curl/lib/vtls/nss.c
2018-10-03 02:28:09 -04:00

2396 lines
71 KiB
C

/***************************************************************************
* _ _ ____ _
* Project ___| | | | _ \| |
* / __| | | | |_) | |
* | (__| |_| | _ <| |___
* \___|\___/|_| \_\_____|
*
* Copyright (C) 1998 - 2018, Daniel Stenberg, <daniel@haxx.se>, et al.
*
* This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which
* you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms
* are also available at https://curl.haxx.se/docs/copyright.html.
*
* You may opt to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute and/or sell
* copies of the Software, and permit persons to whom the Software is
* furnished to do so, under the terms of the COPYING file.
*
* This software is distributed on an "AS IS" basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY
* KIND, either express or implied.
*
***************************************************************************/
/*
* Source file for all NSS-specific code for the TLS/SSL layer. No code
* but vtls.c should ever call or use these functions.
*/
#include "curl_setup.h"
#ifdef USE_NSS
#include "urldata.h"
#include "sendf.h"
#include "formdata.h" /* for the boundary function */
#include "url.h" /* for the ssl config check function */
#include "connect.h"
#include "strcase.h"
#include "select.h"
#include "vtls.h"
#include "llist.h"
#include "curl_printf.h"
#include "nssg.h"
#include <nspr.h>
#include <nss.h>
#include <ssl.h>
#include <sslerr.h>
#include <secerr.h>
#include <secmod.h>
#include <sslproto.h>
#include <prtypes.h>
#include <pk11pub.h>
#include <prio.h>
#include <secitem.h>
#include <secport.h>
#include <certdb.h>
#include <base64.h>
#include <cert.h>
#include <prerror.h>
#include <keyhi.h> /* for SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey() */
#include <private/pprio.h> /* for PR_ImportTCPSocket */
#define NSSVERNUM ((NSS_VMAJOR<<16)|(NSS_VMINOR<<8)|NSS_VPATCH)
#if NSSVERNUM >= 0x030f00 /* 3.15.0 */
#include <ocsp.h>
#endif
#include "strcase.h"
#include "warnless.h"
#include "x509asn1.h"
/* The last #include files should be: */
#include "curl_memory.h"
#include "memdebug.h"
#define SSL_DIR "/etc/pki/nssdb"
/* enough to fit the string "PEM Token #[0|1]" */
#define SLOTSIZE 13
struct ssl_backend_data {
PRFileDesc *handle;
char *client_nickname;
struct Curl_easy *data;
struct curl_llist obj_list;
PK11GenericObject *obj_clicert;
};
#define BACKEND connssl->backend
static PRLock *nss_initlock = NULL;
static PRLock *nss_crllock = NULL;
static PRLock *nss_findslot_lock = NULL;
static PRLock *nss_trustload_lock = NULL;
static struct curl_llist nss_crl_list;
static NSSInitContext *nss_context = NULL;
static volatile int initialized = 0;
/* type used to wrap pointers as list nodes */
struct ptr_list_wrap {
void *ptr;
struct curl_llist_element node;
};
typedef struct {
const char *name;
int num;
} cipher_s;
#define PK11_SETATTRS(_attr, _idx, _type, _val, _len) do { \
CK_ATTRIBUTE *ptr = (_attr) + ((_idx)++); \
ptr->type = (_type); \
ptr->pValue = (_val); \
ptr->ulValueLen = (_len); \
} WHILE_FALSE
#define CERT_NewTempCertificate __CERT_NewTempCertificate
#define NUM_OF_CIPHERS sizeof(cipherlist)/sizeof(cipherlist[0])
static const cipher_s cipherlist[] = {
/* SSL2 cipher suites */
{"rc4", SSL_EN_RC4_128_WITH_MD5},
{"rc4-md5", SSL_EN_RC4_128_WITH_MD5},
{"rc4export", SSL_EN_RC4_128_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5},
{"rc2", SSL_EN_RC2_128_CBC_WITH_MD5},
{"rc2export", SSL_EN_RC2_128_CBC_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5},
{"des", SSL_EN_DES_64_CBC_WITH_MD5},
{"desede3", SSL_EN_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_MD5},
/* SSL3/TLS cipher suites */
{"rsa_rc4_128_md5", SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5},
{"rsa_rc4_128_sha", SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA},
{"rsa_3des_sha", SSL_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
{"rsa_des_sha", SSL_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
{"rsa_rc4_40_md5", SSL_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5},
{"rsa_rc2_40_md5", SSL_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5},
{"rsa_null_md5", SSL_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5},
{"rsa_null_sha", SSL_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA},
{"fips_3des_sha", SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
{"fips_des_sha", SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
{"fortezza", SSL_FORTEZZA_DMS_WITH_FORTEZZA_CBC_SHA},
{"fortezza_rc4_128_sha", SSL_FORTEZZA_DMS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA},
{"fortezza_null", SSL_FORTEZZA_DMS_WITH_NULL_SHA},
/* TLS 1.0: Exportable 56-bit Cipher Suites. */
{"rsa_des_56_sha", TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
{"rsa_rc4_56_sha", TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA},
/* AES ciphers. */
{"dhe_dss_aes_128_cbc_sha", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
{"dhe_dss_aes_256_cbc_sha", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
{"dhe_rsa_aes_128_cbc_sha", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
{"dhe_rsa_aes_256_cbc_sha", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
{"rsa_aes_128_sha", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
{"rsa_aes_256_sha", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
/* ECC ciphers. */
{"ecdh_ecdsa_null_sha", TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA},
{"ecdh_ecdsa_rc4_128_sha", TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA},
{"ecdh_ecdsa_3des_sha", TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
{"ecdh_ecdsa_aes_128_sha", TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
{"ecdh_ecdsa_aes_256_sha", TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
{"ecdhe_ecdsa_null_sha", TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA},
{"ecdhe_ecdsa_rc4_128_sha", TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA},
{"ecdhe_ecdsa_3des_sha", TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
{"ecdhe_ecdsa_aes_128_sha", TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
{"ecdhe_ecdsa_aes_256_sha", TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
{"ecdh_rsa_null_sha", TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA},
{"ecdh_rsa_128_sha", TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA},
{"ecdh_rsa_3des_sha", TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
{"ecdh_rsa_aes_128_sha", TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
{"ecdh_rsa_aes_256_sha", TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
{"ecdhe_rsa_null", TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA},
{"ecdhe_rsa_rc4_128_sha", TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA},
{"ecdhe_rsa_3des_sha", TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
{"ecdhe_rsa_aes_128_sha", TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
{"ecdhe_rsa_aes_256_sha", TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
{"ecdh_anon_null_sha", TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA},
{"ecdh_anon_rc4_128sha", TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA},
{"ecdh_anon_3des_sha", TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
{"ecdh_anon_aes_128_sha", TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
{"ecdh_anon_aes_256_sha", TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
#ifdef TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256
/* new HMAC-SHA256 cipher suites specified in RFC */
{"rsa_null_sha_256", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256},
{"rsa_aes_128_cbc_sha_256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
{"rsa_aes_256_cbc_sha_256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
{"dhe_rsa_aes_128_cbc_sha_256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
{"dhe_rsa_aes_256_cbc_sha_256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
{"ecdhe_ecdsa_aes_128_cbc_sha_256", TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
{"ecdhe_rsa_aes_128_cbc_sha_256", TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
#endif
#ifdef TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
/* AES GCM cipher suites in RFC 5288 and RFC 5289 */
{"rsa_aes_128_gcm_sha_256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
{"dhe_rsa_aes_128_gcm_sha_256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
{"dhe_dss_aes_128_gcm_sha_256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
{"ecdhe_ecdsa_aes_128_gcm_sha_256", TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
{"ecdh_ecdsa_aes_128_gcm_sha_256", TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
{"ecdhe_rsa_aes_128_gcm_sha_256", TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
{"ecdh_rsa_aes_128_gcm_sha_256", TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
#endif
#ifdef TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
/* cipher suites using SHA384 */
{"rsa_aes_256_gcm_sha_384", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
{"dhe_rsa_aes_256_gcm_sha_384", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
{"dhe_dss_aes_256_gcm_sha_384", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
{"ecdhe_ecdsa_aes_256_sha_384", TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384},
{"ecdhe_rsa_aes_256_sha_384", TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384},
{"ecdhe_ecdsa_aes_256_gcm_sha_384", TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
{"ecdhe_rsa_aes_256_gcm_sha_384", TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
#endif
#ifdef TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
/* chacha20-poly1305 cipher suites */
{"ecdhe_rsa_chacha20_poly1305_sha_256",
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256},
{"ecdhe_ecdsa_chacha20_poly1305_sha_256",
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256},
{"dhe_rsa_chacha20_poly1305_sha_256",
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256},
#endif
};
#ifdef WIN32
static const char *pem_library = "nsspem.dll";
static const char *trust_library = "nssckbi.dll";
#else
static const char *pem_library = "libnsspem.so";
static const char *trust_library = "libnssckbi.so";
#endif
static SECMODModule *pem_module = NULL;
static SECMODModule *trust_module = NULL;
/* NSPR I/O layer we use to detect blocking direction during SSL handshake */
static PRDescIdentity nspr_io_identity = PR_INVALID_IO_LAYER;
static PRIOMethods nspr_io_methods;
static const char *nss_error_to_name(PRErrorCode code)
{
const char *name = PR_ErrorToName(code);
if(name)
return name;
return "unknown error";
}
static void nss_print_error_message(struct Curl_easy *data, PRUint32 err)
{
failf(data, "%s", PR_ErrorToString(err, PR_LANGUAGE_I_DEFAULT));
}
static SECStatus set_ciphers(struct Curl_easy *data, PRFileDesc * model,
char *cipher_list)
{
unsigned int i;
PRBool cipher_state[NUM_OF_CIPHERS];
PRBool found;
char *cipher;
/* use accessors to avoid dynamic linking issues after an update of NSS */
const PRUint16 num_implemented_ciphers = SSL_GetNumImplementedCiphers();
const PRUint16 *implemented_ciphers = SSL_GetImplementedCiphers();
if(!implemented_ciphers)
return SECFailure;
/* First disable all ciphers. This uses a different max value in case
* NSS adds more ciphers later we don't want them available by
* accident
*/
for(i = 0; i < num_implemented_ciphers; i++) {
SSL_CipherPrefSet(model, implemented_ciphers[i], PR_FALSE);
}
/* Set every entry in our list to false */
for(i = 0; i < NUM_OF_CIPHERS; i++) {
cipher_state[i] = PR_FALSE;
}
cipher = cipher_list;
while(cipher_list && (cipher_list[0])) {
while((*cipher) && (ISSPACE(*cipher)))
++cipher;
cipher_list = strchr(cipher, ',');
if(cipher_list) {
*cipher_list++ = '\0';
}
found = PR_FALSE;
for(i = 0; i<NUM_OF_CIPHERS; i++) {
if(strcasecompare(cipher, cipherlist[i].name)) {
cipher_state[i] = PR_TRUE;
found = PR_TRUE;
break;
}
}
if(found == PR_FALSE) {
failf(data, "Unknown cipher in list: %s", cipher);
return SECFailure;
}
if(cipher_list) {
cipher = cipher_list;
}
}
/* Finally actually enable the selected ciphers */
for(i = 0; i<NUM_OF_CIPHERS; i++) {
if(!cipher_state[i])
continue;
if(SSL_CipherPrefSet(model, cipherlist[i].num, PR_TRUE) != SECSuccess) {
failf(data, "cipher-suite not supported by NSS: %s", cipherlist[i].name);
return SECFailure;
}
}
return SECSuccess;
}
/*
* Return true if at least one cipher-suite is enabled. Used to determine
* if we need to call NSS_SetDomesticPolicy() to enable the default ciphers.
