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malloc: tcache: Validate tc_idx before checking for double-frees [BZ #23907]

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The previous check could read beyond the end of the tcache entry
array.  If the e->key == tcache cookie check happened to pass, this
would result in crashes.
This commit is contained in:
Florian Weimer 2018-11-26 20:06:37 +01:00
parent 8ae74eadb6
commit affec03b71
2 changed files with 31 additions and 25 deletions
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6
ChangeLog
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@ -1,3 +1,9 @@
2018-11-26 Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
[BZ #23907]
* malloc/malloc.c (_int_free): Validate tc_idx before checking for
double-frees.
2018-11-26 Rafael Ávila de Espíndola <rafael@espindo.la>
[BZ #19767]

50
malloc/malloc.c
View File

@ -4225,33 +4225,33 @@ _int_free (mstate av, mchunkptr p, int have_lock)
#if USE_TCACHE
{
size_t tc_idx = csize2tidx (size);
/* Check to see if it's already in the tcache. */
tcache_entry *e = (tcache_entry *) chunk2mem (p);
/* This test succeeds on double free. However, we don't 100%
trust it (it also matches random payload data at a 1 in
2^<size_t> chance), so verify it's not an unlikely coincidence
before aborting. */
if (__glibc_unlikely (e->key == tcache && tcache))
if (tcache != NULL && tc_idx < mp_.tcache_bins)
{
tcache_entry *tmp;
LIBC_PROBE (memory_tcache_double_free, 2, e, tc_idx);
for (tmp = tcache->entries[tc_idx];
tmp;
tmp = tmp->next)
if (tmp == e)
malloc_printerr ("free(): double free detected in tcache 2");
/* If we get here, it was a coincidence. We've wasted a few
cycles, but don't abort. */
}
/* Check to see if it's already in the tcache. */
tcache_entry *e = (tcache_entry *) chunk2mem (p);
if (tcache
&& tc_idx < mp_.tcache_bins
&& tcache->counts[tc_idx] < mp_.tcache_count)
{
tcache_put (p, tc_idx);
return;
/* This test succeeds on double free. However, we don't 100%
trust it (it also matches random payload data at a 1 in
2^<size_t> chance), so verify it's not an unlikely
coincidence before aborting. */
if (__glibc_unlikely (e->key == tcache))
{
tcache_entry *tmp;
LIBC_PROBE (memory_tcache_double_free, 2, e, tc_idx);
for (tmp = tcache->entries[tc_idx];
tmp;
tmp = tmp->next)
if (tmp == e)
malloc_printerr ("free(): double free detected in tcache 2");
/* If we get here, it was a coincidence. We've wasted a
few cycles, but don't abort. */
}
if (tcache->counts[tc_idx] < mp_.tcache_count)
{
tcache_put (p, tc_idx);
return;
}
}
}
#endif