curl/lib/socks.c

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2006-09-24 03:09:39 +08:00
/***************************************************************************
* _ _ ____ _
* Project ___| | | | _ \| |
* / __| | | | |_) | |
* | (__| |_| | _ <| |___
* \___|\___/|_| \_\_____|
*
* Copyright (C) 1998 - 2022, Daniel Stenberg, <daniel@haxx.se>, et al.
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*
* This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which
* you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms
2020-11-04 21:02:01 +08:00
* are also available at https://curl.se/docs/copyright.html.
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*
* You may opt to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute and/or sell
* copies of the Software, and permit persons to whom the Software is
* furnished to do so, under the terms of the COPYING file.
*
* This software is distributed on an "AS IS" basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY
* KIND, either express or implied.
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: curl
*
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***************************************************************************/
build: fix circular header inclusion with other packages This commit renames lib/setup.h to lib/curl_setup.h and renames lib/setup_once.h to lib/curl_setup_once.h. Removes the need and usage of a header inclusion guard foreign to libcurl. [1] Removes the need and presence of an alarming notice we carried in old setup_once.h [2] ---------------------------------------- 1 - lib/setup_once.h used __SETUP_ONCE_H macro as header inclusion guard up to commit ec691ca3 which changed this to HEADER_CURL_SETUP_ONCE_H, this single inclusion guard is enough to ensure that inclusion of lib/setup_once.h done from lib/setup.h is only done once. Additionally lib/setup.h has always used __SETUP_ONCE_H macro to protect inclusion of setup_once.h even after commit ec691ca3, this was to avoid a circular header inclusion triggered when building a c-ares enabled version with c-ares sources available which also has a setup_once.h header. Commit ec691ca3 exposes the real nature of __SETUP_ONCE_H usage in lib/setup.h, it is a header inclusion guard foreign to libcurl belonging to c-ares's setup_once.h The renaming this commit does, fixes the circular header inclusion, and as such removes the need and usage of a header inclusion guard foreign to libcurl. Macro __SETUP_ONCE_H no longer used in libcurl. 2 - Due to the circular interdependency of old lib/setup_once.h and the c-ares setup_once.h header, old file lib/setup_once.h has carried back from 2006 up to now days an alarming and prominent notice about the need of keeping libcurl's and c-ares's setup_once.h in sync. Given that this commit fixes the circular interdependency, the need and presence of mentioned notice is removed. All mentioned interdependencies come back from now old days when the c-ares project lived inside a curl subdirectory. This commit removes last traces of such fact.
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#include "curl_setup.h"
#if !defined(CURL_DISABLE_PROXY)
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#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H
#include <netinet/in.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_ARPA_INET_H
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#endif
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#include "urldata.h"
#include "sendf.h"
#include "select.h"
#include "cfilters.h"
#include "connect.h"
#include "timeval.h"
#include "socks.h"
#include "multiif.h" /* for getsock macros */
#include "inet_pton.h"
#include "url.h"
/* The last 3 #include files should be in this order */
#include "curl_printf.h"
#include "curl_memory.h"
#include "memdebug.h"
/* for the (SOCKS) connect state machine */
enum connect_t {
CONNECT_INIT,
CONNECT_SOCKS_INIT, /* 1 */
CONNECT_SOCKS_SEND, /* 2 waiting to send more first data */
CONNECT_SOCKS_READ_INIT, /* 3 set up read */
CONNECT_SOCKS_READ, /* 4 read server response */
CONNECT_GSSAPI_INIT, /* 5 */
CONNECT_AUTH_INIT, /* 6 setup outgoing auth buffer */
CONNECT_AUTH_SEND, /* 7 send auth */
CONNECT_AUTH_READ, /* 8 read auth response */
CONNECT_REQ_INIT, /* 9 init SOCKS "request" */
CONNECT_RESOLVING, /* 10 */
CONNECT_RESOLVED, /* 11 */
CONNECT_RESOLVE_REMOTE, /* 12 */
CONNECT_REQ_SEND, /* 13 */
CONNECT_REQ_SENDING, /* 14 */
CONNECT_REQ_READ, /* 15 */
CONNECT_REQ_READ_MORE, /* 16 */
CONNECT_DONE /* 17 connected fine to the remote or the SOCKS proxy */
};
struct socks_state {
enum connect_t state;
ssize_t outstanding; /* send this many bytes more */
unsigned char *outp; /* send from this pointer */
const char *hostname;
int remote_port;
const char *proxy_user;
const char *proxy_password;
};
#if defined(HAVE_GSSAPI) || defined(USE_WINDOWS_SSPI)
/*
* Helper read-from-socket functions. Does the same as Curl_read() but it
* blocks until all bytes amount of buffersize will be read. No more, no less.
*
* This is STUPID BLOCKING behavior. Only used by the SOCKS GSSAPI functions.
*/
int Curl_blockread_all(struct Curl_easy *data, /* transfer */
curl_socket_t sockfd, /* read from this socket */
char *buf, /* store read data here */
ssize_t buffersize, /* max amount to read */
ssize_t *n) /* amount bytes read */
{
ssize_t nread = 0;
ssize_t allread = 0;
int result;
*n = 0;
for(;;) {
timediff_t timeout_ms = Curl_timeleft(data, NULL, TRUE);
if(timeout_ms < 0) {
/* we already got the timeout */
result = CURLE_OPERATION_TIMEDOUT;
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break;
}
if(!timeout_ms)
timeout_ms = TIMEDIFF_T_MAX;
if(SOCKET_READABLE(sockfd, timeout_ms) <= 0) {
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result = ~CURLE_OK;
break;
}
sendf: change Curl_read_plain to wrap Curl_recv_plain (take 2) Prior to this change Curl_read_plain would attempt to read the socket directly. On Windows that's a problem because recv data may be cached by libcurl and that data is only drained using Curl_recv_plain. Rather than rewrite Curl_read_plain to handle cached recv data, I changed it to wrap Curl_recv_plain, in much the same way that Curl_write_plain already wraps Curl_send_plain. Curl_read_plain -> Curl_recv_plain Curl_write_plain -> Curl_send_plain This fixes a bug in the schannel backend where decryption of arbitrary TLS records fails because cached recv data is never drained. We send data (TLS records formed by Schannel) using Curl_write_plain, which calls Curl_send_plain, and that may do a recv-before-send ("pre-receive") to cache received data. The code calls Curl_read_plain to read data (TLS records from the server), which prior to this change did not call Curl_recv_plain and therefore cached recv data wasn't retrieved, resulting in malformed TLS records and decryption failure (SEC_E_DECRYPT_FAILURE). The bug has only been observed during Schannel TLS 1.3 handshakes. Refer to the issue and PR for more information. -- This is take 2 of the original fix. It preserves the original behavior of Curl_read_plain to write 0 to the bytes read parameter on error, since apparently some callers expect that (SOCKS tests were hanging). The original fix which landed in 12e1def5 and was later reverted in 18383fbf failed to work properly because it did not do that. Also, it changes Curl_write_plain the same way to complement Curl_read_plain, and it changes Curl_send_plain to return -1 instead of 0 on CURLE_AGAIN to complement Curl_recv_plain. Behavior on error with these changes: Curl_recv_plain returns -1 and *code receives error code. Curl_send_plain returns -1 and *code receives error code. Curl_read_plain returns error code and *n (bytes read) receives 0. Curl_write_plain returns error code and *written receives 0. -- Ref: https://github.com/curl/curl/issues/9431#issuecomment-1312420361 Assisted-by: Joel Depooter Reported-by: Egor Pugin Fixes https://github.com/curl/curl/issues/9431 Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/9949
2022-11-14 16:30:30 +08:00
result = Curl_read_plain(data, sockfd, buf, buffersize, &nread);
if(CURLE_AGAIN == result)
continue;
if(result)
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break;
if(buffersize == nread) {
allread += nread;
*n = allread;
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result = CURLE_OK;
break;
}
if(!nread) {
result = ~CURLE_OK;
break;
}
buffersize -= nread;
buf += nread;
allread += nread;
}
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return result;
}
#endif
#if defined(DEBUGBUILD) && !defined(CURL_DISABLE_VERBOSE_STRINGS)
#define DEBUG_AND_VERBOSE
#define sxstate(x,d,y) socksstate(x,d,y, __LINE__)
#else
#define sxstate(x,d,y) socksstate(x,d,y)
#endif
/* always use this function to change state, to make debugging easier */
static void socksstate(struct socks_state *sx, struct Curl_easy *data,
enum connect_t state
#ifdef DEBUG_AND_VERBOSE
, int lineno
#endif
)
{
enum connect_t oldstate = sx->state;
#ifdef DEBUG_AND_VERBOSE
/* synced with the state list in urldata.h */
static const char * const statename[] = {
"INIT",
"SOCKS_INIT",
"SOCKS_SEND",
"SOCKS_READ_INIT",
"SOCKS_READ",
"GSSAPI_INIT",
"AUTH_INIT",
"AUTH_SEND",
"AUTH_READ",
"REQ_INIT",
"RESOLVING",
"RESOLVED",
"RESOLVE_REMOTE",
"REQ_SEND",
"REQ_SENDING",
"REQ_READ",
"REQ_READ_MORE",
"DONE"
};
#endif
(void)data;
if(oldstate == state)
/* don't bother when the new state is the same as the old state */
return;
sx->state = state;
#ifdef DEBUG_AND_VERBOSE
infof(data,
"SXSTATE: %s => %s; line %d",
statename[oldstate], statename[sx->state],
lineno);
#endif
}
/*
* This function logs in to a SOCKS4 proxy and sends the specifics to the final
* destination server.
