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curl/tests/python_dependencies/impacket/ntlm.py
cclauss aba1c51553
tests: make Impacket (SMB server) Python 3 compatible 
Closes #3731
Fixes #3289
2019-04-06 22:29:57 +02:00

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from __future__ import print_function
# Copyright (c) 2003-2016 CORE Security Technologies:
#
# This software is provided under under a slightly modified version
# of the Apache Software License. See the accompanying LICENSE file
# for more information.
#
import base64
import struct
import calendar
import time
import hashlib
import random
import string
import binascii
from impacket.structure import Structure
from impacket import LOG
# This is important. NTLMv2 is not negotiated by the client or server.
# It is used if set locally on both sides. Change this item if you don't want to use
# NTLMv2 by default and fall back to NTLMv1 (with EXTENDED_SESSION_SECURITY or not)
# Check the following links:
# http://davenport.sourceforge.net/ntlm.html
# http://blogs.msdn.com/b/openspecification/archive/2010/04/20/ntlm-keys-and-sundry-stuff.aspx
# http://social.msdn.microsoft.com/Forums/en-US/os_interopscenarios/thread/c8f488ed-1b96-4e06-bd65-390aa41138d1/
# So I'm setting a global variable to control this, this can also be set programmatically
USE_NTLMv2 = True # if false will fall back to NTLMv1 (or NTLMv1 with ESS a.k.a NTLM2)
def computeResponse(flags, serverChallenge, clientChallenge, serverName, domain, user, password, lmhash='', nthash='',
use_ntlmv2=USE_NTLMv2):
if use_ntlmv2:
return computeResponseNTLMv2(flags, serverChallenge, clientChallenge, serverName, domain, user, password,
lmhash, nthash, use_ntlmv2=use_ntlmv2)
else:
return computeResponseNTLMv1(flags, serverChallenge, clientChallenge, serverName, domain, user, password,
lmhash, nthash, use_ntlmv2=use_ntlmv2)
try:
POW = None
from Crypto.Cipher import ARC4
from Crypto.Cipher import DES
from Crypto.Hash import MD4
except Exception:
try:
import POW
except Exception:
LOG.critical("Warning: You don't have any crypto installed. You need PyCrypto")
LOG.critical("See http://www.pycrypto.org/")
NTLM_AUTH_NONE = 1
NTLM_AUTH_CONNECT = 2
NTLM_AUTH_CALL = 3
NTLM_AUTH_PKT = 4
NTLM_AUTH_PKT_INTEGRITY = 5
NTLM_AUTH_PKT_PRIVACY = 6
# If set, requests 56-bit encryption. If the client sends NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL or NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN
# with NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_56 to the server in the NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE, the server MUST return NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_56 to
# the client in the CHALLENGE_MESSAGE. Otherwise it is ignored. If both NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_56 and NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_128
# are requested and supported by the client and server, NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_56 and NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_128 will both be
# returned to the client. Clients and servers that set NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL SHOULD set NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_56 if it is
# supported. An alternate name for this field is NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_56.
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_56 = 0x80000000
# If set, requests an explicit key exchange. This capability SHOULD be used because it improves security for message
# integrity or confidentiality. See sections 3.2.5.1.2, 3.2.5.2.1, and 3.2.5.2.2 for details. An alternate name for
# this field is NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_EXCH.
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_EXCH = 0x40000000
# If set, requests 128-bit session key negotiation. An alternate name for this field is NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_128.
# If the client sends NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_128 to the server in the NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE, the server MUST return
# NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_128 to the client in the CHALLENGE_MESSAGE only if the client sets NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL or
# NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN. Otherwise it is ignored. If both NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_56 and NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_128 are
# requested and supported by the client and server, NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_56 and NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_128 will both be
# returned to the client. Clients and servers that set NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL SHOULD set NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_128 if it
# is supported. An alternate name for this field is NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_128
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_128 = 0x20000000
NTLMSSP_RESERVED_1 = 0x10000000
NTLMSSP_RESERVED_2 = 0x08000000
NTLMSSP_RESERVED_3 = 0x04000000
# If set, requests the protocol version number. The data corresponding to this flag is provided in the Version field
# of the NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE, the CHALLENGE_MESSAGE, and the AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE.<22> An alternate name for this field
