and the good general full of caution. This is the way
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to keep a country at peace and an army intact.
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XIII. THE USE OF SPIES
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1. Sun Tzu said: Raising a host of a hundred thousand
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men and marching them great distances entails heavy loss
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|
on the people and a drain on the resources of the State.
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The daily expenditure will amount to a thousand ounces
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|
of silver. There will be commotion at home and abroad,
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|
and men will drop down exhausted on the highways.
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As many as seven hundred thousand families will be impeded
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|
in their labor.
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|
2. Hostile armies may face each other for years,
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striving for the victory which is decided in a single day.
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|
This being so, to remain in ignorance of the enemy's
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|
condition simply because one grudges the outlay of a hundred
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|
ounces of silver in honors and emoluments, is the height
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|
of inhumanity.
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|
3. One who acts thus is no leader of men, no present
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|
help to his sovereign, no master of victory.
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4. Thus, what enables the wise sovereign and the good
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|
general to strike and conquer, and achieve things beyond
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|
the reach of ordinary men, is foreknowledge.
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5. Now this foreknowledge cannot be elicited from spirits;
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|
it cannot be obtained inductively from experience,
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|
nor by any deductive calculation.
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|
6. Knowledge of the enemy's dispositions can only
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|
be obtained from other men.
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|
7. Hence the use of spies, of whom there are five classes:
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|
(1) Local spies; (2) inward spies; (3) converted spies;
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|
(4) doomed spies; (5) surviving spies.
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|
8. When these five kinds of spy are all at work,
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|
none can discover the secret system. This is called "divine
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|
manipulation of the threads." It is the sovereign's
|
|
most precious faculty.
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|
9. Having local spies means employing the services
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|
of the inhabitants of a district.
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10. Having inward spies, making use of officials
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|
of the enemy.
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11. Having converted spies, getting hold of the enemy's
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|
spies and using them for our own purposes.
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12. Having doomed spies, doing certain things openly
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|
for purposes of deception, and allowing our spies to know
|
|
of them and report them to the enemy.
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|
13. Surviving spies, finally, are those who bring
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|
back news from the enemy's camp.
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|
14. Hence it is that which none in the whole army are
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|
more intimate relations to be maintained than with spies.
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|
None should be more liberally rewarded. In no other
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|
business should greater secrecy be preserved.
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|
15. Spies cannot be usefully employed without a certain
|
|
intuitive sagacity.
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|
16. They cannot be properly managed without benevolence
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|
and straightforwardness.
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|
17. Without subtle ingenuity of mind, one cannot make
|
|
certain of the truth of their reports.
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|
18. Be subtle! be subtle! and use your spies for every
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|
kind of business.
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|
19. If a secret piece of news is divulged by a spy
|
|
before the time is ripe, he must be put to death together
|
|
with the man to whom the secret was told.
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|
20. Whether the object be to crush an army, to storm
|
|
a city, or to assassinate an individual, it is always
|
|
necessary to begin by finding out the names of the attendants,
|
|
the aides-de-camp, and door-keepers and sentries of the general
|
|
in command. Our spies must be commissioned to ascertain these.
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|
21. The enemy's spies who have come to spy on us
|
|
must be sought out, tempted with bribes, led away and
|
|
comfortably housed. Thus they will become converted
|
|
spies and available for our service.
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|
22. It is through the information brought by the
|
|
converted spy that we are able to acquire and employ
|
|
local and inward spies.
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|
23. It is owing to his information, again, that we can
|
|
cause the doomed spy to carry false tidings to the enemy.
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|
24. Lastly, it is by his information that the surviving
|
|
spy can be used on appointed occasions.
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|
|
25. The end and aim of spying in all its five varieties
|
|
is knowledge of the enemy; and this knowledge can only
|
|
be derived, in the first instance, from the converted spy.
|
|
Hence it is essential that the converted spy be treated
|
|
with the utmost liberality.
|
|
|
|
26. Of old, the rise of the Yin dynasty was due to I
|
|
Chih who had served under the Hsia. Likewise, the rise
|
|
of the Chou dynasty was due to Lu Ya who had served
|
|
under the Yin.
|
|
|
|
27. Hence it is only the enlightened ruler and the
|
|
wise general who will use the highest intelligence of
|
|
the army for purposes of spying and thereby they achieve
|
|
great results. Spies are a most important element in water,
|
|
because on them depends an army's ability to move.
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