*
* Reference :
* https://www.openssh.com/txt/socks4.protocol
*
* Note :
* Set protocol4a=true for "SOCKS 4A (Simple Extension to SOCKS 4 Protocol)"
* Nonsupport "Identification Protocol (RFC1413)"
*/
static CURLproxycode do_SOCKS4(struct Curl_cfilter *cf,
struct socks_state *sx,
struct Curl_easy *data)
{
struct connectdata *conn = cf->conn;
proxy: Support HTTPS proxy and SOCKS+HTTP(s) * HTTPS proxies: An HTTPS proxy receives all transactions over an SSL/TLS connection. Once a secure connection with the proxy is established, the user agent uses the proxy as usual, including sending CONNECT requests to instruct the proxy to establish a [usually secure] TCP tunnel with an origin server. HTTPS proxies protect nearly all aspects of user-proxy communications as opposed to HTTP proxies that receive all requests (including CONNECT requests) in vulnerable clear text. With HTTPS proxies, it is possible to have two concurrent _nested_ SSL/TLS sessions: the "outer" one between the user agent and the proxy and the "inner" one between the user agent and the origin server (through the proxy). This change adds supports for such nested sessions as well. A secure connection with a proxy requires its own set of the usual SSL options (their actual descriptions differ and need polishing, see TODO): --proxy-cacert FILE CA certificate to verify peer against --proxy-capath DIR CA directory to verify peer against --proxy-cert CERT[:PASSWD] Client certificate file and password --proxy-cert-type TYPE Certificate file type (DER/PEM/ENG) --proxy-ciphers LIST SSL ciphers to use --proxy-crlfile FILE Get a CRL list in PEM format from the file --proxy-insecure Allow connections to proxies with bad certs --proxy-key KEY Private key file name --proxy-key-type TYPE Private key file type (DER/PEM/ENG) --proxy-pass PASS Pass phrase for the private key --proxy-ssl-allow-beast Allow security flaw to improve interop --proxy-sslv2 Use SSLv2 --proxy-sslv3 Use SSLv3 --proxy-tlsv1 Use TLSv1 --proxy-tlsuser USER TLS username --proxy-tlspassword STRING TLS password --proxy-tlsauthtype STRING TLS authentication type (default SRP) All --proxy-foo options are independent from their --foo counterparts, except --proxy-crlfile which defaults to --crlfile and --proxy-capath which defaults to --capath. Curl now also supports %{proxy_ssl_verify_result} --write-out variable, similar to the existing %{ssl_verify_result} variable. Supported backends: OpenSSL, GnuTLS, and NSS. * A SOCKS proxy + HTTP/HTTPS proxy combination: If both --socks* and --proxy options are given, Curl first connects to the SOCKS proxy and then connects (through SOCKS) to the HTTP or HTTPS proxy. TODO: Update documentation for the new APIs and --proxy-* options. Look for "Added in 7.XXX" marks.
2016-11-17 01:49:15 +08:00
const bool protocol4a =
(conn->socks_proxy.proxytype == CURLPROXY_SOCKS4A) ? TRUE : FALSE;
unsigned char *socksreq = (unsigned char *)data->state.buffer;
CURLcode result;
curl_socket_t sockfd = conn->sock[cf->sockindex];
struct Curl_dns_entry *dns = NULL;
ssize_t actualread;
ssize_t written;
/* make sure that the buffer is at least 600 bytes */
DEBUGASSERT(READBUFFER_MIN >= 600);
switch(sx->state) {
case CONNECT_SOCKS_INIT:
/* SOCKS4 can only do IPv4, insist! */
conn->ip_version = CURL_IPRESOLVE_V4;
if(conn->bits.httpproxy)
infof(data, "SOCKS4%s: connecting to HTTP proxy %s port %d",
protocol4a ? "a" : "", sx->hostname, sx->remote_port);
infof(data, "SOCKS4 communication to %s:%d",
sx->hostname, sx->remote_port);
/*
* Compose socks4 request
*
* Request format
*
* +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+....+----+
* | VN | CD | DSTPORT | DSTIP | USERID |NULL|
* +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+....+----+
* # of bytes: 1 1 2 4 variable 1
*/
socksreq[0] = 4; /* version (SOCKS4) */
socksreq[1] = 1; /* connect */
socksreq[2] = (unsigned char)((sx->remote_port >> 8) & 0xff); /* MSB */
socksreq[3] = (unsigned char)(sx->remote_port & 0xff); /* LSB */
/* DNS resolve only for SOCKS4, not SOCKS4a */
if(!protocol4a) {
enum resolve_t rc =
Curl_resolv(data, sx->hostname, sx->remote_port, FALSE, &dns);
if(rc == CURLRESOLV_ERROR)
return CURLPX_RESOLVE_HOST;
else if(rc == CURLRESOLV_PENDING) {
sxstate(sx, data, CONNECT_RESOLVING);
infof(data, "SOCKS4 non-blocking resolve of %s", sx->hostname);
return CURLPX_OK;
}
sxstate(sx, data, CONNECT_RESOLVED);
goto CONNECT_RESOLVED;
}
/* socks4a doesn't resolve anything locally */
sxstate(sx, data, CONNECT_REQ_INIT);
goto CONNECT_REQ_INIT;
case CONNECT_RESOLVING:
/* check if we have the name resolved by now */
dns = Curl_fetch_addr(data, sx->hostname, (int)conn->port);
if(dns) {
#ifdef CURLRES_ASYNCH
data->state.async.dns = dns;
data->state.async.done = TRUE;
#endif
infof(data, "Hostname '%s' was found", sx->hostname);
sxstate(sx, data, CONNECT_RESOLVED);
}
else {
result = Curl_resolv_check(data, &dns);
if(!dns) {
if(result)
return CURLPX_RESOLVE_HOST;
return CURLPX_OK;
}
}
/* FALLTHROUGH */
CONNECT_RESOLVED:
case CONNECT_RESOLVED: {
struct Curl_addrinfo *hp = NULL;
/*
* We cannot use 'hostent' as a struct that Curl_resolv() returns. It
* returns a Curl_addrinfo pointer that may not always look the same.