# is NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_VERSION
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_VERSION = 0x02000000
NTLMSSP_RESERVED_4 = 0x01000000
# If set, indicates that the TargetInfo fields in the CHALLENGE_MESSAGE (section 2.2.1.2) are populated.
# An alternate name for this field is NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_TARGET_INFO.
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_TARGET_INFO = 0x00800000
# If set, requests the usage of the LMOWF (section 3.3). An alternate name for this field is
# NTLMSSP_REQUEST_NON_NT_SESSION_KEY.
NTLMSSP_REQUEST_NON_NT_SESSION_KEY = 0x00400000
NTLMSSP_RESERVED_5 = 0x00200000
# If set, requests an identify level token. An alternate name for this field is NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_IDENTIFY
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_IDENTIFY = 0x00100000
# If set, requests usage of the NTLM v2 session security. NTLM v2 session security is a misnomer because it is not
# NTLM v2. It is NTLM v1 using the extended session security that is also in NTLM v2. NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_LM_KEY and
# NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_EXTENDED_SESSIONSECURITY are mutually exclusive. If both NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_EXTENDED_SESSIONSECURITY
# and NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_LM_KEY are requested, NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_EXTENDED_SESSIONSECURITY alone MUST be returned to the
# client. NTLM v2 authentication session key generation MUST be supported by both the client and the DC in order to be
# used, and extended session security signing and sealing requires support from the client and the server in order to
# be used.<23> An alternate name for this field is NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_EXTENDED_SESSIONSECURITY
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_EXTENDED_SESSIONSECURITY = 0x00080000
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM2 = 0x00080000
NTLMSSP_TARGET_TYPE_SHARE = 0x00040000
# If set, TargetName MUST be a server name. The data corresponding to this flag is provided by the server in the
# TargetName field of the CHALLENGE_MESSAGE. If this bit is set, then NTLMSSP_TARGET_TYPE_DOMAIN MUST NOT be set.
# This flag MUST be ignored in the NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE and the AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE. An alternate name for this field
# is NTLMSSP_TARGET_TYPE_SERVER
NTLMSSP_TARGET_TYPE_SERVER = 0x00020000
# If set, TargetName MUST be a domain name. The data corresponding to this flag is provided by the server in the
# TargetName field of the CHALLENGE_MESSAGE. If set, then NTLMSSP_TARGET_TYPE_SERVER MUST NOT be set. This flag MUST
# be ignored in the NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE and the AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE. An alternate name for this field is
# NTLMSSP_TARGET_TYPE_DOMAIN.
NTLMSSP_TARGET_TYPE_DOMAIN = 0x00010000
# If set, requests the presence of a signature block on all messages. NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_ALWAYS_SIGN MUST be set in the
# NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE to the server and the CHALLENGE_MESSAGE to the client. NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_ALWAYS_SIGN is overridden
# by NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN and NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL, if they are supported. An alternate name for this field is
# NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_ALWAYS_SIGN.
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_ALWAYS_SIGN = 0x00008000 # forces the other end to sign packets
NTLMSSP_RESERVED_6 = 0x00004000
# This flag indicates whether the Workstation field is present. If this flag is not set, the Workstation field MUST be
# ignored. If this flag is set, the length field of the Workstation field specifies whether the workstation name is
# nonempty or not.<24> An alternate name for this field is NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_OEM_WORKSTATION_SUPPLIED.
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_OEM_WORKSTATION_SUPPLIED = 0x00002000
# If set, the domain name is provided (section 2.2.1.1).<25> An alternate name for this field is
# NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_OEM_DOMAIN_SUPPLIED
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_OEM_DOMAIN_SUPPLIED = 0x00001000
NTLMSSP_RESERVED_7 = 0x00000800
# If set, LM authentication is not allowed and only NT authentication is used.
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NT_ONLY = 0x00000400
# If set, requests usage of the NTLM v1 session security protocol. NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM MUST be set in the
# NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE to the server and the CHALLENGE_MESSAGE to the client. An alternate name for this field is
# NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM = 0x00000200
NTLMSSP_RESERVED_8 = 0x00000100
# If set, requests LAN Manager (LM) session key computation. NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_LM_KEY and
# NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_EXTENDED_SESSIONSECURITY are mutually exclusive. If both NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_LM_KEY and
# NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_EXTENDED_SESSIONSECURITY are requested, NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_EXTENDED_SESSIONSECURITY alone MUST be
# returned to the client. NTLM v2 authentication session key generation MUST be supported by both the client and the
# DC in order to be used, and extended session security signing and sealing requires support from the client and the
# server to be used. An alternate name for this field is NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_LM_KEY.
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_LM_KEY = 0x00000080
# If set, requests connectionless authentication. If NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_DATAGRAM is set, then NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_EXCH
# MUST always be set in the AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE to the server and the CHALLENGE_MESSAGE to the client. An alternate
# name for this field is NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_DATAGRAM.
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_DATAGRAM = 0x00000040
# If set, requests session key negotiation for message confidentiality. If the client sends NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL to
# the server in the NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE, the server MUST return NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL to the client in the
# CHALLENGE_MESSAGE. Clients and servers that set NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL SHOULD always set NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_56 and
# NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_128, if they are supported. An alternate name for this field is NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL.
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL = 0x00000020
# If set, requests session key negotiation for message signatures. If the client sends NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN to the
# server in the NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE, the server MUST return NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN to the client in the CHALLENGE_MESSAGE.
# An alternate name for this field is NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN.
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN = 0x00000010 # means packet is signed, if verifier is wrong it fails
NTLMSSP_RESERVED_9 = 0x00000008
# If set, a TargetName field of the CHALLENGE_MESSAGE (section 2.2.1.2) MUST be supplied. An alternate name for this
# field is NTLMSSP_REQUEST_TARGET.
NTLMSSP_REQUEST_TARGET = 0x00000004
# If set, requests OEM character set encoding. An alternate name for this field is NTLM_NEGOTIATE_OEM. See bit A for
# details.
NTLM_NEGOTIATE_OEM = 0x00000002
# If set, requests Unicode character set encoding. An alternate name for this field is NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_UNICODE.