*/
static bool any_cipher_enabled(void)
{
unsigned int i;
for(i = 0; i<NUM_OF_CIPHERS; i++) {
PRInt32 policy = 0;
SSL_CipherPolicyGet(cipherlist[i].num, &policy);
if(policy)
return TRUE;
}
return FALSE;
}
/*
* Determine whether the nickname passed in is a filename that needs to
* be loaded as a PEM or a regular NSS nickname.
*
* returns 1 for a file
* returns 0 for not a file (NSS nickname)
*/
static int is_file(const char *filename)
{
struct_stat st;
if(filename == NULL)
return 0;
if(stat(filename, &st) == 0)
if(S_ISREG(st.st_mode))
return 1;
return 0;
}
/* Check if the given string is filename or nickname of a certificate. If the
* given string is recognized as filename, return NULL. If the given string is
* recognized as nickname, return a duplicated string. The returned string
* should be later deallocated using free(). If the OOM failure occurs, we
* return NULL, too.
*/
static char *dup_nickname(struct Curl_easy *data, const char *str)
{
const char *n;
if(!is_file(str))
/* no such file exists, use the string as nickname */
return strdup(str);
/* search the first slash; we require at least one slash in a file name */
n = strchr(str, '/');
if(!n) {
infof(data, "warning: certificate file name \"%s\" handled as nickname; "
"please use \"./%s\" to force file name\n", str, str);
return strdup(str);
}
/* we'll use the PEM reader to read the certificate from file */
return NULL;
}
/* Lock/unlock wrapper for PK11_FindSlotByName() to work around race condition
* in nssSlot_IsTokenPresent() causing spurious SEC_ERROR_NO_TOKEN. For more
* details, go to <https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/1297397>.
*/
static PK11SlotInfo* nss_find_slot_by_name(const char *slot_name)
{
PK11SlotInfo *slot;
PR_Lock(nss_findslot_lock);
slot = PK11_FindSlotByName(slot_name);
PR_Unlock(nss_findslot_lock);
return slot;
}
/* wrap 'ptr' as list node and tail-insert into 'list' */
static CURLcode insert_wrapped_ptr(struct curl_llist *list, void *ptr)
{
struct ptr_list_wrap *wrap = malloc(sizeof(*wrap));
if(!wrap)
return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
wrap->ptr = ptr;
Curl_llist_insert_next(list, list->tail, wrap, &wrap->node);
return CURLE_OK;
}
/* Call PK11_CreateGenericObject() with the given obj_class and filename. If
* the call succeeds, append the object handle to the list of objects so that
* the object can be destroyed in Curl_nss_close(). */
static CURLcode nss_create_object(struct ssl_connect_data *connssl,
CK_OBJECT_CLASS obj_class,
const char *filename, bool cacert)
{
PK11SlotInfo *slot;
PK11GenericObject *obj;
CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE;
CK_BBOOL ckfalse = CK_FALSE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE attrs[/* max count of attributes */ 4];
int attr_cnt = 0;
CURLcode result = (cacert)
? CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE
: CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM;
const int slot_id = (cacert) ? 0 : 1;
char *slot_name = aprintf("PEM Token #%d", slot_id);
if(!slot_name)
return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
slot = nss_find_slot_by_name(slot_name);
free(slot_name);
if(!slot)
return result;
PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, attr_cnt, CKA_CLASS, &obj_class, sizeof(obj_class));
PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, attr_cnt, CKA_TOKEN, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, attr_cnt, CKA_LABEL, (unsigned char *)filename,
(CK_ULONG)strlen(filename) + 1);
if(CKO_CERTIFICATE == obj_class) {
CK_BBOOL *pval = (cacert) ? (&cktrue) : (&ckfalse);
PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, attr_cnt, CKA_TRUST, pval, sizeof(*pval));
}
/* PK11_CreateManagedGenericObject() was introduced in NSS 3.34 because
* PK11_DestroyGenericObject() does not release resources allocated by
* PK11_CreateGenericObject() early enough. */
obj =
#ifdef HAVE_PK11_CREATEMANAGEDGENERICOBJECT
PK11_CreateManagedGenericObject
#else
PK11_CreateGenericObject
#endif
(slot, attrs, attr_cnt, PR_FALSE);
PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
if(!obj)
return result;
if(insert_wrapped_ptr(&BACKEND->obj_list, obj) != CURLE_OK) {
PK11_DestroyGenericObject(obj);
return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
}
if(!cacert && CKO_CERTIFICATE == obj_class)
/* store reference to a client certificate */
BACKEND->obj_clicert = obj;
return CURLE_OK;
}
/* Destroy the NSS object whose handle is given by ptr. This function is
* a callback of Curl_llist_alloc() used by Curl_llist_destroy() to destroy
* NSS objects in Curl_nss_close() */
static void nss_destroy_object(void *user, void *ptr)
{
struct ptr_list_wrap *wrap = (struct ptr_list_wrap *) ptr;
PK11GenericObject *obj = (PK11GenericObject *) wrap->ptr;
(void) user;
PK11_DestroyGenericObject(obj);
free(wrap);
}
/* same as nss_destroy_object() but for CRL items */
static void nss_destroy_crl_item(void *user, void *ptr)
{
struct ptr_list_wrap *wrap = (struct ptr_list_wrap *) ptr;
SECItem *crl_der = (SECItem *) wrap->ptr;
(void) user;
SECITEM_FreeItem(crl_der, PR_TRUE);
free(wrap);
}
static CURLcode nss_load_cert(struct ssl_connect_data *ssl,
const char *filename, PRBool cacert)
{
CURLcode result = (cacert)
? CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE
: CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM;
/* libnsspem.so leaks memory if the requested file does not exist. For more
* details, go to <https://bugzilla.redhat.com/734760>. */
if(is_file(filename))
result = nss_create_object(ssl, CKO_CERTIFICATE, filename, cacert);
if(!result && !cacert) {
/* we have successfully loaded a client certificate */
CERTCertificate *cert;
char *nickname = NULL;
char *n = strrchr(filename, '/');
if(n)
n++;
/* The following undocumented magic helps to avoid a SIGSEGV on call
* of PK11_ReadRawAttribute() from SelectClientCert() when using an
* immature version of libnsspem.so. For more details, go to
* <https://bugzilla.redhat.com/733685>. */
nickname = aprintf("PEM Token #1:%s", n);
if(nickname) {
cert = PK11_FindCertFromNickname(nickname, NULL);
if(cert)
CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert);
free(nickname);
}
}
return result;
}
/* add given CRL to cache if it is not already there */
static CURLcode nss_cache_crl(SECItem *crl_der)
{
CERTCertDBHandle *db = CERT_GetDefaultCertDB();
CERTSignedCrl *crl = SEC_FindCrlByDERCert(db, crl_der, 0);
if(crl) {
/* CRL already cached */
SEC_DestroyCrl(crl);
SECITEM_FreeItem(crl_der, PR_TRUE);
return CURLE_OK;
}
/* acquire lock before call of CERT_CacheCRL() and accessing nss_crl_list */
PR_Lock(nss_crllock);
/* store the CRL item so that we can free it in Curl_nss_cleanup() */
if(insert_wrapped_ptr(&nss_crl_list, crl_der) != CURLE_OK) {
SECITEM_FreeItem(crl_der, PR_TRUE);
PR_Unlock(nss_crllock);
return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
}
if(SECSuccess != CERT_CacheCRL(db, crl_der)) {
/* unable to cache CRL */
PR_Unlock(nss_crllock);
return CURLE_SSL_CRL_BADFILE;
}
/* we need to clear session cache, so that the CRL could take effect */
SSL_ClearSessionCache();
PR_Unlock(nss_crllock);
return CURLE_OK;
}
static CURLcode nss_load_crl(const char *crlfilename)