*/
if(dns) {
hp = dns->addr;
/* scan for the first IPv4 address */
while(hp && (hp->ai_family != AF_INET))
hp = hp->ai_next;
if(hp) {
struct sockaddr_in *saddr_in;
char buf[64];
Curl_printable_address(hp, buf, sizeof(buf));
saddr_in = (struct sockaddr_in *)(void *)hp->ai_addr;
socksreq[4] = ((unsigned char *)&saddr_in->sin_addr.s_addr)[0];
socksreq[5] = ((unsigned char *)&saddr_in->sin_addr.s_addr)[1];
socksreq[6] = ((unsigned char *)&saddr_in->sin_addr.s_addr)[2];
socksreq[7] = ((unsigned char *)&saddr_in->sin_addr.s_addr)[3];
infof(data, "SOCKS4 connect to IPv4 %s (locally resolved)", buf);
Curl_resolv_unlock(data, dns); /* not used anymore from now on */
}
else
failf(data, "SOCKS4 connection to %s not supported", sx->hostname);
}
else
failf(data, "Failed to resolve \"%s\" for SOCKS4 connect.",
sx->hostname);
if(!hp)
return CURLPX_RESOLVE_HOST;
}
/* FALLTHROUGH */
CONNECT_REQ_INIT:
case CONNECT_REQ_INIT:
/*
* This is currently not supporting "Identification Protocol (RFC1413)".
*/
socksreq[8] = 0; /* ensure empty userid is NUL-terminated */
if(sx->proxy_user) {
size_t plen = strlen(sx->proxy_user);
if(plen >= (size_t)data->set.buffer_size - 8) {
failf(data, "Too long SOCKS proxy user name, can't use");
return CURLPX_LONG_USER;
}
/* copy the proxy name WITH trailing zero */
memcpy(socksreq + 8, sx->proxy_user, plen + 1);
}
/*
* Make connection
*/
{
size_t packetsize = 9 +
strlen((char *)socksreq + 8); /* size including NUL */
/* If SOCKS4a, set special invalid IP address 0.0.0.x */
if(protocol4a) {
size_t hostnamelen = 0;
socksreq[4] = 0;
socksreq[5] = 0;
socksreq[6] = 0;
socksreq[7] = 1;
/* append hostname */
hostnamelen = strlen(sx->hostname) + 1; /* length including NUL */
if(hostnamelen <= 255)
strcpy((char *)socksreq + packetsize, sx->hostname);
else {
failf(data, "SOCKS4: too long host name");
return CURLPX_LONG_HOSTNAME;
}
packetsize += hostnamelen;
}
sx->outp = socksreq;
sx->outstanding = packetsize;
sxstate(sx, data, CONNECT_REQ_SENDING);
}
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case CONNECT_REQ_SENDING:
/* Send request */
result = Curl_write_plain(data, sockfd, (char *)sx->outp,
sx->outstanding, &written);
if(result && (CURLE_AGAIN != result)) {
failf(data, "Failed to send SOCKS4 connect request.");
return CURLPX_SEND_CONNECT;
}
if(written != sx->outstanding) {
/* not done, remain in state */
sx->outstanding -= written;
sx->outp += written;
return CURLPX_OK;
}
/* done sending! */
sx->outstanding = 8; /* receive data size */
sx->outp = socksreq;
sxstate(sx, data, CONNECT_SOCKS_READ);
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case CONNECT_SOCKS_READ:
/* Receive response */
sendf: change Curl_read_plain to wrap Curl_recv_plain (take 2) Prior to this change Curl_read_plain would attempt to read the socket directly. On Windows that's a problem because recv data may be cached by libcurl and that data is only drained using Curl_recv_plain. Rather than rewrite Curl_read_plain to handle cached recv data, I changed it to wrap Curl_recv_plain, in much the same way that Curl_write_plain already wraps Curl_send_plain. Curl_read_plain -> Curl_recv_plain Curl_write_plain -> Curl_send_plain This fixes a bug in the schannel backend where decryption of arbitrary TLS records fails because cached recv data is never drained. We send data (TLS records formed by Schannel) using Curl_write_plain, which calls Curl_send_plain, and that may do a recv-before-send ("pre-receive") to cache received data. The code calls Curl_read_plain to read data (TLS records from the server), which prior to this change did not call Curl_recv_plain and therefore cached recv data wasn't retrieved, resulting in malformed TLS records and decryption failure (SEC_E_DECRYPT_FAILURE). The bug has only been observed during Schannel TLS 1.3 handshakes. Refer to the issue and PR for more information. -- This is take 2 of the original fix. It preserves the original behavior of Curl_read_plain to write 0 to the bytes read parameter on error, since apparently some callers expect that (SOCKS tests were hanging). The original fix which landed in 12e1def5 and was later reverted in 18383fbf failed to work properly because it did not do that. Also, it changes Curl_write_plain the same way to complement Curl_read_plain, and it changes Curl_send_plain to return -1 instead of 0 on CURLE_AGAIN to complement Curl_recv_plain. Behavior on error with these changes: Curl_recv_plain returns -1 and *code receives error code. Curl_send_plain returns -1 and *code receives error code. Curl_read_plain returns error code and *n (bytes read) receives 0. Curl_write_plain returns error code and *written receives 0. -- Ref: https://github.com/curl/curl/issues/9431#issuecomment-1312420361 Assisted-by: Joel Depooter Reported-by: Egor Pugin Fixes https://github.com/curl/curl/issues/9431 Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/9949
2022-11-14 16:30:30 +08:00
result = Curl_read_plain(data, sockfd, (char *)sx->outp,
sx->outstanding, &actualread);
if(result && (CURLE_AGAIN != result)) {
failf(data, "SOCKS4: Failed receiving connect request ack: %s",
curl_easy_strerror(result));
return CURLPX_RECV_CONNECT;
}
else if(!result && !actualread) {
/* connection closed */
failf(data, "connection to proxy closed");
return CURLPX_CLOSED;
}
else if(actualread != sx->outstanding) {
/* remain in reading state */
sx->outstanding -= actualread;
sx->outp += actualread;
return CURLPX_OK;
}
sxstate(sx, data, CONNECT_DONE);
break;
default: /* lots of unused states in SOCKS4 */
break;
}
/*
* Response format
*
* +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
* | VN | CD | DSTPORT | DSTIP |
* +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
* # of bytes: 1 1 2 4
*
* VN is the version of the reply code and should be 0. CD is the result
* code with one of the following values:
*
* 90: request granted
* 91: request rejected or failed
* 92: request rejected because SOCKS server cannot connect to
* identd on the client
* 93: request rejected because the client program and identd
* report different user-ids
*/
/* wrong version ? */
if(socksreq[0]) {
failf(data,
"SOCKS4 reply has wrong version, version should be 0.");
return CURLPX_BAD_VERSION;
}
/* Result */
switch(socksreq[1]) {
case 90:
infof(data, "SOCKS4%s request granted.", protocol4a?"a":"");
break;
case 91:
failf(data,
"Can't complete SOCKS4 connection to %d.%d.%d.%d:%d. (%d)"
", request rejected or failed.",
socksreq[4], socksreq[5], socksreq[6], socksreq[7],
(((unsigned char)socksreq[2] << 8) | (unsigned char)socksreq[3]),
(unsigned char)socksreq[1]);
return CURLPX_REQUEST_FAILED;
case 92:
failf(data,
"Can't complete SOCKS4 connection to %d.%d.%d.%d:%d. (%d)"
", request rejected because SOCKS server cannot connect to "
"identd on the client.",
socksreq[4], socksreq[5], socksreq[6], socksreq[7],
(((unsigned char)socksreq[2] << 8) | (unsigned char)socksreq[3]),
(unsigned char)socksreq[1]);
return CURLPX_IDENTD;
case 93:
failf(data,
"Can't complete SOCKS4 connection to %d.%d.%d.%d:%d. (%d)"
", request rejected because the client program and identd "
"report different user-ids.",
socksreq[4], socksreq[5], socksreq[6], socksreq[7],
(((unsigned char)socksreq[2] << 8) | (unsigned char)socksreq[3]),
(unsigned char)socksreq[1]);
return CURLPX_IDENTD_DIFFER;
default:
failf(data,
"Can't complete SOCKS4 connection to %d.%d.%d.%d:%d. (%d)"
", Unknown.",
socksreq[4], socksreq[5], socksreq[6], socksreq[7],
(((unsigned char)socksreq[2] << 8) | (unsigned char)socksreq[3]),
(unsigned char)socksreq[1]);
return CURLPX_UNKNOWN_FAIL;
}
return CURLPX_OK; /* Proxy was successful! */
}
/*
* This function logs in to a SOCKS5 proxy and sends the specifics to the final
* destination server.