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_UNICODE = 0x00000001
# AV_PAIR constants
NTLMSSP_AV_EOL = 0x00
NTLMSSP_AV_HOSTNAME = 0x01
NTLMSSP_AV_DOMAINNAME = 0x02
NTLMSSP_AV_DNS_HOSTNAME = 0x03
NTLMSSP_AV_DNS_DOMAINNAME = 0x04
NTLMSSP_AV_DNS_TREENAME = 0x05
NTLMSSP_AV_FLAGS = 0x06
NTLMSSP_AV_TIME = 0x07
NTLMSSP_AV_RESTRICTIONS = 0x08
NTLMSSP_AV_TARGET_NAME = 0x09
NTLMSSP_AV_CHANNEL_BINDINGS = 0x0a
class AV_PAIRS():
def __init__(self, data = None):
self.fields = {}
if data is not None:
self.fromString(data)
def __setitem__(self,key,value):
self.fields[key] = (len(value),value)
def __getitem__(self, key):
if key in self.fields:
return self.fields[key]
return None
def __delitem__(self, key):
del self.fields[key]
def __len__(self):
return len(self.getData())
def __str__(self):
return len(self.getData())
def fromString(self, data):
tInfo = data
fType = 0xff
while fType is not NTLMSSP_AV_EOL:
fType = struct.unpack('<H',tInfo[:struct.calcsize('<H')])[0]
tInfo = tInfo[struct.calcsize('<H'):]
length = struct.unpack('<H',tInfo[:struct.calcsize('<H')])[0]
tInfo = tInfo[struct.calcsize('<H'):]
content = tInfo[:length]
self.fields[fType]=(length,content)
tInfo = tInfo[length:]
def dump(self):
for i in self.fields.keys():
print("%s: {%r}" % (i,self[i]))
def getData(self):
if NTLMSSP_AV_EOL in self.fields:
del self.fields[NTLMSSP_AV_EOL]
ans = ''
for i in self.fields.keys():
ans+= struct.pack('<HH', i, self[i][0])
ans+= self[i][1]
# end with a NTLMSSP_AV_EOL
ans += struct.pack('<HH', NTLMSSP_AV_EOL, 0)
return ans
class NTLMAuthMixin:
def get_os_version(self):
if self['os_version'] == '':
return None
else:
mayor_v = struct.unpack('B',self['os_version'][0])[0]
minor_v = struct.unpack('B',self['os_version'][1])[0]
build_v = struct.unpack('H',self['os_version'][2:4])
return (mayor_v,minor_v,build_v)
class NTLMAuthNegotiate(Structure, NTLMAuthMixin):
structure = (
('','"NTLMSSP\x00'),
('message_type','<L=1'),
('flags','<L'),
('domain_len','<H-domain_name'),
('domain_max_len','<H-domain_name'),
('domain_offset','<L=0'),
('host_len','<H-host_name'),
('host_maxlen','<H-host_name'),
('host_offset','<L=0'),
('os_version',':'),
('host_name',':'),
('domain_name',':'))
def __init__(self):
Structure.__init__(self)
self['flags']= (
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_128 |
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_EXCH|
# NTLMSSP_LM_KEY |
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM |
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_UNICODE |
# NTLMSSP_ALWAYS_SIGN |
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN |
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL |
# NTLMSSP_TARGET |
0)
self['host_name']=''
self['domain_name']=''
self['os_version']=''
def getData(self):
if len(self.fields['host_name']) > 0:
self['flags'] |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_OEM_WORKSTATION_SUPPLIED
if len(self.fields['domain_name']) > 0:
self['flags'] |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_OEM_DOMAIN_SUPPLIED
if len(self.fields['os_version']) > 0:
self['flags'] |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_VERSION
if (self['flags'] & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_VERSION) == NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_VERSION:
version_len = 8
else:
version_len = 0
if (self['flags'] & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_OEM_WORKSTATION_SUPPLIED) == NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_OEM_WORKSTATION_SUPPLIED:
self['host_offset']=32 + version_len
if (self['flags'] & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_OEM_DOMAIN_SUPPLIED) == NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_OEM_DOMAIN_SUPPLIED:
self['domain_offset']=32+len(self['host_name']) + version_len
return Structure.getData(self)
def fromString(self,data):
Structure.fromString(self,data)
domain_offset = self['domain_offset']
domain_end = self['domain_len'] + domain_offset
self['domain_name'] = data[ domain_offset : domain_end ]
host_offset = self['host_offset']
host_end = self['host_len'] + host_offset
self['host_name'] = data[ host_offset : host_end ]
hasOsInfo = self['flags'] & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_VERSION
if len(data) >= 36 and hasOsInfo:
self['os_version'] = data[32:40]
else:
self['os_version'] = ''