{
PRFileDesc *infile;
PRFileInfo info;
SECItem filedata = { 0, NULL, 0 };
SECItem *crl_der = NULL;
char *body;
infile = PR_Open(crlfilename, PR_RDONLY, 0);
if(!infile)
return CURLE_SSL_CRL_BADFILE;
if(PR_SUCCESS != PR_GetOpenFileInfo(infile, &info))
goto fail;
if(!SECITEM_AllocItem(NULL, &filedata, info.size + /* zero ended */ 1))
goto fail;
if(info.size != PR_Read(infile, filedata.data, info.size))
goto fail;
crl_der = SECITEM_AllocItem(NULL, NULL, 0U);
if(!crl_der)
goto fail;
/* place a trailing zero right after the visible data */
body = (char *)filedata.data;
body[--filedata.len] = '\0';
body = strstr(body, "-----BEGIN");
if(body) {
/* assume ASCII */
char *trailer;
char *begin = PORT_Strchr(body, '\n');
if(!begin)
begin = PORT_Strchr(body, '\r');
if(!begin)
goto fail;
trailer = strstr(++begin, "-----END");
if(!trailer)
goto fail;
/* retrieve DER from ASCII */
*trailer = '\0';
if(ATOB_ConvertAsciiToItem(crl_der, begin))
goto fail;
SECITEM_FreeItem(&filedata, PR_FALSE);
}
else
/* assume DER */
*crl_der = filedata;
PR_Close(infile);
return nss_cache_crl(crl_der);
fail:
PR_Close(infile);
SECITEM_FreeItem(crl_der, PR_TRUE);
SECITEM_FreeItem(&filedata, PR_FALSE);
return CURLE_SSL_CRL_BADFILE;
}
static CURLcode nss_load_key(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex,
char *key_file)
{
PK11SlotInfo *slot, *tmp;
SECStatus status;
CURLcode result;
struct ssl_connect_data *ssl = conn->ssl;
struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data;
(void)sockindex; /* unused */
result = nss_create_object(ssl, CKO_PRIVATE_KEY, key_file, FALSE);
if(result) {
PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY, 0);
return result;
}
slot = nss_find_slot_by_name("PEM Token #1");
if(!slot)
return CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM;
/* This will force the token to be seen as re-inserted */
tmp = SECMOD_WaitForAnyTokenEvent(pem_module, 0, 0);
if(tmp)
PK11_FreeSlot(tmp);
PK11_IsPresent(slot);
status = PK11_Authenticate(slot, PR_TRUE, SSL_SET_OPTION(key_passwd));
PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
return (SECSuccess == status) ? CURLE_OK : CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM;
}
static int display_error(struct connectdata *conn, PRInt32 err,
const char *filename)
{
switch(err) {
case SEC_ERROR_BAD_PASSWORD:
failf(conn->data, "Unable to load client key: Incorrect password");
return 1;
case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CERT:
failf(conn->data, "Unable to load certificate %s", filename);
return 1;
default:
break;
}
return 0; /* The caller will print a generic error */
}
static CURLcode cert_stuff(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex,
char *cert_file, char *key_file)
{
struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data;
CURLcode result;
if(cert_file) {
result = nss_load_cert(&conn->ssl[sockindex], cert_file, PR_FALSE);
if(result) {
const PRErrorCode err = PR_GetError();
if(!display_error(conn, err, cert_file)) {
const char *err_name = nss_error_to_name(err);
failf(data, "unable to load client cert: %d (%s)", err, err_name);
}
return result;
}
}
if(key_file || (is_file(cert_file))) {
if(key_file)
result = nss_load_key(conn, sockindex, key_file);
else
/* In case the cert file also has the key */
result = nss_load_key(conn, sockindex, cert_file);
if(result) {
const PRErrorCode err = PR_GetError();
if(!display_error(conn, err, key_file)) {
const char *err_name = nss_error_to_name(err);
failf(data, "unable to load client key: %d (%s)", err, err_name);
}
return result;
}
}
return CURLE_OK;
}
static char *nss_get_password(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
{
(void)slot; /* unused */
if(retry || NULL == arg)
return NULL;
else
return (char *)PORT_Strdup((char *)arg);
}
/* bypass the default SSL_AuthCertificate() hook in case we do not want to
* verify peer */
static SECStatus nss_auth_cert_hook(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool checksig,
PRBool isServer)
{
struct connectdata *conn = (struct connectdata *)arg;
#ifdef SSL_ENABLE_OCSP_STAPLING
if(SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifystatus)) {
SECStatus cacheResult;
const SECItemArray *csa = SSL_PeerStapledOCSPResponses(fd);
if(!csa) {
failf(conn->data, "Invalid OCSP response");
return SECFailure;
}
if(csa->len == 0) {
failf(conn->data, "No OCSP response received");
return SECFailure;
}
cacheResult = CERT_CacheOCSPResponseFromSideChannel(
CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), SSL_PeerCertificate(fd),
PR_Now(), &csa->items[0], arg
);
if(cacheResult != SECSuccess) {
failf(conn->data, "Invalid OCSP response");
return cacheResult;
}
}
#endif
if(!SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifypeer)) {
infof(conn->data, "skipping SSL peer certificate verification\n");
return SECSuccess;
}
return SSL_AuthCertificate(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), fd, checksig, isServer);
}
/**
* Inform the application that the handshake is complete.
*/
static void HandshakeCallback(PRFileDesc *sock, void *arg)
{
struct connectdata *conn = (struct connectdata*) arg;
unsigned int buflenmax = 50;
unsigned char buf[50];
unsigned int buflen;
SSLNextProtoState state;
if(!conn->bits.tls_enable_npn && !conn->bits.tls_enable_alpn) {
return;
}
if(SSL_GetNextProto(sock, &state, buf, &buflen, buflenmax) == SECSuccess) {
switch(state) {
#if NSSVERNUM >= 0x031a00 /* 3.26.0 */
/* used by NSS internally to implement 0-RTT */
case SSL_NEXT_PROTO_EARLY_VALUE:
/* fall through! */
#endif
case SSL_NEXT_PROTO_NO_SUPPORT:
case SSL_NEXT_PROTO_NO_OVERLAP:
infof(conn->data, "ALPN/NPN, server did not agree to a protocol\n");
return;
#ifdef SSL_ENABLE_ALPN
case SSL_NEXT_PROTO_SELECTED:
infof(conn->data, "ALPN, server accepted to use %.*s\n", buflen, buf);
break;
#endif
case SSL_NEXT_PROTO_NEGOTIATED:
infof(conn->data, "NPN, server accepted to use %.*s\n", buflen, buf);
break;
}
#ifdef USE_NGHTTP2
if(buflen == NGHTTP2_PROTO_VERSION_ID_LEN &&
!memcmp(NGHTTP2_PROTO_VERSION_ID, buf, NGHTTP2_PROTO_VERSION_ID_LEN)) {
conn->negnpn = CURL_HTTP_VERSION_2;
}
else
#endif
if(buflen == ALPN_HTTP_1_1_LENGTH &&
!memcmp(ALPN_HTTP_1_1, buf, ALPN_HTTP_1_1_LENGTH)) {
conn->negnpn = CURL_HTTP_VERSION_1_1;
}
}
}
#if NSSVERNUM >= 0x030f04 /* 3.15.4 */
static SECStatus CanFalseStartCallback(PRFileDesc *sock, void *client_data,
PRBool *canFalseStart)
{
struct connectdata *conn = client_data;
struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data;
SSLChannelInfo channelInfo;
SSLCipherSuiteInfo cipherInfo;
SECStatus rv;
PRBool negotiatedExtension;
*canFalseStart = PR_FALSE;
if(SSL_GetChannelInfo(sock, &channelInfo, sizeof(channelInfo)) != SECSuccess)
return SECFailure;
if(SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channelInfo.cipherSuite, &cipherInfo,
sizeof(cipherInfo)) != SECSuccess)
return SECFailure;
/* Prevent version downgrade attacks from TLS 1.2, and avoid False Start for
* TLS 1.3 and later. See https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=861310
*/
if(channelInfo.protocolVersion != SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2)
goto end;
/* Only allow ECDHE key exchange algorithm.