*/
static CURLproxycode do_SOCKS5(struct Curl_cfilter *cf,
struct socks_state *sx,
struct Curl_easy *data)
{
/*
According to the RFC1928, section "6. Replies". This is what a SOCK5
replies:
+----+-----+-------+------+----------+----------+
|VER | REP | RSV | ATYP | BND.ADDR | BND.PORT |
+----+-----+-------+------+----------+----------+
| 1 | 1 | X'00' | 1 | Variable | 2 |
+----+-----+-------+------+----------+----------+
Where:
o VER protocol version: X'05'
o REP Reply field:
o X'00' succeeded
*/
struct connectdata *conn = cf->conn;
unsigned char *socksreq = (unsigned char *)data->state.buffer;
char dest[256] = "unknown"; /* printable hostname:port */
int idx;
ssize_t actualread;
ssize_t written;
CURLcode result;
curl_socket_t sockfd = conn->sock[cf->sockindex];
proxy: Support HTTPS proxy and SOCKS+HTTP(s) * HTTPS proxies: An HTTPS proxy receives all transactions over an SSL/TLS connection. Once a secure connection with the proxy is established, the user agent uses the proxy as usual, including sending CONNECT requests to instruct the proxy to establish a [usually secure] TCP tunnel with an origin server. HTTPS proxies protect nearly all aspects of user-proxy communications as opposed to HTTP proxies that receive all requests (including CONNECT requests) in vulnerable clear text. With HTTPS proxies, it is possible to have two concurrent _nested_ SSL/TLS sessions: the "outer" one between the user agent and the proxy and the "inner" one between the user agent and the origin server (through the proxy). This change adds supports for such nested sessions as well. A secure connection with a proxy requires its own set of the usual SSL options (their actual descriptions differ and need polishing, see TODO): --proxy-cacert FILE CA certificate to verify peer against --proxy-capath DIR CA directory to verify peer against --proxy-cert CERT[:PASSWD] Client certificate file and password --proxy-cert-type TYPE Certificate file type (DER/PEM/ENG) --proxy-ciphers LIST SSL ciphers to use --proxy-crlfile FILE Get a CRL list in PEM format from the file --proxy-insecure Allow connections to proxies with bad certs --proxy-key KEY Private key file name --proxy-key-type TYPE Private key file type (DER/PEM/ENG) --proxy-pass PASS Pass phrase for the private key --proxy-ssl-allow-beast Allow security flaw to improve interop --proxy-sslv2 Use SSLv2 --proxy-sslv3 Use SSLv3 --proxy-tlsv1 Use TLSv1 --proxy-tlsuser USER TLS username --proxy-tlspassword STRING TLS password --proxy-tlsauthtype STRING TLS authentication type (default SRP) All --proxy-foo options are independent from their --foo counterparts, except --proxy-crlfile which defaults to --crlfile and --proxy-capath which defaults to --capath. Curl now also supports %{proxy_ssl_verify_result} --write-out variable, similar to the existing %{ssl_verify_result} variable. Supported backends: OpenSSL, GnuTLS, and NSS. * A SOCKS proxy + HTTP/HTTPS proxy combination: If both --socks* and --proxy options are given, Curl first connects to the SOCKS proxy and then connects (through SOCKS) to the HTTP or HTTPS proxy. TODO: Update documentation for the new APIs and --proxy-* options. Look for "Added in 7.XXX" marks.
2016-11-17 01:49:15 +08:00
bool socks5_resolve_local =
(conn->socks_proxy.proxytype == CURLPROXY_SOCKS5) ? TRUE : FALSE;
const size_t hostname_len = strlen(sx->hostname);
ssize_t len = 0;
const unsigned long auth = data->set.socks5auth;
bool allow_gssapi = FALSE;
struct Curl_dns_entry *dns = NULL;
switch(sx->state) {
case CONNECT_SOCKS_INIT:
if(conn->bits.httpproxy)
infof(data, "SOCKS5: connecting to HTTP proxy %s port %d",
sx->hostname, sx->remote_port);
/* RFC1928 chapter 5 specifies max 255 chars for domain name in packet */
if(!socks5_resolve_local && hostname_len > 255) {
infof(data, "SOCKS5: server resolving disabled for hostnames of "
"length > 255 [actual len=%zu]", hostname_len);
socks5_resolve_local = TRUE;
}
if(auth & ~(CURLAUTH_BASIC | CURLAUTH_GSSAPI))
infof(data,
"warning: unsupported value passed to CURLOPT_SOCKS5_AUTH: %lu",
auth);
if(!(auth & CURLAUTH_BASIC))
/* disable username/password auth */
sx->proxy_user = NULL;
#if defined(HAVE_GSSAPI) || defined(USE_WINDOWS_SSPI)
if(auth & CURLAUTH_GSSAPI)
allow_gssapi = TRUE;
#endif
idx = 0;
socksreq[idx++] = 5; /* version */
idx++; /* number of authentication methods */
socksreq[idx++] = 0; /* no authentication */
if(allow_gssapi)
socksreq[idx++] = 1; /* GSS-API */
if(sx->proxy_user)
socksreq[idx++] = 2; /* username/password */
/* write the number of authentication methods */
socksreq[1] = (unsigned char) (idx - 2);
result = Curl_write_plain(data, sockfd, socksreq, idx, &written);
if(result && (CURLE_AGAIN != result)) {
failf(data, "Unable to send initial SOCKS5 request.");
return CURLPX_SEND_CONNECT;
}
if(written != idx) {
sxstate(sx, data, CONNECT_SOCKS_SEND);
sx->outstanding = idx - written;
sx->outp = &socksreq[written];
return CURLPX_OK;
}
sxstate(sx, data, CONNECT_SOCKS_READ);
goto CONNECT_SOCKS_READ_INIT;
case CONNECT_SOCKS_SEND:
result = Curl_write_plain(data, sockfd, (char *)sx->outp,
sx->outstanding, &written);
if(result && (CURLE_AGAIN != result)) {
failf(data, "Unable to send initial SOCKS5 request.");
return CURLPX_SEND_CONNECT;
}
if(written != sx->outstanding) {
/* not done, remain in state */
sx->outstanding -= written;
sx->outp += written;
return CURLPX_OK;
}
/* FALLTHROUGH */
CONNECT_SOCKS_READ_INIT:
case CONNECT_SOCKS_READ_INIT:
sx->outstanding = 2; /* expect two bytes */
sx->outp = socksreq; /* store it here */
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case CONNECT_SOCKS_READ:
sendf: change Curl_read_plain to wrap Curl_recv_plain (take 2) Prior to this change Curl_read_plain would attempt to read the socket directly. On Windows that's a problem because recv data may be cached by libcurl and that data is only drained using Curl_recv_plain. Rather than rewrite Curl_read_plain to handle cached recv data, I changed it to wrap Curl_recv_plain, in much the same way that Curl_write_plain already wraps Curl_send_plain. Curl_read_plain -> Curl_recv_plain Curl_write_plain -> Curl_send_plain This fixes a bug in the schannel backend where decryption of arbitrary TLS records fails because cached recv data is never drained. We send data (TLS records formed by Schannel) using Curl_write_plain, which calls Curl_send_plain, and that may do a recv-before-send ("pre-receive") to cache received data. The code calls Curl_read_plain to read data (TLS records from the server), which prior to this change did not call Curl_recv_plain and therefore cached recv data wasn't retrieved, resulting in malformed TLS records and decryption failure (SEC_E_DECRYPT_FAILURE). The bug has only been observed during Schannel TLS 1.3 handshakes. Refer to the issue and PR for more information. -- This is take 2 of the original fix. It preserves the original behavior of Curl_read_plain to write 0 to the bytes read parameter on error, since apparently some callers expect that (SOCKS tests were hanging). The original fix which landed in 12e1def5 and was later reverted in 18383fbf failed to work properly because it did not do that. Also, it changes Curl_write_plain the same way to complement Curl_read_plain, and it changes Curl_send_plain to return -1 instead of 0 on CURLE_AGAIN to complement Curl_recv_plain. Behavior on error with these changes: Curl_recv_plain returns -1 and *code receives error code. Curl_send_plain returns -1 and *code receives error code. Curl_read_plain returns error code and *n (bytes read) receives 0. Curl_write_plain returns error code and *written receives 0. -- Ref: https://github.com/curl/curl/issues/9431#issuecomment-1312420361 Assisted-by: Joel Depooter Reported-by: Egor Pugin Fixes https://github.com/curl/curl/issues/9431 Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/9949
2022-11-14 16:30:30 +08:00
result = Curl_read_plain(data, sockfd, (char *)sx->outp,
sx->outstanding, &actualread);
if(result && (CURLE_AGAIN != result)) {
failf(data, "Unable to receive initial SOCKS5 response.");
return CURLPX_RECV_CONNECT;
}
else if(!result && !actualread) {
/* connection closed */
failf(data, "Connection to proxy closed");
return CURLPX_CLOSED;
}
else if(actualread != sx->outstanding) {
/* remain in reading state */
sx->outstanding -= actualread;
sx->outp += actualread;
return CURLPX_OK;
}
else if(socksreq[0] != 5) {
failf(data, "Received invalid version in initial SOCKS5 response.");
return CURLPX_BAD_VERSION;
}
else if(socksreq[1] == 0) {
/* DONE! No authentication needed. Send request. */
sxstate(sx, data, CONNECT_REQ_INIT);
goto CONNECT_REQ_INIT;
}
else if(socksreq[1] == 2) {
/* regular name + password authentication */
sxstate(sx, data, CONNECT_AUTH_INIT);
goto CONNECT_AUTH_INIT;
}
#if defined(HAVE_GSSAPI) || defined(USE_WINDOWS_SSPI)
else if(allow_gssapi && (socksreq[1] == 1)) {
sxstate(sx, data, CONNECT_GSSAPI_INIT);
result = Curl_SOCKS5_gssapi_negotiate(cf->sockindex, data);
if(result) {
failf(data, "Unable to negotiate SOCKS5 GSS-API context.");
return CURLPX_GSSAPI;
}
}
#endif
else {
/* error */
if(!allow_gssapi && (socksreq[1] == 1)) {
failf(data,
"SOCKS5 GSSAPI per-message authentication is not supported.");
return CURLPX_GSSAPI_PERMSG;
}
else if(socksreq[1] == 255) {
failf(data, "No authentication method was acceptable.");
return CURLPX_NO_AUTH;
}
}
failf(data,
"Undocumented SOCKS5 mode attempted to be used by server.");
return CURLPX_UNKNOWN_MODE;
#if defined(HAVE_GSSAPI) || defined(USE_WINDOWS_SSPI)
case CONNECT_GSSAPI_INIT:
/* GSSAPI stuff done non-blocking */
break;
#endif
default: /* do nothing! */
break;
CONNECT_AUTH_INIT:
case CONNECT_AUTH_INIT: {
/* Needs user name and password */
size_t proxy_user_len, proxy_password_len;
if(sx->proxy_user && sx->proxy_password) {
proxy_user_len = strlen(sx->proxy_user);
proxy_password_len = strlen(sx->proxy_password);
}
else {
proxy_user_len = 0;
proxy_password_len = 0;
}
/* username/password request looks like
* +----+------+----------+------+----------+
* |VER | ULEN | UNAME | PLEN | PASSWD |
* +----+------+----------+------+----------+
* | 1 | 1 | 1 to 255 | 1 | 1 to 255 |
* +----+------+----------+------+----------+
*/
len = 0;
socksreq[len++] = 1; /* username/pw subnegotiation version */
socksreq[len++] = (unsigned char) proxy_user_len;
if(sx->proxy_user && proxy_user_len) {
/* the length must fit in a single byte */
if(proxy_user_len >= 255) {
failf(data, "Excessive user name length for proxy auth");
return CURLPX_LONG_USER;
}
memcpy(socksreq + len, sx->proxy_user, proxy_user_len);
}
len += proxy_user_len;
socksreq[len++] = (unsigned char) proxy_password_len;
if(sx->proxy_password && proxy_password_len) {
/* the length must fit in a single byte */
if(proxy_password_len > 255) {
failf(data, "Excessive password length for proxy auth");
return CURLPX_LONG_PASSWD;
}
memcpy(socksreq + len, sx->proxy_password, proxy_password_len);
}
len += proxy_password_len;
sxstate(sx, data, CONNECT_AUTH_SEND);
sx->outstanding = len;
sx->outp = socksreq;
}
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case CONNECT_AUTH_SEND:
result = Curl_write_plain(data, sockfd, sx->outp,
sx->outstanding, &written);
if(result && (CURLE_AGAIN != result)) {
failf(data, "Failed to send SOCKS5 sub-negotiation request.");
return CURLPX_SEND_AUTH;
}
if(sx->outstanding != written) {
/* remain in state */
sx->outstanding -= written;
sx->outp += written;
return CURLPX_OK;
}
sx->outp = socksreq;
sx->outstanding = 2;
sxstate(sx, data, CONNECT_AUTH_READ);
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case CONNECT_AUTH_READ:
sendf: change Curl_read_plain to wrap Curl_recv_plain (take 2) Prior to this change Curl_read_plain would attempt to read the socket directly. On Windows that's a problem because recv data may be cached by libcurl and that data is only drained using Curl_recv_plain. Rather than rewrite Curl_read_plain to handle cached recv data, I changed it to wrap Curl_recv_plain, in much the same way that Curl_write_plain already wraps Curl_send_plain. Curl_read_plain -> Curl_recv_plain Curl_write_plain -> Curl_send_plain This fixes a bug in the schannel backend where decryption of arbitrary TLS records fails because cached recv data is never drained. We send data (TLS records formed by Schannel) using Curl_write_plain, which calls Curl_send_plain, and that may do a recv-before-send ("pre-receive") to cache received data. The code calls Curl_read_plain to read data (TLS records from the server), which prior to this change did not call Curl_recv_plain and therefore cached recv data wasn't