infof: consistent capitalization of warning messages

Ensure that all infof calls with a warning message are capitalized
in the same way.  At some point we should probably set up a style-
guide for infof but until then let's aim for a little consistenncy
where we can.

Closes: #8711
Reviewed-by: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
This commit is contained in:
Daniel Gustafsson 2022-04-14 21:13:29 +02:00
parent af2dac8298
commit 34bbf96475
4 changed files with 10 additions and 10 deletions

View File

@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ OM_uint32 Curl_gss_init_sec_context(
#ifdef GSS_C_DELEG_POLICY_FLAG
req_flags |= GSS_C_DELEG_POLICY_FLAG;
#else
infof(data, "warning: support for CURLGSSAPI_DELEGATION_POLICY_FLAG not "
infof(data, "WARNING: support for CURLGSSAPI_DELEGATION_POLICY_FLAG not "
"compiled in");
#endif
}

View File

@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ static CURLcode randit(struct Curl_easy *data, unsigned int *rnd)
if(!seeded) {
struct curltime now = Curl_now();
infof(data, "WARNING: Using weak random seed");
infof(data, "WARNING: using weak random seed");
randseed += (unsigned int)now.tv_usec + (unsigned int)now.tv_sec;
randseed = randseed * 1103515245 + 12345;
randseed = randseed * 1103515245 + 12345;

View File

@ -592,7 +592,7 @@ static CURLcode ssh_knownhost(struct Curl_easy *data)
LIBSSH2_KNOWNHOST_KEYENC_RAW|
keybit, NULL);
if(addrc)
infof(data, "Warning adding the known host %s failed!",
infof(data, "WARNING: adding the known host %s failed!",
conn->host.name);
else if(rc == CURLKHSTAT_FINE_ADD_TO_FILE ||
rc == CURLKHSTAT_FINE_REPLACE) {
@ -603,7 +603,7 @@ static CURLcode ssh_knownhost(struct Curl_easy *data)
data->set.str[STRING_SSH_KNOWNHOSTS],
LIBSSH2_KNOWNHOST_FILE_OPENSSH);
if(wrc) {
infof(data, "Warning, writing %s failed!",
infof(data, "WARNING: writing %s failed!",
data->set.str[STRING_SSH_KNOWNHOSTS]);
}
}

View File

@ -434,7 +434,7 @@ static char *dup_nickname(struct Curl_easy *data, const char *str)
/* search the first slash; we require at least one slash in a file name */
n = strchr(str, '/');
if(!n) {
infof(data, "warning: certificate file name \"%s\" handled as nickname; "
infof(data, "WARNING: certificate file name \"%s\" handled as nickname; "
"please use \"./%s\" to force file name", str, str);
return strdup(str);
}
@ -1748,7 +1748,7 @@ static CURLcode nss_load_ca_certificates(struct Curl_easy *data,
PR_CloseDir(dir);
}
else
infof(data, "warning: CURLOPT_CAPATH not a directory (%s)", capath);
infof(data, "WARNING: CURLOPT_CAPATH not a directory (%s)", capath);
}
return CURLE_OK;
@ -1985,11 +1985,11 @@ static CURLcode nss_setup_connect(struct Curl_easy *data,
/* unless the user explicitly asks to allow the protocol vulnerability, we
use the work-around */
if(SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV, ssl_cbc_random_iv) != SECSuccess)
infof(data, "warning: failed to set SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV = %d",
infof(data, "WARNING: failed to set SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV = %d",
ssl_cbc_random_iv);
#else
if(ssl_cbc_random_iv)
infof(data, "warning: support for SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV not compiled in");
infof(data, "WARNING: support for SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV not compiled in");
#endif
if(SSL_CONN_CONFIG(cipher_list)) {
@ -2000,7 +2000,7 @@ static CURLcode nss_setup_connect(struct Curl_easy *data,
}
if(!SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifypeer) && SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifyhost))
infof(data, "warning: ignoring value of ssl.verifyhost");
infof(data, "WARNING: ignoring value of ssl.verifyhost");
/* bypass the default SSL_AuthCertificate() hook in case we do not want to
* verify peer */
@ -2020,7 +2020,7 @@ static CURLcode nss_setup_connect(struct Curl_easy *data,
const CURLcode rv = nss_load_ca_certificates(data, conn, sockindex);
if((rv == CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE) && !SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifypeer))
/* not a fatal error because we are not going to verify the peer */
infof(data, "warning: CA certificates failed to load");
infof(data, "WARNING: CA certificates failed to load");
else if(rv) {
result = rv;
goto error;