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117 lines
5.1 KiB
Markdown
117 lines
5.1 KiB
Markdown
curl security for developers
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============================
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This document is intended to provide guidance to curl developers on how
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security vulnerabilities should be handled.
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Publishing Information
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----------------------
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All known and public curl or libcurl related vulnerabilities are listed on
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[the curl web site security page](https://curl.haxx.se/docs/security.html).
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Security vulnerabilities should not be entered in the project's public bug
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tracker unless the necessary configuration is in place to limit access to the
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issue to only the reporter and the project's security team.
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Vulnerability Handling
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----------------------
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The typical process for handling a new security vulnerability is as follows.
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No information should be made public about a vulnerability until it is
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formally announced at the end of this process. That means, for example that a
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bug tracker entry must NOT be created to track the issue since that will make
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the issue public and it should not be discussed on any of the project's public
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mailing lists. Also messages associated with any commits should not make
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any reference to the security nature of the commit if done prior to the public
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announcement.
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- The person discovering the issue, the reporter, reports the vulnerability
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privately to `curl-security@haxx.se`. That's an email alias that reaches a
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handful of selected and trusted people.
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- Messages that do not relate to the reporting or managing of an undisclosed
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security vulnerability in curl or libcurl are ignored and no further action
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is required.
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- A person in the security team sends an e-mail to the original reporter to
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acknowledge the report.
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- The security team investigates the report and either rejects it or accepts
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it.
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- If the report is rejected, the team writes to the reporter to explain why.
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- If the report is accepted, the team writes to the reporter to let him/her
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know it is accepted and that they are working on a fix.
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- The security team discusses the problem, works out a fix, considers the
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impact of the problem and suggests a release schedule. This discussion
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should involve the reporter as much as possible.
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- The release of the information should be "as soon as possible" and is most
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often synced with an upcoming release that contains the fix. If the
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reporter, or anyone else, thinks the next planned release is too far away
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then a separate earlier release for security reasons should be considered.
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- Write a security advisory draft about the problem that explains what the
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problem is, its impact, which versions it affects, solutions or
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workarounds, when the release is out and make sure to credit all
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contributors properly.
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- Request a CVE number from
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[distros@openwall](http://oss-security.openwall.org/wiki/mailing-lists/distros)
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when also informing and preparing them for the upcoming public security
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vulnerability announcement - attach the advisory draft for information. Note
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that 'distros' won't accept an embargo longer than 19 days and they do not
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care for Windows-specific flaws. For windows-specific flaws, request CVE
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directly from MITRE.
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- Update the "security advisory" with the CVE number.
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- The security team commits the fix in a private branch. The commit message
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should ideally contain the CVE number. This fix is usually also distributed
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to the 'distros' mailing list to allow them to use the fix prior to the
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public announcement.
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- No more than 48 hours before the release, the private branch is merged into
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the master branch and pushed. Once pushed, the information is accessible to
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the public and the actual release should follow suit immediately afterwards.
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The time between the push and the release is used for final tests and
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reviews.
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- The project team creates a release that includes the fix.
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- The project team announces the release and the vulnerability to the world in
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the same manner we always announce releases. It gets sent to the
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curl-announce, curl-library and curl-users mailing lists.
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- The security web page on the web site should get the new vulnerability
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mentioned.
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Pre-notification
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----------------
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If you think you are or should be eligible for a pre-notification about
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upcoming security announcements for curl, we urge OS distros and similar
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vendors to primarily join the distros@openwall list as that is one of the
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purposes of that list - and not just for curl of course.
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If you are not a distro or otherwise not suitable for distros@openwall and yet
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want pre-notifications from us, contact the curl security team with a detailed
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and clear explanation why this is the case.
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curl-security (at haxx dot se)
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------------------------------
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Who is on this list? There are a couple of criteria you must meet, and then we
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might ask you to join the list or you can ask to join it. It really isn't very
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formal. We basically only require that you have a long-term presence in the
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curl project and you have shown an understanding for the project and its way
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of working. You must've been around for a good while and you should have no
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plans in vanishing in the near future.
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We do not make the list of participants public mostly because it tends to vary
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somewhat over time and a list somewhere will only risk getting outdated.
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