retrieved, resulting in malformed TLS records and decryption failure (SEC_E_DECRYPT_FAILURE). The bug has only been observed during Schannel TLS 1.3 handshakes. Refer to the issue and PR for more information. -- This is take 2 of the original fix. It preserves the original behavior of Curl_read_plain to write 0 to the bytes read parameter on error, since apparently some callers expect that (SOCKS tests were hanging). The original fix which landed in 12e1def5 and was later reverted in 18383fbf failed to work properly because it did not do that. Also, it changes Curl_write_plain the same way to complement Curl_read_plain, and it changes Curl_send_plain to return -1 instead of 0 on CURLE_AGAIN to complement Curl_recv_plain. Behavior on error with these changes: Curl_recv_plain returns -1 and *code receives error code. Curl_send_plain returns -1 and *code receives error code. Curl_read_plain returns error code and *n (bytes read) receives 0. Curl_write_plain returns error code and *written receives 0. -- Ref: https://github.com/curl/curl/issues/9431#issuecomment-1312420361 Assisted-by: Joel Depooter Reported-by: Egor Pugin Fixes https://github.com/curl/curl/issues/9431 Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/9949
2022-11-14 16:30:30 +08:00
result = Curl_read_plain(data, sockfd, (char *)sx->outp,
sx->outstanding, &actualread);
if(result && (CURLE_AGAIN != result)) {
failf(data, "Unable to receive SOCKS5 sub-negotiation response.");
return CURLPX_RECV_AUTH;
}
else if(!result && !actualread) {
/* connection closed */
failf(data, "connection to proxy closed");
return CURLPX_CLOSED;
}
else if(actualread != sx->outstanding) {
/* remain in state */
sx->outstanding -= actualread;
sx->outp += actualread;
return CURLPX_OK;
}
/* ignore the first (VER) byte */
else if(socksreq[1]) { /* status */
failf(data, "User was rejected by the SOCKS5 server (%d %d).",
socksreq[0], socksreq[1]);
return CURLPX_USER_REJECTED;
}
/* Everything is good so far, user was authenticated! */
sxstate(sx, data, CONNECT_REQ_INIT);
/* FALLTHROUGH */
CONNECT_REQ_INIT:
case CONNECT_REQ_INIT:
if(socks5_resolve_local) {
enum resolve_t rc = Curl_resolv(data, sx->hostname, sx->remote_port,
FALSE, &dns);
if(rc == CURLRESOLV_ERROR)
return CURLPX_RESOLVE_HOST;
if(rc == CURLRESOLV_PENDING) {
sxstate(sx, data, CONNECT_RESOLVING);
return CURLPX_OK;
}
sxstate(sx, data, CONNECT_RESOLVED);
goto CONNECT_RESOLVED;
}
goto CONNECT_RESOLVE_REMOTE;
case CONNECT_RESOLVING:
/* check if we have the name resolved by now */
dns = Curl_fetch_addr(data, sx->hostname, sx->remote_port);
if(dns) {
#ifdef CURLRES_ASYNCH
data->state.async.dns = dns;
data->state.async.done = TRUE;
#endif
infof(data, "SOCKS5: hostname '%s' found", sx->hostname);
}
if(!dns) {
result = Curl_resolv_check(data, &dns);
if(!dns) {
if(result)
return CURLPX_RESOLVE_HOST;
return CURLPX_OK;
}
}
/* FALLTHROUGH */
CONNECT_RESOLVED:
case CONNECT_RESOLVED: {
struct Curl_addrinfo *hp = NULL;
size_t destlen;
if(dns)
hp = dns->addr;
if(!hp) {
failf(data, "Failed to resolve \"%s\" for SOCKS5 connect.",
sx->hostname);
return CURLPX_RESOLVE_HOST;
}
Curl_printable_address(hp, dest, sizeof(dest));
destlen = strlen(dest);
msnprintf(dest + destlen, sizeof(dest) - destlen, ":%d", sx->remote_port);
len = 0;
socksreq[len++] = 5; /* version (SOCKS5) */
socksreq[len++] = 1; /* connect */
socksreq[len++] = 0; /* must be zero */
if(hp->ai_family == AF_INET) {
int i;
struct sockaddr_in *saddr_in;
socksreq[len++] = 1; /* ATYP: IPv4 = 1 */
saddr_in = (struct sockaddr_in *)(void *)hp->ai_addr;
for(i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
socksreq[len++] = ((unsigned char *)&saddr_in->sin_addr.s_addr)[i];
}
infof(data, "SOCKS5 connect to IPv4 %s (locally resolved)", dest);
}
#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6
else if(hp->ai_family == AF_INET6) {
int i;
struct sockaddr_in6 *saddr_in6;
socksreq[len++] = 4; /* ATYP: IPv6 = 4 */
saddr_in6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)(void *)hp->ai_addr;
for(i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
socksreq[len++] =
((unsigned char *)&saddr_in6->sin6_addr.s6_addr)[i];
}
infof(data, "SOCKS5 connect to IPv6 %s (locally resolved)", dest);
}
#endif
else {
hp = NULL; /* fail! */
failf(data, "SOCKS5 connection to %s not supported", dest);
}
Curl_resolv_unlock(data, dns); /* not used anymore from now on */
goto CONNECT_REQ_SEND;
}
CONNECT_RESOLVE_REMOTE:
case CONNECT_RESOLVE_REMOTE:
/* Authentication is complete, now specify destination to the proxy */
len = 0;
socksreq[len++] = 5; /* version (SOCKS5) */
socksreq[len++] = 1; /* connect */
socksreq[len++] = 0; /* must be zero */
if(!socks5_resolve_local) {
/* ATYP: domain name = 3,
IPv6 == 4,
IPv4 == 1 */
unsigned char ip4[4];
#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6
if(conn->bits.ipv6_ip) {
char ip6[16];
if(1 != Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET6, sx->hostname, ip6))
return CURLPX_BAD_ADDRESS_TYPE;
socksreq[len++] = 4;
memcpy(&socksreq[len], ip6, sizeof(ip6));
len += sizeof(ip6);
}
else
#endif
if(1 == Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET, sx->hostname, ip4)) {
socksreq[len++] = 1;
memcpy(&socksreq[len], ip4, sizeof(ip4));
len += sizeof(ip4);
}
else {
socksreq[len++] = 3;
socksreq[len++] = (char) hostname_len; /* one byte address length */
memcpy(&socksreq[len], sx->hostname, hostname_len); /* w/o NULL */
len += hostname_len;
}
infof(data, "SOCKS5 connect to %s:%d (remotely resolved)",
sx->hostname, sx->remote_port);
}
/* FALLTHROUGH */
CONNECT_REQ_SEND:
case CONNECT_REQ_SEND:
/* PORT MSB */
socksreq[len++] = (unsigned char)((sx->remote_port >> 8) & 0xff);
/* PORT LSB */
socksreq[len++] = (unsigned char)(sx->remote_port & 0xff);
#if defined(HAVE_GSSAPI) || defined(USE_WINDOWS_SSPI)
if(conn->socks5_gssapi_enctype) {
failf(data, "SOCKS5 GSS-API protection not yet implemented.");
return CURLPX_GSSAPI_PROTECTION;
}
#endif
sx->outp = socksreq;
sx->outstanding = len;
sxstate(sx, data, CONNECT_REQ_SENDING);
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case CONNECT_REQ_SENDING:
result = Curl_write_plain(data, sockfd, (char *)sx->outp,
sx->outstanding, &written);
if(result && (CURLE_AGAIN != result)) {
failf(data, "Failed to send SOCKS5 connect request.");
return CURLPX_SEND_REQUEST;