class NTLMAuthChallenge(Structure):
structure = (
('','"NTLMSSP\x00'),
('message_type','<L=2'),
('domain_len','<H-domain_name'),
('domain_max_len','<H-domain_name'),
('domain_offset','<L=40'),
('flags','<L=0'),
('challenge','8s'),
('reserved','8s=""'),
('TargetInfoFields_len','<H-TargetInfoFields'),
('TargetInfoFields_max_len','<H-TargetInfoFields'),
('TargetInfoFields_offset','<L'),
('VersionLen','_-Version','self.checkVersion(self["flags"])'),
('Version',':'),
('domain_name',':'),
('TargetInfoFields',':'))
def checkVersion(self, flags):
if flags is not None:
if flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_VERSION == 0:
return 0
return 8
def getData(self):
if self['TargetInfoFields'] is not None and type(self['TargetInfoFields']) is not str:
raw_av_fields = self['TargetInfoFields'].getData()
self['TargetInfoFields'] = raw_av_fields
return Structure.getData(self)
def fromString(self,data):
Structure.fromString(self,data)
# Just in case there's more data after the TargetInfoFields
self['TargetInfoFields'] = self['TargetInfoFields'][:self['TargetInfoFields_len']]
# We gotta process the TargetInfoFields
#if self['TargetInfoFields_len'] > 0:
# av_pairs = AV_PAIRS(self['TargetInfoFields'][:self['TargetInfoFields_len']])
# self['TargetInfoFields'] = av_pairs
return self
class NTLMAuthChallengeResponse(Structure, NTLMAuthMixin):
structure = (
('','"NTLMSSP\x00'),
('message_type','<L=3'),
('lanman_len','<H-lanman'),
('lanman_max_len','<H-lanman'),
('lanman_offset','<L'),
('ntlm_len','<H-ntlm'),
('ntlm_max_len','<H-ntlm'),
('ntlm_offset','<L'),
('domain_len','<H-domain_name'),
('domain_max_len','<H-domain_name'),
('domain_offset','<L'),
('user_len','<H-user_name'),
('user_max_len','<H-user_name'),
('user_offset','<L'),
('host_len','<H-host_name'),
('host_max_len','<H-host_name'),
('host_offset','<L'),
('session_key_len','<H-session_key'),
('session_key_max_len','<H-session_key'),
('session_key_offset','<L'),
('flags','<L'),
('VersionLen','_-Version','self.checkVersion(self["flags"])'),
('Version',':=""'),
('MICLen','_-MIC','self.checkMIC(self["flags"])'),
('MIC',':=""'),
('domain_name',':'),
('user_name',':'),
('host_name',':'),
('lanman',':'),
('ntlm',':'),
('session_key',':'))
def __init__(self, username = '', password = '', challenge = '', lmhash = '', nthash = '', flags = 0):
Structure.__init__(self)
self['session_key']=''
self['user_name']=username.encode('utf-16le')
self['domain_name']='' #"CLON".encode('utf-16le')
self['host_name']='' #"BETS".encode('utf-16le')
self['flags'] = ( #authResp['flags']
# we think (beto & gera) that his flags force a memory conten leakage when a windows 2000 answers using uninitializaed verifiers
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_128 |
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_EXCH|
# NTLMSSP_LM_KEY |
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM |
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_UNICODE |
# NTLMSSP_ALWAYS_SIGN |
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN |
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL |
# NTLMSSP_TARGET |
0)
# Here we do the stuff
if username and ( lmhash != '' or nthash != ''):
self['lanman'] = get_ntlmv1_response(lmhash, challenge)
self['ntlm'] = get_ntlmv1_response(nthash, challenge)
elif (username and password):
lmhash = compute_lmhash(password)
nthash = compute_nthash(password)
self['lanman']=get_ntlmv1_response(lmhash, challenge)
self['ntlm']=get_ntlmv1_response(nthash, challenge) # This is not used for LM_KEY nor NTLM_KEY
else:
self['lanman'] = ''
self['ntlm'] = ''
if not self['host_name']:
self['host_name'] = 'NULL'.encode('utf-16le') # for NULL session there must be a hostname
def checkVersion(self, flags):
if flags is not None:
if flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_VERSION == 0:
return 0
return 8
def checkMIC(self, flags):
# TODO: Find a proper way to check the MIC is in there
if flags is not None:
if flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_VERSION == 0:
return 0
return 16
def getData(self):
self['domain_offset']=64+self.checkMIC(self["flags"])+self.checkVersion(self["flags"])
self['user_offset']=64+self.checkMIC(self["flags"])+self.checkVersion(self["flags"])+len(self['domain_name'])
self['host_offset']=self['user_offset']+len(self['user_name'])
self['lanman_offset']=self['host_offset']+len(self['host_name'])