* See https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=952863 */
if(cipherInfo.keaType != ssl_kea_ecdh)
goto end;
/* Prevent downgrade attacks on the symmetric cipher. We do not allow CBC
* mode due to BEAST, POODLE, and other attacks on the MAC-then-Encrypt
* design. See https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1109766 */
if(cipherInfo.symCipher != ssl_calg_aes_gcm)
goto end;
/* Enforce ALPN or NPN to do False Start, as an indicator of server
* compatibility. */
rv = SSL_HandshakeNegotiatedExtension(sock, ssl_app_layer_protocol_xtn,
&negotiatedExtension);
if(rv != SECSuccess || !negotiatedExtension) {
rv = SSL_HandshakeNegotiatedExtension(sock, ssl_next_proto_nego_xtn,
&negotiatedExtension);
}
if(rv != SECSuccess || !negotiatedExtension)
goto end;
*canFalseStart = PR_TRUE;
infof(data, "Trying TLS False Start\n");
end:
return SECSuccess;
}
#endif
static void display_cert_info(struct Curl_easy *data,
CERTCertificate *cert)
{
char *subject, *issuer, *common_name;
PRExplodedTime printableTime;
char timeString[256];
PRTime notBefore, notAfter;
subject = CERT_NameToAscii(&cert->subject);
issuer = CERT_NameToAscii(&cert->issuer);
common_name = CERT_GetCommonName(&cert->subject);
infof(data, "\tsubject: %s\n", subject);
CERT_GetCertTimes(cert, &notBefore, &notAfter);
PR_ExplodeTime(notBefore, PR_GMTParameters, &printableTime);
PR_FormatTime(timeString, 256, "%b %d %H:%M:%S %Y GMT", &printableTime);
infof(data, "\tstart date: %s\n", timeString);
PR_ExplodeTime(notAfter, PR_GMTParameters, &printableTime);
PR_FormatTime(timeString, 256, "%b %d %H:%M:%S %Y GMT", &printableTime);
infof(data, "\texpire date: %s\n", timeString);
infof(data, "\tcommon name: %s\n", common_name);
infof(data, "\tissuer: %s\n", issuer);
PR_Free(subject);
PR_Free(issuer);
PR_Free(common_name);
}
static CURLcode display_conn_info(struct connectdata *conn, PRFileDesc *sock)
{
CURLcode result = CURLE_OK;
SSLChannelInfo channel;
SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
CERTCertificate *cert;
CERTCertificate *cert2;
CERTCertificate *cert3;
PRTime now;
int i;
if(SSL_GetChannelInfo(sock, &channel, sizeof(channel)) ==
SECSuccess && channel.length == sizeof(channel) &&
channel.cipherSuite) {
if(SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite,
&suite, sizeof(suite)) == SECSuccess) {
infof(conn->data, "SSL connection using %s\n", suite.cipherSuiteName);
}
}
cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(sock);
if(cert) {
infof(conn->data, "Server certificate:\n");
if(!conn->data->set.ssl.certinfo) {
display_cert_info(conn->data, cert);
CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert);
}
else {
/* Count certificates in chain. */
now = PR_Now();
i = 1;
if(!cert->isRoot) {
cert2 = CERT_FindCertIssuer(cert, now, certUsageSSLCA);
while(cert2) {
i++;
if(cert2->isRoot) {
CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert2);
break;
}
cert3 = CERT_FindCertIssuer(cert2, now, certUsageSSLCA);
CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert2);
cert2 = cert3;
}
}
result = Curl_ssl_init_certinfo(conn->data, i);
if(!result) {
for(i = 0; cert; cert = cert2) {
result = Curl_extract_certinfo(conn, i++, (char *)cert->derCert.data,
(char *)cert->derCert.data +
cert->derCert.len);
if(result)
break;
if(cert->isRoot) {
CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert);
break;
}
cert2 = CERT_FindCertIssuer(cert, now, certUsageSSLCA);
CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert);
}
}
}
}
return result;
}
static SECStatus BadCertHandler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *sock)
{
struct connectdata *conn = (struct connectdata *)arg;
struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data;
PRErrorCode err = PR_GetError();
CERTCertificate *cert;
/* remember the cert verification result */
if(SSL_IS_PROXY())
data->set.proxy_ssl.certverifyresult = err;
else
data->set.ssl.certverifyresult = err;
if(err == SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN && !SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifyhost))
/* we are asked not to verify the host name */
return SECSuccess;
/* print only info about the cert, the error is printed off the callback */
cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(sock);
if(cert) {
infof(data, "Server certificate:\n");
display_cert_info(data, cert);
CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert);
}
return SECFailure;
}
/**
*
* Check that the Peer certificate's issuer certificate matches the one found
* by issuer_nickname. This is not exactly the way OpenSSL and GNU TLS do the
* issuer check, so we provide comments that mimic the OpenSSL
* X509_check_issued function (in x509v3/v3_purp.c)
*/
static SECStatus check_issuer_cert(PRFileDesc *sock,
char *issuer_nickname)
{
CERTCertificate *cert, *cert_issuer, *issuer;
SECStatus res = SECSuccess;
void *proto_win = NULL;
cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(sock);
cert_issuer = CERT_FindCertIssuer(cert, PR_Now(), certUsageObjectSigner);
proto_win = SSL_RevealPinArg(sock);
issuer = PK11_FindCertFromNickname(issuer_nickname, proto_win);
if((!cert_issuer) || (!issuer))
res = SECFailure;
else if(SECITEM_CompareItem(&cert_issuer->derCert,
&issuer->derCert) != SECEqual)
res = SECFailure;
CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert);
CERT_DestroyCertificate(issuer);
CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert_issuer);
return res;
}
static CURLcode cmp_peer_pubkey(struct ssl_connect_data *connssl,
const char *pinnedpubkey)
{
CURLcode result = CURLE_SSL_PINNEDPUBKEYNOTMATCH;
struct Curl_easy *data = BACKEND->data;
CERTCertificate *cert;
if(!pinnedpubkey)
/* no pinned public key specified */
return CURLE_OK;
/* get peer certificate */
cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(BACKEND->handle);
if(cert) {
/* extract public key from peer certificate */
SECKEYPublicKey *pubkey = CERT_ExtractPublicKey(cert);
if(pubkey) {
/* encode the public key as DER */
SECItem *cert_der = PK11_DEREncodePublicKey(pubkey);
if(cert_der) {
/* compare the public key with the pinned public key */
result = Curl_pin_peer_pubkey(data, pinnedpubkey, cert_der->data,
cert_der->len);
SECITEM_FreeItem(cert_der, PR_TRUE);
}
SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubkey);
}
CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert);
}
/* report the resulting status */
switch(result) {
case CURLE_OK:
infof(data, "pinned public key verified successfully!\n");
break;
case CURLE_SSL_PINNEDPUBKEYNOTMATCH:
failf(data, "failed to verify pinned public key");
break;
default:
/* OOM, etc. */
break;
}
return result;
}
/**
*
* Callback to pick the SSL client certificate.