}
if(sx->outstanding != written) {
/* remain in state */
sx->outstanding -= written;
sx->outp += written;
return CURLPX_OK;
}
#if defined(HAVE_GSSAPI) || defined(USE_WINDOWS_SSPI)
if(conn->socks5_gssapi_enctype) {
failf(data, "SOCKS5 GSS-API protection not yet implemented.");
return CURLPX_GSSAPI_PROTECTION;
}
#endif
sx->outstanding = 10; /* minimum packet size is 10 */
sx->outp = socksreq;
sxstate(sx, data, CONNECT_REQ_READ);
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case CONNECT_REQ_READ:
sendf: change Curl_read_plain to wrap Curl_recv_plain (take 2) Prior to this change Curl_read_plain would attempt to read the socket directly. On Windows that's a problem because recv data may be cached by libcurl and that data is only drained using Curl_recv_plain. Rather than rewrite Curl_read_plain to handle cached recv data, I changed it to wrap Curl_recv_plain, in much the same way that Curl_write_plain already wraps Curl_send_plain. Curl_read_plain -> Curl_recv_plain Curl_write_plain -> Curl_send_plain This fixes a bug in the schannel backend where decryption of arbitrary TLS records fails because cached recv data is never drained. We send data (TLS records formed by Schannel) using Curl_write_plain, which calls Curl_send_plain, and that may do a recv-before-send ("pre-receive") to cache received data. The code calls Curl_read_plain to read data (TLS records from the server), which prior to this change did not call Curl_recv_plain and therefore cached recv data wasn't retrieved, resulting in malformed TLS records and decryption failure (SEC_E_DECRYPT_FAILURE). The bug has only been observed during Schannel TLS 1.3 handshakes. Refer to the issue and PR for more information. -- This is take 2 of the original fix. It preserves the original behavior of Curl_read_plain to write 0 to the bytes read parameter on error, since apparently some callers expect that (SOCKS tests were hanging). The original fix which landed in 12e1def5 and was later reverted in 18383fbf failed to work properly because it did not do that. Also, it changes Curl_write_plain the same way to complement Curl_read_plain, and it changes Curl_send_plain to return -1 instead of 0 on CURLE_AGAIN to complement Curl_recv_plain. Behavior on error with these changes: Curl_recv_plain returns -1 and *code receives error code. Curl_send_plain returns -1 and *code receives error code. Curl_read_plain returns error code and *n (bytes read) receives 0. Curl_write_plain returns error code and *written receives 0. -- Ref: https://github.com/curl/curl/issues/9431#issuecomment-1312420361 Assisted-by: Joel Depooter Reported-by: Egor Pugin Fixes https://github.com/curl/curl/issues/9431 Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/9949
2022-11-14 16:30:30 +08:00
result = Curl_read_plain(data, sockfd, (char *)sx->outp,
sx->outstanding, &actualread);
if(result && (CURLE_AGAIN != result)) {
failf(data, "Failed to receive SOCKS5 connect request ack.");
return CURLPX_RECV_REQACK;
}
else if(!result && !actualread) {
/* connection closed */
failf(data, "connection to proxy closed");
return CURLPX_CLOSED;
}
else if(actualread != sx->outstanding) {
/* remain in state */
sx->outstanding -= actualread;
sx->outp += actualread;
return CURLPX_OK;
}
if(socksreq[0] != 5) { /* version */
failf(data,
"SOCKS5 reply has wrong version, version should be 5.");
return CURLPX_BAD_VERSION;
}
else if(socksreq[1]) { /* Anything besides 0 is an error */
CURLproxycode rc = CURLPX_REPLY_UNASSIGNED;
int code = socksreq[1];
failf(data, "Can't complete SOCKS5 connection to %s. (%d)",
sx->hostname, (unsigned char)socksreq[1]);
if(code < 9) {
/* RFC 1928 section 6 lists: */
static const CURLproxycode lookup[] = {
CURLPX_OK,
CURLPX_REPLY_GENERAL_SERVER_FAILURE,
CURLPX_REPLY_NOT_ALLOWED,
CURLPX_REPLY_NETWORK_UNREACHABLE,
CURLPX_REPLY_HOST_UNREACHABLE,
CURLPX_REPLY_CONNECTION_REFUSED,
CURLPX_REPLY_TTL_EXPIRED,
CURLPX_REPLY_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED,
CURLPX_REPLY_ADDRESS_TYPE_NOT_SUPPORTED,
};
rc = lookup[code];
}
return rc;
}
/* Fix: in general, returned BND.ADDR is variable length parameter by RFC
1928, so the reply packet should be read until the end to avoid errors
at subsequent protocol level.
+----+-----+-------+------+----------+----------+
|VER | REP | RSV | ATYP | BND.ADDR | BND.PORT |
+----+-----+-------+------+----------+----------+
| 1 | 1 | X'00' | 1 | Variable | 2 |
+----+-----+-------+------+----------+----------+
ATYP:
o IP v4 address: X'01', BND.ADDR = 4 byte
o domain name: X'03', BND.ADDR = [ 1 byte length, string ]
o IP v6 address: X'04', BND.ADDR = 16 byte
*/
/* Calculate real packet size */
if(socksreq[3] == 3) {
/* domain name */
int addrlen = (int) socksreq[4];
len = 5 + addrlen + 2;
}
else if(socksreq[3] == 4) {
/* IPv6 */
len = 4 + 16 + 2;
}
else if(socksreq[3] == 1) {
len = 4 + 4 + 2;
}
else {
failf(data, "SOCKS5 reply has wrong address type.");
return CURLPX_BAD_ADDRESS_TYPE;
}
/* At this point we already read first 10 bytes */
#if defined(HAVE_GSSAPI) || defined(USE_WINDOWS_SSPI)
if(!conn->socks5_gssapi_enctype) {
/* decrypt_gssapi_blockread already read the whole packet */
#endif
if(len > 10) {
sx->outstanding = len - 10; /* get the rest */
sx->outp = &socksreq[10];
sxstate(sx, data, CONNECT_REQ_READ_MORE);
}
else {
sxstate(sx, data, CONNECT_DONE);
break;
}
#if defined(HAVE_GSSAPI) || defined(USE_WINDOWS_SSPI)
}
#endif
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case CONNECT_REQ_READ_MORE:
sendf: change Curl_read_plain to wrap Curl_recv_plain (take 2) Prior to this change Curl_read_plain would attempt to read the socket directly. On Windows that's a problem because recv data may be cached by libcurl and that data is only drained using Curl_recv_plain. Rather than rewrite Curl_read_plain to handle cached recv data, I changed it to wrap Curl_recv_plain, in much the same way that Curl_write_plain already wraps Curl_send_plain. Curl_read_plain -> Curl_recv_plain Curl_write_plain -> Curl_send_plain This fixes a bug in the schannel backend where decryption of arbitrary TLS records fails because cached recv data is never drained. We send data (TLS records formed by Schannel) using Curl_write_plain, which calls Curl_send_plain, and that may do a recv-before-send ("pre-receive") to cache received data. The code calls Curl_read_plain to read data (TLS records from the server), which prior to this change did not call Curl_recv_plain and therefore cached recv data wasn't retrieved, resulting in malformed TLS records and decryption failure (SEC_E_DECRYPT_FAILURE). The bug has only been observed during Schannel TLS 1.3 handshakes. Refer to the issue and PR for more information. -- This is take 2 of the original fix. It preserves the original behavior of Curl_read_plain to write 0 to the bytes read parameter on error, since apparently some callers expect that (SOCKS tests were hanging). The original fix which landed in 12e1def5 and was later reverted in 18383fbf failed to work properly because it did not do that. Also, it changes Curl_write_plain the same way to complement Curl_read_plain, and it changes Curl_send_plain to return -1 instead of 0 on CURLE_AGAIN to complement Curl_recv_plain. Behavior on error with these changes: Curl_recv_plain returns -1 and *code receives error code. Curl_send_plain returns -1 and *code receives error code. Curl_read_plain returns error code and *n (bytes read) receives 0. Curl_write_plain returns error code and *written receives 0. -- Ref: https://github.com/curl/curl/issues/9431#issuecomment-1312420361 Assisted-by: Joel Depooter Reported-by: Egor Pugin Fixes https://github.com/curl/curl/issues/9431 Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/9949
2022-11-14 16:30:30 +08:00
result = Curl_read_plain(data, sockfd, (char *)sx->outp,
sx->outstanding, &actualread);
if(result && (CURLE_AGAIN != result)) {
failf(data, "Failed to receive SOCKS5 connect request ack.");
return CURLPX_RECV_ADDRESS;
}
else if(!result && !actualread) {
/* connection closed */
failf(data, "connection to proxy closed");
return CURLPX_CLOSED;
}
else if(actualread != sx->outstanding) {
/* remain in state */
sx->outstanding -= actualread;
sx->outp += actualread;
return CURLPX_OK;
}
sxstate(sx, data, CONNECT_DONE);
}
infof(data, "SOCKS5 request granted.");
return CURLPX_OK; /* Proxy was successful! */
}
static CURLcode connect_SOCKS(struct Curl_cfilter *cf,
struct socks_state *sxstate,
struct Curl_easy *data)
{
CURLcode result = CURLE_OK;
CURLproxycode pxresult = CURLPX_OK;
struct connectdata *conn = cf->conn;
switch(conn->socks_proxy.proxytype) {
case CURLPROXY_SOCKS5:
case CURLPROXY_SOCKS5_HOSTNAME:
pxresult = do_SOCKS5(cf, sxstate, data);
break;
case CURLPROXY_SOCKS4:
case CURLPROXY_SOCKS4A:
pxresult = do_SOCKS4(cf, sxstate, data);
break;
default:
failf(data, "unknown proxytype option given");
result = CURLE_COULDNT_CONNECT;
} /* switch proxytype */
if(pxresult) {
result = CURLE_PROXY;
data->info.pxcode = pxresult;
}
return result;
}
static void socks_proxy_cf_free(struct Curl_cfilter *cf)
{
struct socks_state *sxstate = cf->ctx;
if(sxstate) {
free(sxstate);
cf->ctx = NULL;
}
}
/* After a TCP connection to the proxy has been verified, this function does
the next magic steps. If 'done' isn't set TRUE, it is not done yet and
must be called again.
Note: this function's sub-functions call failf()
*/
static CURLcode socks_proxy_cf_connect(struct Curl_cfilter *cf,
struct Curl_easy *data,
bool blocking, bool *done)
{
CURLcode result;
struct connectdata *conn = cf->conn;
int sockindex = cf->sockindex;
struct socks_state *sx = cf->ctx;
if(cf->connected) {
*done = TRUE;
return CURLE_OK;
}
result = cf->next->cft->connect(cf->next, data, blocking, done);
if(result || !*done)
return result;
if(!sx) {
sx = calloc(sizeof(*sx), 1);
if(!sx)
return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
cf->ctx = sx;
}
if(sx->state == CONNECT_INIT) {
/* for the secondary socket (FTP), use the "connect to host"
* but ignore the "connect to port" (use the secondary port)
*/
sxstate(sx, data, CONNECT_SOCKS_INIT);
sx->hostname =
conn->bits.httpproxy ?
conn->http_proxy.host.name :
conn->bits.conn_to_host ?
conn->conn_to_host.name :
sockindex == SECONDARYSOCKET ?
conn->secondaryhostname : conn->host.name;
sx->remote_port =
conn->bits.httpproxy ? (int)conn->http_proxy.port :
sockindex == SECONDARYSOCKET ? conn->secondary_port :
conn->bits.conn_to_port ? conn->conn_to_port :
conn->remote_port;
sx->proxy_user = conn->socks_proxy.user;
sx->proxy_password = conn->socks_proxy.passwd;
}
result = connect_SOCKS(cf, sx, data);
if(!result && sx->state == CONNECT_DONE) {
cf->connected = TRUE;
Curl_updateconninfo(data, conn, conn->sock[cf->sockindex]);
Curl_verboseconnect(data, conn);
socks_proxy_cf_free(cf);
}
*done = cf->connected;
return result;
}
static int socks_cf_get_select_socks(struct Curl_cfilter *cf,
struct Curl_easy *data,
curl_socket_t *socks)
{
struct socks_state *sx = cf->ctx;
int fds;
fds = cf->next->cft->get_select_socks(cf->next, data, socks);
if(!fds && cf->next->connected && !cf->connected && sx) {
/* If we are not connected, the filter below is and has nothing
* to wait on, we determine what to wait for. */
socks[0] = cf->conn->sock[cf->sockindex];
switch(sx->state) {
case CONNECT_RESOLVING:
case CONNECT_SOCKS_READ:
case CONNECT_AUTH_READ:
case CONNECT_REQ_READ:
case CONNECT_REQ_READ_MORE:
fds = GETSOCK_READSOCK(0);
break;
default:
fds = GETSOCK_WRITESOCK(0);
break;
}
}
return fds;
}
static void socks_proxy_cf_close(struct Curl_cfilter *cf,
struct Curl_easy *data)
{
DEBUGASSERT(cf->next);
cf->connected = FALSE;
socks_proxy_cf_free(cf);
cf->next->cft->close(cf->next, data);
}
static void socks_proxy_cf_destroy(struct Curl_cfilter *cf,
struct Curl_easy *data)
{
(void)data;
socks_proxy_cf_free(cf);
}
static void socks_proxy_cf_detach_data(struct Curl_cfilter *cf,
struct Curl_easy *data)
{
(void)data;
socks_proxy_cf_free(cf);
}
static const struct Curl_cftype cft_socks_proxy = {
"SOCKS-PROXYY",
socks_proxy_cf_destroy,
Curl_cf_def_attach_data,
socks_proxy_cf_detach_data,
Curl_cf_def_setup,
socks_proxy_cf_close,
socks_proxy_cf_connect,
socks_cf_get_select_socks,
Curl_cf_def_data_pending,
Curl_cf_def_send,
Curl_cf_def_recv,
};
CURLcode Curl_cfilter_socks_proxy_add(struct Curl_easy *data,
struct connectdata *conn,
int sockindex)
{
struct Curl_cfilter *cf;
CURLcode result;
result = Curl_cfilter_create(&cf, data, conn, sockindex,
&cft_socks_proxy, NULL);
if(!result)
Curl_cfilter_add(data, conn, sockindex, cf);
return result;
}
#endif /* CURL_DISABLE_PROXY */