self['ntlm_offset']=self['lanman_offset']+len(self['lanman'])
self['session_key_offset']=self['ntlm_offset']+len(self['ntlm'])
return Structure.getData(self)
def fromString(self,data):
Structure.fromString(self,data)
# [MS-NLMP] page 27
# Payload data can be present in any order within the Payload field,
# with variable-length padding before or after the data
domain_offset = self['domain_offset']
domain_end = self['domain_len'] + domain_offset
self['domain_name'] = data[ domain_offset : domain_end ]
host_offset = self['host_offset']
host_end = self['host_len'] + host_offset
self['host_name'] = data[ host_offset: host_end ]
user_offset = self['user_offset']
user_end = self['user_len'] + user_offset
self['user_name'] = data[ user_offset: user_end ]
ntlm_offset = self['ntlm_offset']
ntlm_end = self['ntlm_len'] + ntlm_offset
self['ntlm'] = data[ ntlm_offset : ntlm_end ]
lanman_offset = self['lanman_offset']
lanman_end = self['lanman_len'] + lanman_offset
self['lanman'] = data[ lanman_offset : lanman_end]
#if len(data) >= 36:
# self['os_version'] = data[32:36]
#else:
# self['os_version'] = ''
class ImpacketStructure(Structure):
def set_parent(self, other):
self.parent = other
def get_packet(self):
return str(self)
def get_size(self):
return len(self)
class ExtendedOrNotMessageSignature(Structure):
def __init__(self, flags = 0, **kargs):
if flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_EXTENDED_SESSIONSECURITY:
self.structure = self.extendedMessageSignature
else:
self.structure = self.MessageSignature
return Structure.__init__(self, **kargs)
class NTLMMessageSignature(ExtendedOrNotMessageSignature):
extendedMessageSignature = (
('Version','<L=1'),
('Checksum','<q'),
('SeqNum','<i'),
)
MessageSignature = (
('Version','<L=1'),
('RandomPad','<i=0'),
('Checksum','<i'),
('SeqNum','<i'),
)
KNOWN_DES_INPUT = "KGS!@#$%"
def __expand_DES_key( key):
# Expand the key from a 7-byte password key into a 8-byte DES key
key = key[:7]
key += '\x00'*(7-len(key))
s = chr(((ord(key[0]) >> 1) & 0x7f) << 1)
s = s + chr(((ord(key[0]) & 0x01) << 6 | ((ord(key[1]) >> 2) & 0x3f)) << 1)
s = s + chr(((ord(key[1]) & 0x03) << 5 | ((ord(key[2]) >> 3) & 0x1f)) << 1)
s = s + chr(((ord(key[2]) & 0x07) << 4 | ((ord(key[3]) >> 4) & 0x0f)) << 1)
s = s + chr(((ord(key[3]) & 0x0f) << 3 | ((ord(key[4]) >> 5) & 0x07)) << 1)
s = s + chr(((ord(key[4]) & 0x1f) << 2 | ((ord(key[5]) >> 6) & 0x03)) << 1)
s = s + chr(((ord(key[5]) & 0x3f) << 1 | ((ord(key[6]) >> 7) & 0x01)) << 1)
s = s + chr((ord(key[6]) & 0x7f) << 1)
return s
def __DES_block(key, msg):
if POW:
cipher = POW.Symmetric(POW.DES_ECB)
cipher.encryptInit(__expand_DES_key(key))
return cipher.update(msg)
else:
cipher = DES.new(__expand_DES_key(key),DES.MODE_ECB)
return cipher.encrypt(msg)
def ntlmssp_DES_encrypt(key, challenge):
answer = __DES_block(key[:7], challenge)
answer += __DES_block(key[7:14], challenge)
answer += __DES_block(key[14:], challenge)
return answer
# High level functions to use NTLMSSP
def getNTLMSSPType1(workstation='', domain='', signingRequired = False, use_ntlmv2 = USE_NTLMv2):
# Let's do some encoding checks before moving on. Kind of dirty, but found effective when dealing with
# international characters.
import sys
encoding = sys.getfilesystemencoding()
if encoding is not None:
try:
workstation.encode('utf-16le')
except:
workstation = workstation.decode(encoding)
try:
domain.encode('utf-16le')
except:
domain = domain.decode(encoding)
# Let's prepare a Type 1 NTLMSSP Message
auth = NTLMAuthNegotiate()
auth['flags']=0
if signingRequired:
auth['flags'] = NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_EXCH | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_ALWAYS_SIGN | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL
if use_ntlmv2:
auth['flags'] |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_TARGET_INFO
auth['flags'] |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_EXTENDED_SESSIONSECURITY | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_UNICODE | NTLMSSP_REQUEST_TARGET | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_128 | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_56
auth['domain_name'] = domain.encode('utf-16le')
return auth
def getNTLMSSPType3(type1, type2, user, password, domain, lmhash = '', nthash = '', use_ntlmv2 = USE_NTLMv2):