*/
static SECStatus SelectClientCert(void *arg, PRFileDesc *sock,
struct CERTDistNamesStr *caNames,
struct CERTCertificateStr **pRetCert,
struct SECKEYPrivateKeyStr **pRetKey)
{
struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = (struct ssl_connect_data *)arg;
struct Curl_easy *data = BACKEND->data;
const char *nickname = BACKEND->client_nickname;
static const char pem_slotname[] = "PEM Token #1";
if(BACKEND->obj_clicert) {
/* use the cert/key provided by PEM reader */
SECItem cert_der = { 0, NULL, 0 };
void *proto_win = SSL_RevealPinArg(sock);
struct CERTCertificateStr *cert;
struct SECKEYPrivateKeyStr *key;
PK11SlotInfo *slot = nss_find_slot_by_name(pem_slotname);
if(NULL == slot) {
failf(data, "NSS: PK11 slot not found: %s", pem_slotname);
return SECFailure;
}
if(PK11_ReadRawAttribute(PK11_TypeGeneric, BACKEND->obj_clicert, CKA_VALUE,
&cert_der) != SECSuccess) {
failf(data, "NSS: CKA_VALUE not found in PK11 generic object");
PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
return SECFailure;
}
cert = PK11_FindCertFromDERCertItem(slot, &cert_der, proto_win);
SECITEM_FreeItem(&cert_der, PR_FALSE);
if(NULL == cert) {
failf(data, "NSS: client certificate from file not found");
PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
return SECFailure;
}
key = PK11_FindPrivateKeyFromCert(slot, cert, NULL);
PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
if(NULL == key) {
failf(data, "NSS: private key from file not found");
CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert);
return SECFailure;
}
infof(data, "NSS: client certificate from file\n");
display_cert_info(data, cert);
*pRetCert = cert;
*pRetKey = key;
return SECSuccess;
}
/* use the default NSS hook */
if(SECSuccess != NSS_GetClientAuthData((void *)nickname, sock, caNames,
pRetCert, pRetKey)
|| NULL == *pRetCert) {
if(NULL == nickname)
failf(data, "NSS: client certificate not found (nickname not "
"specified)");
else
failf(data, "NSS: client certificate not found: %s", nickname);
return SECFailure;
}
/* get certificate nickname if any */
nickname = (*pRetCert)->nickname;
if(NULL == nickname)
nickname = "[unknown]";
if(!strncmp(nickname, pem_slotname, sizeof(pem_slotname) - 1U)) {
failf(data, "NSS: refusing previously loaded certificate from file: %s",
nickname);
return SECFailure;
}
if(NULL == *pRetKey) {
failf(data, "NSS: private key not found for certificate: %s", nickname);
return SECFailure;
}
infof(data, "NSS: using client certificate: %s\n", nickname);
display_cert_info(data, *pRetCert);
return SECSuccess;
}
/* update blocking direction in case of PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR */
static void nss_update_connecting_state(ssl_connect_state state, void *secret)
{
struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = (struct ssl_connect_data *)secret;
if(PR_GetError() != PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)
/* an unrelated error is passing by */
return;
switch(connssl->connecting_state) {
case ssl_connect_2:
case ssl_connect_2_reading:
case ssl_connect_2_writing:
break;
default:
/* we are not called from an SSL handshake */
return;
}
/* update the state accordingly */
connssl->connecting_state = state;
}
/* recv() wrapper we use to detect blocking direction during SSL handshake */
static PRInt32 nspr_io_recv(PRFileDesc *fd, void *buf, PRInt32 amount,
PRIntn flags, PRIntervalTime timeout)
{
const PRRecvFN recv_fn = fd->lower->methods->recv;
const PRInt32 rv = recv_fn(fd->lower, buf, amount, flags, timeout);
if(rv < 0)
/* check for PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR and update blocking direction */
nss_update_connecting_state(ssl_connect_2_reading, fd->secret);
return rv;
}
/* send() wrapper we use to detect blocking direction during SSL handshake */
static PRInt32 nspr_io_send(PRFileDesc *fd, const void *buf, PRInt32 amount,
PRIntn flags, PRIntervalTime timeout)
{
const PRSendFN send_fn = fd->lower->methods->send;
const PRInt32 rv = send_fn(fd->lower, buf, amount, flags, timeout);
if(rv < 0)
/* check for PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR and update blocking direction */
nss_update_connecting_state(ssl_connect_2_writing, fd->secret);
return rv;
}
/* close() wrapper to avoid assertion failure due to fd->secret != NULL */
static PRStatus nspr_io_close(PRFileDesc *fd)
{
const PRCloseFN close_fn = PR_GetDefaultIOMethods()->close;
fd->secret = NULL;
return close_fn(fd);
}
/* load a PKCS #11 module */
static CURLcode nss_load_module(SECMODModule **pmod, const char *library,
const char *name)
{
char *config_string;
SECMODModule *module = *pmod;
if(module)
/* already loaded */
return CURLE_OK;
config_string = aprintf("library=%s name=%s", library, name);
if(!config_string)
return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
module = SECMOD_LoadUserModule(config_string, NULL, PR_FALSE);
free(config_string);
if(module && module->loaded) {
/* loaded successfully */
*pmod = module;
return CURLE_OK;
}
if(module)
SECMOD_DestroyModule(module);
return CURLE_FAILED_INIT;
}
/* unload a PKCS #11 module */
static void nss_unload_module(SECMODModule **pmod)
{
SECMODModule *module = *pmod;
if(!module)
/* not loaded */
return;
if(SECMOD_UnloadUserModule(module) != SECSuccess)
/* unload failed */
return;
SECMOD_DestroyModule(module);
*pmod = NULL;
}
/* data might be NULL */
static CURLcode nss_init_core(struct Curl_easy *data, const char *cert_dir)
{
NSSInitParameters initparams;
if(nss_context != NULL)
return CURLE_OK;
memset((void *) &initparams, '\0', sizeof(initparams));
initparams.length = sizeof(initparams);
if(cert_dir) {
char *certpath = aprintf("sql:%s", cert_dir);
if(!certpath)
return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
infof(data, "Initializing NSS with certpath: %s\n", certpath);
nss_context = NSS_InitContext(certpath, "", "", "", &initparams,
NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
free(certpath);
if(nss_context != NULL)
return CURLE_OK;
infof(data, "Unable to initialize NSS database\n");
}
infof(data, "Initializing NSS with certpath: none\n");
nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", &initparams, NSS_INIT_READONLY
| NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB | NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN
| NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_OPTIMIZESPACE | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
if(nss_context != NULL)
return CURLE_OK;
infof(data, "Unable to initialize NSS\n");
return CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE;
}
/* data might be NULL */
static CURLcode nss_init(struct Curl_easy *data)
{
char *cert_dir;
struct_stat st;
CURLcode result;
if(initialized)
return CURLE_OK;
/* list of all CRL items we need to destroy in Curl_nss_cleanup() */
Curl_llist_init(&nss_crl_list, nss_destroy_crl_item);
/* First we check if $SSL_DIR points to a valid dir */
cert_dir = getenv("SSL_DIR");
if(cert_dir) {
if((stat(cert_dir, &st) != 0) ||
(!S_ISDIR(st.st_mode))) {
cert_dir = NULL;
}
}
/* Now we check if the default location is a valid dir */
if(!cert_dir) {
if((stat(SSL_DIR, &st) == 0) &&
(S_ISDIR(st.st_mode))) {
cert_dir = (char *)SSL_DIR;
}
}
if(nspr_io_identity == PR_INVALID_IO_LAYER) {
/* allocate an identity for our own NSPR I/O layer */
nspr_io_identity = PR_GetUniqueIdentity("libcurl");
if(nspr_io_identity == PR_INVALID_IO_LAYER)
return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
/* the default methods just call down to the lower I/O layer */
memcpy(&nspr_io_methods, PR_GetDefaultIOMethods(),
sizeof(nspr_io_methods));
/* override certain methods in the table by our wrappers */
nspr_io_methods.recv = nspr_io_recv;
nspr_io_methods.send = nspr_io_send;
nspr_io_methods.close = nspr_io_close;
}
result = nss_init_core(data, cert_dir);
if(result)
return result;
if(!any_cipher_enabled())
NSS_SetDomesticPolicy();
initialized = 1;
return CURLE_OK;
}
/**
* Global SSL init
*
* @retval 0 error initializing SSL
* @retval 1 SSL initialized successfully
*/
static int Curl_nss_init(void)
{
/* curl_global_init() is not thread-safe so this test is ok */
if(nss_initlock == NULL) {
PR_Init(PR_USER_THREAD, PR_PRIORITY_NORMAL, 256);
nss_initlock = PR_NewLock();
nss_crllock = PR_NewLock();
nss_findslot_lock = PR_NewLock();
nss_trustload_lock = PR_NewLock();
}
/* We will actually initialize NSS later */
return 1;
}
/* data might be NULL */
CURLcode Curl_nss_force_init(struct Curl_easy *data)
{
CURLcode result;
if(!nss_initlock) {
if(data)
failf(data, "unable to initialize NSS, curl_global_init() should have "
"been called with CURL_GLOBAL_SSL or CURL_GLOBAL_ALL");
return CURLE_FAILED_INIT;
}
PR_Lock(nss_initlock);
result = nss_init(data);
PR_Unlock(nss_initlock);
return result;
}
/* Global cleanup */
static void Curl_nss_cleanup(void)
{
/* This function isn't required to be threadsafe and this is only done
* as a safety feature.
*/
PR_Lock(nss_initlock);
if(initialized) {
/* Free references to client certificates held in the SSL session cache.
* Omitting this hampers destruction of the security module owning
* the certificates. */
SSL_ClearSessionCache();
nss_unload_module(&pem_module);
nss_unload_module(&trust_module);
NSS_ShutdownContext(nss_context);
nss_context = NULL;
}
/* destroy all CRL items */
Curl_llist_destroy(&nss_crl_list, NULL);
PR_Unlock(nss_initlock);
PR_DestroyLock(nss_initlock);
PR_DestroyLock(nss_crllock);
PR_DestroyLock(nss_findslot_lock);
PR_DestroyLock(nss_trustload_lock);
nss_initlock = NULL;
initialized = 0;
}
/*
* This function uses SSL_peek to determine connection status.