# Let's do some encoding checks before moving on. Kind of dirty, but found effective when dealing with
# international characters.
import sys
encoding = sys.getfilesystemencoding()
if encoding is not None:
try:
user.encode('utf-16le')
except:
user = user.decode(encoding)
try:
password.encode('utf-16le')
except:
password = password.decode(encoding)
try:
domain.encode('utf-16le')
except:
domain = user.decode(encoding)
ntlmChallenge = NTLMAuthChallenge(type2)
# Let's start with the original flags sent in the type1 message
responseFlags = type1['flags']
# Token received and parsed. Depending on the authentication
# method we will create a valid ChallengeResponse
ntlmChallengeResponse = NTLMAuthChallengeResponse(user, password, ntlmChallenge['challenge'])
clientChallenge = "".join([random.choice(string.digits+string.letters) for i in range(8)])
serverName = ntlmChallenge['TargetInfoFields']
ntResponse, lmResponse, sessionBaseKey = computeResponse(ntlmChallenge['flags'], ntlmChallenge['challenge'], clientChallenge, serverName, domain, user, password, lmhash, nthash, use_ntlmv2 )
# Let's check the return flags
if (ntlmChallenge['flags'] & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_EXTENDED_SESSIONSECURITY) == 0:
# No extended session security, taking it out
responseFlags &= 0xffffffff ^ NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_EXTENDED_SESSIONSECURITY
if (ntlmChallenge['flags'] & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_128 ) == 0:
# No support for 128 key len, taking it out
responseFlags &= 0xffffffff ^ NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_128
if (ntlmChallenge['flags'] & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_EXCH) == 0:
# No key exchange supported, taking it out
responseFlags &= 0xffffffff ^ NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_EXCH
if (ntlmChallenge['flags'] & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL) == 0:
# No sign available, taking it out
responseFlags &= 0xffffffff ^ NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL
if (ntlmChallenge['flags'] & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN) == 0:
# No sign available, taking it out
responseFlags &= 0xffffffff ^ NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN
if (ntlmChallenge['flags'] & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_ALWAYS_SIGN) == 0:
# No sign available, taking it out
responseFlags &= 0xffffffff ^ NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_ALWAYS_SIGN
keyExchangeKey = KXKEY(ntlmChallenge['flags'],sessionBaseKey, lmResponse, ntlmChallenge['challenge'], password, lmhash, nthash,use_ntlmv2)
# Special case for anonymous login
if user == '' and password == '' and lmhash == '' and nthash == '':
keyExchangeKey = '\x00'*16
# If we set up key exchange, let's fill the right variables
if ntlmChallenge['flags'] & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_EXCH:
# not exactly what I call random tho :\
# exportedSessionKey = this is the key we should use to sign
exportedSessionKey = "".join([random.choice(string.digits+string.letters) for i in range(16)])
#exportedSessionKey = "A"*16
#print "keyExchangeKey %r" % keyExchangeKey
# Let's generate the right session key based on the challenge flags
#if responseFlags & NTLMSSP_NTLM2_KEY:
# Extended session security enabled
# if responseFlags & NTLMSSP_KEY_128:
# Full key
# exportedSessionKey = exportedSessionKey
# elif responseFlags & NTLMSSP_KEY_56:
# Only 56-bit key
# exportedSessionKey = exportedSessionKey[:7]
# else:
# exportedSessionKey = exportedSessionKey[:5]
#elif responseFlags & NTLMSSP_KEY_56:
# No extended session security, just 56 bits key
# exportedSessionKey = exportedSessionKey[:7] + '\xa0'
#else:
# exportedSessionKey = exportedSessionKey[:5] + '\xe5\x38\xb0'
encryptedRandomSessionKey = generateEncryptedSessionKey(keyExchangeKey, exportedSessionKey)
else:
encryptedRandomSessionKey = None
# [MS-NLMP] page 46
exportedSessionKey = keyExchangeKey
ntlmChallengeResponse['flags'] = responseFlags
ntlmChallengeResponse['domain_name'] = domain.encode('utf-16le')
ntlmChallengeResponse['lanman'] = lmResponse
ntlmChallengeResponse['ntlm'] = ntResponse
if encryptedRandomSessionKey is not None:
ntlmChallengeResponse['session_key'] = encryptedRandomSessionKey
return ntlmChallengeResponse, exportedSessionKey
# NTLMv1 Algorithm
def generateSessionKeyV1(password, lmhash, nthash):
if POW:
hash = POW.Digest(POW.MD4_DIGEST)
else:
hash = MD4.new()
hash.update(NTOWFv1(password, lmhash, nthash))
return hash.digest()
def computeResponseNTLMv1(flags, serverChallenge, clientChallenge, serverName, domain, user, password, lmhash='', nthash='', use_ntlmv2 = USE_NTLMv2):
if (user == '' and password == ''):
# Special case for anonymous authentication
lmResponse = ''
ntResponse = ''
else:
lmhash = LMOWFv1(password, lmhash, nthash)
nthash = NTOWFv1(password, lmhash, nthash)
if flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_LM_KEY:
ntResponse = ''
lmResponse = get_ntlmv1_response(lmhash, serverChallenge)
elif flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_EXTENDED_SESSIONSECURITY:
md5 = hashlib.new('md5')
chall = (serverChallenge + clientChallenge)
md5.update(chall)
ntResponse = ntlmssp_DES_encrypt(nthash, md5.digest()[:8])
lmResponse = clientChallenge + '\x00'*16
else:
ntResponse = get_ntlmv1_response(nthash,serverChallenge)
lmResponse = get_ntlmv1_response(lmhash, serverChallenge)