*
* Return codes:
* 1 means the connection is still in place
* 0 means the connection has been closed
* -1 means the connection status is unknown
*/
static int Curl_nss_check_cxn(struct connectdata *conn)
{
struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[FIRSTSOCKET];
int rc;
char buf;
rc =
PR_Recv(BACKEND->handle, (void *)&buf, 1, PR_MSG_PEEK,
PR_SecondsToInterval(1));
if(rc > 0)
return 1; /* connection still in place */
if(rc == 0)
return 0; /* connection has been closed */
return -1; /* connection status unknown */
}
static void nss_close(struct ssl_connect_data *connssl)
{
/* before the cleanup, check whether we are using a client certificate */
const bool client_cert = (BACKEND->client_nickname != NULL)
|| (BACKEND->obj_clicert != NULL);
free(BACKEND->client_nickname);
BACKEND->client_nickname = NULL;
/* destroy all NSS objects in order to avoid failure of NSS shutdown */
Curl_llist_destroy(&BACKEND->obj_list, NULL);
BACKEND->obj_clicert = NULL;
if(BACKEND->handle) {
if(client_cert)
/* A server might require different authentication based on the
* particular path being requested by the client. To support this
* scenario, we must ensure that a connection will never reuse the
* authentication data from a previous connection. */
SSL_InvalidateSession(BACKEND->handle);
PR_Close(BACKEND->handle);
BACKEND->handle = NULL;
}
}
/*
* This function is called when an SSL connection is closed.
*/
static void Curl_nss_close(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
{
struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
struct ssl_connect_data *connssl_proxy = &conn->proxy_ssl[sockindex];
if(BACKEND->handle || connssl_proxy->backend->handle) {
/* NSS closes the socket we previously handed to it, so we must mark it
as closed to avoid double close */
fake_sclose(conn->sock[sockindex]);
conn->sock[sockindex] = CURL_SOCKET_BAD;
}
if(BACKEND->handle)
/* nss_close(connssl) will transitively close also
connssl_proxy->backend->handle if both are used. Clear it to avoid
a double close leading to crash. */
connssl_proxy->backend->handle = NULL;
nss_close(connssl);
nss_close(connssl_proxy);
}
/* return true if NSS can provide error code (and possibly msg) for the
error */
static bool is_nss_error(CURLcode err)
{
switch(err) {
case CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION:
case CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM:
case CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR:
case CURLE_SSL_ISSUER_ERROR:
return true;
default:
return false;
}
}
/* return true if the given error code is related to a client certificate */
static bool is_cc_error(PRInt32 err)
{
switch(err) {
case SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_ALERT:
case SSL_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERT_ALERT:
case SSL_ERROR_REVOKED_CERT_ALERT:
return true;
default:
return false;
}
}
static Curl_recv nss_recv;
static Curl_send nss_send;
static CURLcode nss_load_ca_certificates(struct connectdata *conn,
int sockindex)
{
struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data;
const char *cafile = SSL_CONN_CONFIG(CAfile);
const char *capath = SSL_CONN_CONFIG(CApath);
bool use_trust_module;
CURLcode result = CURLE_OK;
/* treat empty string as unset */
if(cafile && !cafile[0])
cafile = NULL;
if(capath && !capath[0])
capath = NULL;
infof(data, " CAfile: %s\n CApath: %s\n",
cafile ? cafile : "none",
capath ? capath : "none");
/* load libnssckbi.so if no other trust roots were specified */
use_trust_module = !cafile && !capath;
PR_Lock(nss_trustload_lock);
if(use_trust_module && !trust_module) {
/* libnssckbi.so needed but not yet loaded --> load it! */
result = nss_load_module(&trust_module, trust_library, "trust");
infof(data, "%s %s\n", (result) ? "failed to load" : "loaded",
trust_library);
if(result == CURLE_FAILED_INIT)
/* If libnssckbi.so is not available (or fails to load), one can still
use CA certificates stored in NSS database. Ignore the failure. */
result = CURLE_OK;
}
else if(!use_trust_module && trust_module) {
/* libnssckbi.so not needed but already loaded --> unload it! */
infof(data, "unloading %s\n", trust_library);
nss_unload_module(&trust_module);
}
PR_Unlock(nss_trustload_lock);
if(cafile)
result = nss_load_cert(&conn->ssl[sockindex], cafile, PR_TRUE);
if(result)
return result;
if(capath) {
struct_stat st;
if(stat(capath, &st) == -1)
return CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE;
if(S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) {
PRDirEntry *entry;
PRDir *dir = PR_OpenDir(capath);
if(!dir)
return CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE;
while((entry = PR_ReadDir(dir, PR_SKIP_BOTH | PR_SKIP_HIDDEN))) {
char *fullpath = aprintf("%s/%s", capath, entry->name);
if(!fullpath) {
PR_CloseDir(dir);
return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
}
if(CURLE_OK != nss_load_cert(&conn->ssl[sockindex], fullpath, PR_TRUE))
/* This is purposefully tolerant of errors so non-PEM files can
* be in the same directory */
infof(data, "failed to load '%s' from CURLOPT_CAPATH\n", fullpath);
free(fullpath);
}
PR_CloseDir(dir);
}
else
infof(data, "warning: CURLOPT_CAPATH not a directory (%s)\n", capath);
}
return CURLE_OK;
}
static CURLcode nss_sslver_from_curl(PRUint16 *nssver, long version)
{
switch(version) {
case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1:
/* TODO: set sslver->max to SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 once stable */
#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
*nssver = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2;
#elif defined SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
*nssver = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1;
#else
*nssver = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
#endif
return CURLE_OK;
case CURL_SSLVERSION_SSLv2:
*nssver = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_2;
return CURLE_OK;
case CURL_SSLVERSION_SSLv3:
*nssver = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0;
return CURLE_OK;
case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_0:
*nssver = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
return CURLE_OK;
case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_1:
#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
*nssver = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1;
return CURLE_OK;
#else
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
#endif
case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_2:
#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
*nssver = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2;
return CURLE_OK;
#else
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
#endif
case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_3:
#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
*nssver = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3;
return CURLE_OK;
#else
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
#endif
default:
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
}
}
static CURLcode nss_init_sslver(SSLVersionRange *sslver,
struct Curl_easy *data,
struct connectdata *conn)
{
CURLcode result;
const long min = SSL_CONN_CONFIG(version);
const long max = SSL_CONN_CONFIG(version_max);
/* map CURL_SSLVERSION_DEFAULT to NSS default */
if(min == CURL_SSLVERSION_DEFAULT || max == CURL_SSLVERSION_MAX_DEFAULT) {
/* map CURL_SSLVERSION_DEFAULT to NSS default */
if(SSL_VersionRangeGetDefault(ssl_variant_stream, sslver) != SECSuccess)
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
/* ... but make sure we use at least TLSv1.0 according to libcurl API */
if(sslver->min < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0)
sslver->min = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
}
switch(min) {
case CURL_SSLVERSION_DEFAULT:
break;
case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1:
sslver->min = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
break;
default:
result = nss_sslver_from_curl(&sslver->min, min);
if(result) {
failf(data, "unsupported min version passed via CURLOPT_SSLVERSION");
return result;
}
}
switch(max) {
case CURL_SSLVERSION_MAX_NONE:
case CURL_SSLVERSION_MAX_DEFAULT:
break;
default:
result = nss_sslver_from_curl(&sslver->max, max >> 16);
if(result) {
failf(data, "unsupported max version passed via CURLOPT_SSLVERSION");
return result;
}
}
return CURLE_OK;
}
static CURLcode nss_fail_connect(struct ssl_connect_data *connssl,
struct Curl_easy *data,
CURLcode curlerr)
{
PRErrorCode err = 0;
if(is_nss_error(curlerr)) {
/* read NSPR error code */
err = PR_GetError();
if(is_cc_error(err))
curlerr = CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM;
/* print the error number and error string */
infof(data, "NSS error %d (%s)\n", err, nss_error_to_name(err));
/* print a human-readable message describing the error if available */
nss_print_error_message(data, err);
}
/* cleanup on connection failure */
Curl_llist_destroy(&BACKEND->obj_list, NULL);
return curlerr;