sessionBaseKey = generateSessionKeyV1(password, lmhash, nthash)
return ntResponse, lmResponse, sessionBaseKey
def compute_lmhash(password):
# This is done according to Samba's encryption specification (docs/html/ENCRYPTION.html)
password = password.upper()
lmhash = __DES_block(password[:7], KNOWN_DES_INPUT)
lmhash += __DES_block(password[7:14], KNOWN_DES_INPUT)
return lmhash
def NTOWFv1(password, lmhash = '', nthash=''):
if nthash != '':
return nthash
return compute_nthash(password)
def LMOWFv1(password, lmhash = '', nthash=''):
if lmhash != '':
return lmhash
return compute_lmhash(password)
def compute_nthash(password):
# This is done according to Samba's encryption specification (docs/html/ENCRYPTION.html)
try:
password = unicode(password).encode('utf_16le')
except NameError: # unicode() was removed in Python 3
password = str(password).encode('utf_16le')
except UnicodeDecodeError:
import sys
password = password.decode(sys.getfilesystemencoding()).encode('utf_16le')
if POW:
hash = POW.Digest(POW.MD4_DIGEST)
else:
hash = MD4.new()
hash.update(password)
return hash.digest()
def get_ntlmv1_response(key, challenge):
return ntlmssp_DES_encrypt(key, challenge)
# NTLMv2 Algorithm - as described in MS-NLMP Section 3.3.2
# Crypto Stuff
def MAC(flags, handle, signingKey, seqNum, message):
# [MS-NLMP] Section 3.4.4
# Returns the right messageSignature depending on the flags
messageSignature = NTLMMessageSignature(flags)
if flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_EXTENDED_SESSIONSECURITY:
if flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_EXCH:
messageSignature['Version'] = 1
messageSignature['Checksum'] = struct.unpack('<q',handle(hmac_md5(signingKey, struct.pack('<i',seqNum)+message)[:8]))[0]
messageSignature['SeqNum'] = seqNum
seqNum += 1
else:
messageSignature['Version'] = 1
messageSignature['Checksum'] = struct.unpack('<q',hmac_md5(signingKey, struct.pack('<i',seqNum)+message)[:8])[0]
messageSignature['SeqNum'] = seqNum
seqNum += 1
else:
messageSignature['Version'] = 1
messageSignature['Checksum'] = struct.pack('<i',binascii.crc32(message))
messageSignature['RandomPad'] = 0
messageSignature['RandomPad'] = handle(struct.pack('<i',messageSignature['RandomPad']))
messageSignature['Checksum'] = struct.unpack('<i',handle(messageSignature['Checksum']))[0]
messageSignature['SeqNum'] = handle('\x00\x00\x00\x00')
messageSignature['SeqNum'] = struct.unpack('<i',messageSignature['SeqNum'])[0] ^ seqNum
messageSignature['RandomPad'] = 0
return messageSignature
def SEAL(flags, signingKey, sealingKey, messageToSign, messageToEncrypt, seqNum, handle):
sealedMessage = handle(messageToEncrypt)
signature = MAC(flags, handle, signingKey, seqNum, messageToSign)
return sealedMessage, signature
def SIGN(flags, signingKey, message, seqNum, handle):
return MAC(flags, handle, signingKey, seqNum, message)
def SIGNKEY(flags, randomSessionKey, mode = 'Client'):
if flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_EXTENDED_SESSIONSECURITY:
if mode == 'Client':
md5 = hashlib.new('md5')
md5.update(randomSessionKey + "session key to client-to-server signing key magic constant\x00")
signKey = md5.digest()
else:
md5 = hashlib.new('md5')
md5.update(randomSessionKey + "session key to server-to-client signing key magic constant\x00")
signKey = md5.digest()
else:
signKey = None
return signKey
def SEALKEY(flags, randomSessionKey, mode = 'Client'):
if flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_EXTENDED_SESSIONSECURITY:
if flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_128:
sealKey = randomSessionKey
elif flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_56:
sealKey = randomSessionKey[:7]
else:
sealKey = randomSessionKey[:5]
if mode == 'Client':
md5 = hashlib.new('md5')
md5.update(sealKey + 'session key to client-to-server sealing key magic constant\x00')
sealKey = md5.digest()
else:
md5 = hashlib.new('md5')
md5.update(sealKey + 'session key to server-to-client sealing key magic constant\x00')
sealKey = md5.digest()
elif flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_56:
sealKey = randomSessionKey[:7] + '\xa0'
else:
sealKey = randomSessionKey[:5] + '\xe5\x38\xb0'
return sealKey
def generateEncryptedSessionKey(keyExchangeKey, exportedSessionKey):
if POW:
cipher = POW.Symmetric(POW.RC4)
cipher.encryptInit(keyExchangeKey)
cipher_encrypt = cipher.update
else:
cipher = ARC4.new(keyExchangeKey)
cipher_encrypt = cipher.encrypt
sessionKey = cipher_encrypt(exportedSessionKey)
return sessionKey
def KXKEY(flags, sessionBaseKey, lmChallengeResponse, serverChallenge, password, lmhash, nthash, use_ntlmv2 = USE_NTLMv2):
if use_ntlmv2:
return sessionBaseKey
if flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_EXTENDED_SESSIONSECURITY:
if flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM:
keyExchangeKey = hmac_md5(sessionBaseKey, serverChallenge + lmChallengeResponse[:8])
else:
keyExchangeKey = sessionBaseKey
elif flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM:
if flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_LM_KEY:
keyExchangeKey = __DES_block(LMOWFv1(password,lmhash)[:7], lmChallengeResponse[:8]) + __DES_block(LMOWFv1(password,lmhash)[7] + '\xBD\xBD\xBD\xBD\xBD\xBD', lmChallengeResponse[:8])
elif flags & NTLMSSP_REQUEST_NON_NT_SESSION_KEY:
keyExchangeKey = LMOWFv1(password,lmhash)[:8] + '\x00'*8
else:
keyExchangeKey = sessionBaseKey
else:
raise "Can't create a valid KXKEY!"