}
/* Switch the SSL socket into blocking or non-blocking mode. */
static CURLcode nss_set_blocking(struct ssl_connect_data *connssl,
struct Curl_easy *data,
bool blocking)
{
static PRSocketOptionData sock_opt;
sock_opt.option = PR_SockOpt_Nonblocking;
sock_opt.value.non_blocking = !blocking;
if(PR_SetSocketOption(BACKEND->handle, &sock_opt) != PR_SUCCESS)
return nss_fail_connect(connssl, data, CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR);
return CURLE_OK;
}
static CURLcode nss_setup_connect(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
{
PRFileDesc *model = NULL;
PRFileDesc *nspr_io = NULL;
PRFileDesc *nspr_io_stub = NULL;
PRBool ssl_no_cache;
PRBool ssl_cbc_random_iv;
struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data;
curl_socket_t sockfd = conn->sock[sockindex];
struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
CURLcode result;
bool second_layer = FALSE;
SSLVersionRange sslver = {
SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0, /* min */
SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0 /* max */
};
BACKEND->data = data;
/* list of all NSS objects we need to destroy in Curl_nss_close() */
Curl_llist_init(&BACKEND->obj_list, nss_destroy_object);
/* FIXME. NSS doesn't support multiple databases open at the same time. */
PR_Lock(nss_initlock);
result = nss_init(conn->data);
if(result) {
PR_Unlock(nss_initlock);
goto error;
}
PK11_SetPasswordFunc(nss_get_password);
result = nss_load_module(&pem_module, pem_library, "PEM");
PR_Unlock(nss_initlock);
if(result == CURLE_FAILED_INIT)
infof(data, "WARNING: failed to load NSS PEM library %s. Using "
"OpenSSL PEM certificates will not work.\n", pem_library);
else if(result)
goto error;
result = CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
model = PR_NewTCPSocket();
if(!model)
goto error;
model = SSL_ImportFD(NULL, model);
if(SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_SECURITY, PR_TRUE) != SECSuccess)
goto error;
if(SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_SERVER, PR_FALSE) != SECSuccess)
goto error;
if(SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_CLIENT, PR_TRUE) != SECSuccess)
goto error;
/* do not use SSL cache if disabled or we are not going to verify peer */
ssl_no_cache = (SSL_SET_OPTION(primary.sessionid)
&& SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifypeer)) ? PR_FALSE : PR_TRUE;
if(SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_NO_CACHE, ssl_no_cache) != SECSuccess)
goto error;
/* enable/disable the requested SSL version(s) */
if(nss_init_sslver(&sslver, data, conn) != CURLE_OK)
goto error;
if(SSL_VersionRangeSet(model, &sslver) != SECSuccess)
goto error;
ssl_cbc_random_iv = !SSL_SET_OPTION(enable_beast);
#ifdef SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV
/* unless the user explicitly asks to allow the protocol vulnerability, we
use the work-around */
if(SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV, ssl_cbc_random_iv) != SECSuccess)
infof(data, "warning: failed to set SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV = %d\n",
ssl_cbc_random_iv);
#else
if(ssl_cbc_random_iv)
infof(data, "warning: support for SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV not compiled in\n");
#endif
if(SSL_CONN_CONFIG(cipher_list)) {
if(set_ciphers(data, model, SSL_CONN_CONFIG(cipher_list)) != SECSuccess) {
result = CURLE_SSL_CIPHER;
goto error;
}
}
if(!SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifypeer) && SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifyhost))
infof(data, "warning: ignoring value of ssl.verifyhost\n");
/* bypass the default SSL_AuthCertificate() hook in case we do not want to
* verify peer */
if(SSL_AuthCertificateHook(model, nss_auth_cert_hook, conn) != SECSuccess)
goto error;
/* not checked yet */
if(SSL_IS_PROXY())
data->set.proxy_ssl.certverifyresult = 0;
else
data->set.ssl.certverifyresult = 0;
if(SSL_BadCertHook(model, BadCertHandler, conn) != SECSuccess)
goto error;
if(SSL_HandshakeCallback(model, HandshakeCallback, conn) != SECSuccess)
goto error;
{
const CURLcode rv = nss_load_ca_certificates(conn, sockindex);
if((rv == CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE) && !SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifypeer))
/* not a fatal error because we are not going to verify the peer */
infof(data, "warning: CA certificates failed to load\n");
else if(rv) {
result = rv;
goto error;
}
}
if(SSL_SET_OPTION(CRLfile)) {
const CURLcode rv = nss_load_crl(SSL_SET_OPTION(CRLfile));
if(rv) {
result = rv;
goto error;
}
infof(data, " CRLfile: %s\n", SSL_SET_OPTION(CRLfile));
}
if(SSL_SET_OPTION(cert)) {
char *nickname = dup_nickname(data, SSL_SET_OPTION(cert));
if(nickname) {
/* we are not going to use libnsspem.so to read the client cert */
BACKEND->obj_clicert = NULL;
}
else {
CURLcode rv = cert_stuff(conn, sockindex, SSL_SET_OPTION(cert),
SSL_SET_OPTION(key));
if(rv) {
/* failf() is already done in cert_stuff() */
result = rv;
goto error;
}
}
/* store the nickname for SelectClientCert() called during handshake */
BACKEND->client_nickname = nickname;
}
else
BACKEND->client_nickname = NULL;
if(SSL_GetClientAuthDataHook(model, SelectClientCert,
(void *)connssl) != SECSuccess) {
result = CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM;
goto error;
}
if(conn->proxy_ssl[sockindex].use) {
DEBUGASSERT(ssl_connection_complete == conn->proxy_ssl[sockindex].state);
DEBUGASSERT(conn->proxy_ssl[sockindex].backend->handle != NULL);
nspr_io = conn->proxy_ssl[sockindex].backend->handle;
second_layer = TRUE;
}
else {
/* wrap OS file descriptor by NSPR's file descriptor abstraction */
nspr_io = PR_ImportTCPSocket(sockfd);
if(!nspr_io)
goto error;
}
/* create our own NSPR I/O layer */
nspr_io_stub = PR_CreateIOLayerStub(nspr_io_identity, &nspr_io_methods);
if(!nspr_io_stub) {
if(!second_layer)
PR_Close(nspr_io);
goto error;
}
/* make the per-connection data accessible from NSPR I/O callbacks */
nspr_io_stub->secret = (void *)connssl;
/* push our new layer to the NSPR I/O stack */
if(PR_PushIOLayer(nspr_io, PR_TOP_IO_LAYER, nspr_io_stub) != PR_SUCCESS) {
if(!second_layer)
PR_Close(nspr_io);
PR_Close(nspr_io_stub);
goto error;
}
/* import our model socket onto the current I/O stack */
BACKEND->handle = SSL_ImportFD(model, nspr_io);
if(!BACKEND->handle) {
if(!second_layer)
PR_Close(nspr_io);
goto error;
}
PR_Close(model); /* We don't need this any more */
model = NULL;
/* This is the password associated with the cert that we're using */
if(SSL_SET_OPTION(key_passwd)) {
SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg(BACKEND->handle, SSL_SET_OPTION(key_passwd));
}
#ifdef SSL_ENABLE_OCSP_STAPLING
if(SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifystatus)) {
if(SSL_OptionSet(BACKEND->handle, SSL_ENABLE_OCSP_STAPLING, PR_TRUE)
!= SECSuccess)
goto error;
}
#endif
#ifdef SSL_ENABLE_NPN
if(SSL_OptionSet(BACKEND->handle, SSL_ENABLE_NPN, conn->bits.tls_enable_npn
? PR_TRUE : PR_FALSE) != SECSuccess)
goto error;
#endif
#ifdef SSL_ENABLE_ALPN
if(SSL_OptionSet(BACKEND->handle, SSL_ENABLE_ALPN, conn->bits.tls_enable_alpn
? PR_TRUE : PR_FALSE) != SECSuccess)
goto error;
#endif
#if NSSVERNUM >= 0x030f04 /* 3.15.4 */
if(data->set.ssl.falsestart) {
if(SSL_OptionSet(BACKEND->handle, SSL_ENABLE_FALSE_START, PR_TRUE)
!= SECSuccess)
goto error;
if(SSL_SetCanFalseStartCallback(BACKEND->handle, CanFalseStartCallback,
conn) != SECSuccess)
goto error;
}
#endif
#if defined(SSL_ENABLE_NPN) || defined(SSL_ENABLE_ALPN)
if(conn->bits.tls_enable_npn || conn->bits.tls_enable_alpn) {
int cur = 0;
unsigned char protocols[128];
#ifdef USE_NGHTTP2
if(data->set.httpversion >= CURL_HTTP_VERSION_2 &&
(!SSL_IS_PROXY() || !conn->bits.tunnel_proxy)) {
protocols[cur++] = NGHTTP2_PROTO_VERSION_ID_LEN;
memcpy(&protocols[cur], NGHTTP2_PROTO_VERSION_ID,
NGHTTP2_PROTO_VERSION_ID_LEN);
cur += NGHTTP2_PROTO_VERSION_ID_LEN;
}
#endif
protocols[cur++] = ALPN_HTTP_1_1_LENGTH;
memcpy(&protocols[cur], ALPN_HTTP_1_1, ALPN_HTTP_1_1_LENGTH);
cur += ALPN_HTTP_1_1_LENGTH;
if(SSL_SetNextProtoNego(BACKEND->handle, protocols, cur) != SECSuccess)
goto error;
}
#endif
/* Force handshake on next I/O */
if(SSL_ResetHandshake(BACKEND->handle, /* asServer */ PR_FALSE)
!= SECSuccess)
goto error;
/* propagate hostname to the TLS layer */
if(SSL_SetURL(BACKEND->handle, SSL_IS_PROXY() ? conn->http_proxy.host.name :
conn->host.name) != SECSuccess)
goto error;
/* prevent NSS from re-using the session for a different hostname */
if(SSL_SetSockPeerID(BACKEND->handle, SSL_IS_PROXY() ?
conn->http_proxy.host.name : conn->host.name)
!= SECSuccess)
goto error;
return CURLE_OK;
error:
if(model)
PR_Close(model);
return nss_fail_connect(connssl, data, result);
}
static CURLcode nss_do_connect(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
{
struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data;
CURLcode result = CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
PRUint32 timeout;
long * const certverifyresult = SSL_IS_PROXY() ?
&data->set.proxy_ssl.certverifyresult : &data->set.ssl.certverifyresult;
const char * const pinnedpubkey = SSL_IS_PROXY() ?
data->set.str[STRING_SSL_PINNEDPUBLICKEY_PROXY] :
data->set.str[STRING_SSL_PINNEDPUBLICKEY_ORIG];
/* check timeout situation */
const time_t time_left = Curl_timeleft(data, NULL, TRUE);
if(time_left < 0) {
failf(data, "timed out before SSL handshake");
result = CURLE_OPERATION_TIMEDOUT;
goto error;
}
/* Force the handshake now */
timeout = PR_MillisecondsToInterval((PRUint32) time_left);
if(SSL_ForceHandshakeWithTimeout(BACKEND->handle, timeout) != SECSuccess) {
if(PR_GetError() == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)
/* blocking direction is updated by nss_update_connecting_state() */
return CURLE_AGAIN;
else if(*certverifyresult == SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN)
result = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
else if(*certverifyresult != 0)
result = CURLE_SSL_CACERT;
goto error;
}
result = display_conn_info(conn, BACKEND->handle);
if(result)
goto error;
if(SSL_SET_OPTION(issuercert)) {
SECStatus ret = SECFailure;
char *nickname = dup_nickname(data, SSL_SET_OPTION(issuercert));
if(nickname) {
/* we support only nicknames in case of issuercert for now */
ret = check_issuer_cert(BACKEND->handle, nickname);
free(nickname);
}
if(SECFailure == ret) {
infof(data, "SSL certificate issuer check failed\n");
result = CURLE_SSL_ISSUER_ERROR;
goto error;
}
else {
infof(data, "SSL certificate issuer check ok\n");
}
}
result = cmp_peer_pubkey(connssl, pinnedpubkey);
if(result)
/* status already printed */
goto error;
return CURLE_OK;
error:
return nss_fail_connect(connssl, data, result);
}
static CURLcode nss_connect_common(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex,
bool *done)
{
struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data;
const bool blocking = (done == NULL);
CURLcode result;
if(connssl->state == ssl_connection_complete) {
if(!blocking)
*done = TRUE;
return CURLE_OK;
}
if(connssl->connecting_state == ssl_connect_1) {
result = nss_setup_connect(conn, sockindex);
if(result)
/* we do not expect CURLE_AGAIN from nss_setup_connect() */
return result;
connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_2;
}
/* enable/disable blocking mode before handshake */
result = nss_set_blocking(connssl, data, blocking);
if(result)
return result;
result = nss_do_connect(conn, sockindex);
switch(result) {
case CURLE_OK:
break;
case CURLE_AGAIN:
if(!blocking)
/* CURLE_AGAIN in non-blocking mode is not an error */
return CURLE_OK;
/* fall through */
default:
return result;
}
if(blocking) {
/* in blocking mode, set NSS non-blocking mode _after_ SSL handshake */
result = nss_set_blocking(connssl, data, /* blocking */ FALSE);
if(result)
return result;
}
else
/* signal completed SSL handshake */
*done = TRUE;
connssl->state = ssl_connection_complete;
conn->recv[sockindex] = nss_recv;
conn->send[sockindex] = nss_send;
/* ssl_connect_done is never used outside, go back to the initial state */
connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_1;
return CURLE_OK;
}
static CURLcode Curl_nss_connect(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
{
return nss_connect_common(conn, sockindex, /* blocking */ NULL);
}
static CURLcode Curl_nss_connect_nonblocking(struct connectdata *conn,
int sockindex, bool *done)
{
return nss_connect_common(conn, sockindex, done);
}
static ssize_t nss_send(struct connectdata *conn, /* connection data */
int sockindex, /* socketindex */
const void *mem, /* send this data */
size_t len, /* amount to write */
CURLcode *curlcode)
{
struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
ssize_t rc;
/* The SelectClientCert() hook uses this for infof() and failf() but the
handle stored in nss_setup_connect() could have already been freed. */
BACKEND->data = conn->data;
rc = PR_Send(BACKEND->handle, mem, (int)len, 0, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
if(rc < 0) {
PRInt32 err = PR_GetError();
if(err == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)
*curlcode = CURLE_AGAIN;
else {
/* print the error number and error string */
const char *err_name = nss_error_to_name(err);
infof(conn->data, "SSL write: error %d (%s)\n", err, err_name);
/* print a human-readable message describing the error if available */
nss_print_error_message(conn->data, err);
*curlcode = (is_cc_error(err))
? CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM
: CURLE_SEND_ERROR;
}
return -1;
}
return rc; /* number of bytes */
}
static ssize_t nss_recv(struct connectdata *conn, /* connection data */
int sockindex, /* socketindex */
char *buf, /* store read data here */
size_t buffersize, /* max amount to read */
CURLcode *curlcode)
{
struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
ssize_t nread;
/* The SelectClientCert() hook uses this for infof() and failf() but the
handle stored in nss_setup_connect() could have already been freed. */
BACKEND->data = conn->data;
nread = PR_Recv(BACKEND->handle, buf, (int)buffersize, 0,
PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
if(nread < 0) {
/* failed SSL read */
PRInt32 err = PR_GetError();
if(err == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)
*curlcode = CURLE_AGAIN;
else {
/* print the error number and error string */
const char *err_name = nss_error_to_name(err);
infof(conn->data, "SSL read: errno %d (%s)\n", err, err_name);
/* print a human-readable message describing the error if available */
nss_print_error_message(conn->data, err);
*curlcode = (is_cc_error(err))
? CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM
: CURLE_RECV_ERROR;
}
return -1;
}
return nread;
}
static size_t Curl_nss_version(char *buffer, size_t size)
{
return snprintf(buffer, size, "NSS/%s", NSS_VERSION);
}
/* data might be NULL */
static int Curl_nss_seed(struct Curl_easy *data)
{
/* make sure that NSS is initialized */
return !!Curl_nss_force_init(data);
}
/* data might be NULL */
static CURLcode Curl_nss_random(struct Curl_easy *data,
unsigned char *entropy,
size_t length)
{
Curl_nss_seed(data); /* Initiate the seed if not already done */
if(SECSuccess != PK11_GenerateRandom(entropy, curlx_uztosi(length)))
/* signal a failure */
return CURLE_FAILED_INIT;
return CURLE_OK;
}
static CURLcode Curl_nss_md5sum(unsigned char *tmp, /* input */
size_t tmplen,
unsigned char *md5sum, /* output */
size_t md5len)
{
PK11Context *MD5pw = PK11_CreateDigestContext(SEC_OID_MD5);
unsigned int MD5out;
PK11_DigestOp(MD5pw, tmp, curlx_uztoui(tmplen));
PK11_DigestFinal(MD5pw, md5sum, &MD5out, curlx_uztoui(md5len));
PK11_DestroyContext(MD5pw, PR_TRUE);
return CURLE_OK;
}
static CURLcode Curl_nss_sha256sum(const unsigned char *tmp, /* input */
size_t tmplen,
unsigned char *sha256sum, /* output */
size_t sha256len)
{
PK11Context *SHA256pw = PK11_CreateDigestContext(SEC_OID_SHA256);
unsigned int SHA256out;
PK11_DigestOp(SHA256pw, tmp, curlx_uztoui(tmplen));
PK11_DigestFinal(SHA256pw, sha256sum, &SHA256out, curlx_uztoui(sha256len));
PK11_DestroyContext(SHA256pw, PR_TRUE);
return CURLE_OK;
}
static bool Curl_nss_cert_status_request(void)
{
#ifdef SSL_ENABLE_OCSP_STAPLING
return TRUE;
#else
return FALSE;
#endif
}
static bool Curl_nss_false_start(void)
{
#if NSSVERNUM >= 0x030f04 /* 3.15.4 */
return TRUE;
#else
return FALSE;
#endif
}
static void *Curl_nss_get_internals(struct ssl_connect_data *connssl,
CURLINFO info UNUSED_PARAM)
{
(void)info;
return BACKEND->handle;
}
const struct Curl_ssl Curl_ssl_nss = {
{ CURLSSLBACKEND_NSS, "nss" }, /* info */
SSLSUPP_CA_PATH |
SSLSUPP_CERTINFO |
SSLSUPP_PINNEDPUBKEY |
SSLSUPP_HTTPS_PROXY,
sizeof(struct ssl_backend_data),
Curl_nss_init, /* init */
Curl_nss_cleanup, /* cleanup */
Curl_nss_version, /* version */
Curl_nss_check_cxn, /* check_cxn */
/* NSS has no shutdown function provided and thus always fail */
Curl_none_shutdown, /* shutdown */
Curl_none_data_pending, /* data_pending */
Curl_nss_random, /* random */
Curl_nss_cert_status_request, /* cert_status_request */
Curl_nss_connect, /* connect */
Curl_nss_connect_nonblocking, /* connect_nonblocking */
Curl_nss_get_internals, /* get_internals */
Curl_nss_close, /* close_one */
Curl_none_close_all, /* close_all */
/* NSS has its own session ID cache */
Curl_none_session_free, /* session_free */
Curl_none_set_engine, /* set_engine */
Curl_none_set_engine_default, /* set_engine_default */
Curl_none_engines_list, /* engines_list */
Curl_nss_false_start, /* false_start */
Curl_nss_md5sum, /* md5sum */
Curl_nss_sha256sum /* sha256sum */
};
#endif /* USE_NSS */