return keyExchangeKey
def hmac_md5(key, data):
if POW:
h = POW.Hmac(POW.MD5_DIGEST, key)
h.update(data)
result = h.mac()
else:
import hmac
h = hmac.new(key)
h.update(data)
result = h.digest()
return result
def NTOWFv2( user, password, domain, hash = ''):
if hash != '':
theHash = hash
else:
theHash = compute_nthash(password)
return hmac_md5(theHash, user.upper().encode('utf-16le') + domain.encode('utf-16le'))
def LMOWFv2( user, password, domain, lmhash = ''):
return NTOWFv2( user, password, domain, lmhash)
def computeResponseNTLMv2(flags, serverChallenge, clientChallenge, serverName, domain, user, password, lmhash = '', nthash = '', use_ntlmv2 = USE_NTLMv2):
responseServerVersion = '\x01'
hiResponseServerVersion = '\x01'
responseKeyNT = NTOWFv2(user, password, domain, nthash)
responseKeyLM = LMOWFv2(user, password, domain, lmhash)
# If you're running test-ntlm, comment the following lines and uncoment the ones that are commented. Don't forget to turn it back after the tests!
######################
av_pairs = AV_PAIRS(serverName)
# In order to support SPN target name validation, we have to add this to the serverName av_pairs. Otherwise we will get access denied
# This is set at Local Security Policy -> Local Policies -> Security Options -> Server SPN target name validation level
av_pairs[NTLMSSP_AV_TARGET_NAME] = 'cifs/'.encode('utf-16le') + av_pairs[NTLMSSP_AV_HOSTNAME][1]
if av_pairs[NTLMSSP_AV_TIME] is not None:
aTime = av_pairs[NTLMSSP_AV_TIME][1]
else:
aTime = struct.pack('<q', (116444736000000000 + calendar.timegm(time.gmtime()) * 10000000) )
#aTime = '\x00'*8
av_pairs[NTLMSSP_AV_TIME] = aTime
serverName = av_pairs.getData()
######################
#aTime = '\x00'*8
######################
temp = responseServerVersion + hiResponseServerVersion + '\x00' * 6 + aTime + clientChallenge + '\x00' * 4 + serverName + '\x00' * 4
ntProofStr = hmac_md5(responseKeyNT, serverChallenge + temp)
ntChallengeResponse = ntProofStr + temp
lmChallengeResponse = hmac_md5(responseKeyNT, serverChallenge + clientChallenge) + clientChallenge
sessionBaseKey = hmac_md5(responseKeyNT, ntProofStr)
if (user == '' and password == ''):
# Special case for anonymous authentication
ntChallengeResponse = ''
lmChallengeResponse = ''
return ntChallengeResponse, lmChallengeResponse, sessionBaseKey
class NTLM_HTTP(object):
'''Parent class for NTLM HTTP classes.'''
MSG_TYPE = None
@classmethod
def get_instace(cls,msg_64):
msg = None
msg_type = 0
if msg_64 != '':
msg = base64.b64decode(msg_64[5:]) # Remove the 'NTLM '
msg_type = ord(msg[8])
for _cls in NTLM_HTTP.__subclasses__():
if msg_type == _cls.MSG_TYPE:
instance = _cls()
instance.fromString(msg)
return instance
class NTLM_HTTP_AuthRequired(NTLM_HTTP):
commonHdr = ()
# Message 0 means the first HTTP request e.g. 'GET /bla.png'
MSG_TYPE = 0
def fromString(self,data):
pass
class NTLM_HTTP_AuthNegotiate(NTLM_HTTP, NTLMAuthNegotiate):
commonHdr = ()
MSG_TYPE = 1
def __init__(self):
NTLMAuthNegotiate.__init__(self)
class NTLM_HTTP_AuthChallengeResponse(NTLM_HTTP, NTLMAuthChallengeResponse):
commonHdr = ()
MSG_TYPE = 3
def __init__(self):
NTLMAuthChallengeResponse.__init__(self)
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